<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Title</strong></th>
<th>Erewhon or Nowhere Land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authors(s)</strong></td>
<td>Buttmer, Anne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Publication date</strong></td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Publication information</strong></td>
<td>Gale, S., Olsson, G. (eds.). Philosophy in Geography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Series</strong></td>
<td>Theory and Decision Library; Volume 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Publisher</strong></td>
<td>D. Reidel Publishing Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Item record/more information</strong></td>
<td><a href="http://hdl.handle.net/10197/10728">http://hdl.handle.net/10197/10728</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EREWHON OR NOWHERE LAND

Anne Buttimer, University College Dublin

I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout a century of Western social thought, mankind's perennial enquiry into the where, when, and how of life has yielded a rich legacy of speculation. From the ebullient satire of Butler's Erewhon (Butler 1872) and the idealism of utopian fiction, the angry critique of Existentialist and Marxist philosophy and the resounding protest of popular song, evidence abounds that the human spirit remains undaunted in its desire to not only grasp the course of events but also to ameliorate and control the conditions of life. The increasing rate and complexity of change in our day renders the challenge to rationality so overwhelming that at times it becomes difficult to pause, reflect, and evaluate the latent assumptions and implications of scholarly effort. Barriers to communication between separate worlds of scholarship, too, prevent the flow of insight between different specialized perspectives, or the restoration of harmony between the YIN and the YANG of human reason.

The folkways of Erewhon, under the satirical gaze of Butler, all appeared internally consistent, albeit absurd, because of the 'unreason' governing this strange land. The roles assumed by professors of Hypothetics, Evasion, and Inconsistency, within their Colleges of Unreason, the use of currency from Musical Banks, and the ubiquitous assent to the expertise of Straighteners all add up to a picture of one particular society somewhere. Butler's account could have served not only as entertainment for readers in England, but also as a mirror which Erewhonians could have used to gaze at the absurdity of their own life styles, values, and social organization. How fascinating it would be if a contemporary Butler could look in a similar way at our Colleges of Unreason, our speculative games in hypothetics and straightening! Planners, psychiatrists, landscape arthitects and social workers today could be seen as having roles analogous to those of Erewhon's 'Straighteners'. The role of academic geographers, other social scientists and philosophers, could be seen as analogous to those of 'Professors' in the Colleges of Unreason. Role systems and values are no doubt very different, the separation of professor and straightener roles is not so clearly defined, nor do we speak exclusively for one culturally circumscribed world like Erewhon. Today we seek universal principles governing behavior everywhere and blueprints for planning which might be applicable anywhere. Could the contemporary geographer and would-be planner find himself satirized in the Beatles’ cry:

"He's a real nowhere man sitting in his nowhere land making all his nowhere plans for nobody... "?

One of the profound differences between the 'unreason' of either end of our century appears to lie not only in the manner in which the where, how, and why of life is posed, but also in our conceptions of the 'who'. Do we speak of somebody, living somewhere, or of anybody, anywhere? Have we, social scientists involved in applied work, ever seriously considered what life might be like in the rationally-designed environments which our disciplines have taunt us to imagine and prescribe? And if we had been assigned to them, with little or no discretion over

---

the choice or the design, what would the impact be on our attitudes and perceptions of life?

As repeated evidence of ecological and political crisis join a gnawing sense of personal and collective failure to cope, scholars engage so eagerly in the quest for rational understanding that they become less open to hear such satire. Why, at this time, question whether or how reason may address itself to these issues? Something of the naïveté of a child, the vision of a poet, or the wit of a novelist, would be needed to question, for instance, whether the geographer could plan wisely for the organization of space or the management of ecological systems. Yet, as the pace of analytical and programmatic effort gains momentum, it may be crucially important to pause and reflect critically upon the nature and direction of our applied endeavors.

This paper outlines some general themes for a critical look at the geographer’s involvement in applied work: to sound a note of YANG amidst the resounding YIN of contemporary ‘rationality’. Adopting a Butler-style perspective on contemporary Erewhon, it focuses first on some of the meta-ply opers used in applied geography as expressions of the ‘professor’s’ desire to combine his efforts with those of the ‘straightener’. Recognizing the positive intent and reasonable success of much applied work, it raises some questions concerning its logical and practical rationale, as well as the short- and long-term consequences of a managerial approach toward the amelioration of environmental problems. Next it explores the myth of ‘rationality’ and the peculiar sets of social and ideological influences which tend to shape both the language and style of the geographer’s engagement in problem resolution. Thirdly, it examines some of the philosophical premises which underlie contrasting perspectives on an ideal social and physical order.

A critical look at the record to date can benefit from the categories of philosophy and sociology of knowledge, but these do not necessarily point toward a direction for future effort. To clear the ground for a more logically-defensible and practically relevant applied geography, there are legacies of thought and practice to be transcended. One needs emancipation not only from ideological and institutional influence, but also a clearer understanding of the geographer’s potential role in elucidating problems. Unwittingly perhaps, geographers appear to have assumed the anthropocentric bias characteristic of Western philosophy and social sciences generally, and an implicit faith in scientific rationality. There appears to be a need, in the applied sphere particularly, for a kind of geography which regards man as part of the biosphere as a whole; a geography which refuses to base its identity solely on the criteria appropriate to other disciplines. There is also a need to evoke the conscious engagement of people in coping with issues which touch their lives, and the best intentioned efforts of specialized academic and planning elites have often prevented rather than encouraged this. A critical examination of role and appropriate domain of effort is needed if we wish to assume practical relevance to society.

I. 1. Utopia for Erewhon
Revisiting Erewhon, one century later, Butler might have remarked on the profound changes evident within its Colleges of Unreason. Professors, for a variety of reasons, are more involved in the practical affairs of society. Straighteners, now more numerous and functionally specialized, are obviously failing in their duties as counsellots, therapists, and monitors of social life. More rational ideas and guidelines are needed in order to cope with the unprecedented nature and volume of ecological and social crises.

Each type of professor rallies his own brand of Hypothetics to the task of ameliorating Erewhon life. Some share visions of efficient and comprehensive administrative systems, others speculate on ways whereby the production and distribution of material goods and services could
be organized more efficiently. Theories are advanced to show how social relationships and interactions might be better streamlined and rationally harmonized. Prophets of doom warn of ecological catastrophe and propose measures which could help restore equilibrium and sustained yield of national resources. The specialization of expertise which by now characterizes academic life has led to much keener insight into particular facets of social life and its environmental context, but it has also created enormous difficulties in communicating across disciplinary boundaries, thus militating against the prospect of ever reaching an integrated perspective on problems or their resolution. A cacaphony of monologues serves to confuse rather than elucidate the real world anxieties and hopes of people. While diversity of perspectives marks an impressive advance in knowledge, the lack of a common language prevents professors from reaping the full fruits of specialized endeavor.

Geographers, of course, argue that they possess special skills to deal with manifold phenomena. Sensitive to the straighteners’ challenge, they had always endeavored to gain a more comprehensive grasp of the connections between physical and human processes. De facto, however, the thrust of applied geographic concern had not only been limited by the restricted vision of subdisciplinary specialization but it had also become imbued with the anthropocentric bias of related disciplines. The concerns of other occupants of the biosphere - animals, plants, resources, technology - had been relegated almost exclusively to specialized and separated disciplines, and rarely if ever had the language of interdisciplinary or cross-disciplinary effort been sensitive to any other sphere of being except human or ecological 'systems'.

Philosophers and others watch this movement with a mixture of cynicism and guarded optimism. They offer fresh insight into the philosophical premises underlying the ideas and practices of various disciplines, and remark about ways in which ideology and politics often influence the nature and direction of professors’ work. As ever unrivalled masters in the art of sitting-on-the fence, however, they often leave the applied geographer in a worse state of confusion than when he had begun. Overwhelmed by the urgency of immediate problems he has difficulty grasping either the full meaning of philosophical critique or constructing a more comprehensive and logically defensible overall framework for applied work. To illustrate some features of the contemporary American geographer’s approach to applied research let us focus more specifically on some of the standard metaphors used in his contribution to the general discourse. These metaphors can best be appreciated in the context of the ideal social and physical order which is deemed desireable.

1.2. Geographic Perspectives: Diagnosis and Therapy

Within the ideal vision commonly held in the mid 20th century, peace and justice for all is to be guaranteed by scientifically-based research and planning. Equal opportunities to material welfare are to be available to all individuals and rational programming of economic and social life is to guarantee general harmony with the society. Many geographers feel they have much to offer on the feasibility of various strategies which could help achieve such an order. To gain a perspective on inequalities within existing levels of social well-being, for example, they offer ‘gap maps’: summary documentation on the spatial dimensions of various problems which were to be 'straightened'. Further, they offer special insight into the mechanisms whereby inequalities come to be, i.e., inefficiencies in delivery of services, ‘non-rational’ location of jobs, schools, and housing and other aspects of everyday life. If only straighteners could be convinced of the rationality involved in central place systems, they could experiment with alternative models of locational efficiency, and thus hopefully reduce
inequalities. On the general question of social justice however, geographers remain divided and this often leads to conflicts over values, ideological orientation, and even some of the philosophical foundations of their work. Some argue for revolution within the capitalist system which had dominated this land for at least a century; some spell out reformist strategies without even questioning the fundamental structure of society; others argue that nothing short of radical demolition of existing structures would ever suffice to guarantee a route toward justice. A look at each of these terms: 'inequality', 'inefficiency', and 'injustice', could illustrate some of the problems faced by the applied geographer today.

1.2.1. Inequality. By mid-century, a considerable bank of data was available to allow geographers to document spatial variations in social well-being within society. For example, they could offer some useful insight into pressing issues of poverty by plotting the spatial distribution of income within the entire population.

One implicit solution to poverty was simply to transfer 'income' from the 'have' regions to the 'have not', i.e., to reduce the gaps on the welfare map. This solution had already been applied in other contexts with a reasonable measure of success. Why not apply this relatively straightforward procedure, then, to other spheres of social inequality, e.g., housing, education, health and retail services? In fact, their professional association begins compiling a whole atlas of such gap maps to indicate their corporate support for this venture.

From the fence, however, come voices of protest and philosophical misgiving. First, questions are raised concerning the methodology of using aggregate measures of welfare over such wide and diverse regions as administratively defined areas and census tracts. What was the value of an index of average income for a total district where obvious differentials existed? Secondly, queries emerge about the feasibility of such solutions as fiscal transfer, bussing of schoolchildren, or legal proscriptions against prejudicial housing codes. The geographer should become aware of the economist's hypothetics - the political scientist's too - before he could assume that structural and spatial solutions could thus be harmonized. More seriously, however, comes the criticism of language: what precisely was meant by 'poverty'? Surely people varied in their definitions of what constituted well-being - poverty was a relative rather than an absolute state - and also would not the capacity to earn currency be a more important measure of wealth or poverty than a record of bank deposits? Other social scientists come to the geographer's defense, elaborating on the need (not only on methodological but moral grounds) for standard definitions of poverty and minimal standards of provision. The debate takes various directions, and indeed minimal standards for welfare are eventually defined at least for the benefit of census takers and civil servants. Misgivings still abound, however, from both within and without the geographer's world. How was this equalization of welfare to be achieved? Was it to be administered by a 'straightener' elite equipped with the social scientist's rational blueprint? What relationship could or should exist between those who plan, and those for whom plans were made? What role could or should individuals play in creating and implementing social change? Was there a qualitative difference between planning policy at a national and local scale? These questions probe to the heart of taken-for-granted folkways deeply anchored within society as a whole, and they challenge geographers and straighteners to question both their conventional roles and the myriad ways in which their ideas and practices had become inextricably bound up with economic, technological, and political interests.

Some geographers dismiss such distractions and press on with unabated zeal to find more
incisive analytical tools to examine problems. After all, evidence abounded from socialist societies that redistribution of wealth had actually succeeded in reducing inequalities. Others heed the methodological cautions and revise their procedures; several become more explicit in their ideological stances. A great number do agree that their 'gap maps' merely scratched the surface of social problems and they rally disciplinary expertise toward the task of elucidating processes responsible for causing such inequalities.

1.2.2. *Inefficiency.* If the gaps on spatial inequality maps could be regarded as somehow stemming from inefficiencies in certain underlying systems, then a fresh perspective could perhaps be gained on the issue of social injustice. A whole range of tools from the geographer's arsenal could be applied to this task, e.g., assessing systems of service provision, transport networks, job opportunities, and access to market. To solve problems of inequality, one had merely to restore, or infuse some rationality into 'spatial systems'. For if spatial systems were made to function efficiently, then everyone would behave rationally, support his appropriate node in the spatial hierarchy of services, and not have to wander about in search of alternatives.

Voices from the fence again come to temper the geographer's enthusiasm. Look at the evidence, it is argued: Garden City and New Town plans, concrete jungles and White Elephants all originally planned on the basis of good spatial models and theory, and the results have not been impressive. Besides, what justification does the geographer offer for assuming that there is a connection between the efficiency of spatial systems and the quality of human life? What if some of the key ingredients of human happiness are not reducable to a metric which can be accomodated in spatial models? What, again, if it is the very efficiency of spatial systems which produces inequality, and thereby militates most against the quality of human life?

Questions such as these provoke more fundamental enquiry into the implicit ideals sought in studies of both equality and efficiency. Was the 'geographic' utopia one in which all men would have access to an equal share of material welfare, and all systems were operating efficiently? But were these two conditions compatible? In some cases, it could be argued, these two objectives were at odds with one another - that it was the very efficiency of spatial systems which contributed most toward polarization of wealth and increasing levels of inequality. Centralized economic and social opportunity, growth poles, and rational networks of communication could be regarded as 'systems of spatial domination'. Was there something inherent in geographic models themselves which made them particularly amenable to application in 'imperializing' contexts, favoring the 'supplier's' view of services rather than the clienfs, the investor's perspective rather than the consumer's? Decentralization plans for hospitals, social welfare, services or schools appear to have been based on the criteria of 'supply efficiency'-optimal allocation of personnel, equipment, and service outlets. They have not always been sensitive to the nature, quality and location of probable demand. Could it be because the focus of both analysis and therapy had rested on ROLES, aggregate measures of population, rather than on individual persons, that the 'planned' service failed to satisfy people in their total everyday situations? The impasse was more than methodological; there were issues here of a moral and ideological character, and these generated heated debate over what one actually meant by 'social justice'.

1.2.3. *Injustice.* For the applied geographer, willing to adopt legal definitions of justice,
metaphysical and ethical problems scarcely arose. The meaning of terms such as ‘equality’ and ‘efficiency’, rights and responsibilities, could be logically derived from publicly affirmed norms and standards. Disturbing evidence from their own actual practice, however, coupled with a growing confidence in confronting philosophical questions, begins to generate much debate over the nature of society generally, its ideological underpinnings, and the justification for having such an elite as planners and applied social scientists at all. What if an ideal social order were to involve more than a full complement of material goods and security against environmental hazards? The capacity to allow individual human beings to grow creatively, to be concerned about one another and about their environments: how could one plan for such situations? Few would question the desirability of minimal standards of material provision, but how were facilities and opportunities to be redistributed? Was one to invite or compel the underprivileged to adopt a lifestyle and ethic which had already made the affluent ones less than happy? Could people be trusted to draft their own course toward ‘development’?

A painful realization dawns on the socially-conscious geographer. He begins to realize the extent to which spatial models had sometimes been used to impose a rational structure on social life which left little room for human becoming except at the price of buying into an alien system of values, behavior and world view. Spatial models promised efficiency and they had often vindicated themselves; what had not been specified was efficiency for whom, and what were the social costs or inefficiencies for the powerless. Having elucidated various structural (political, economic, technological) foundations for social injustice, was one then to deduce that solutions must also be construed in structural terms? Once identifying a capitalist system as arch villain, for example, should one argue for revolution to abolish the market and set up some kind of socialist structure? In this more ‘spatially just’ economy of the future, could inequalities be reduced (even eliminated by force?), would inefficiencies in spatial systems be intolerable, and could an omniscient ‘people’ be in charge?

The validity of these and other claims for the best strategy toward overall social reform could only be argued on theoretical or ideological grounds: evidence from both socialist and capitalist societies remained equivocal. In so many varied political situations, would-be managers of the social order had only limited success in harnessing the ‘efficiencies’ of production elites for the welfare of society at large. Zealots of structural reform from Rousseau and Ebenezer Howard, to Monnet and Doxiadis, had spent their energies on the architecture of political systems to the neglect of one vital ingredient, viz, human individuals whose lives were to be organized and influenced by these systems. The story of revolutions through history revealed again and again that structural change does not necessarily bring about a change in social dispositions, in the perception or quest for social injustice. Structural reform could, of course, facilitate and precipitate changes in behavior: legal prescriptions and proscriptions could remove or add constraints on opportunities. History, however, suggested that ‘have’ privileges are not easily ceded to ‘have nots’ and the skills developed by powerful elites to circumvent legal constraints were by now public knowledge.

To varying degrees, then, each of the geographer’s metaphors evokes not only issues of logic and methodology, but also triggers worries over their metaphysical and ethical implications. Justifications for the use of terms such as ‘inequality’, ‘inefficiency’, or ‘injustice’ could not even begin without a specification of the ‘utopia’ toward which applied research was directed. The nature and dynamics of this ideal is in turn deeply influenced by
the sociological and political context in which applied research is actually practiced, as becomes clear when one examines the characteristic roles assumed, and the interests which are served in the process. First, let us examine some competing 'utopian' views of social and environmental order in terms of their fundamental assumptions about life, knowledge, and planning. For there is a peculiar sense of 'self fulfilling prophecy' about the models cultivated within particular social sciences; no matter how we may protest about the detached attitudes of the Ivory Tower, our ideas do actually shape the realities we study. And all metaphors of truth - be they mystical scientific, or poetic bear public consequences with profound ethical importance for contemporary life.

II. HUMANISM VERSUS SOCIAL ENGINEERING

Two countervailing themes emerge from recent scholarly writing on the ideal order for society and environment. On the one hand one hears the case for more rationally-ordered monitoring systems to guide and police technology and life styles. On the other hand one hears the plea for an environment which allows for freedom and creativity for the individual. At the risk of understating or diminishing the range and diversity of contemporary effort, one could propose a bi-polar continuum of stances ranging from optimal levels of rational order at one extreme to maximum levels of individual freedom on the other. Like any polarity, this is an artificial construct, designed to highlight contrasts, and to provoke an awareness of the logical foundations and extensions of existing stances. In a very general sense, one might label one pole as that of the positive scientist, and the other is that of the existentialist. The capacity of this schema to accomodate the literature is limited; its aim is rhetorical, designed to open the way for discovering forgotten elements, and intended as an invitation to improve communication among those who are concerned about the practical significance of scholarly effort. What is lost in terms of accuracy may be a justifiable price to pay for improved clarity on the general directions toward which our literature points.

At each pole of our continuum, elaborate scenarios are often sketched, and arguments rallied on both sides. Certain basic contrasts in their fundamental ideological and moral premises, however, make it difficult to evaluate and judge between these seemingly conflicting visions of the ideal order. Perhaps the question to raise is not whether they are compatible or reconcilable, but rather whether there is a perspective on mankind and world which might enable both to discern more clearly where the appropriate arena for their efforts might lie.

To highlight contrasts between the two poles of our continuum, one could outline a stereotypical set of goals which reflect their respective visions of the ideal social order. In the existentialist scenario, self-aware and responsible persons are actively engaged in creating communities and caring for their own environments (Wild, 1963; Winter, 1966; Teilhard de Chardin, 1965; Fromm, 1968): The flowing of individual personalities assumes primary importance; the order and dynamics of social systems are evaluated in terms of personal growth among community members. In the positive scientist's scenario the social order is managed and directed by rationally-designed administrative systems; crises and conflicts are contained, techno-structures controlled; individual needs and behavior are accomodated through well programmed feedback mechanisms (Bell, 1969; Toffier, 1972).

The gulf between these two visions of an ideal social order seems enormous. The human geographer, too, may often feel caught in the tensions between these two extremes (Mercer
Our traditional concern for the earth as home of man, however, should ideally place us in a position to offer some contribution toward better communication across the gulf. It could be argued, from a geographic viewpoint, that as long as utopia is conceived in purely anthropocentric terms, that there will be an inevitable impasse in the debate between 'systems' and 'persons'. Our perspective should challenge minds to examine the relationship between the role of humans as creators of and actors within socio-technical systems on the one hand, and their role as part of nature on the other. To transcend the difficulties created by disciplinary specialization may be extremely difficult within our present institutional settings, but it may very well be the sine qua non for developing a language and perspective on knowledge of the biosphere as a whole. Without an integrated perspective on knowledge, how can one apply bits of knowledge to practical planning (Giddens, 1974)? The route toward developing such a perspective needs to be cleared not only of administrative constraints, but also of the philosophical and conceptual undergrowth which litters our present language and separate endeavors.

II. 1. Rationality and Reason
To begin such ground-clearing one has to appreciate the fundamental philosophy of knowledge and action which underlies the positions held at either end of our continuum. What existentialism offers fundamentally is a perspective on the quality and meaning of human life in the concrete everyday world. Its epistemological foundations stem largely from the phenomeno-logical critique of objectivism and scientific theory, so it speaks of lived experience in the language of meaning, and tries to make values explicit (Jasper, 1956, 1957; Spiegelberg, 1960). The present is seen as emanating from a history, and projected toward a future. Positive science, by contrast, seeks order and measurement in explaining systems operative within the physical and social world (Braithwaite, 1960; Hempel, 1965; Carnap, 1966). Though not explicitly concerned with meaning in the full existentialist sense, it does investigate ordered meaning, i.e., the internal consistency and logic of systems and organizations. It is fundamentally a 'scientific' perspective, emphasizing objectivity, and striving in its use of the scientific method at least, to become 'value free' (Chase, 1962; Myrdal, 1969). Its focus rests primarily on the dynamics of present processes and structures, though it does also claim a predictive function. Explanation may involve references to antecedent processes, but the verification of its postulates, and the validity of its assumptions, depend upon conventionally accepted rules, or to calculations based on the tangibly measureable data of present and past experience. Assertions about practical application usually take the form of extrapolation from existing trends; it has to make assumptions concerning the variability or stability of other conditions in the future (Braithwaite, 1960; Arendt, 1968).

When these contrasting perspectives on knowledge are applied to planning, or to future projection, important contrasts become evident in the manner in which 'value' issues are resolved, and also in assumptions about the manner in which individuals may exercise discretion over the process of change. For the positive social scientist, individuals are usually conceptualized in terms of aggregates- groups labelled and classified according to the methodological requirements of particular research models. Policy formulation, on the other hand, tends to construe populations in terms of roles, sectors, and demographic types, manipulable within the framework of a rational social order. In contrast to this, the existentialist sees individuals as conscious human subjects who have a right and responsibility to choose their own future. Individual persons become free in responding creatively to ambiguous situations, in
becoming consciously engaged in shaping their own lives and milieux. Freedom, in this view, involves more than the elimination of external constraint; it also demands a measure of self-awareness which enables a person to transcend his own situation and evaluate it. Positive scientists have indeed tried to accommodate considerations of value differences (Kohler, 1959; Myrdal, 1969; Scheibe, 1970). As observable phenomena, values have been considered as objectively measurable data which should be included as variables in testing particular hypotheses and developing theory. It is recognized also that values not only influence definition of problems, but also the models used in projecting planning strategies (Gouldnet, 1962; Langer, 1965; Olsson, 1971, 1972; European Cultural Foundation, 1971). Hence comes the increasingly convincing argument for more pluralistic models for social policy, and a more diversified base for democratic participation in decision-making and management (Fromm, 1968; Illich, 1971).

There are many limitations in each of these polarized perspectives which make their relevance as guides for geographic enquiry seriously questionable. The objectivist and ‘rational’ underpinnings of positive science derive from the peculiar philosophical traditions which have influenced Anglo-American social science (Passmore, 1968). Philosophy of science has become virtually identical with epistemology (ways of knowing) as distinct, and often divorced from metaphysical and ethical concerns (Carnap, 1966).

Whereas tremendous gains have been achieved in logical precision and the internal consistency of particular methods and models of analysis, little tangible guidance is available in evaluating the human implications of particular types of logic, rationality, and objectivity as guides for our perceptions of social reality (Brown, 1969; Bortoft, 1971). Despite the enormous strides made in analytical precision and in the verification of descriptive statements, epistemology per se has difficulty in supplying criteria to guide the leap of faith between empirical-descriptive statement and normative prescriptive ones (Carnap, 1966; Hempel, 1965).

Each position contains, no doubt, a germ of truth, and valid methods whereby that version of truth is to be articulated. Taken separately, however, each can lead to exaggerated conclusions about the feasibility of particular planning strategies. The existentialist position is particularly valuable as critique and caution to the rational planner, but in itself it either refuses to make judgement about the ethical and logical dimensions of normative projection, or else implicitly assigns this to the area of personal or ideological choice (Entrikin, 1976). With some exceptions, there is a tendency among existentialists to absolutize individual freedom and the capacity for responsible choice, and to overlook the enormous managerial challenges of designing systems of production, exchange, and organization at the collective level.

Both traditions share an anthropocentric bias; future is seen primarily in human terms, whether one emphasizes managerial efficiency of socio-technical systems on the one hand, or the freedom for individuals on the other. This bias has found ideological and institutional support in most Western societies, whether of a laissez-faire capitalist-type or of a more centrally organized socialist one. The domination of nature, it has been argued, is part and parcel of the genesis of scientific methodology (Leiss, 1974; Schroyer, 1975).

II.2. Rationality’s Challenge: to be ‘straightened’ or ‘tamed’?

The volume of literature which has emphasized contrasts between phenomenology and positive science has perhaps clouded our ability to grasp their common denominators (Husserl, 1954; Wild, 1963; Mercer and Powell, 1972). At the core of each stance lay an implicit faith in objectivity. Yet the ultimate goal of rational knowledge, in most Western intellectual traditions,
was ideally one of emancipation, i.e., the rules and discipline which guided enquiry were intended to set the mind free to explore and elucidate reality in a logically defensible and/or experientially grounded manner. It is not surprising that in recent years, the overwhelming challenge of applying knowledge to action and planning has brought scholars from both traditions to an appreciation of common problems, and a concerted attempt to reach solutions. A critique of knowledge and action has to incorporate more than simply the logic and acuity of cognitive processes for it is now observed that both the logic and methodology of scientific enquiry are intimately conjoined with the human interests which they serve (Habermas, 1974. See also, Gadamer, 1975 and Goulet 1971).

The directions set by Husserl, i.e., to become aware of those 'fillers' through which the mind screens its perceptions of reality, and to aim at arriving at a state of pure objectivity, has offered a valuable critique of 'objectivism', a priori models, and procedures of positive science (Husserl, 1931, 1954; Pivcevic, 1970; Spiegelberg, 1960). Few, however, still cling to the hope of achieving a state where one may be certain of having grasped the 'essences' of things, and, in fact, hermeneutical scholars freely admit that any interpretation of 'fact' is inevitably influenced by preconceptions (Ricoeur, 1971; Palmer, 1969; Kockelmans, 1975). Joining the long line of scholarship which for a century or so has pursued a Verstehen approach to knowledge, they have probed into the whole area of meanings, values, and ideas, which have characterized the human record (Dilthey, 1954, 1957; Martindale, 1968). They do not rely on a priori theory or the testing of lawlike hypotheses; rather they attempt to unmask the meanings expressed in human behavior and action, following a method analogous to the literary interpretation of texts (Palmer, 1969; Kockelmans, 1975). Hermeneutical knowledge is always mediated through the categories of the interpreter's pre-understanding. Hence if he does not simultaneously become aware of his own meaning world, he will fail to unmask the meanings underlying the situations he studies (Tuttle, 1969). There is an obvious trap here: for the language through which he can gain and eventually articulate such understanding may simply be a different version of knowledge- a different language and a different understanding from that of the positive scientist (Bortoft, 1971). How is one to evaluate the appropriate-ness of different forms of language in the arena of knowledge in use, if one has not clarified the appropriate language for the communication of knowledge itself? There is a vital need for this kind of interpretative elucidation of human meaning when one considers applied scientific work. It serves the 'practical' human interest, i.e., it can yield insight into the rules whereby theory may be applied in practice (Habermas, 1971; Marcuse, 1972).

Theory, hypothetico-deductive procedures, and the testing of hypotheses belong to the domain of the empirical-analytical sciences. The fundamental goal of this type of enquiry is technical: it is essentially concerned with 'know how' rather than 'know what'. Under specified conditions, these procedures may arrive at law-like statements which may have predictive power. But the application of such theoretical knowledge to planning still depends upon the a priori rules established to direct the relationship between theory and practice within a particular setting (Habermas, 1971).

Both types of enquiry are thus needed in the attempt to make geographic knowledge relevant to the resolution of planning problems. One could argue that much of the confusion and gaucheries of applied social science has stemmed from a confusion of 'technical' and 'practical' interests. This kind of confusion can be better understood when one considers the manner in which ideology and political vested interest have often co-opted and channelled scholarly work. Strong views have been expressed for instance, on the growing tendency for so-called 'objective
science’ to become manipulated toward ideologically defined ends, especially those of technological rationality. Philosophers from a variety of stances have endeavored to emancipate rationality, in the literal sense of the term, from the constraints of social context, or methodological naïveté to restore it to reason, to shield it from the dangers of political manipulation and epistemological confusion (Gadamer, 1975; Heidegger, 1971).

To restore order within rationality’s empire may be a laudable and necessary step in the direction of ground clearing for the applied geographer. As long as its central aim is to write a recipe for more logically based knowledge of facts, and the ingredients for a more controllable blueprint for human management of environments, however, it may still remain caught in an anthropocentric trap. As with the geographer’s own metaphors, the language which provides categories for a critique of the present or past may not be adequate for the formulation of an alternative way (Bortoft, 1971).

Could one not conceive of ‘taming’ rather than ‘straightening’ of rationality? To use Heidegger’s words, a straightened rationality would still belong with the *Herrschaftswissen* (literally 'knowledge of overlordship') which has characterized Western science, and might simply further the compelling drive which humans betray to control and manipulate nature for their own ends (Heidegger, 1967). Technologically sophisticated societies have been shaped and influenced by the same attitude toward knowledge as they demonstrate in their attitudes toward things and toward other human beings as well. The hubris of Western man, in Heidegger’s view, has robbed things of their wholeness; in trying to dominate the earth, they rob it of its integrity and thus distort it. The opposite of *Herrschaftswissen* is *Bildungswissen* (knowledge of meaning and creativity); it demands an attitude of *Gelassenheit* a tenderness in our perspectives on things, letting them be and become. If such an attitude is lacking, is it any wonder that we are constantly surprised by the often ‘irrational’ and anarchistic way in which knowledge itself may grow? We trust in the logic and power of operationalized enquiry, systems of deduction and theory, rather than in the charisma and insight of bright individuals. Yet it is clear from history that great advances in knowledge have almost invariably come about from the inspiration and insight of particular scholars. In the light of such considerations, should one not look again at our institutional structures, subdisciplinary specialization, and rules whereby scientific knowledge is applied in practice? Does our sociological context tend to bury rather than promote individual creativity in scholarship, and open, caring engagement in discussion with people actually involved in environment issues? Perhaps the most fundamental challenge which critical philosophy can offer to applied geography is this: there is an intimate connection between our ways of approaching knowledge and its relationship to action on the one hand, and the syndrome of attitudes and behavior between people and environments which characterize contemporary society. The hope is that once having grasped the ideological and institutional influences which have surrounded our thoughts and practices to date, we may be in a better position to evaluate the appropriateness of particular methods and directions for geographic effort in the future.

III. COLLEGE OF UNREASON

III.1. *Myth of the 'Intelligentsia'

To deal adequately with the complex ways in which social institutions and the roles assumed by scientists influence thought and practice one would have to survey a very broad spectrum of the sociology of knowledge (Mannheim, 1936, 1952; Mills, 1958; Gouldner, 1962;
Berger and Luckman, 1967). Mannheim, writing in the 1930's, remarked on the inevitable tensions between what he labelled ideological and utopian forms of thought during periods of social change (Mannhelm, 1936). Ideological thought, in his view, tends to justify the status quo and the existing power position of dominant social classes; it could be used as an instrument of social oppression by power elites. Utopian thought, on the other hand, tends to interpret reality in terms of a projected future, and to justify radical changes; it could be used as an instrument of fundamental reform or revolution. Mannheim envisioned only one group who could be sufficiently detached from the existing social order as to be able to make a radical critique of the present, and invent scenarios for alternatives; this was the 'intelligentsia' whose ideas could be used as bases for rational social planning.

Though the pace and complexity of social change may be even more dramatic in our day, this tension between ideological and utopian forms of thought may be more apparent than real. While there is a discernible tension in most Western societies between the values of social egalitarianism on the one hand, and the exigencies of industrial capitalism on the other, a substantial portion of pure and applied social sciences appears to be closely aligned to technological process (Habermas, 1971, 1974; Marcuse, 1968). Could one suggest that ideology and utopia have converged in recent scenarios for future environments? Marcuse, critical of the Weberian concept of 'rationality' and cynical about the role of 'intelligentsia' lies pointed to this (con) fusion: the very concept of technical reason is perhaps ideological. Not only the application of technology but technology itself is domination (of nature and men) - methodical, scientific, calculated, calculating control. Specific purposes and interests of domination are not foisted upon technology 'subsequently' and from the outside; they enter the very construction of the technical apparatus. Technology is always a historical-social project: in it is projected what a society and its ruling interests intend to do with men and things. Such a 'purpose' of domination is 'substantive' and to this extent belongs to the very form of technical reason (Marcuse, 1968, p. 223).

Marcuse, among others, has argued that rationality, in the service of technology, can no longer perform the emancipatory, detached, function envisioned by Weber (Weber, 1949, 1958). Rather it serves as 'rationalization' in the Freudian sense of the term, i.e., justification of the status quo (Habermas, 1971). This is because the rationality of science and technology is essentially one of control; it is a rationality of domination (Marcuse, 1972; see also Leiss, 1974). He is perhaps foremost in articulating the political content of 'technical reason', and has elaborated on the political mechanisms which contribute toward a persistence of this situation within so-called democratic societies today.

III.2. Folkways of Applied Scholarship

How many geographers were aware, when first they tried to offer their expertise in applied situations, that such constraints were to be confronted? Sociology of knowledge, by focussing on the ways in which context and language actually mold the articulation of ideas, can sometimes give the impression of overemphasizing the media, and ignoring the intentions and motivations underlying the message. Many geographers have indeed been stirred by a sense of concern and responsibility to help alleviate problems and
forestall processes which threatened to destroy the quality of life and environments (Griffin, 1965; Zelinsky, 1970; Wolpert, 1976). Once embarked upon this course, did they not find themselves surrounded by a complex sociological situation where institutionally defined roles, funding sources, and even the medium of print set boundaries and direction for the articulation of their efforts? A great deal of the direction and volume of applied research today is shaped by the practical and technical interests of sponsors, which in turn tend to favor the promotion of existing (ideological and economic) conditions. Though most problems are many-faceted, the actual intellectual exploration of them does not promote dialogue among different stances or feedback between planners and those for whom they plan.

Consider, for example, some typical features of academic involvement: the multidisciplinary team organizing a symposium on a particular problem. Through a variety of 'objective' stances, the issue is dissected into several discrete parts, individual human experiences converted to aggregate estimates, and some kind of 'whole' picture is sought through the assembly of specialized parts. The value and success of such a meeting would probably be judged in terms of the ideas presented, the practicability and/or political feasibility of its conclusions, perhaps even on the nature and number of committees appointed to explore new avenues of research. The question of whether the process itself—the physical assembly of concerned scholars—had sparked insight or openness to dialogue with alternative stances would hardly be considered as measures of success. 'Proceedings' may be published which are really 'preceedings': they are often the homework preparation of discussion rather than a record of the discussion itself. How much more provocative it would be if there were evidence of dialogue initiated not only among different 'invited' stances, but also between the official contributors and other participants who did not have a prepared script? From the vantage point of eliciting active engagement from various sectors of society, the critical criterion of success should surely be not one of discerning which positions are logically defensible, 'right', or 'wrong', but rather whether or how they invite dialogue? The print industry itself is a medium ill suited to provoking any kind of dialogue. It serves to assemble a smorgasbord of position statements, each illustrating and promoting a distinct type of 'know how' rather than a concerted effort to elucidate the 'what'. The lag which often occurs between the actual experience of environmental crisis and the time when printed reports are finally published, gives many academics the feeling of being post facto commentators on issues, or else weak-voiced prophets of doom.

Consultant reports, whether or not academics are involved, may be delivered more speedily, albeit at greater expense to the decision maker. Many academics deplore the poor quality of research which often lies hidden beneath the glossy pages of such reports, and scoff empirically about the 'token' or 'rubber stamp' character of the exercise. Yet in most urgent situations, academic geographers do not have the time, energy, or data required to do thoroughly scientific research before risking an opinion or estimate. If we have done our homework on grounding our geographic models in real life situations, why should we lack the confidence to make intuitive judgements when necessary without
compromising truly 'academic' standards? As long as various contributors may hide behind the facade of print and feasibility reports, there is little room for sharing such intuitive leaps in the dark, partially grounded opinions -let alone engaging in the discussion of values, ethics, and hopes for problem resolution with the people who are involved in the problem.

The basic assumption underlying our conventional exercises is that intellectual discourse over issues will lead to some kind of solution. Conflicts may be resolved by bright ideas, particularly if these can be couched in practical policy statements. A second assumption is that what is written in rational language will ultimately lead to action; and this usually involves a faith in institutional means for promoting social change. Both assumptions virtually ignore and often prevent the potential input of gifted individuals -gifted in the sense of grasping problems in a comprehensive way and committed to living with the solutions. And more seriously still, from an intellectual point of view, they may allow little room for discovery in the process.

To recognize the ways in which rationality has been abused in the past does not suggest that it should be abandoned; should it not rather suggest that rationality should be channelled more appropriately, i.e., orientated toward discovery rather than validation of knowledge? The 'intelligentsia' myth and the ethic of scholarly objectivity and detachment, laudable in its own right, has unfortunately led to an elitism and redundancy of effort which actually robs society of that very precious interplay of insight and responsibility which is required today in the face of environmental and social crisis. How reasonable or even rational is it to justify - ethically or pragmatically the situation where an elite assumes the role of articulator and arbitrator for society in general? Weberian rationality has inspired the erection of tightly-knit research bureaucracies, each with clear lines of specialization, but this has often led to a stifling of individual freedom and creativity. When an elite abrogates responsibility for the analysis and planning of the social order does it not tend to deaden initiative rather than elicit an awareness of the scope for involvement which individuals could assume for their own collective future? Even in situations where the 'intelligensia', cooperating with an efficient managerial elite, has designed blueprints for society based on majority opinion, there is still the pragmatic challenge of making such plans effective. Almost every Western society since World War II has had its share of failure in implementing such plans. The managerial spirit would remain undaunted by such questions: they merely pose a challenge to its executive and manipulative and political skills, and there would be little difficult to find a behavioral scientist to provide models for the task. abric of life for future generations is no doubt a positive feature of contemporary geography. If we are to fully appreciate Heidegger's critique of Herrschaftswissen, however, and wish to cultivate a more concerned, caring, approach to knowledge and action, it would serve well to evaluate our present endeavors in this light.

On purely logical grounds, there are serious limitations in our present approaches to the modelling of both spatial and ecological systems as bases for prognoses or planning policy. The complexity of contemporary problems demands insight and direction from fields of knowledge and experience far beyond the scope of existing social science
methodology. The geographer, in his disciplinary role, may be well equipped to analyse several dimensions of problems, to specify what needs to be done in order to redress imbalances, to streamline spatial systems of service, or to revamp administrative systems. But to claim that such structural or mechanical changes will inevitably bring about social justice is at best an exaggeration.

Social justice, however defined, involves moral judgements concerning the quality and ordering of social life. It is presumptuous to assert that general standards for social justice can be subsumed entirely under the rubric of spatial equality or the efficiency of spatial systems. Justice involves the whole person, not just journey to work, take-home pay, or the sum total of material conditions which the external observer may wish to 'equalize'. It also involves the social environment, and the types of interaction which occur among persons, 'nature', and technology. A definition of justice which does not incorporate each is not only inadequate, but may be destructive as well. While there is no doubt much pedagogical value in spatial models of equity and inefficiency, it should be observed that the logic underlying a critique of the present may not be unequivocally relevant in projecting about alternatives. Such global assessments, based on external criteria, ignores the question of whether it is possible to reach an objective measure of what constitutes 'poverty', or 'welfare', and to what extent the rational efficiency of servicing systems may influence the human experience of well-being. These models are characteristically pertinent to the description and manipulation of systems extraneous to individual experience. Their value emphases derive from the prerequisites of systems generally, be they biological, technological, or cybernetic. They impinge upon, and constrain human behavior, but they do not EXPLAIN it. What may be far more helpful is an explanation - elucidation- rather than partial attempts at scientific 'explanation'. We have come to recognize the extent to which most of the status quo systems modelled by spatial analysts have become imbued with the values of industrial growth and managerial efficiency, and how poorly they elucidate the values or interests of client or consumer populations. With increasing levels of specialization, both in technology and in the executive and consultant caste system which controls it, the language and dynamics of such systems are further and further removed from those who may be most affected by them (Goulet, 1971).

A more fundamental critique, from a geographic viewpoint, could be addressed to the 'humanist' trap, and our failure to consider the quality of 'justice' in whole earth terms (Lovelock, 1975; Heidegger, 1967). Our characteristic discourse echoes the ideological legacy of eighteenth century European Enlightenment, and the faith in mind-over-matter which has generated economic, technological, and political systems which prove insensitive to nature and the human body. How many of our spatial models, for instance, assume ceteris paribus, a featureless plane rather than the living surface of the earth? May one validly persist in the taken-for-granted assumption in ecological models that the whole orchestra of natural milieux can be subsumed under the rubric of 'environmental factors', expressed in categories suitable for systems analysis and systems management?

The more one probes into the sociological, political, and philosophical dimensions of applied scholarship, the more it becomes obvious that ethical questions need to be elucidated also (Winter, 1966). Each of the stances assumed on knowledge, action, and
the utopian order, is supported by a particular ethic of its own. These ethical imperatives,
be they oriented toward scholarly standards, status quo maintenance, economic growth,
social equality, or personal growth, lend motivation and energy to each participant's
contribution, but they also often underlie fixed opinions, intransigent to discussion or
compromise. To deal with conflicts merely on the level of ideas, 'know how', or political
fiat, ignores the power of ethically grounded opinions. Should the geographer assume a
relativist stance on such conflicts of ethic, and trust in the political process to arbitrate
between them? Recent political history does not augur well for this. Should he pretend
that ethical conviction is a purely private affair and acquiesce in the 'intelligentsia' stance
on knowledge and action?

Without denying the autonomy and importance of personal belief and ethics, could one
not strive toward a more general ethical horizon on earth life as a whole, which could
guide discussion on environmental issues (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965; Ferkiss, 1969)?
The challenge is surely not to judge among existing ethical stances, but rather to elicit an
awareness of their environmental implications. Having suffered repeatedly through
history from the blinding effects of one ethical tyranny after another, should we not be
now in a better position to admit the limitations of inherited norms, and listen to one
another as we endeavor to formulate a wider vision on earth life as a whole? Wherein,
then, might the contribution of geography lie?

The answer depends on the particular geographer's mode of construing the world, his
image of the ideal social order, and his understanding of the strengths and limitations of
his discipline's research potential. Our metaphorical language in applied geography tends
to reveal a Cartesian world view, a managerial perspective on social life, and a tendency
to extrapolate from partial analyses of discipline-der'reed problems to blueprints for
societal planning as a whole. If one were to recapture a more fundamental definition of
geography, however, one might begin to sense a path beyond the historically conditioned
practices which guide our present task.

The overall task of geography has often been cited in terms as broad as the drama of
human life within its total environmental setting. If the goals of human existence are seen
to be the fulfillment of human potential, then state of becoming should be more important
than state of being. If such human becoming can be construed as part of total becoming
within the biosphere, then our time-worn geographic perspective may in fact be one of
the most valuable contributions possible toward the resolution of social and ecological
issues. A perspective this broad does not immediately specify a workable research
programme for any one discipline, but it could provide a framework for multidisciplinary
approaches on major issues. For example, many problems could be construed in terms of
the juxtaposition in space and time of groups who have unequal opportunities to choose
and exercise discretion over their environments. One could investigate what
environmental forces impede or facilitate the interests, or life projects, of such groups
(Hagerstrand, 1974a). At the interface between societies and their environments one finds
more than simply the tension between human beings and 'spatial systems': one finds the
juxtaposition in space and time of highly complex systems of forces, each operating
according to its own appropriate direction and rhythmicity. Humans bring with them a
history, collective memories, as well as images and anticipations which guide their actions within changing environments. Natural systems have their own internal dynamic and ecological prerequisites, which are often brashly ignored by the rationally defined functional systems superimposed upon them. To gain a grasp of this complexity, or to offer hope to manage it wisely, one gets little help from specialized disciplinary research which separates and atomizes each of its components. It is not an encyclopedic atlas of juxtaposed distributions which is needed, but rather a method to enable us to appreciate the relational problems and consequences of such juxtaposition in space and time. Case studies which reveal the interpenetration of these multidimensional processes within particular situations may be a far more valuable contribution than debates over scientific respectability or ideological orthodoxy.

This does not mean, of course, that we ignore the quest for general propositions, and analyses of general processes which lead to environmental crises. A focus on values, for example, could yield insight into the directions of particular policy orientations, and help predict and forestall outcomes deemed undesireable. Having reached some assessment of the values which operate within our own institutional and 'market' contexts as applied geographers, for example, we could begin to assess the values which guide other institutions and systems, particularly those which are likely to have the most profound influence on the future. An effort could be made to identify those institutions which are likely to impinge upon the everyday time-space horizons of urban populations, e.g., media, communications facilities, commercial and educational institutions, and examine (a) their probable effect upon opportunities and choices for individuals, and (b) the kind of knowledge and attitudes about environment which these institutions propagate and their behavioral consequences. Existing models provide some tools whereby these features of the functional environment may be elucidated, (Hagerstrand, 1974b), but we have not, by and large, begun to explore the bio-ecological consequences of certain styles of organizing functional environments. Rationality mediated through institutions and technology tends to impose a clock/calendar time scheduling on systems of employment, retail, transport and administrative service and eventually on industrial and agrarian livelihoods as well. This eventually leads to a human use of space and time which may be grossly out of synchronization with the natural rhythmicity of biological and physical time, with severe consequences for human and ecological health (Fischer, 1968; Luce, 1973). The 'hurry sickness' and TYPE A Behavior for which the medical world treats (and blames) the victim could perhaps be elucidated in terms of those everyday environments whose space-time routines are so badly synchronized with the natural physiological rhythms (Friedman and Rosenman, 1975). Could we not examine contemporary genres de vie in terms of their temporal as well as spatial characteristics, focussing, not only on their functional 'efficiency', and the values and images which characterize their perspectives, but especially on the ways in which they succeed or fail in orchestrating their activities with the natural rhythmicity and dynamics of air, water, earth and seasons?

A retrospective and critical study of the evolution of technology and society could yield valuable insight if it were formulated in this comprehensive manner. If one is
convinced that political revolution is the only road to salvation, there are many interesting experiences of the twentieth century which could be re-examined. Efforts to move toward a rational utopia founded upon an egalitarian social philosophy, could be studied in Scandinavia and elsewhere. Similarly, efforts to achieve anarchist and libertarian social reform in Civil War Spain as well as revolutionary social change in the context of China or Cuba in the twentieth century deserve critical study. It is ironic how eager we are to draft blueprints for the future and at the same time how unwilling we seem to be to look at past experiences. Our spatial and ecological models, derived in large part from an effort to shape our discipline according to the style of systematic social and natural sciences, remain often insensitive to time, development, and the inextricable connections of place and rhythmicity within life as a whole.

Ultimately, perhaps the most important role for geographers might emerge from its evocative and pedagogical efficacy. If we succeed in achieving a measure of critical insight into our own situations, and how appropriate our ways of thinking may be to elucidate them, we could begin to devise methods to help individuals to become aware of their own life situations, to understand the dynamics of those systems which surround them (Richards, 1975). Pedagogical efforts proposed in the late 'sixties and early 'seventies, e.g., learning webs, grass roots dialogue and networks of self-educating groups (Illich, 1971; Freire, 1970) may have now had enough time to yield data on the feasibility of such strategies. The aim, in general terms, was to initiate and promote discussion and engagement from a wide spectrum of people on issues related to environments. In this model of learning, change was envisioned not only on the part of participants, but also in the content, style, and structure of planning (Fromm, 1968). Could we not now find evidence of the strengths and limitations of these approaches? Even if one notices more complacency rather than militancy over environmental issues, this would still not mean that the 'consciousness raising' approach was an irrelevant one; rather it might suggest that it did not address itself to a sufficiently wide audience. Why should consumers, tenants, and clients be the only target for such a pedagogical program? Could it not be argued that it is the managerial sector (and its academic consultants) which have a more serious need for 'consciousness raising'? Instead of decrying our existing links with the so-called establishment, then, should we not consider the content of our message and eventually discover media more appropriate for communicating it?

The applied geographer's role, like that of philosopher or social scientist, can only be envisioned within the larger framework of processes leading toward awakening responsibility among various sectors of society. Does this role of provocateur, or facilitator of such a movement, not require that we eventually allow the 'objects' of our research to become 'subjects' of their own individual and collective lives'? We may have expertise to offer at various stages of this effort, but to imagine that we can write the script, set the stage, and manage the production, seems not only pretentious, but could also be destructive of that very creativity from all actors which this period of history delllands.

Revisiting Erewhon today leaves little doubt that enormous structural changes may be needed in order to redress imbalances of power and wealth. Its Colleges of Unreason
need emancipation from the stifling effects of functional specification and cooption by ideological or technological interests. External reform, however, needs to be matched by an even more pervasive revolution within the minds and hearts of individual people, be they regarded as playing a consumer, straightener, professor, or managerial roles. Structural reform and legislated social justice meted out to hungry automatons so they may be 'straightened' to fit 'rational' folkways, belongs to a Cartesian, managerial view of society. An appeal for internal renewal and creativity within human individuals implies an existential view of society where people can create as well as accumulate, acquire as well as inherit, learn to grapple with environmental problems rather than have them resolved for them by some intellectual or managerial elite. But it may also imply a fundamental renewal with the Colleges of Unreason: the old Hypothetics provide primarily 'autopsy' language to describe problems; in fact, the various brands of unreason which they have perpetuated have now become incarnate on the lived landscape. The first step to take in becoming more 'relevant' to society, then, is to deal with the basic homework on what we take for granted about reason and unreason, knowledge and action.

The geographer's success in contributing toward a whole earth perspective depends upon the breadth of his vision and the depth of his empathy for the manifold social and bio-ecological roots and directions within the human prospect. The value of our achievement may well lie in demonstrating potential paths for concerted action, rather than the discovery of uniquely 'spatial' or 'geographical' solutions to problems. In this quest, the more we arouse social, political and environmental consciousness among all potential actors in the planning process, the more we ourselves and our discipline may learn the art of creative becoming.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dilthey, W.: 1957, Philosophy of Existence: Introduction to Weltanschaungslehre,
Brookman Association, New York.
European Cultural Foundation: 1971, Citizenry and Q'ty in the Year 2000, Deventer, Kluwer.
York.


Mayer, H. M.: 1954, 'Geographers in City and Regional Planning', *Professional Geographer* VI, 7-12.


