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**BELIEF SYSTEMS AND ACTION INFERENCES AS A SOURCE OF VIOLENCE IN THE NAME OF ISLAM**

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### **Abstract**

I draw on the belief system literature and use a cognitive mapping methodology to compare Islamists from the nonviolent Muslim Brotherhood and from the formerly violent groups al-Jihad and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya in Egypt. Using data from in-depth interviews conducted in Egypt, I identify eight combinations of beliefs antecedent to decisions for and against violence and make three main claims. First, decisions for or against violence towards the state are only made if an individual believes that the state is violent. Second, decisions against violence are logically preceded by beliefs about the superiority of state structures to the chaos of violence, the negative consequences of revenge, the potential success of peaceful action, and the impossibility of reaching goals through violence. Third, decisions in favour of violence are logically preceded by beliefs about beliefs: transformatory goals, support for violence in the local environment, and ignorance of the state's reaction to violent resistance. I conclude with brief suggestions of how the kinds of belief-chains identified may be useful for other, more policy-oriented literature about the sources of violence in the name of Islam.

In this paper, I address the origins of violence in the name of Islam as a form of political violence. Seeking to answer the question why certain Islamists – Muslim political activists who want to implement their visions of Islam in the state - pick up arms while others from the same environment do not, I focus on the micro-level perspective of the subjects who make decisions for and against violence towards states. This approach relies on the assumption that if one wants to stop violence, one has to gain a better understanding of the perspective of the individuals who decide to use it. One has to engage with the people who are widely considered “the enemy” or “terrorists” and take seriously their reasons for launching attacks as well as their views of their targets.

Attempting to shed light on the sources of political violence by taking such a stance, I analyze the explanations of Islamists who have launched attacks against states in comparison to other, nonviolent Islamists from the same environment. I find that both violent and nonviolent Islamists explain their actions against states with reference to violence by states, that violent Islamists refer to transformatory goals and the absence of alternative means or the possibility of reaching their goals through violence to explain their actions, whereas nonviolent Islamists refer to the negative consequences of revenge or the chaos of losing existing state structures.

These results are demonstrated in three steps. First, I use a cognitive mapping methodology and identify the belief systems of the Islamists, including chains of reasoning which are connected with decisions for and against violence. Second, I compare the maps of different interviewees, creating a taxonomy of the beliefs involved in the decision-making process, and identifying typical chains of reasoning related to decisions for and against violence. Third, using the computer programming environment CLIPS, I begin to develop an expert system which assesses different stages in the decision-making process based on a computation of the chains of inferential reasoning abduced (that is observed to allow the inferring of decisions; first used by Pierce, 1958, today used in cognitive science, e.g. Magnani 2009; Cohn et al. 2003) from the cognitive maps. Before proceeding to the mapping analysis, I provide a brief definition of the main terms, an overview of the existing literature focusing on beliefs as a source of violence, an introduction to cognitive mapping, and a brief description of my research design.

### **Definitions of Key Terms**

Political violence is “behaviour involving physical force intended to hurt, damage, or kill someone or something” (Gurr in Oxford Reference Online Dictionary, 2010), and as a “deliberate” act performed for political ends (Wilkinson in Della Porta, 1995, p. 2). It is an organized action which can be carried out by

groups or individuals. Violence in the name of Islam is thus a form of political violence (a definition also adopted by Crenshaw, 1996) because most of the targets of violence in the name of Islam - states or the inhabitants of certain states - are political, and because Islamist goals - the removal of states and the introduction of a Khalifat - are directed at a complete change of existing political structures.

Islamists are defined as that subgroup of Muslims who are “committed to implementation of their ideological vision of Islam in the state” (Esposito in Oxford Reference Online Dictionary, 2003) and who aim for “the unification of the religious and the political” (Roy, 2004, p. 3). Their commitment implies that they consider all of their political actions to be carried out “in the name of Islam,” which makes Islamists “revolutionary” as long as they live in non-Islamic states, and which differentiates them from other people such as “traditional fundamentalists” who live “without caring about the locus of political power” (Roy, 1997, p. 69).

One can differentiate violent and nonviolent Islamists with regard to the means they use to implement visions of Islam in the state. Violent and nonviolent Islamists are political activists who embrace the use and nonuse of violence to reach their political goals, and who participate in groups planning and conducting violent and nonviolent actions against states. My analysis mainly focuses on Islamists who have embraced the use of violence and participated in groups exercising violence against states in the past, but who later renounced violence as the means of implementing political Islam.

Beliefs are psychological states in which a person considers something to be true or to be the case (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2006). Most contemporary philosophers deal with beliefs in terms of propositional attitudes, that is, as mental states holding what is expressed in sentences as true. An assertion is the construction of such sentences, a speech act in which something is claimed to hold, or, in the words of Frege, “an outward sign of a judgement” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2006). If Frege’s use of judgement (*Urteil*) is taken to mean belief, assertions are the expressions of beliefs. In this paper, I adopt this point of view, and use belief and assertion interchangeably.

However, it must be noted that Frege’s definition is not necessarily taken for granted by all philosophers. Bringing in elements such as intentionality, inconclusive evidence and indirect insincerity, analysts like Owens or Williamson (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2006) have pointed to possible differences between what is believed and asserted, and to the possibility that assertions are incorrect or might not express beliefs. Instead of dealing with these important issues more closely, I focus on what is asserted by the speakers to explain political violence disregarding whether these assertions are based on beliefs which are truly held and which reflect the real world correctly. This disregard stems from my purpose: to reveal typical chains of reasoning connected with decisions for and against violence and to

show why these decisions are possible with certain but not with other sets of beliefs. In principle, the identification of such chains does not require that the speaker be sincere or that the real state of the world be represented by the beliefs – rather, it requires information about possibilities which can also be obtained from insincere speakers and incorrect assertions about the world.

### **Explanations of Political Violence**

The large body of literature about the causes of non-state political violence can be divided into three broad fields: group theories, structural-psychological theories, and psychopathological theories.

Group theories emphasize the importance of collectives and refer to the nature and internal processes of groups in order to explain political violence. Marc Sageman's book *Understanding Terror Networks* (2004) is an example of this kind of theory. Considering the ideological origins of a "movement" called the global jihad, Sageman uses data from public sources to analyse the biographies of 172 violent Islamists with regard to social, personal and situational variables. He finds that "this form of terrorism is an emergent quality of the social networks formed by alienated young men who become transformed into fanatics yearning for martyrdom and eager to kill" (vii).

Although not explicitly applying the framework of group theory, the important work by Jerrold Post, Ehud Sprinzak and Laurita Denny (2003) also attributes most explanatory power to groups. In this study, for which they actually talked to individuals who had used violence, the authors take into account factors like family background, boyhood heroes or social environment of violent political activists from the Middle East. (Other studies for which researchers made the effort to meet with violent individuals include Atran, 2010; Stern, 2003; Horgan, 2009; Quintain, 2005; Ashour, 2007; and Gerges, 2007). While Sageman concludes "it's the group" (Sageman in Victoroff, 2005, p.30), Post, Sprinzak and Denny point at "an overarching sense of the collective" which "consumes the individual," and at "the major influence" of "the social environment of the youths" (2003, pp. 176, 173).

Consistent with the group-focused perspective, Albert Bandura (1998, pp. 161, 164, 190) describes the "conversion of socialized people into dedicated combatants" by virtue of "moral sanction of violent means." According to Bandura, individuals who pick up arms have been exposed to a "course of socialization." During this, they "adopt moral standards," but then abandon these through various "mechanisms of moral disengagement which involve cognitive and social machinations."

Numerous other authors have acknowledged and addressed the importance of groups for understanding political violence (Sageman, 2008; Kirby, 2007; Ashour, 2007; Laitin, 2008; Weinberg, 1991; Wiktorowicz, 2005; Della Porta, 1995; Atran, 2006; Horgan and Bjorgo, 2009), and recent

publications have expanded research in this field by providing detailed analyses of the structures of violent networks (for example Jones, Lane, Schulte, 2010; Kindt, Post, and Schneider, 2009; Bunker, 2005). Rather than demonstrating that groups matter, publications of the latter group often take such a relevance for granted and focus on the mechanisms by which large groups function, in this way offering explanations of political violence with regard to the existence and maintenance of violent groups. On the other hand, some publications like *Radical Islam Rising* focus on individuals' entries into existing militant groups (Wiktorowicz, 2005). Nevertheless, Wiktorowicz, proceeds by adopting a social movement theory that treats individuals from the perspective of the organization (an approach also adopted by Della Porta, 1995; Wickham, 2002) and points to explanatory factors that recall Bandura's work: recruiters, group leadership, and "culturing process" (p.167).

Relating this literature to the research puzzle of this paper – why certain Islamists pick up arms as opposed to others from the same environment who do not - , one notices that group and network theories have relatively little to say. Since they focus on groups, they leave aside the question why certain individuals join or leave violent groups as opposed to other groups. From this perspective, the puzzle presented in this paper adds a different dimension of political violence, and it also calls into question explanations which consider groups as the ultimate source of political violence.

The second broad approach to explaining non-state political violence, structural-psychological theory, focuses on the nature of the economic, political, and cultural environments of violent groups and often includes the psychological effects these environments have on the groups' members. Among the most famous works in this field are those written by Ted Gurr, most importantly *Why Men Rebel* (1971), but also others like "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945" (1994) or *People vs. States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (2000). In *Why Men Rebel*, Gurr builds on the works by Alexis de Tocqueville, who introduced the notion of frustration as a result of people's dissatisfaction with their living situations (in Wieviorka, 2004, p.148), and Francis Dollard, who put forward the frustration-aggression hypothesis according to which aggression is always preceded by frustration (in Victoroff, 2005, p.19).

Applying the frustration-aggression hypothesis to collective political violence, Gurr remarks that "rebellions come to be when people cannot bear the misery of their lot," and that "the primary source of men's capacity to be violent lies in the mechanism of frustration-aggression" related to "strains" in their environments (in Ashour, p.600). Such "strains" have been the focus of numerous other works about political violence, including analyses related to topics like economic deprivation and inequalities (Fearon and Laitin, 2001; Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Ibrahim, 1980; Zubaida, 2001; Keefer and

Loayza, 2008; Alvarez and Bachman, 2008; Unal-Karagüven, 2009; de Mesquita, 2008, 1.1), political oppression (Hafez, 2003; Pape, 2005; Kepel, 2002; Gerges, 2005; Burgat, 2003; Fuller, 1997; also already mentioned in Fanon, 1961), cultural differences (Huntington, 1993; Lewis, 1990; Esposito and Voll, 1996; Galtung, 1990; Roy and Juergensmeyer in Richardson, 2006), or global structures (Rapoport in Cronin, 2004; Stern, 2003; Crenshaw, 1981; Gotchev in Richardson, 2006; a very early example could be found in Sorel's 1901 views of class struggle).

There are several limitations to be noted in relation to contributions coming out of this field. As already indicated by Gurr's later works (1994; 2000) attempting to include more dynamic factors like mobilization, the structural-psychological approach is rather static, implying that if environmental conditions change, the frequency with which political violence occurs will change as well. Such a linear causal relation can easily be refuted with reference to observations that the majority of people from poor environments do not pick up arms (Victoroff, 2005), that individuals as well as groups have embraced or renounced violence when environmental conditions stayed the same (Ashour; Wickham, 2002), or that individuals of the same group came from different environments (Ansari, 1984; Ibrahim, 1980). Focusing on environments with certain features, analyses from this field cannot present political violence through the eyes of the subjects who pick up arms. Like group theories, structural-psychological theories cannot account for differences in the behaviour of individuals, and, in addition, cannot differentiate between groups.

The third approach to understanding non-state political violence promises to overcome these limitations by giving priority to the psyches of individuals who pick up arms. Psychopathology as explanation of violence is, however, often completely detached from considerations of the environments from which violence emerges. From a psychopathological perspective, individuals who pick up arms are labelled as "abnormal", and their uses of violence are explained with reference to psychological factors such as lack of self esteem, insight or real feelings; a sense of helplessness; personality disorders such as narcissism (Post, 2007); or emotional attachments (Rorschach in Silke, 1998, 51; Adigun Lawal, 2002; Hubbart, 1971; and Ferracuti and Bruno, 1981, in Gill, 2008). As noticed by numerous researchers from the field of psychology, "findings supporting the pathology model are rare and often of poor quality," and most recent researchers agree that we "cannot accept the comforting and unchallenging assumption that equates [terrorist] behaviour with illness" (Silke, p.51; Taylor and Quale, 1994, in Silke, p.53; Horgan, 2008). Despite the obvious liabilities which largely discredit psychopathological theories, focus on the psychology of individuals who use political violence could help to enrich existing approaches by combining factors from group and environmental studies through a

psychological perspective. An insightful example of such a synthesis is put forward by Horgan's and Taylor's "Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of a Terrorist" (2006).

### **Method**

My research constructed cognitive maps from interviews with once-violent and never-violent Egyptian Islamists. In all interviews, I phrased my questions referring to past decisions, that is I asked the Islamists to tell me why they became involved in violent and nonviolent political activism.

### **Cognitive Mapping**

In response to the limitations identified in current approaches to understanding political violence, the aim of this paper is to present an analysis that represents individuals' own explanations of embracing or rejecting violence. In order to achieve this, I turn to cognitive theories and use a methodology called cognitive mapping. This methodology was first applied to studies of politics by Robert Axelrod in 1976 with a focus on decision-making by policy leaders. In this application, Axelrod draws on the works from five different fields (citations in Axelrod, pp. 8-10): psycho-logic (Abelson and Rosenberg, 1958; Lambert, 1966), causal inferences (Simon, 1957; Blalock, 1964), graph theory (Cartwright and Harary, 1965; Heider, 1946; Harary, Norman and Cartwright, 1965), evaluative assertion analysis (Osgood, Saporta and Nunnally, 1956) and decision theory (Luce and Raiffa, 1957).

By choosing cognitive mapping as methodology, Axelrod (1976) proposed to rely on the notion of causation which is considered to be "vital" to the processes in which people evaluate the possible consequences of their actions (p. 5). The "basic tactic" of this methodology is "to infer things about decision making and cognition from a systematic study of [decision-makers'] assertions, and especially from a study of the structural relationships among these assertions" (p. 10). Cognitive maps are defined as specific representations of people's assertions - or beliefs - about confined fields, e.g. policy problems, with the primary goal to reveal the structure of these assertions and the consequences following from this structure (p. 55). Consisting of points which represent the beliefs of the decision-makers and positive or negative arrows which connect these points, cognitive maps can reveal the structures of complex belief systems including possible chains of reasoning expressed by the indirect and direct connections between beliefs. The basic assumption underlying this design is that if the decision-makers' belief systems are known, one can analyse their reasoning under all kinds of circumstances, even if not all their beliefs are stated openly.

Numerous applications of cognitive mapping were conducted in Axelrod's leading publication, and many others have been conducted since. Early examples include analyses of Gouverneur Morris in the Constitutional Convention, the Syrian intervention in Jordan in 1970, and commuter transportation policy in the energy crisis (in Axelrod, 1976). Cognitive maps can be used to predict policy-makers' decisions, to evaluate their negotiation positions, or to provide an expert system to help them decide about complex problems. More recent applications, have dealt with strategic culture and grand strategy in Chinese history (Johnston, 1995), the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 (Bonham, Sergeev and Parshin, 1997), the October War (Bonham, Shapiro and Trumble, 1979), or the development of cooperation in policy in the US and the EU (Tapio, 2003; related studies have been conducted by Ray, 1988, and by Maoz and Shayer, 1987). Furthermore, the method itself has become a subject of study (Montello, 2002; Pena, Sossa and Gutierrez, 2007; Brotos, 1999; Young, 1996; Langfield-Smith and Wirth, 1992; Hodgkinson et al., 1999; Young and Schafer, 1998). What is notable about all of these contributions is that analyses have always relied on the decision-makers' own concepts and never imposed predefined conceptual frameworks.

While Axelrod (1976) uses this method to make multiple consequences visible to policymakers so that they can improve their decision-making, my analysis traces chains of reasoning antecedent to decisions about violence to make multiple sets of sources visible and infer explanations of violence. The goal of my analysis is to demonstrate how decisions for or against violence towards states depend on certain antecedent beliefs. This goal is supported by the design of my analysis as a comparison of once-violent and non-violent Egyptian Islamists.

### **Interviews**

Since July 2009, I have been meeting with activists from nonviolent and formerly violent Islamist groups in Egypt. In this paper, I focus on data coded from interviews with ten Egyptians, five non-violent and five formerly violent.

Most of my Egyptian interviewees either participate in Islamist groups secretly and hide from the state, or have been arrested and tortured and live in constant fear of being put into prison again. Because of this, no interviewee agreed to have his conversations recorded; I depend on my extensive notes taken during and after each interview. Conversations usually spread over several meetings and were often interrupted by families, friends and work colleagues. Some Islamists did not start talking about the research topic of this paper until they had met and interviewed me several times. I aim to allow each interviewee to see and criticize my cognitive map of his beliefs, but have not yet had follow-

up discussions with all interviewees. The data reported here are thus a preliminary report of a promising methodology.

This paper deals with violence in the name of Islam in a specific setting: Egypt, an authoritarian state, which is often considered as the cradle of Islamism. Egypt is the home of influential Muslim thinkers such as Ibn Khaldun, Muhammad 'Abdou, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, and Rashid Rida. It is the home of the highest Sunni authority and the oldest Islamic university. It is the place where Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood when Egypt was occupied by the British, setting off a wave of activism in the name of Islam; and it is the home country of leading figures in al Qaeda.

My analysis focuses on five members of the peaceful Muslim Brotherhood as well as five members of the formerly violent groups al-Jihad and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya. These two groups were responsible for killing President Sadat in 1981 and are often considered the roots of al Qaeda (Wright, 2006). Considered "a counter model" to the well-known Muslim Brothers, al-Jihad and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya formed as part of the 1970s Islamic revival which, supported by Sadat's infitah policy, provided an unprecedented platform for Islamist activism ( see Abed-Kotob Sullivan, 1999, also see Hamzawy and Grebowski, 2010; Kepel, 2002; Al-Sayyid, 2003; Moneep, 2009; Zayyat, 2005). After the assassination of Sadat, most of the groups' members were put into prison and those considered to carry the main responsibility for Sadat's death were executed.

Nevertheless, al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya continued to carry out attacks and, in an attempt to damage the economy and force the government to resign, they also started targeting tourists. In 1997, the so-called historical leaders of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya announced their initiative to end the violence, which was later accompanied by various publications (Ibrahim et al., 2002; Hafez et al., 2002; al-Sherif et al., 2002; Abdel-Rahman et al., 2002), and which the group considers to have been implemented since the release of prisoners in 2001 (interview with a historical leader). Leaders from al-Jihad who have recently been released from prison have also renounced violence, but members who have left the country have denounced this new approach (interviews with leaders from al-Jihad; Al-Sayyid; Al-Zawahiri, 2002).

### Drawing Cognitive Maps from Interview Data

Cognitive mapping proceeded from identifying assertions to identifying inferences.

#### Identifying Assertions

Applying my methodology to the data obtained from the interviews, I searched my notes of the conversations for assertions and connections between these assertions. As defined earlier, the core components of assertions are their propositional contents, that is, *what* is believed or asserted. Based on this, the search for assertions first of all involves the search for declarative sentences in which something is claimed to hold (sentences with “an assertoric force,” Frege in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). In this search, not any utterance will be treated as an assertion - “I like cars,” for instance, is merely considered a grammatical construct where meaning is given to words but where nothing is claimed to hold (see Austin’s “locutionary act,” Ibid.).

Assertions or beliefs were identified from the direct speech of the individuals represented by structured notes. There are numerous pitfalls when taking notes on Arabic conversations and translating these into English. To name just a few, there are often no immediate translations for Arabic words (e.g. “daawa,” “jihad”), and religious contexts of the Islamists’ speech are often established through the structure of sentences (e.g. sentences about the future involve uses of the phrase “insha’allah” - “God willing”). I dealt with these problems by writing down the Arabic words in Latin letters and by adding notes after the interviews indicating certain structures of sentences. In addition to notes taken during the interviews, I added notes afterwards about topics like atmosphere, gestures, or location of the conversation. The following is a small excerpt of such notes, translated into English, dealing with an Islamist’s response to my question how his dream of a Khalifat could be implemented:

- through the daawa
- through ending the evil
- ending violence
- we went to the mosque of al jamaat
- there were meetings ...

In these notes, the Islamist’s speech was already immediately broken down into complete assertions or into main components of assertions which become complete assertions in connection with the question, while the order in which the Islamist made them is preserved. Assertions based on these notes would be

“the daawa is a means to implement the Khalifat,” “the Khalifat could be implemented through ending the evil,” “the Khalifat could be implemented through ending violence,” “we went to the mosque of al Jamaat” and “there were meetings.”

The details of rules by which linguistic speech was translated to a series of assertions is available from the author.

### **Identifying Inferences**

To identify connections between assertions, I again relied on the structured notes. As explained above, these notes supported the identification of the individual assertions in the order in which they were made referring to certain questions. In this way, they already provide a basic framework establishing connections between assertions appearing as sets related to specific issues. The individual links between assertions of such sets were identified by three indicators: conditional clauses, words following causal constructions such as “because,” “that is why,” or “therefore,” and the propositional contents and the internal order of sets of assertions.

First, using conditional clauses, arrows were drawn representing the causes and consequences expressed in the sub- and main-clauses. One of the Muslim Brothers, for example, answered to the question whether he would participate in armed jihad in Iraq: “Only if the government issues its approval, am I allowed to participate.” Based on this, a positive arrow was drawn from the government’s approval to the allowance to participate in armed jihad in Iraq.] It must be noted, however, that the occurrence of conditional clauses was comparatively low.

The second way to construct arrows connecting assertions was to follow key words indicating causal structures. Whenever possible, I made notes of the use of these structures in the form of the sign “>”. An Islamist’s response to the question about peaceful jihad in Palestine, for instance, was represented as follows.

- the governments’ stance differs from the Arab peoples
- > peaceful effort
- I think that stopping violence needs pressure from the whole world
- alone it is too weak
- it needs the whole world
- it needs the agreement of the peoples
- > it is a kind of jihad

In this case, “>” indicated what was logically antecedent to 1. the existence of nonviolence in a certain place, and 2. the Islamist’s acceptance of peaceful means. Based on this, arrows were drawn which positively related the government’s stance which differed from the Arab peoples to the existence of peaceful effort in Palestine, and the need for agreement of the peoples to “it is a kind of jihad.” Note, however, that, based on this, no arrows connecting the assertions which were not directly mentioned before the appearance of “>” were drawn.

The third and most frequently applied method of identification of inferences was examination of the propositional contents of sets of assertions. In this procedure, the sets of beliefs related to certain questions were either taken as a whole or, if responses were very long, divided into subsets according to the different themes addressed in relation to the question. The following example presents a set of assertions and the question to which they refer:

*Why did you not join al-Jihad when you were released from prison?*

- Islam builds an inner system
- Allah sees everything
- in prison, there was torture
- this was an exam
- we saw the jihad from prison
- torture and prison are part of the exam
- when I was released I was convinced of that
- we wanted to prevent the jihadis from using violence

Evaluating the propositional contents of these assertions, one observes that the last one is a decision against violence towards the Egyptian state, because it expresses an action the Islamist wanted to perform, which, in turn, expresses a rejection of violence towards the state. As a next step, the assertions mentioned before the mentioning of the decision are considered, in the order they are linked with the decision starting with the most immediate one. Here one notices that the propositional contents of certain assertions are very similar to each other, although they might be mentioned slightly more directly or indirectly connected with the decision. For example, “Islam builds an inner system” and “Allah sees everything” both express the existence of a religious context the Islamist relates to his life, whereas “this was an exam” and “torture and prison are part of the exam” refer to the application of the religious context to specific experiences of the Islamist. “We saw the jihadis from prison” and “in

prison, there was torture,” represent yet other types of propositional content referring to the existence of violent opposition against the state and aggression by the state towards the Islamist. Finally, bearing in mind the basic components of assertions mentioned earlier, “when I was released I was convinced of that” was not considered as an assertion, as it lacks assertive force – however, the temporal frame expressed in this sentence was added to the following assertion, the decision about nonviolence.

Comparing the connections between these subsets of assertions, one can now start identifying a chain of reasoning antecedent to the decision to not use force against the state. As already indicated by the order in which this Islamist uttered assertions from the different subsets, the propositional contents of assertions from certain subsets relies on the propositional contents of assertions from other subsets. For instance, “torture and prison are part of the exam” relies on both “in prison, there was torture” and “Allah sees everything”. Based on such analyses of propositional contents, the following arrows were drawn: an arrow from both “Allah sees everything” and “in prison, there was torture” to “torture and prison are part of an exam,” and an arrow from “torture and prison are part of an exam” and “we saw the jihad from prison” to the decision not to pick up arms.

In this procedure, the connections between the individual assertions and the decision were usually drawn starting with the elements connected with the decision through the highest number of other assertions. In other words, I normally drew chains of assertions starting with those that were most distant from decisions. It is important to notice that the mentioned connections were expanded during a later stage of the drawing process, when comparisons across all subsets of assertions by the individual were made. In the final map of the mentioned Islamist, for instance, the quote “prison and torture do not give you the right to use violence,” which was discovered in another subset where it was connected with different antecedent assertions, was inserted as a belief following “torture and prison are part of an exam” and antecedent to the decision.

### **Comparing Cognitive Maps**

Comparison of cognitive maps required assigning beliefs to classes and identifying common chains of reasoning about violence.

### **Assigning Assertions to Classes**

Once the maps had been drawn, the analysis proceeded in several steps. First, the assertions of all individuals antecedent to decisions about violence towards the Egyptian state were compared and assigned certain classes (an appendix of all classes and assertions is available from the author upon

request.); second, the lines of reasoning antecedent to the decisions were written down referring to both assertions and classes; third, the lines of reasoning of the individuals were compared and common chains identified; fourth, common chains were computed by using the programming environment CLIPS (see <http://clipsrules.sourceforge.net/>). It must be noted that the following analysis addresses parts of and not all of the information represented in the maps I have drawn so far. In the next steps of the research, I will expand the analysis to other antecedents of decisions mentioned by the Islamists, as well as other decisions (the maps also contain information about the use and nonuse of violence against foreign states, the joining and leaving of violent and nonviolent groups, and decisions to stop using violence against home states).

The construction of classes – generalizations of assertions based on similarities of their propositional contents - is based on a comparison of all assertions presented in the maps which are antecedent to decisions to use or not use violence against states. First, assertions expressing decisions were considered and assigned the classes *Violence against Home State* and *Nonviolence against Home State*. Assertions assigned to the violence class read like “I thought that violence was an appropriate means,” “it was allowed to kill Sadat,” “We agreed and gave Khaled three more people,” “we decided to kill Sadat” or “I advised to do the change.” Assertions from the nonviolence class included “I do not agree with jihad against the Egyptian state,” “I do not retaliate by force,” “I am in favor of the daawa,” or, as mentioned above, “We wanted to prevent the jihadis from using violence.”

In addition to these classes referring to decisions, there are other classes of assertions used exclusively by either violent or nonviolent Islamists exclusively. For example *Unacceptable Consequences of Revenge*, used only by nonviolent Islamists, includes assertions such as “A bad government is better than a war killing thousands,” and “It is better to live without rights than with violence.” Another example is *Possibility to Reach Goals through Violence*, is used only by violent Islamists with assertions like “I thought at the time that the army could bring the change” or “I thought it would be easier to reach the goals.” Most of these exclusive classes are also more directly connected with decisions than other, mixed classes which contain assertions made by both violent and nonviolent Islamists, and which were most frequently found at the beginning of chains.

The most prominent example of such mixed classes is *Violence by Home State*, referred to by all violent and nonviolent Islamists with assertions like “Sadat arrested 3000 of us,” “The government arrests and tortures Islamists,” “Hundreds of Muslim Brothers were killed,” or “The state attacked me and threatened my children.” Other examples of mixed classes are *Peaceful Activity against Home State*, or the already mentioned class containing religious beliefs.

Another crucial mixed class, which is referred to in the decision-making of both violent and nonviolent Islamist, is that of *Transformatory Goals*. Assertions belonging to this class usually express the Islamists' belief that their decisions are made in the name of Islam, which reflects the focus of this paper. Some examples are: "I dreamt of building an Islamic state," "I wanted to die for Islam," or "We need an Islamic frame of life." Note, however, that this class can also contain assertions which express an Islamist's goal of transforming his personal reality without reference to Islam - for instance: "I wanted to die" or "I want to create a good and free society."

Having assigned the Islamists' assertions to these classes, the rules for arriving at their decisions were written down. This involved writing down the links between the assertions and their classes in the order they are connected with decisions. The following line of reasoning, for example, represents one of several chains connected with an Islamist's decision against violence:

If **Violence by Home State** ("The government started attacking its opponents")  
Then **Possibility for Revenge** ("The ruler will find opposition")  
Then **Unacceptable Revenge** ("Mistakes like 9/11")  
Then **Repetition of Unacceptable Revenge** ("After 9/11 there have been so many mistakes")  
Then **Negative Consequences of Unacceptable Revenge** ("One mistake from the jihadis is followed by 1000 mistakes from the other side")  
Then **Unacceptable Consequences of Revenge** ("A bad government is better than a war killing thousands")  
Then **NO VIOLENCE AGAINST HOME STATE** ("I do not and would not use violence against the Egyptian state")

### Common Chains of Reasoning about Violence

Based on such lines of reasoning, I compared the maps and identified about a dozen common chains of reasoning connected with decisions for and against violence towards states. These can be divided into three different types:

- A. Chains antecedent to the belief that the home state is violent, a class which, in turn, is antecedent to all decisions about use of violence.
- B. Chains antecedent to Violence against Home State
- C. Chains antecedent to Nonviolence against Home State.

Clusters of beliefs belonging to these types were identified referring to beliefs which several Islamists consider to be directly or indirectly logically preceding the belief that the home state is violent (A) or a decision about use of violence (B and C).

*A. Chains of beliefs antecedent to assertion of violence by home state.*

The Islamists believe that there are two kinds of state violence, and, based on that, I identified two general kinds of chains of beliefs - one referring to state violence conducted for the first time (“state violence”), and another one referring to the repetition of state violence (“repeated state violence”). Despite this distinction, beliefs about both kinds of state violence often involve assertions with very similar propositional contents. The following is a presentation of the clusters of chains (with beliefs which were assigned classes) identified as antecedent to the belief that the state is violent or that the state has used violence repeatedly. Each cluster is named after the most significant beliefs according to which it can be identified and distinguished from other clusters.

International Context (cluster 1), see Table 1:

The first cluster of chains identified with regard to similarities between three nonviolent Islamists and two violent Islamists presents violence by the state as indirectly related to the international context, or to the badness of a foreign state. Chains 1a show that two nonviolent Islamists related this badness of the foreign state to the imposition of their home state, and this, in turn, to violence. Another nonviolent Islamist related the foreign state’s badness to peaceful activity conducted against the foreign state, and this, in turn, to violence, as shown by chain 1b. In 1c, a violent Islamist also observed a badness in the home state’s foreign policy, which he directly linked with violence by the state. In addition, badness in the home state’s foreign policy was also considered as antecedent to badness of a foreign state by another violent Islamist, and another class antecedent to badness of a foreign state, namely weakness of the Islamists, was observed by a nonviolent Islamist in 1c.

**Table 1 about here**

Moreover, several other clusters of chains antecedent to the belief that the home state is violent were identified according to assertions which present state violence in direct relation with the following beliefs:

Badness of home state (cluster 2)

State violence is considered an aspect of the home state's badness expressed in qualities like injustice, disregard of the citizens, abandonment of Nasser's nationalism, or lack of education.

Peaceful activities against home state (cluster 3)

Peaceful activities were directly antecedent to state violence in the opinion of four Islamists – both nonviolent and violent . In this chain, state violence is also seen to be logically preceded by

a) the duty to act against wrong and an indispensability of the existing structures (nonviolent Islamist)

b) the impossibility to reach goals through violence (nonviolent Islamist)

c) a transformatory goal and availability of alternative means (nonviolent Islamist)

d) insufficiency of religious activity (violent Islamist)

e) badness of the home state ("long version" of cluster 1, adding beliefs to the chain about the badness of the home state; observed by violent and nonviolent Islamists).

Partial success of peaceful activities against home state (cluster 4)

This cluster is an extension of the cluster named after peaceful activities, additionally involving the belief in partial success of peaceful activities.

Peaceful activities against home state and underestimation by home state (cluster 5)

Chains from this cluster additionally involve the belief that one has ignored possible reactions of the state towards political activism (violent Islamist).

Clusters of chains related to repeated state violence can be divided into clusters similar to, and therefore confirming the mentioned lines of reasoning, and clusters about additional antecedents of state violence. Those additional lines of reasoning refer repeated state violence directly to the following beliefs:

Belief in violence by the home state (cluster 6)

These chains were abducted from the belief systems of two violent and two nonviolent Islamists and mostly only involve direct links between state violence and repeated state violence. One Islamist also observed opposition, directly linked with violent revenge against state violence, which was in turn directly linked to repeated state violence by the home state.

B. CHAINS ANTECEDENT TO NONVIOLENCE AGAINST HOME STATE.

All of the chains of reasoning antecedent to nonviolence against the Egyptian state include the belief that the home state is violent and can thus be considered extensions of the chains antecedent to the belief that the home state is violent. Like the chains about state violence themselves, chains about nonviolence are divided into several clusters of chains. In addition to state violence, these are related to four beliefs.

1. Superiority of existing structures to chaos of violence. Typical chains directly related to the superiority of existing structures were abducted from the belief systems of four nonviolent Islamists. Table 2 shows two examples.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Table 2 shows how assertions about the superiority of existing structures are connected to other assertions about the absence of these structures and the negative consequences of this absence. In other words, Islamists reasoning in this way imagine worlds where the state would not exist, observe negative aspects of these imagined worlds, and assert that the existing state is better than no state. Notice however, that the propositional contents of these assertions by themselves are insufficient to reason about using violence against the state, because they do not allow considering the state as a possible target. Rather, the propositional content suggests acceptance or even satisfaction with the state, and one could even imagine that the superiority of existing structures could be logically preceded by chains related to the goodness of the state. Adding the belief about state violence, however, it becomes possible to reason about the state as a target of violence and the decision to not pick up arms against it can be made.

2. Negative consequences of revenge. Clusters about the negative consequences of violence were identified from all five nonviolent Islamists. In general, these chains involve reasoning along these lines:

If       **Possibility for revenge** (“If I use violence”)  
And      **Repeated violence by the home state** (“the wheel of violence started”)

Then **Negative consequences of revenge** (“The state would kill us all”)  
Then **Unacceptable consequences of revenge**  
 (“a bad government is better than a war killing thousands”)  
Then **NO VIOLENCE AGAINST HOME STATE**

Rather than addressing the importance of structures per se as the previous cluster of chains about nonviolence, these chains deal with the government’s reaction if force was used against it. As expressed in the presented line of reasoning, beliefs about the unacceptable consequences of revenge are logically preceded by aggression by the state and the possibility to take revenge against it, thus recognizing the state as a target of violence. In this way, the propositional content of unacceptable consequences of revenge already implies the possibility to consider the state as a target, as opposed to the superiority of existing structures.

3. Success of peaceful activities. Chains directly connecting nonviolence with the complete success of peaceful activities were abducted from the cognitive maps of two nonviolent Islamists. The lines of reasoning of both Islamists start with aggression by the home state, which is connected with the partial success of peaceful activity against the state (“the government’s crimes become visible;” “a new generation of Muslim Brothers developed”), which, in turn, is connected with the complete success of peaceful activity against the state (“the government will disappear;” “We eliminated the evil”). Like the propositional contents of assertions about the negative consequences of revenge, the propositional contents of peaceful activities against the state imply that the state is considered a target, and one can imagine that possible activities against it include the use of violence. This consideration is moreover strengthened by the observation that the class antecedent to peaceful activities is state violence. In addition, the propositional content of the assertions directly connected with the decision – the complete success of peaceful activities – even implies that aggression by the states, against which peaceful activities are directed, is overcome.

4. Impossibility to reach goals through violence. Chains directly connecting nonviolence with the impossibility of reaching goals through violence were identified from the cognitive maps of three nonviolent Islamists. Chains antecedent to this impossibility differed with each individual: One linked it to a badness of his fellow citizens, which was in turn linked to a badness of the home state (living conditions), a second one connected it with God’s Might, and a third one to repeated aggression by the home state. As observed concerning assertions about the negative consequences of revenge and the complete success of peaceful activities, the propositional contents of assertions about the impossibility

to reach goals through violence imply that the state can be considered a target of violence. Unlike the propositional contents of assertions about the complete success of peaceful activities, they do however not suggest that aggression by the state is overcome.

C. CHAINS ANTECEDENT TO VIOLENCE AGAINST HOME STATE.

Like the chains of reasoning antecedent to nonviolence against the Egyptian state, chains antecedent to violence involve state violence and can be considered extensions of the chains antecedent to state violence. Like the chains about state violence and nonviolence, chains about nonviolence are also divided into several clusters of chains, directly linking violence with four belief combinations.

Before going into a more detailed presentation, it must be noted that, with the exception of one violent Islamist who nevertheless still had transformatory goals (“I wanted to die”), all of these chains include direct links between transformatory goals and violence – a key inference which differentiates the decision-making of violent from that of nonviolent Islamists. Taking a closer look at the individual clusters, one observes that transformatory goals appear in combination with assertions about state violence and other beliefs.

1. Transformatory goals and absence of alternative means. This cluster was identified from the belief systems of two violent Islamists and connects transformatory goals with the absence of alternative means and the decision to use violence against the Egyptian state. In both belief systems, the absence of alternative means is logically preceded by violence of the state; one Islamist also considered his lack of success in the pursuit of his private goals as antecedent of the absence of alternative means, while the other said that his private goals and peaceful activities against the state are also antecedent to the absence of alternative means.

2. The possibility to reach transformative goals by violence. This cluster of chains was abduced from the cognitive maps of two other violent Islamists and involves reasoning with the belief that it is possible to reach the goals through violence. Consider this line of reasoning, for example:

Table 3

Looking at this line of reasoning, one observes that the possibility to reach the Islamist's goals is logically preceded by several other assertions about the strength of the army, the support of violence in his direct environment, and his strong will. This was also found in the line of reasoning of the second violent Islamist who directly connected the possibility to reach the goals through violence with his decision in favour of violence against the Egyptian state. Like the line of reasoning by the first Islamist, the line of this second Islamist involves a support of violence in his direct environment and strong will, but also other beliefs like the approval of the people and badness of the government (suppression), revealing additional sub-chains connected with the decision to pick up arms.

Comparing the propositional contents of the main beliefs of the latter cluster involving the possibility to reach goals with that of the previous cluster involving the absence of alternative means, one notices that assertions of the previous cluster provide a comparatively negative outlook on the achievement of the goals, an outlook referring to the existence but not to the possible success of violence as a means. From this perspective, the inference from the absence of nonviolent means for reaching transformatory goals to the application of violence presented by the first cluster point at the possibility to decide to pick up arms with beliefs that do not by themselves suggest that there is use or hope in doing so.

One could, for instance, imagine that the absence of alternative means was logically preceded by beliefs whose propositional contents only exclude other means, thus suggesting violence as a last resort rather than a means promising success (such reasoning was in fact discovered: "there was a wall ... there were no rights ... there was nothing"). On the contrary, the propositional contents of the main beliefs of the second cluster, the possibility to reach goals through violence, does imply the possibility of success. Such a possibility could but does not have to be logically preceded by the absence of alternative means. As observed by a nonviolent Islamist, one can imagine that violent Islamists believed that political participation took too long to reach their goals and decided to use violence "as a shortcut to the goal" – so there was in fact another means. On the other hand, one could imagine the possibility to reach goals to be logically preceded by absence of alternative means in combination with successful application of violence in other places.

*3. Transformatory goals, support of violence in local environment and ignorance of possible reactions of the state to resistance.* This cluster of chains related to violence against the Egyptian state involves reasoning with transformatory goals, support for violence in direct environment and activity supporting violence, and ignorance of possible state reactions to resistance. These chains were abducted from the

cognitive maps of two violent Islamists and directly link decisions in favour of violence with transformatory goals and ignorance of the state's reaction to resistance. One of the Islamists, for instance, referred to this ignorance, or superficiality, in this way: "I was superficial. It didn't occur to me that the US would have come and defeated us, had we taken over the state." The other Islamist talked about his transformatory goals this way: "We are living in jahiliyya (ignorance from God's will) while the Sharia is a duty."

Moreover, both Islamists observed aggression and a badness of the home state as antecedents to support for violence. However, as observed concerning the previous clusters, the individual lines of reasoning still differed through other, not shared beliefs, which I refer to as sub-chains of this cluster: While one of the Islamists also directly connected the observation that he had an alternative ("I am a doctor, I could have been a millionaire") with his decision to use violence against the Egyptian state, the other one considered the loss of Nasser's government to be antecedent to the badness of the home state. In comparison with the previous clusters, the chains of this cluster have assertions with propositional contents not focusing on violence as a means. Rather, their propositional contents refer to the immediate context in which the Islamists applied violence as a means, to a lack of insight and support of the means through activities or friends.

### Conclusion

In this paper, I have presented belief systems connected with decisions to use and not use violence against the state. These systems were abduced from cognitive maps based on interviews with ten Egyptian Islamists, five who have turned from violence and five who never embraced violence. All ten cognitive maps share chains of beliefs antecedent to the belief that the state is violent, which is in turn connected with other chains of beliefs antecedent to decisions for and against violence towards the state. Every interviewee talked about state violence and considered this a major source of his decision for political action, whether with or without violence. Hence, perceived state violence appears to be a crucial first step in decision-making both for and against violence by Egyptian Islamists.

In addition, the cognitive maps indicate that certain key beliefs, when combined with belief in state violence, logically precede decisions for and against violence towards the state.

*Nonviolence towards the state is logically preceded by one or more of four combinations of beliefs:*

1. State violence and superiority of existing structure to chaos of violence
2. State violence and negative consequences of revenge

3. State violence and potential success of peaceful activities against state
4. State violence and impossibility to reach goals through violence

Violence towards the state is logically preceded by one or more of three combinations of beliefs:

1. State violence, transformatory goals and absence of alternative means
2. State violence, transformatory goals and possibility to reach goals by violence
3. State violence, transformatory goals, local support of violence, and ignorance of possible state reactions to violent resistance .

In addition to the belief that the state is violent, all the Islamists who decide to pick up arms share a belief in transformatory goals, that is goals which include the complete transformation of existing political structures. Although nonviolent Islamists also have these goals, they do not directly relate them to their decisions to not pick up arms - instead, they consider their decisions against violence to be directly connected with other beliefs. As shown, the beliefs directly connected with the decision to not pick up arms are even contradictory to transformatory goals (superiority of existing structures to chaos of violence), or they imply that transformatory goals are achievable by nonviolent means (potential success of peaceful activities against state).

It is interesting to note that the core beliefs of the combinations logically preceding decisions both for and against violence include some of the main elements of just war theory, namely just cause (state violence), last resort (absence of alternative means), probability of success (possibility to reach goals), and proportionality such that benefits outweigh harm (chaos, consequences of revenge) (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and Evans, 2005, pp.12-13).

However, whereas just war theory requires all of these elements, decisions in favour of violence by my interviewees are not so demanding. Decisions for violence against the state can apparently be made from beliefs in just cause and last resort (no matter the probability of success) or from beliefs in just cause and probability of success (no matter if violence is the last resort). If confirmed in future studies, this kind of disjunction between the psychology of just war and moral and legal requirements of just war theory may be of general importance for understanding the origins of violence in intergroup conflict.

There is another possible implication of my results, if confirmed in future research. This paper has explored decision-making in favour of and against violence in the name of Islam and presented common chains of reasoning allowing such decision-making. Knowledge of these chains might be useful

for other literature about the sources of violence in the name of Islam. Leuprecht et al. (2010), for example, examine narratives of jihad which hold that the “war on terrorism” is a war on Islam, that al-Qaeda is the vanguard of Islamic resistance to Western domination, and that the means used by al-Qaeda and its supporters are justified in defense of Islam (cf. pp. 42-47). As the authors note, polling data suggest that substantial numbers of Muslims accept this narrative, but those who agree that there is a war on Islam and that violent responses are justified in defense of Islam are far from action (Ibid.). The chains of beliefs that are connected with a personal decision for or against violence may provide useful insights about how general beliefs do or do not translate to violent action.

The chains of beliefs reported here suggest that there are explicit supports and barriers for violence against the state, which involve the belief that the state is violent in combination with other key beliefs about the nature of the state, the availability of nonviolent means, the possibility of success, the nature of goals, and other beliefs in the key combinations identified. These more specific beliefs can be investigated in future research, including polls designed to assess the popularity of key beliefs about violence in name of Islam.

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**Table 1. Belief chains antecedent to seeing state violence against citizens, cluster 1**

<b>CHAIN 1a Nonviolent Islamist 1</b>	<b>CHAIN 1a Nonviolent Islamist 3</b>	<b>CHAIN 1b Nonviolent Islamist 2</b>	<b>CHAIN 1c Violent Islamist 5</b>	<b>CHAIN 1c Violent Islamist 3</b>
	<p>If</p> <p><b>Weakness of the Islamists</b></p> <p>The Khalifat doesn't exist any more</p> <p>The umma is deteriorating</p>		<p>If</p> <p><b>Badness of Home State: Foreign Policy</b></p> <p>Sadat made peace with Israel</p>	<p>If</p> <p><b>Badness of Home State: Foreign Policy</b></p> <p>Sadat made peace with Israel</p>
<p>If</p> <p><b>Badness of Foreign State: Domination and Foreign Policy</b></p> <p>US superiority, imperialism</p>	<p>Then</p> <p><b>Badness of Foreign State: Domination and Foreign Policy</b></p> <p>The US rules the world</p>	<p>If</p> <p><b>Badness of Foreign State: Domination and Foreign Policy</b></p> <p>The US supported Israel</p>	<p>Then</p> <p><b>Badness of Foreign State: Domination and Foreign Policy</b></p> <p>He gave peace into the hands of the US</p>	
<p>Then</p> <p><b>Strength of Home State</b></p> <p>Support of Nasser</p>				
<p>Then</p> <p><b>Badness of Home State: Imposition</b></p> <p>Nasser became president</p> <p>Some people rule this country by force, the people did not elect the state</p>	<p>Then</p> <p><b>Badness of Home State: Imposition</b></p> <p>We see the opposite of what we had</p> <p>We need free and fair elections</p>			
		<p>Then</p> <p><b>Peaceful Activity against Foreign State</b></p> <p>I demonstrated against the US</p>		
<p>Then</p> <p><b>Violence by Home State</b></p> <p>The government started attacking its opponents</p>	<p>Then</p> <p><b>Violence by Home State</b></p> <p>The government arrests Islamists and tortures them</p> <p>The government attacks the Islamists online and in the media</p>	<p>Then</p> <p><b>Violence by Home State</b></p> <p>They put me into prison in 2003, 2006, 2007</p>	<p><b>Violence by Home State</b></p> <p>The arrests of 1981 occurred</p> <p>Sadat arrested 3000 of us</p>	<p>Then</p> <p><b>Violence by Home State</b></p> <p>He attacked Islam</p>

**Table 2.**  
**Typical chain of reasoning antecedent to nonviolence:**  
**Belief in state violence but also in value of state against chaos**

<b>Nonviolent Islamist 1</b>	<b>Nonviolent Islamist 2</b>
If <b>Absence of Existing Structures</b> If there was no law We see this in the Sudan, in Iraq	If <b>Absence of Existing Structures</b> If there was no structure
Then <b>Negative Consequences of Structures Absence</b> We would have chaos There will be fitna (fights among Muslims)	Then <b>Negative Consequences of Structures Absence</b> There would be chaos
	Then <b>Indispensability of Existing Structure</b> The structure is our basis We need a structure organizing life
Then <b>Superiority of Existing Structures</b> <u>The law must be respected even if it is unjust</u> <u>My mind does not accept a violation of the law</u>	Then <b>Superiority of Existing Structures</b> <u>I respect the state and the constitution in every way</u>
If <b>Superiority of the Existing Structures</b> <i>And</i> <b>Violence by Home State</b> <i>The state attacked me and threatened my children</i>	If <b>Superiority of the Existing Structures</b> <i>And</i> <b>Violence by Home State</b> <i>They put me into prison</i>
Then <b>NO VIOLENCE AGAINST HOME STATE</b> <i>I DO NOT AND WOULD NOT USE VIOLENCE AGAINST THE EGYPTIAN STATE</i>	Then <b>NO VIOLENCE AGAINST HOME STATE</b> <i>I DID NOT RETALIATE BY FORCE</i>

Table 3. Chain of reasoning involving the belief that it is possible to reach goals through violence. Other chains which involved this belief additionally involved about ten other concepts and were too complex to be represented in this table.

<p><i>If</i>  <b>Violence by Home State</b>  <i>The arrests of 81 occurred, Sadat arrested 1536 of us</i></p> <p>And  <b>Strength of the Opposition</b>  Societal movements were very strong back then</p>
<p>Then  <u><b>Strong Will</b></u>  <u>We were very angry and wanted revenge</u></p>
<p><i>If</i>  <b>Support of Violence in Direct Environment</b>  I knew the army, I had friends there</p> <p>And  <b>Strength of the Army</b>  The army changes and moves society without shedding blood</p> <p>And  <b>Transformatory Goal</b>  We are living in jahiliyya while the Sharia is a duty  I dreamt of building an Islamic state  I thought of changing the state and the system  I wanted a complete change to happen</p>
<p>Then  <u><b>Possibility to Reach Goals through Violence</b></u>  <u>I thought at the time that the army could bring the change</u></p>
<p><i>If</i>  <u><b>Possibility to Reach Goals through Violence</b></u>  <u>I thought at the time that the army could bring the change</u></p> <p>And  <u><b>Strong Will</b></u>  <u>We were very angry and wanted revenge</u></p>
<p><i>Then</i>  <b>VIOLENCE AGAINST HOME STATE</b>  <i>I ADVISED TO DO THE CHANGE, I USED VIOLENCE INTELLECTUALLY</i></p>