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Beat 'em or join 'em? : export subsidies versus international research joint ventures in oligopolistic markets
Author(s)
Date Issued
1998-05-11
Date Available
2011-07-25T14:22:23Z
Abstract
This paper compares adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and,
because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other's R&D. When the government can
commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidisation may yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation and lower even than free trade, though qualifications to the dangers from no commitment are noted.
Sponsorship
Not applicable
Type of Material
Working Paper
Publisher
University College Dublin. School of Economics
Series
UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series
WP98/10
Subject – LCSH
Research, Industrial--Mathematical models
Commercial policy--Mathematical models
Export subsidies--Mathematical models
Language
English
Status of Item
Not peer reviewed
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
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