Was Sally's reason for running from the bear that she thought it was chasing her

Sally thinks she is being chased by a bear, and runs away. Let us suppose that running away makes sense in the circumstance.1 It seems clear that her reason for running is that a bear is chasing her. But it also seems that her reason for running is that she thinks a bear is chasing her.2 Indeed it is sometimes asserted that her real reason cannot be that a bear is chasing her, but must be merely that she thinks or believes that a bear is chasing her. For example, Michael Smith has argued as follows:
Given that an agent who has a motivating reason to φ is in a state that is in this way potentially explanatory of her φ-ing, it is then natural to suppose that her motivating reason is itself psychologically real. … By contrast with normative reasons, then, which seem to be truths … motivating reasons would seem to be psychological states, states that play a certain explanatory role in providing action. (Smith 1994, p. 96)