CHAPTER XXVII

The Arousal of Interest in Plato's *Protagoras* and *Gorgias*

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Interest in philosophy

Plato is alert to the question of why people engage in philosophical discussion, and regularly explains it in terms of the emotions.[1] He often describes the motivation of the participants to continue with a discussion, with the ever-present possibility that they have other things to do. The most common of these motivating emotions are pleasure and desire, although an excitement akin to madness is sometimes mentioned. Socrates thus characterizes himself as a lover (ἐραστής) of speeches (*Phaedrus* 228c), although it should be noted that this is focalized through Phaedrus' desire to find someone with whom to share his speech. His self-characterization is indeed typically oblique, bantering, and ironical. He describes himself as a lover of learning (φιλομαθής, *Phdr.* 230d; cf. *Phdr*. 67b) and a speech-lover (φιλόλογος, *Phdr.* 236e; cf. *Tht.* 146a). He may frequently have been bested in argument, but refuses to give up because he has such a great passion (ἔρως) for this type of exercise (*Theaetetus* 169c). These emotions may be aroused by the process of philosophical discussion, or directed towards knowledge itself. He thus speaks of wisdom (φρόνησις) 'which we desire (ἐπιθυμοῦμεν) and whose lovers (ἐρασταί) we profess to be' (*Phdr.* 66e). His youthful passion for natural philosophy is described in similar terms: 'I had an amazing desire (ἐπεθύμησα) when I was young for this knowledge' (*Phdr.* 96a). Philosophical discussion has a sociable aspect, and Socrates is a 'friend-lover' (φιλέταιρος, *Ly.* 211d–e). After a long period away on military campaign, he 'returned with delight (ἀσμένως)' to his usual haunts (*Chrm.* 153a), and the news from Athens that he wants is about philosophy and whether any of the young men is remarkable for beauty or intelligence.

The passion for wisdom, philosophy, or philosophical discussion resembles erotic passion for another person. Socrates develops this parallel in *Gorgias*, where he compares his love for Alcibiades and Philosophy to Callicles' love for **[end of p. 442]** Demos son of Pyrilampes and the Athenian *dêmos* (*Gorgias* 481c–d). This striking view of the essential similarity of apparently distinct emotions enables him to explain how we can understand the

[1] I am grateful to the editors for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

emotions of others: 'If people had not certain feelings in common (τὸ αὐτό), some sharing one feeling, some another, but some of us had unique feelings unshared by the rest (ἴδιον ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι), it would not be easy to reveal one's experience (πάθημα, the result of the πάθος) to one's neighbour' (*Grg.* 481c).[2] Socrates' expertise in love (ἔρως, for example *Phdr.* 257; *Smp.* 177d; 204b) is fundamental to his philosophical project.[3]

Socrates' friends and associates share his passion. The aged Cephalus speaks of the desires (ἐπιθυμίαι) and pleasures (ἡδοναί) concerning philosophical discussion, which replace their physical equivalents as one gets older (*Respublica* 328d). Apollodorus says that whenever he engages in philosophical discussion 'apart from believing that I am benefiting, I get extraordinary pleasure (χαίρω)' (*Smp.* 173c). Nicias knows that he will be subjected to examination by Socrates, 'for I enjoy (χαίρω) associating with him' (*La.* 188a). Laches adds 'I would very greatly enjoy (ἥδιστα) being questioned by him' (*La.* 189a). Alcibiades, very drunk, expresses himself in more extravagant terms: 'when I hear him talk, my heart leaps and tears pour from my eyes' (*Smp.* 215e), and later says to the others 'you have all shared the philosophical madness (μανία) and frenzy (βακχεία)' (*Smp.* 218a–b).[4]

Irene de Jong has argued that the reactions of secondary narratees to embedded narratives in Homer 'may help us to determine the intended reaction of the primary narratees to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* themselves' (for instance emotional involvement).[5] In a similar vein, Margalit Finkelberg, focusing on the joy and sorrow triggered by the progress of a philosophical argument, argues, 'There is good reason to suppose that the ultimate target of Plato's strategies of emotional involvement is the dialogues' extradiegetic audience'.[6] The present chapter will look somewhat more broadly at Plato's engagement of the emotions of the primary narratees (that is, the readers or audiences of the dialogues), **[end of p. 443]** and in particular how he arouses and maintains interest in the whole process of philosophical discussion. One way of doing so is to describe the enthusiasm of the participants, and another

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[2] Translated and annotated by Dodds 1959: 261.

[3] See (e.g.) Belfiore 2012: 3, contrasting 'ordinary ἔρως' with 'Socratic ἔρως' ('a passionate desire for the wisdom, beauty and other good things that one recognizes that one lacks'); Yunis 2011: 87, note on *Phaedrus* 227c3–4.

[4] Belfiore 2012: 24 remarks on Socrates' rather less emotional attitude to philosophy in the trial and death dialogues.

[5] De Jong 2004: 23; cf. 2001: 197–198. See also the introduction to this volume ***.

[6] Finkelberg in this volume, ***.

is to have an eager internal narratee to guide our response. The rest of this chapter will focus on two dialogues, *Protagoras* and *Gorgias*, in order to show how Plato generates interest in the philosophical discussion. This has two aspects. First, it explains why the participants choose to occupy their time in this way, when the experience is sometimes uncomfortable and they may have other things to do. Second, Plato arouses the interest of the readers of the works, drawing them into material which might seem difficult or irrelevant. In both of these aspects, emotion plays a significant role.

Protagoras

Protagoras is mostly narrated by Socrates as a secondary internal narrator, but is introduced by a brief dramatic dialogue with an anonymous friend.[7] The Friend will be the internal narratee of the main body of the dialogue, and his enthusiasm to hear about Protagoras is designed to generate the interest of the reader from the start.[8] This dialogue also conveys Socrates' interest in Protagoras, although in a more oblique and ironic way.

The beginning of a Platonic dialogue often introduces themes which will be developed later, and this is no exception.[9] The Friend addresses Socrates abruptly, assuming that he must have come from 'the hunt of the beautiful Alcibiades' (309a). He follows up this rather presumptuous reference to Socrates' emotional attachment to Alcibiades by remarking that he has seen him recently, suggesting that he has independent, and perhaps more up-to-date, knowledge. Finally, he observes that, while Alcibiades may still be beautiful, he is, 'between the two of us', too old to be an appropriate *erômenos*. This is a remarkable amount of provocation to get into such a short speech, in particular the Friend's assumption that he can read Socrates' emotions and thereby gain a conversational advantage. Socrates does not reply directly, which would inevitably betray his emotions one way or the other, but focalizes Alcibiades' beauty through the attitudes and opinions of the Friend: he is an admirer of Homer, who regarded as most attractive the age when the first beard is growing, **[end of p. 444]** which is Alcibiades' age now. The Friend persists with direct questions, but Socrates

[7] On dramatic, narrated, and mixed dialogues in Plato, see Morgan 2004: 361.

[8] See Finkelberg 2019: 82–83 for discussion of the three brief occasions when attention is drawn to the narrative frame, although none of these mentions the response of the Friend.

[9] See generally Burnyeat 1997, although he does not discuss *Protagoras*.

disconcertingly responds that he paid hardly any attention to Alcibiades when he saw him earlier in the day. The Friend is thrown off the track, assuming that Socrates has met a more beautiful boy, indirectly admitting that there could be none more beautiful than Alcibiades. Socrates reminds him of this later: 'Alcibiades the beautiful, as you say and I agree' (316a), again focalizing his admiration for Alcibiades through the viewpoint of the Friend.

Socrates gradually reveals, to the incredulity of the Friend, that the person he has met who is more beautiful than Alcibiades is a visitor from Abdera. He explains: 'How is the wisest not going to seem more beautiful?' (309c). The Friend then asks whether Socrates has just met someone wise, to which he answers: 'The wisest man alive, if the person who seems wisest to you is Protagoras' (309d). The name is held back for effect, and Socrates wins this conversational game of chess as the Friend cannot contain his excitement: 'O what are you saying? Is Protagoras in town?' (309d).[10] We are not in a position to know whether Socrates is aware that the Friend has any particular enthusiasm for Protagoras, or merely that he knows that anyone would be impressed by his acquaintance with this celebrity. Either way, he reads the Friend's emotions, and manipulates him into betraying them. He emphasizes his victory by revealing that Protagoras has already been in Athens for two days, echoing the Friend's provocative implication that he may have seen Socrates' beloved more recently than he has himself. The dialogue ends with an elaborately polite exchange in which the Friend asks Socrates to describe his encounter with Protagoras, and he agrees.[11]

The Friend fulfils the role of eager narratee, who helps to arouse the reader's interest. The question arises why the revelation of his enthusiasm for Protagoras in this introductory dialogue is so elaborate, and why he needs to be manipulated by Socrates into revealing it. The answer must partly be that Socrates is adept at reading the emotions of others and concealing his own, and this is indeed an important theme in what follows. This section also shows that Socrates himself is interested in Protagoras, although he only reveals this obliquely and ironically.[12] **[end of p. 445]**

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[10] Denyer 2008: 67, n. on 309d3 observes that 'ὦ is a strongly emotional expression', with only one other example in Plato (*Phaedrus* 227c).

[11] See Lloyd 2018: 418–419 for the polite negotiations involved in someone agreeing to give a lengthy verbal performance, discussing this passage and two others in Plato.

[12] Rutherford 1995: 123 notes that Socrates' irony in this introductory dialogue 'does not convey outright dismissal or condemnation of its object [i.e. Protagoras], but raises doubts and questions'.

The second stage of Plato's arousal of interest in Protagoras is the opening of Socrates' narrative, in which he describes being disturbed at the crack of dawn. He begins as if he has less restricted focalization than one might have expected from someone lying in bed in the dark: 'Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus and brother of Phason, banged violently on my door with his stick, and when a slave had opened it to him rushed immediately inside …' (310a–b). Socrates' focalization then narrows to his perceptions at the time, as he describes his recognition of Hippocrates' voice, followed by awareness of him standing beside his bed and feeling for a place to sit down. This shift of focalization enables Socrates to stress his identification of Hippocrates' emotions, which he characterizes as ἀνδρεία ('impetuosity') and πτοίησις ('excitement'), brought on by news of the arrival of Protagoras.[13] Socrates also comments on Hippocrates shouting and laughing. His excitability would in any case have been evident from his speech, according to which he insists on doing everything 'immediately', and in which he frequently uses oaths (310b–d). Socrates' questioning soon reveals that Hippocrates' urgent desire to meet Protagoras is not informed by any very coherent view of what he might gain from associating with him.

Socrates develops analogies to illustrate what one might hope to learn from specialists in various fields, for example that one might want to learn to be a sculptor oneself by seeking instruction from a well-known sculptor, and then asks Hippocrates why he would go to the sophist Protagoras: 'And he said with a blush (ἐρυθριάσας) – for day was already beginning to dawn, so that he was visible – "If it is anything like the previous examples, then clearly in order to become a sophist myself". "But wouldn't you" I said "be ashamed to present yourself to the Greeks as a sophist?" "Absolutely, Socrates, at least if I should say what I really think"' (312a). The significance of the blush here is that it reveals Hippocrates' true opinion, as he goes on to state explicitly.[14] Socrates suggests instead that he would be going to Protagoras for educational purposes, and the argument which follows from this would have been blocked if Hippocrates had stuck with his original answer, which would have given him a coherent position which followed logically from the previous discussion. It will turn out that one of Protagoras' pupils, Antimoerus of Mende, is indeed studying to be a sophist himself (315a), but he is exceptional. Socrates regularly insists that participants in a dialogue say what they really think rather than merely what might help them to win the argument (for example, *Prt.* 331b–e; *Grg*. 499c; *Chrm.* 174b; **[end of p. 446]** *La.* 196c; *Smp.* 201c). The elenchus often

[13] On these two words, see Denyer 2008: 69–70, n. on 310d3.

[14] On blushing in Plato, see Morgan 2018: 449–450.

exposes contradictions in the interlocutor's beliefs, demonstrating that he must abandon or revise one or more of them.

It is also a common feature of argument that consistency can be achieved only at the price of the interlocutor adopting views which he can reasonably be suspected of not really believing. Richard McKim has argued that in *Gorgias* Socrates tries to shame Polus and Callicles into admitting what they really believe, that it is better to suffer injustice than to do it (for example, *Grg.* 494c–e): 'Whereas Callicles says that men assert out of shame what they really believe to be false, Socrates thinks that men assert out of shame what they really believe to be true.'[15] This is an interesting and convincing reversal of the usual view of the role of shame in the dialogue. Hippocrates' change of tack here is an example of the same process, showing the importance of emotion as evidence of what someone really thinks. Protagoras himself later says: 'it would be shameful (αἰσχρός) for me of all people to deny that wisdom and knowledge are the most powerful of all human things' (352d), although it might have been to the advantage of his argument if he had denied it.

The amusing episode in which Socrates gains admittance to Callias' house, where Protagoras is staying, illustrates again how he explicitly interprets someone's emotions when they are in any case apparent from the dialogue. The porter says 'Ha! Sophists! My master is busy', before pushing the door closed (314d). Socrates introduces this reaction by saying that he thought the porter might have been annoyed by the number of sophists visiting the house, which the narratee could in any case have deduced from the dialogue. Socrates presents himself as continually reasoning about the emotions of others, and being proved right by events (compare *Phdr.* 228a; *Euthd*. 285a; 288b).[16]

Socrates asks Protagoras to consider taking on Hippocrates as his pupil (316b–c). The request is later expressed more precisely: 'Hippocrates here desires (ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ ὤν) your company, and says that he would gladly (ἡδέως) discover what the outcome would be from associating with you' (318a). Protagoras explains why he would rather discuss the matter in public (317c), but before describing his reply Socrates makes the following narratorial comment: 'I suspected that he wanted to show off to Prodicus and Hippias and preen himself (καλλωπίζομαι) on our presence as his admirers' (317c–d). Socrates ignores Protagoras' lengthy and plausible explanation for his preference to be as open as possible. No evidence is provided for his interpretation of Protagoras' emotions, **[end of p. 447]** as it was in the scenes

[15] McKim 1988: 40; contrast Denyer 2008: 181, n. on 352d2.

[16] See the discussion by Finkelberg 2019: 33; 51–52; 82.

with Hippocrates and the porter discussed above.[17] Plato's extended build-up to the discussion reaches its climax as the large and distinguished audience gather round, glad (ἄσμενος) that they are going to listen to wise men (317d–e). The internal narratee (the Friend) is well rewarded for his attention, but all this serves to engage the interest of the external narratee (the reader): Plato makes the point that what is to follow is of the greatest interest and importance.

Socrates also has the challenge of keeping Protagoras himself engaged. The first sign of strain is when Socrates changes the subject 'since you seem to me to be annoyed by this' (332a). His later comments on Protagoras' emotional state are in his narratorial voice and not shared with him. They start with 'he agreed very reluctantly' (333b), when his actual words are not quoted. A little later, Socrates again uses the word καλλωπίζομαι (333d). This was translated 'preen himself' in the discussion of its occurrence at 317d above, but here it seems to mean 'play hard to get' (compare *Phdr.* 236d). Either way, this is the behaviour of a pretty boy pursued by admirers. An element of seduction is prominent in other dialogues (for example, *Charmides*, *Lysis*). It is rather surprising to find it in a dialogue with an elderly sophist, but we may recall Socrates' comparison of Protagoras to Alcibiades in the introductory conversation. Socrates then decides to proceed more cautiously: 'I thought Protagoras had become exasperated and agitated, and had drawn himself up against giving answers' (καί μοι ἐδόκει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἤδη τετραχύνθαι τε καὶ ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ παρατετάχθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, 333e).[18]

The pleasure of the company in the discussion comes to the fore again in the passage where Socrates threatens to break it off and needs to be persuaded to resume (335d–338e). The introductory section of the dialogue established that Protagoras was an interesting and important figure, who was worth going to listen to. This passage makes explicit that the audience, and by implication the readers, have time for Socrates' dialogue with him. When Socrates was standing up to leave, Callias grasped his hand with his right hand and his cloak with his left and says: 'We shall not let you go, Socrates. The conversation will not be the

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[17] For Socrates' narrative control in dialogues narrated by him, see Morgan 2004: 363–364; 2017: 454–456.

[18] παρατάττω is a metaphor from lining up troops in battle order, and πρός shows that Protagoras is setting himself against giving answers at all, as if answering Socrates' questions were the enemy (cf. Isocrates 4.96), rather than, as some translators have it, setting himself to give battle *in* his answers. For ἀγωνιάω, cf. *Chrm.* 162c, discussed below.

same if you leave. There is nothing I would listen to with more pleasure (ἥδιον) than you and Protagoras conversing. Please do us this favour' (335d). **[end of p. 448]** Other distinguished members of the audience also ask them to continue the discussion. This remarkable episode is the climax of Plato's efforts to engage the interest of the reader in the dialogue. We may feel dissatisfaction, boredom, or impatience with various aspects of it, but the pleas of Callias and the others to continue indicate the correct response. There are further problems at the end of the discussion of Simonides, when Alcibiades asks Socrates and Protagoras to continue their previous discussion (347b), and after Socrates has said that he would gladly (ἡδέως) do so, puts pressure on Protagoras to continue. Callias and almost all the others also ask him to continue, and Socrates again interprets his response: 'He was ashamed (αἰσχύνομαι), as it seemed to me, and reluctantly returned to the discussion' (348c).

Gorgias

In *Gorgias*, a dramatic dialogue, Socrates' identification and manipulation of his interlocutor's emotions are necessarily expressed in a different way. He does not have the narrative control of interpreting the emotions of his interlocutor to the narratee which he has in *Protagoras*. He only has the other people present, and thus needs to be more indirect and polite. Gorgias has not been bridling under the pressure of Socrates' questioning, as Protagoras was (*Protagoras* 333e), and has indeed just made a long and confident speech arguing that the teacher of rhetoric is not responsible for any bad use of it made by his pupils (*Gorgias* 456a–457c). He clearly expects that to be his last word on the matter, but Socrates actually intends to question him in order to expose inconsistencies in his position. Socrates' reply begins with generalities about how discussion can go wrong, politely focalized from Gorgias' point of view: 'I think that you too, Gorgias, have experience of many discussions, and have seen in them the following…' (457c). He does no more than express concern that Gorgias might experience the disagreeable emotions (χαλεπαίνουσι, 457d) of the participants in such discussions if he were to be questioned more closely, and does not actually attribute such emotions to him. He then focalizes the issue through his own pleasure in either refuting or being refuted, according to who is speaking the truth. In other words, he does not say 'Do you mind being refuted if you are wrong?' but 'I would gladly (ἡδέως) be rid of false ideas: are you like me?'. Finally, Socrates gives Gorgias the option of continuing the discussion on

these terms or giving it up. He does not take for granted that everyone will find this kind of activity worthwhile.

Gorgias insists that he is just like Socrates in not minding being refuted if he is mistaken, but suggests that the audience may have had enough of the discussion; **[end of p. 449]** 'We should consider them too, in case we are detaining some of them when they are wanting to do something else' (458b–c). It is sometimes alleged that Gorgias only says this because he wants to make a face-saving exit from the discussion himself,[19] but the possibility that we all have better things to do is regularly mentioned in Plato, and Gorgias turns out to be quite willing to continue when asked to do so. Chaerephon reports the sounds of enthusiasm from the audience, and remarks that he personally would never be too busy to listen to such discussions. He plays a useful role here and on two other occasions in the dialogue (447a–448c; 481b), where the dramatic form leaves a gap which was filled by Socrates as narrator in *Protagoras*.[20] It is actually the intervention of Callicles which is most striking here: 'By the gods, Chaerephon, I have been present at many discussions before, and I do not think that I have ever taken such pleasure (ἥσθην) as I am doing now. So far as I am concerned, you will be doing me a favour if you continue your discussion for the rest of the day' (458d). The intensity of Callicles' enthusiasm comes as a surprise, especially as we have not heard from him since the beginning of the dialogue. He both guides our response to what we have already heard, and whets our appetite for what is to come. Gorgias later returns the favour when he encourages Socrates and Callicles to continue (497b; 506b). Gorgias, like Protagoras, is also motivated to continue the discussion because of shame: 'It would be shameful (αἰσχρόν) for me not to continue, Socrates, since I have said [447d–448a] that anyone could ask me whatever they wanted'.

Gorgias also exemplifies a technique which Plato often uses to generate interest in a discussion. This is not used in *Protagoras*, but does occur in the *Republic* as we shall see, so is not confined to dramatic dialogues. As with the expressions of enthusiasm discussed above, it both explains the motivation of the participants to continue and reflects and reinforces the interest of the narratee and reader. Polus becomes exasperated by the progress of the debate with Gorgias, and bursts in with criticisms of Socrates' handling of it (461b–c). His emotional

[19] E.g. Rutherford 1995: 149.

[20] Finkelberg 2019: 68 may however go too far when she says: 'the *Gorgias* is focalized through Chaerephon and … it is Chaerephon who is envisaged as its implicit narrator'.

state is made apparent by his abrupt questions and disordered syntax,[21] culminating in the direct criticism 'It is very boorish to bring the discussion down to this'. Socrates makes no explicit comment on Polus' manner, although his ironically restrained reply could well be understood to imply criticism. We may also recall Polus' rudeness earlier (448a–e). The impetus of the discussion is thus maintained by the arrival of a new participant who is provoked **[end of p. 450]** by how it is proceeding, and in particular believes that he can deal better with Socrates' questioning. This will reflect the emotions of many readers, and serve to maintain and increase their interest and engagement. There is a similar, although more polite, sequence at the beginning of the dialogue, which starts with Chaerephon questioning Gorgias and then Polus for just long enough to arouse impatience for the discussion between the principals Socrates and Gorgias for which both internal and external audiences have been waiting (447d–449a). Callicles is similarly provoked to join in the discussion, although he does so more politely when he asks if Socrates is serious about his paradoxical view that doing injustice is worse than suffering it (481b).

There is a series of such interventions in the *Republic*. Polemarchus interrupts, prompting Cephalus to bequeath the argument to him (*Respublica* 331d). There is then the episode of Thrasymachus' intervention (*Respublica* 336b–d). Socrates as narrator can describe how he had been observing his growing impatience to interrupt, in contrast to the unprepared intervention of Polus in the dramatic dialogue *Gorgias*, whose emotions can only be deduced from his language. Finally, Glaucon is dissatisfied with Thrasymachus' withdrawal and carries on the discussion himself (*Respublica* 357a). There is something similar in *Charmides*, another dialogue narrated by Socrates, when Critias is drawn into the conversation. Socrates gives an elaborate analysis of Critias' emotional condition during the preceding discussion with Charmides: 'It had been clear for some time that Critias was agitated (ἀγωνιῶν) and anxious to impress (φιλοτίμως … ἔχων) in front of Charmides and the others present. He had only with difficulty restrained himself previously, but was no longer able to do so' (*Chrm.* 162c).[22]

Losing Interest in Philosophy

[21] See Dodds 1959: 221, n. on 461b4–c3.

[22] The passage is well discussed by Morgan 2004: 363–364.

Returning to *Protagoras*, the moment eventually comes when Protagoras has finally had enough of Socrates: 'We shall discuss these matters some other time, whenever you like, but now it is time to turn our attention to something else' (361e). Rutherford is critical: 'we cannot help feeling that Protagoras has failed a test: he lacks the determination, and the concern for truth, which would enable him to ignore his own failures or false moves and concentrate on the enquiry at hand.'[23] Another way of looking at it is that he has persevered for a remarkably **[end of p. 451]** long time with an unfamiliar and unwelcome mode of philosophizing, which does not show his abilities to the best advantage and does little or nothing for his reputation. Socrates highlights his own skill in seducing him into continuing to participate. Plato himself certainly does not take for granted that his readers will have limitless appetite for Socratic dialectic, and goes to remarkable lengths to generate enough enthusiasm to keep it going. It is evidence for the success of his philosophical project that modern scholars tend to assume that failure to go along with it demonstrates moral and intellectual failure. Plato is always alert to the fact that Socrates needed reasonably co-operative interlocutors, and that he himself needed to maintain the interest of his readers. Dialogues do not always end with all participants content with the conclusions reached, and there is the ever-present possibility that they may decide that they have better things to do. Euthyphro is less polite than Protagoras: Socrates wants to start the investigation of piety again from the beginning, but he replies 'Some other time, Socrates, for I have urgent business now and it is time for me to go' (15e).[24] Socrates analyses Anytus' withdrawal from the discussion, believing himself to be insulted (95a). Cephalus happily bequeaths the argument to Polemarchus, while he goes off to attend to a sacrifice (*Respublica* 331d). Blondell is rather censorious about this: 'he is quite literally retreating to traditional values rather than face elenctic scrutiny' (170).[25] Socrates himself occasionally remembers other engagements (*Protagoras* 335c; 362a; *Meno* 100b; *Theaetetus* 210d).

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[23] Rutherford 1995: 139.

[24] For 'some other time' (εἰς αὖθις) as a polite way of saying 'never', see *Prt.* 347b; *Grg,* 449b, 449c; *Cra.* 440e; *Euthphr.* 6c.

[25] Blondell 2002: 168–173, at 170. Beversluis 2000: 185–202 quotes various judgements of Cephalus, including some sympathetic ones.

Conclusion

Plato is always aware that people have other things to do than engage in philosophical discussion, and that their interest needs to be aroused and maintained. *Protagoras* begins with two separate scenes in which characters (the Friend and Hippocrates) want to hear about or to meet Protagoras. Socrates is able to guide his conversations with both of them because he is able to identify their emotions while concealing his own. Many characters in Plato feel emotions towards philosophy or philosophical discussion which are explicitly or implicitly related to other emotions, and in particular to desire for another person. When the discussion in *Protagoras* seems about to break down, members of the audience noisily express their wish for it to continue. Similar enthusiasm **[end of p. 452]** is expressed by the audience in *Gorgias*, notably Chaerephon and Callicles. The momentum of a discussion can also be sustained by emotions of a more negative kind, such as annoyance or impatience. This can be seen with both Polus and Callicles in *Gorgias*, and a number of examples from other dialogues were mentioned above. These expressions of emotion are clearly designed to guide or reflect the emotions of the external narratee, and play a significant role in generating interest in the dialogue. We have seen a number of cases where the participants remember pressing engagements and decide that they have better ways of passing their time than engaging in philosophical discussion, and Plato is always alert to the possibility that his readers may have similar feelings. He thus both encourages our interest by describing the enthusiasm of the participants, and also anticipates and expresses possible feelings of boredom or dissatisfaction. In conclusion, Plato offers striking examples in these dialogues of how a writer can use the description of emotion to arouse and maintain the interest of the reader.

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