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A dynamic model of cross licensing
Author(s)
Date Issued
2004-11-05
Date Available
2008-11-24T17:04:39Z
Abstract
In sectors with cumulative and complementry technologies, some rms build patent portfolios in order to block their competitors' access to the technology and/or to negociate cross licensing agreements. We propose a dynamic model that captures this behaviour in an integrated duopoly where the rms invest successively in upstream patentable technologies and downstream marketable products. We study the impact of legal patent strength on competition and investment. We then consider two alternative settings. One where the rms cross license or pool their patents and another where the patent strength is restricetd. We verify whether and when such alternatives are socially efficient.
Type of Material
Working Paper
Publisher
University College Dublin. School Of Economics
Series
UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series
WP04/24
Copyright (Published Version)
2004 School Of Economics, University College Dublin
Subject – LCSH
Technological innovations
License agreements
Patents
Language
English
Status of Item
Not peer reviewed
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
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