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The Puzzle of Self-Deception
Author(s)
Date Issued
2013-11
Date Available
2015-11-04T04:00:19Z
Abstract
It is commonly accepted that people can, and regularly do, deceive
themselves. Yet closer examination reveals a set of conceptual puzzles
that make self-deception difficult to explain. Applying the conditions for
other-deception to self-deception generates what are known as the
'paradoxes' of belief and intention. Simply put, the central problem is how
it is possible for me to believe one thing, and yet
intentionally cause myself
to believe its contradiction. There are two general
approaches taken by
philosophers to account for these puzzles about the
self-deceptive state
and the process of self-deception. 'Partitioning' strategies try to resolve
the paradoxes by proposing that the mind is divided
in some way that
allows self-deception to occur. 'Reformulation' strategies suggest that the
conditions we use to define self-deception should be modified so that the
paradoxes do not arise at all. Both approaches are
subject to criticism
about the consequences of the strategies philosophers use, but recent
cross-disciplinary analyses of self-deception may help shed light on the
puzzles that underlie this phenomenon.
Type of Material
Journal Article
Publisher
Wiley
Journal
Philosophy Compass
Volume
8
Issue
11
Start Page
1018
End Page
1029
Copyright (Published Version)
2013 Wiley
Language
English
Status of Item
Peer reviewed
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
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