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PARLIAMENTARY ACTIVITY, RE-SELECTION AND THE PERSONAL VOTE. EVIDENCE FROM FLEXIBLE-LIST SYSTEMS¹

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Summary

We analyze how the degree of parliamentary activity affects both individual MPs' performance in the candidate selection process within the party and their popularity with voters at the electoral stage. We expect that parliamentary work of MPs matters less for voters' evaluations of MPs because of limited monitoring capacities and lower salience attached to this type of representation. The empirical analysis uses data from recent elections in the Czech Republic and Sweden. During the analyzed period, these countries further personalized their flexible list electoral systems. Our results suggest that parties hold MPs accountable mainly through the threat of non-re-selection rather than by assigning them to a promising list position. While there is no evidence that voters consistently reward MPs' effort, the case of the Czech elections in 2010 shows that they may do so if context draws attention to individual MPs' work.

Keywords: accountability, candidate selection, electoral reform, flexible-list systems, personal vote

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Members of parliament are agents of at least two principals: the candidate selectorate within the party and the voters. To make delegation work and induce the agent to work hard on behalf of the principals, the threat of non-re-election must be credible (Fearon 1999, Ashworth 2012). How do the two principals consider the degree of parliamentary activity when deciding about the re-election of MPs? This is a particular pressing question with regard to the voter side, since it is not clear if citizens know or care enough about MPs' parliamentary work to reward the hard workers and send the others packing. Whether voters are able to hold MPs to account for their record has important implications for electoral system design. Shifting influence on intra-party seat allocation from party selectors to party voters by "personalizing" electoral rules is a common trend at least in Europe (Renwick and Pilet 2016). Empowering voters, however, may be detrimental to the latter's interests, if negative effects on representatives' behavior eat up benefits from increased choice.

This paper analyses how parliamentary activity – understood as the overall effort spent on individual forms of parliamentary behavior – affects both an MP's performance in the candidate selection process and her popularity with voters at the electoral stage. We expect that parliamentary work of MPs matters less for voters' evaluations of MPs because of limited monitoring capacities and lower salience attached to this type of representation. The empirical analysis uses data from recent elections in the Czech Republic (2006, 2010 and 2013) and Sweden (2010 and 2014). These countries share three features that are beneficial for the purpose of our analysis: first, they use flexible list electoral systems, under which both the list position and the personal vote are important determinants of re-election. Second, since voters may also cast their ballot for a party list, the votes cast for a candidate are "true" personal votes for that individual politician. Third, during the analyzed period, these two countries further "personalized" their electoral systems, allowing to study short-run consequences of these reforms.

Our results suggest that parties hold MPs accountable mainly through the threat of non-re-selection. While there is no consistent relationship between parliamentary activities and the personal vote, the case of the Czech elections in 2010 suggests that this link can materialize when context draws citizens' attention towards MPs' personal record.

1. Parliamentary activity and re-election seeking

We are interested in examining how party selectors *and* voters take into account parliamentary effort of incumbent MPs when deciding about their re-election. Almost all of the existing

literature studies the evaluation of incumbents by only one of these two principals, or considers overall re-election as the combined result of the two processes (e.g. Navarro 2010). Particularly regarding candidate selection, systematic research about the characteristics that selectors value is scarce. Only few studies focus on the question how candidates' features and incumbents' work record affect the outcomes of specific nomination processes. Candidates seem to benefit from previous experience as MPs (Gherghina and Chiru 2010, Pemstein et al. 2015), but it is not clear if hard work as such pays off for incumbents. For instance, bill sponsorship does not affect incumbents' subsequent list ranking in Slovakian national elections (Crisp et al. 2013). German Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) perform better at the candidate selection stage if they were members of influential committees, but do not seem to be rewarded for high attendance rates or drafting many reports (Frech 2016). Hermansen (2016), on the other hand, finds a positive association between legislative reports and obtaining a safe seat when analyzing the electoral career of MEPs from 11 member states.

Regarding voters' reactions to the parliamentary work of incumbent MPs, a number of studies conclude that legislative activity contributes to individual electoral performance of candidates also in parliamentary systems (Bowler 2010, Crisp et al. 2013, Kellermann 2013, Loewen et al. 2014, Däubler et al. 2016).² From these findings, the ones for preferential list PR systems are remarkable, since it is well known that candidates ranked at the top of the list receive a very large share of the preference vote (e.g. Marcinkiewicz and Stegmaier 2015). One should, however, keep in mind that those results refer to one specific type of activity – initiating legislative bills, and in some cases certain types of legislative bills – rather than a measure of overall effort across different types of activity.

There are two main principals which hold MPs to account for their degree of parliamentary activity: party selectors and voters. We assume that party selectors and voters take into account the past behavior of MPs to form an expectation about how they will behave in the future. If MPs anticipate to receive a reward for parliamentary work (or being sanctioned for a lack thereof), the pending verdict of the principals will also induce accountability by anticipation. We suggest that they differ concerning their ability to hold MPs accountable for two main reasons.

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² Compare also Martin (2010), a study using survey-based measures of constituency orientation and effort. The literature on participatory shirking is mainly concerned with the question whether legislators not running for re-election show lower attendance rates. Bernecker (2014) is an exception that also tests if participation in parliamentary votes improves election results; the study finds an effect for constituency candidates in Germany.

First, party selectors can be expected to have a higher level of monitoring capacity (cp. Fearon 1999, André et al. 2014) than voters. Party selectors should follow parliamentary proceedings and the individual activities of their MPs more closely than voters do. They should both be more aware of the importance of being represented well (or have higher personal stakes), and thus be more willing to pay the cost of monitoring from an instrumental perspective. At the same time, as actors in one way or another involved in politics, party selectors may also simply have a stronger intrinsic motivation to follow how MPs do their job. It is, however, more difficult to answer the question if voters know enough to reward or sanction MPs for their exerted effort levels. In this context it is important to note that there can be two different mechanisms for how effort improves reputation (Däubler et al. 2016). First, it is possible that principals base their decision directly and consciously on merit. They observe the effort by the agent, and credit her for the engagement as such. This direct form of assessment may also be facilitated by third parties providing fire-alarm type information – with quantitative data on parliamentary work being more easily available than in the past, media and websites may for instance directly report on the amount of activity.³ Second, learning about agent effort may take indirect routes, since work can create visibility and name recognition (e.g. Cain et al. 1987, Wilson et al. 2016).

In addition – and independent of their knowledge about what MPs do – voters may also differ from party actors by preferring MPs who put less relative emphasis on parliamentary work as compared to other forms of representation (such as constituency work in a narrow sense). What MPs contribute in parliament to legislation or government oversight may not have an immediately visible relevance or benefit for people's lives. This may lead citizens to prefer constituency service, which is more tangible in nature.⁴ In addition, voters get to “evaluate” MPs only after the party has ranked the candidates on the list, which may further limit the scope for a positive association between parliamentary work and the personal vote.

Our central expectation is therefore that the overall degree of parliamentary work has a stronger effect on the evaluation of MPs by party selectors than it has for that by voters. Note, however,

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³ This is actually the case in both countries. For the Swedish case, see Dagens Industri, 2014-06-25, „They are most absent in parliament“ <<http://www.di.se/artiklar/2014/6/25/de-skolkar-mest-i-riksdagen/>>; in the Czech case, NGO Kohovolit.eu publishes regular reports on MPs' activity which are used by almost all major media outlets.

⁴ For parliamentary systems, there seems to be little data on citizens' preferences regarding constituency service *per se* (rather than more general representational focus). Vivyan and Wagner (2016) find that Britons prefer MPs to strike a moderate balance between constituency service and work on national policy (see also Cain et al. 1987: 36-43 for data from 1979.)

that we refrain from making a prediction about the absolute level of the association we expect to find for voters.

We empirically analyze the actual outcomes of both the nomination and electoral stage, using data from recent elections in the Czech Republic and Sweden. The flexible list systems employed make the Czech Republic and Sweden particularly suitable cases for testing the arguments. Parties present voters with pre-ordered lists, and the order of candidates will be consequential for intra-party seat allocation unless all candidates clear the preference vote threshold. Since preference voting is not obligatory, the votes to candidates are “true” personal votes, rather than party votes in disguise. In addition, the two countries under study reduced the preference vote threshold of their flexible list system in a recent reform. This change makes it easier for candidates to be elected on the basis of personal votes rather than due to a good pre-electoral list position. So the incentives for incumbent MPs may change, and this again may also alter how party selectors and voters hold representatives to account. With stronger incentives to cater to voters directly, MPs may invest more resources in communicating with voters, and media may report more intensively on individual behavior. Then, the reform may also make it easier for voters to hold individual representatives accountable for their activities. For each country, we study the last pre-reform election and all post-reform elections that had been passed at the time of writing.

2. Institutional context

2.1 Czech Republic

The Czech Chamber of Deputies (*Poslanecká sněmovna*) consists of 200 MPs who are elected based on a flexible-list PR system. There are fourteen constituencies mirroring the administrative division of the country, ranging in magnitude from 5 to 25 seats. Parties with at least 5% of the vote at the national level gain seats, which are distributed among parties based on their support within constituencies. Voters have the opportunity to cast preference votes for multiple candidates within one party list. The number of preference votes increased from two to four since the 2010 election. Candidates who have reached the preference vote threshold are moved to the top of the list and are ranked according to the number of personal votes received; for all other candidates pre-electoral list position applies. The threshold was lowered from 7% to 5% since the 2010 election (for more details about the preference vote rules, see Marcinkiewicz and Stegmaier 2015). Together with the increase in the number of preference

votes, this led to a considerable increase in preference voting, with the number of preference votes per ballot rising from 0.38 to 0.68.⁵

Candidate selection takes place at the local and regional level in most parties, and the influence of the national level party organizations is generally limited. The process is remarkably similar in all major parties (ČSSD, KSČM, KDU-ČSL and ODS) covered in the present analysis (Outlý and Prouza 2009). In general, party selectorates reward candidates with higher preferential votes in previous elections and put them on better list positions (André et al. 2017).

In the Czech Republic, individual MPs enjoy extensive rights in the legislative process. The government has only weak control over the agenda which is decided mainly by majority vote in the Chamber (Zubek and Stecker 2010). Moreover, not only the government, but also an individual MP or group of them are allowed to introduce bills. While the number of private members' bills has declined since the beginning of the post-communist transition period (Linek and Mansfeldová 2007), their success rate is considerable. Most of the bills submitted by individual MPs (rather than a group), however, seek to put an issue onto the agenda rather than aiming at actually adjusting the law (Kolář et al. 2013: 238). In addition to that, an individual MP is allowed to propose amendments to the bills.

Almost all decisions of the Chamber are done by registered electronic roll-call votes. During the four-year term, MPs usually take more than 10,000 votes and on average 50 votes per meeting day (Linek and Mansfeldová 2007: 30–32). Since 1996, there is an informal agreement among government and opposition parties to “pair” absenting MP so that the balance between government and opposition is not changed. This artificially leads to increase in abstentions, especially for the opposition MPs who are pairs for MPs who are also cabinet members.

The Chamber uses oral and written questions, which are called interpellations. Any MP has the right to engage in both forms of interpellations. Oral interpellations take place once a week. They need to be submitted beforehand, their order on the agenda is drawn in the morning of the day they are covered. Written interpellations can be answered verbally or in writing. If an MP is not satisfied with an answer, he can ask the President of the Chamber to include the question on the agenda. MPs have the possibility to ask the government and ministers about any topic which is covered by their field of action (Kolář et al. 2013: 320). In interpellations, MPs are

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⁵ Own calculations based on <http://www.volby.cz/pls/ps2006/ps111?xjazyk=CZ&xkraj=0&xstrana=0&xv=2&xt=1> and <http://www.volby.cz/pls/ps2010/ps111?xjazyk=CZ&xkraj=0&xstrana=0&xv=2&xt=1>. The sum of preference votes for a list was divided by the total number of ballots for that list. This was done for each list that won at least one seat, and then averaged across lists.

quite independent from the party leadership. In MP surveys, however, representatives state that interpellations are blunt instruments for influencing the government. Private members' bills and amendments receive better assessments by MPs in this regard (Mansfeldová, Linek 2009: 88–93).

2.2 Sweden

The Swedish national parliament, the *Riksdag*, consists of 349 seats, of which 310 are allocated to the 29 electoral constituencies, and 39 are leveling (second-tier compensation) seats. The Swedish preferential-list PR system is a flexible-list system, allowing voters to choose between casting a list vote and expressing a preference for a single candidate on a party list. If a candidate gets enough votes to pass the personal vote threshold, this candidate will receive the first seat allocated to the party. The threshold was lowered from 8% to 5% in 2014 elections. Politicians widely agreed that the change was unlikely to have dramatic effects on various aspects of intra-party and MP-voter relationships (Berg and Oscarsson 2015).⁶ If more candidates cross the threshold, the candidates are ranked according to number of personal votes they receive. Any remaining seats are distributed according to the order on the party list.

The Swedish parliament is characterized by strong party discipline (Larsson and Bäck 2008: 160). MPs, however, have several tools to pursue more individual representation. Individual MPs have the right to initiate private members' bills (*motioner*). So-called standalone bills, i.e. proposals that do not seek to amend other proposals, may be initiated during a certain time period each year (from the start of the session until shortly after submission of the budget). Swedish MPs also have the right to ask questions to ministers and other government members. There is a weekly question time with spontaneous oral questions, interpellations (submitted in writing but answered by government member personally), and written questions that receive written answers. Roll-call votes occur frequently, and the threshold for a roll-call to take place is low.

Public attention to MPs' activities is generally limited (Bergman 2006: 607), and the activities seldom make the news (Larsson and Bäck 2008). However, MPs find questions useful for creating media attention in local constituencies (Bergman 2006: 604), and their usage has increased over time (Bergman and Bolin 2013: 269-270). Individual motions very seldom receive media coverage, since these are almost never passed.

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⁶ Yet, studying the first preference vote reform, Davidsson (2006) showed that electorally vulnerable MPs deviate more often from the party line in their private members' bills and initiate a larger share of proposals with local focus.

Candidate selection in Swedish parties usually takes place at the regional level (Aylott, 2013: 322). There is some disagreement, though, about the importance of local representation in the Riksdag. Esaiasson and Holmberg (1996) concluded from their analyses that local interest promotion is strong, but Bergman and Bolin (2013: 261) argue that, once elected, MPs perceive themselves rather as party/national than constituency representatives. Folke et al. (2015) also show that, on the local level, party selectors appear to use the personal vote to identify popular politicians and to promote them to positions of power within the party.

Although only a minority of voters use the personal vote (23% in 2010 and 25% in 2014), its usage is distributed evenly across social groups (e.g., income, education, geography) and other voter characteristics (Berg and Oscarsson 2015). According to data from the 2014 Swedish National Election Study, the most common motive for rewarding a candidate with a vote was individual candidate traits such as competence and reliability. Amongst the voters who did not use the personal vote, the most common reason was lacking information about candidates.

3. Data, measures, and models

To examine the arguments outlined above, we consider the link between parliamentary activities of incumbent MPs and their performance at the subsequent party nomination stage and their personal vote at the following elections. We analyse the consequences of parliamentary work undertaken during one pre-electoral-reform and all post-reform legislative periods in the Czech Republic (2002-2006, 2006-2010 and 2010-2013), and Sweden (2006-2010 and 2010-2014). The two parliaments provide databases that contain information about activities and the parliamentary biography of politicians. We combined parliamentary data with information obtained from the election authorities, which provide details about the ballots/party lists used and the electoral performance of parties and individual politicians.

For each legislative period, we analyze three dependent variables: whether MPs re-run for the same party, whether they obtain a promising position on the list (defined as being within the first N ranks, where N is the number of seats the party won in the previous election), and the intra-party vote share (for details on its transformation see below).⁷ The first type of analyses uses the sample of MPs who are in office at the end of the third year of the legislative term (this should approximately reflect the time point when selection processes start), and who have held their mandate for at least 200 days. We exclude any MPs who have been party leaders or

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⁷ This is in line with the notion that personal votes are intra-party votes, and that few voters choose a party just because of an individual candidate.

government members during the term. The analyses of list positions and the personal vote covers those MPs who run for the same party in the same constituency as in the previous election, since we include a lagged dependent variable.

As measures of the degree of parliamentary work, we consider two indicators.⁸ The first one is a summary measure of activities that are individual in a sense that they can be assumed to be fairly independent of party influence (and for which data are available). In the Czech Republic, we consider single-authored private members' bills, oral interpellations and amendments submitted during the second reading of a bill.⁹ In the Swedish case, we look at single-authored private members' bills (i.e. the stand-alone proposals from the respective yearly period), the number of oral interpellations and the number of written parliamentary questions.¹⁰ To create our summary measure, we divide each MP's activity count by the duration of her mandate in that year, standardize within each activity-party-year, and take the mean over all the values (activities times years) for each MP (see Appendix A1 for more details and examples).¹¹ Our second indicator is the share of missed roll-call votes among all votes during an MP's mandate, standardized within parties.¹² The measures, thus, capture how productive MPs are, but not the quality of their work. This approach has limitations, but what constitutes "good" parliamentary work is hard to define and even harder to measure.

When examining the effect of re-election-seeking activities on electoral performance, it is important to control for factors reflecting marginality, i.e. the need to be active in the first place. We use lagged measures for this purpose (indicators for list leader and for previous promising position, the logit-transformed personal vote, and the ratio of the number of candidates and party seats as a measure of intra-party competition, see Crisp et al. (2007)). In addition, we also include variables for being a *replacement MP*, *party group leadership* (share of term serving as group or vice group leader), *previous parliamentary experience* (none, one term, two or more terms; counting spells with a minimum duration of 100 days), being the *sole representative* of

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⁸ We choose two indicators, since different activities may have the character of substitutes, while this is not the case for voting. The absolute value of Pearson's r between the two indicators does not exceed .15 in any of the subsamples.

⁹ While written questions exist in the Czech Republic as well, no systematic data on these is available (personal communication with parliamentary staff). For oral interpellations, we count all submitted interpellations save the ones that were withdrawn or not held due to absence of the asking MP. The amendment variable refers to the number of bills an MP amended.

¹⁰ Interpellations and questions withdrawn at a later point in time are not considered.

¹¹ The term of the Swedish parliament is organized around official yearly sessions, for the Czech Republic we split the terms into parts with approximate length of one year. The legislative period starting in 2010 turned out to finish after a little more than three years because of early elections. As a start point for the fourth part of this legislative period we choose the day after the resignation of Prime Minister Nečas.

¹² In the Czech case, the data allow to separate "excused" from unexcused missed votes. We ran all models also with the share of missed unexcused votes; the results are very similar.

a party-in-a-constituency, the share of term the party was in *opposition*, *age* and *age squared*, and *gender*. In the Czech case, we also have data on involvement in *subnational elections* (obtaining a mandate at the municipality level or running in regional elections during the term as an MP). When analyzing the personal vote, an indicator variable for the *first list position* and a continuous variable for *list rank* also enter the models, since the outcome of the nomination stage is of course an important predictor of the personal vote. Descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix A2.

We use standard logit models for analyzing the re-selection outcomes. For the personal vote models, we log-transform intra-party vote shares, from which we subtract the respective value of a reference category (ballots cast for the list and for candidates not in the sample), and then use OLS. This model can be derived from a utility-maximization framework, making certain simplifying assumptions (cp. Berry et al. 1995). To take into account unobserved heterogeneity at the party-list level, we use clustered standard errors.¹³ We note that the aim of our analysis is to examine whether parliamentary activity predicts (rather than causes) performance at the re-selection and re-election stages, and we acknowledge that the comparison between selectors and voters is merely an indirect test of their monitoring capacities.

4. Results

Table 1 displays the results of the regression models for the re-selection stage, split by legislative term, for the Czech Republic. Models C1-C3 consider the binary indicator of running for the same party in the subsequent election as dependent variable, Models C4-C6 explain whether an MP received a promising list position. Shown are logit coefficients along with standard errors in parentheses.

[Table 1 about here]

Effort and the relative frequency of missing roll-call votes show the expected associations with running again in some, but not all of the elections. The coefficient of parliamentary activity is of considerable size both in 2006 and 2013 (but statistically significant only in the latter case). Those MPs missing more roll call votes were less likely to stand again in 2006 and 2013. The 2010 election, and we will see this repeatedly, shows a different pattern. The coefficient for the activity variable is much smaller, and the one for the roll-call vote measure even has the

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¹³ The substantive results do not change when using regular standard errors. Random effects models for the personal vote also give very similar results (those for re-selection outcomes did not converge).

opposite sign. The relationships for 2006 and 2013 are of considerable size. If we take .75 as a baseline probability (approximately the mean of the 2006 and 2013 proportion of re-running MPs), a change of the size of the interquartile range of the respective variable implies expected probabilities of re-running of .84 (for activity in 2013), of .57 (missed roll-calls in 2006), and of .62 (missed roll-calls in 2013). These are substantive changes – the question about the direction of causality is justified, though. The findings do not necessarily provide evidence for party selectors sorting out the not so hard-working MPs. The pattern would also be consistent with those MPs voluntarily withdrawing from parliament exerting less effort. We cannot disentangle these processes in our setup, but we control for age and seniority, which may alleviate the reversed causality problem to some extent.

Space constraints do generally not permit us to discuss findings for control variables, we therefore only occasionally point to particularly interesting findings. The fact that in 2006 and 2013 intra-party competition for seats is linked to a lower chance of running again also points into the direction that we are not only observing a last-period effect for the parliamentary effort-related variables.

There is no evidence that the amount of parliamentary work or participation in votes helps re-running MPs to obtain a promising list position. None of the key variables reaches statistical significance in these models, and the signs are inconsistent (activity) or contrary to the expectation (roll-calls). Overall, none of the explanatory variables shows consistent results across years in these models. Even the coefficient of the lagged personal vote is estimated with high uncertainty in 2010.

Table 2 reports results of the parallel analysis conducted for the Swedish elections in 2010 and 2014. Also here, the more active MPs are more likely to run again (statistically significant at 10% in 2010 and at 5% in 2014). Taking the sample mean of .77 as a baseline, the expected probability changes to .81 (2014) when considering a difference in activity of the size of the interquartile range. The roll-call vote variables have a negative sign as expected, but are far from significant. The decision to run again strongly depends on seniority and age, with the latter showing an inverse U-shape pattern with the maximum at approximately 39 respectively 42 years.

[Table 2 about here]

As in the Czech case, the results from the models with receiving a promising list position as dependent variable remain inconclusive. The signs of the effort-related variables are as expected only for the 2010 election. The most interesting finding is that in 2014 both the lagged

dependent variable and the lagged personal vote turn out as strong predictors, while this was not the case in 2010. With 2014 being the first election after lowering the preference vote threshold, this could be interpreted in a way that the selectorate in the political parties put more weight on candidate popularity before the elections to be held under “personalized” electoral rules. Of course, it is impossible to infer a causal effect of the electoral reform from this simple change over time. Another noteworthy result is that in 2014 the most senior MPs were less likely to receive a good list position, whereas in 2010 this variable had a positive sign. One interpretation of this finding is that some longer-serving MPs lose the determination to stay in parliament, but are still included on the list, leaving the decision to the voters whether to move them up the list again. We can also speculate that party selectors’ incentives to retain well-known MPs on the list merely for their vote-attraction potential increase in anticipation of an election held under personalized electoral rules.

[Table 3 about here]

We are now turning to the analysis of the personal vote results (see Table 3 for the Czech Republic).¹⁴ Again, the 2010 election stands out from the others. There is a highly significant association between the degree of parliamentary activity and the personal vote MPs achieved. Consider again the implied change when increasing parliamentary activity by as much as the interquartile range: it amounts to an approximate shift from .047 (which is the median of the difference in intra-party vote share relative to the reference category) to .056. While not exactly huge, we should keep in mind that the preference vote threshold was lowered from 7 to 5% of the party vote, so 0.9 percentage points can make a difference for an MP’s direct election. Attendance at parliamentary votes, on the other hand, does not predict MPs’ electoral fortunes in any of the years.

[Table 4 about here]

Swedish voters do not appear to reward parliamentary activity with personal votes (compare Table 4), the coefficients for this variable are close to zero in both years. A somewhat curious finding is that missing more roll-call votes (relative to the standards of the own party) is associated with a larger personal vote (statistically significant at 10% in 2014). Applying the usual interquartile procedure implies a change in expected difference in vote share (relative to the reference category) from approximately .028 to .029, so the substantive size of the

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¹⁴ Tables A3a and A3b in the appendix report results of models using party indicator variables to account for variation in preference vote usage across parties. The conclusions for the key variables of interest remain unchanged.

association is small. The obvious explanation may be that MPs who campaign (for themselves) in the constituency may be in parliament less frequently (Fukumoto and Matsuo 2015). The measure used in Table 4 refers to the full four-year term, but the association is practically unchanged if we replace the variable with a version that considers only the first three years of the term (see Table A3c in Appendix A3). Perhaps this finding points to a more general pattern of MPs who care about their personal vote giving more priority to local at the expense of parliamentary work. Another possibility is that able politicians are rewarded with important functions within the party, devoting more time to party service than parliamentary work. If these individuals are also better at attracting personal votes, this will induce a negative bias on the effect of missing roll-call votes.¹⁵

5. Conclusion

We have analyzed the link between parliamentary effort and MPs' performance at the re-nomination and re-election stages. Starting from the notion that the threat of non-re-election must be credible in order to induce MPs to take their job seriously, we distinguished between MPs' retrospective evaluation by party selectors and voters. It is important to examine if the two principals differ with regard to rewarding or sanctioning MPs for their efforts, since there is a general trend to give voters more influence on intra-party seat allocation (Renwick and Pilet 2016). In both the Czech Republic and Sweden, their flexible list systems were even more personalized. We expected that parliamentary work of MPs matters less for voters' decisions, because of limited monitoring capacities and the lower salience they may attach to work in parliament as compared to other forms of representation. This would be a cause of concern, since the *ex ante* control of parties through candidate selection is weakened, while voters may not be in a position to compensate through *ex post* control (cp. Bergman and Strøm 2013).

Overall, the evidence that party selectors and voters take into account MPs' parliamentary work effort is mixed. The findings suggest that at the selection stage – as long as we assume that there is more than a last period effect – party selectors do sort out underperformers or signal them not to seek re-nomination at all. In contrast, parliamentary effort does not seem to affect the quality of the list position among the group of re-selected MPs. These patterns may also be interpreted as evidence that accountability works in practice: if MPs anticipate sanctioning, then all those interested in re-election will work, and relative differences between them can hardly

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¹⁵ We also examined how the results change when leaving out one type of activity at a time for creating the summary indicator of effort. These findings are presented in Appendix 3, Tables A3d to A3g.

predict the quality of their list rank. In addition, there are of course many other factors that influence list ranking, such as various balancing considerations, regarding gender, intra-constituency regional dispersion etc.

Regarding the voters, the case of the 2010 Czech election points out that under certain conditions the individual work of MPs can indeed make a difference to their personal vote. The election followed a major corruption scandal, and calls to vote in new politicians accompanied the introduction of the new preference voting rules. There was even an NGO whose main aim consisted in promoting to give preferences to “four [candidates] from the bottom”. Therefore, what may be required is a context that draws citizens’ attention to politicians’ personal record, which is facilitated by third party actors like media and NGOs (compare also Stegmaier et al. 2014 on the success of female candidates in that election). This provides ground for optimism, suggesting that voters do not always know or care little about MPs’ work. Whether the reform of preferential voting before the 2010 election was a necessary condition for improving accountability is a question that we cannot answer. The association we found between lower attendance and a better personal vote performance in Sweden, on the other hand, allows for less positive interpretations. Pessimists may suspect that MPs shirk while mobilizing voters through other, less valuable means (say social media entertainment). On the other hand, if the result is due to MPs simply substituting constituency service for parliamentary work, MPs may merely respond to (perceived) citizens’ expectations.

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Table 1 Results from logistic regression of reselection outcomes in the Czech Republic

	<i>Dep. var.: Re-running for same party</i>			<i>Dep. var.: Good list position</i>		
	<i>C1: 2006</i>	<i>C2: 2010</i>	<i>C3: 2013</i>	<i>C4: 2006</i>	<i>C5: 2010</i>	<i>C6: 2013</i>
Parl. activity year 1-3 (party-std.)	0.65 (0.57)	0.05 (0.62)	1.43** (0.59)	0.41 (0.69)	-0.67 (0.73)	-0.44 (0.61)
Missed RCV year 1-3 (party-std.)	-0.61*** (0.23)	0.34 (0.25)	-0.46** (0.24)	0.10 (0.30)	0.30 (0.40)	0.10 (0.33)
Lag list leader	0.06 (0.70)	1.69 (1.08)	1.30 (0.88)	-0.01 (0.75)	1.23 (0.77)	-0.34 (0.88)
Lag good list pos.	1.20 (2.06)	-1.07 (0.74)	-1.47* (0.76)	-1.15 (2.05)	0.02 (1.30)	1.93** (0.77)
Lag logit pers. vote	0.51 (0.35)	0.47 (0.34)	0.75 (0.58)	0.73*** (0.27)	0.47 (0.32)	1.42*** (0.51)
Lag intra-p. comp	-0.25** (0.10)	0.04 (0.10)	-0.18* (0.10)	-0.07 (0.17)	-0.13* (0.07)	-0.03 (0.09)
Replacement MP	1.96 (2.16)	-2.30** (1.04)	-0.89 (1.19)	-0.34 (2.07)		1.69 (1.60)
Sole representative	-0.54 (1.73)	-3.74* (2.12)	0.23 (1.12)		0.73 (1.59)	0.33 (1.29)
PPG leadership	-0.13 (0.74)	-0.60 (0.89)	0.87 (0.71)	1.41 (1.08)	-0.35 (0.92)	0.49 (0.69)
Seniority: 1 term exp.	-1.14** (0.57)	0.53 (0.67)	-1.17* (0.60)	0.30 (0.87)	0.11 (0.66)	0.66 (0.89)
Seniority: >=2 terms exp.	-0.59 (0.50)	-1.57*** (0.58)	-0.58 (0.71)	-0.95 (0.74)	-1.12 (0.80)	-0.99 (0.87)
Opposition	1.49*** (0.52)	0.32 (0.49)	2.82*** (0.68)	0.64 (0.48)	0.66 (0.62)	0.69 (0.67)
Age	0.03 (0.16)	-0.15 (0.22)	0.26* (0.13)	-0.51 (0.50)	-0.25 (0.21)	0.14 (0.18)
Age squared/1000	-0.40 (1.73)	1.09 (2.21)	-2.88** (1.42)	4.03 (4.69)	2.18 (2.38)	-1.89 (2.01)
Female	0.42 (0.64)	-0.68 (0.45)	-0.10 (0.63)	-0.62 (0.60)	-1.18 (0.72)	-0.09 (0.63)
Sub-national politics	0.56 (0.48)	0.65 (0.40)	-0.85* (0.48)	0.07 (0.50)	0.20 (0.41)	0.14 (0.47)
Constant	2.79 (4.37)	8.50 (5.29)	0.09 (3.49)	20.41 (12.71)	10.66** (4.83)	1.65 (4.95)
<i>N</i>	182	171	161	141	120	114

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients, standard errors clustered by party-list in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

In 2006, being the sole representative predicts obtaining a good list position perfectly, $N=2$ cases were dropped.
In 2010, being a replacement MP predicts obtaining a good list position perfectly, $N=3$ cases were dropped.

Table 2 Results from logistic regression of re-selection outcomes in Sweden

	<i>Dep. var.: Re-running for same party</i>		<i>Dep. var.: Good list position</i>	
	<i>S1: 2010</i>	<i>S2: 2014</i>	<i>S3: 2010</i>	<i>S4: 2014</i>
Parl. activity year 1-3 (party-std.)	0.59* (0.36)	0.62** (0.28)	0.21 (0.33)	-0.45 (0.38)
Missed RCV year 1-3 (party-std.)	-0.02 (0.11)	-0.17 (0.15)	-0.24 (0.35)	0.32 (0.30)
Lag list leader	-0.14 (0.48)	0.34 (0.40)	1.30 (0.87)	0.43 (0.96)
Lag good list pos.	0.72 (2.05)	-2.59 (1.97)	0.26 (1.13)	3.68*** (0.98)
Lag logit pers. vote	0.14 (0.19)	0.02 (0.17)	0.09 (0.22)	1.04*** (0.26)
Lag intra-p. comp	0.00 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.08* (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)
Replacement MP	0.23 (2.25)	-2.38 (2.03)	-1.68 (1.15)	0.52 (1.10)
Sole representative	-0.13 (0.80)	-0.64 (0.73)	0.77 (1.26)	-0.85 (1.28)
PPG leadership	0.52 (0.98)	1.53 (1.34)	0.17 (1.51)	2.03 (1.53)
Seniority: 1 term exp.	-1.16** (0.49)	-1.02** (0.51)	0.81 (0.60)	-0.85 (0.65)
Seniority: >=2 terms exp.	-2.42*** (0.45)	-1.78*** (0.53)	0.58 (0.65)	-2.37*** (0.82)
Opposition	-0.15 (0.36)	-0.14 (0.32)	0.51 (0.53)	0.41 (0.68)
Age	0.30 (0.18)	0.32** (0.12)	0.15 (0.15)	0.08 (0.19)
Age squared/1000	-3.82* (1.96)	-3.78*** (1.36)	-2.44 (1.58)	-1.16 (2.06)
Female	0.06 (0.29)	-0.29 (0.27)	0.09 (0.36)	0.32 (0.54)
Constant	-2.25 (4.70)	-0.96 (2.70)	0.47 (3.58)	4.03 (4.66)
<i>N</i>	331	316	253	243

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients, standard errors clustered by party-list in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table 3 Results from binomial-logistic regression of preference vote share in the Czech Republic

	<i>Dep. var.: Log of preference votes relative to reference category</i>		
	<i>C7: 2006</i>	<i>C8: 2010</i>	<i>C9: 2013</i>
Parl. activity year 1-4 (party-std.)	0.15* (0.09)	0.35*** (0.09)	0.07 (0.09)
Missed RCV year 1-4 (party-std.)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.001 (0.05)
List leader	0.14 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.09)
List rank (linear)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Lag list leader	0.003 (0.13)	0.03 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.10)
Lag good list pos.	0.45*** (0.13)	0.03 (0.14)	-0.12 (0.13)
Lag of depend. var	0.65*** (0.05)	0.67*** (0.06)	0.72*** (0.09)
Lag intra-p. comp	0.06** (0.03)	-0.003 (0.01)	0.002 (0.02)
Replacement MP	0.59*** (0.12)	0.41*** (0.13)	0.08 (0.22)
Sole representative	0.01 (0.19)	0.20 (0.19)	0.05 (0.17)
PPG leadership	-0.07 (0.12)	0.12 (0.12)	0.04 (0.10)
Seniority: 1 term	0.06 (0.15)	0.03 (0.12)	0.18* (0.10)
Seniority: >=2 terms	0.14 (0.12)	0.02 (0.10)	0.15 (0.11)
Opposition	-0.18* (0.10)	-0.05 (0.13)	-0.35*** (0.13)
Age	0.003 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Age squared/1000	-0.11 (0.32)	0.35 (0.33)	0.20 (0.34)
Female	0.34*** (0.13)	-0.03 (0.10)	0.02 (0.10)
Sub-national politics	0.01 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.13 (0.10)
Constant	-1.61** (0.74)	0.63 (0.75)	0.30 (0.83)
Adjusted R-sq.	.83	.74	.60
<i>N</i>	142	122	114

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients, standard errors clustered by party-list in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table 4 Results from binomial-logistic regression of preference vote share in Sweden

	<i>Dep. var.: Log of preference votes relative to reference category</i>	
	<i>S5: 2010</i>	<i>S6: 2014</i>
Parl. activity year 1-4 (party-std.)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)
Missed RCV year 1-4 (party-std.)	0.03 (0.04)	0.05* (0.03)
List leader	0.65*** (0.12)	0.43*** (0.06)
List rank (linear)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)
Lag list leader	-0.46*** (0.09)	-0.35*** (0.07)
Lag good list pos.	-0.58*** (0.20)	0.03 (0.09)
Lag of depend. var	0.82*** (0.06)	0.79*** (0.05)
Lag intra-p. comp	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.005)
Replacement MP	-0.29 (0.27)	0.15 (0.11)
Sole representative	0.03 (0.14)	0.001 (0.12)
PPG leadership	-0.05 (0.16)	0.03 (0.11)
Seniority: 1 term	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.13** (0.06)
Seniority: >=2 terms	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.07)
Opposition	0.17** (0.08)	-0.00 (0.06)
Age	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)
Age squared/1000	0.04 (0.37)	0.06 (0.22)
Female	0.08 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.04)
Constant	0.21 (0.53)	-0.06 (0.42)
Adjusted R-sq.	.90	.94
<i>N</i>	253	243

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients, standard errors clustered by party-list in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Online Appendix

Däubler, Christensen and Linek:

Parliamentary Activity, Re-Selection and the Personal Vote. Evidence from flexible-list systems. Parliamentary Affairs

Appendix A1: Measuring legislative activity

We illustrate how we construct our summary measure of legislative activity using an example from each of our country cases. The raw data for an individual MP consist of counts of three activities in each quarter of the four-year legislative period, and information on the relative duration of the MP's parliamentary mandate in the respective parliamentary year,¹⁶ with duration representing a proportion between 0 and 1. To start with, we divide each activity count by this relative length of the individual mandate, to get activity figures for MPs who did not serve the full period that are comparable to those for MPs who did (for MPs who did not serve in the specific year, a missing value will result).

This gives us twelve raw observations per MP (3 activities * 4 years). For each activity-year-combination, we standardize the figures within parties (while pooling across constituencies), by subtracting the party mean and dividing by the party standard deviation. If there is no variation within a party (sd=0), all MPs of the party receive a score of 0 since they are all at the mean. Finally, for each MP, we take the mean across the (up to 12) non-missing values calculated this way. In the re-selection models, we consider only the work from the first three years, thus taking the mean of up to nine values.

Table A1a illustrates this for a Czech MP from ČSSD in the 2002/06 legislative period. He only became an MP in the third year of the term, where his relative length of mandate is .73. Thus, he has missing values regarding the activities for the first two years, and the third-year values will be adjusted for the shorter mandate. The values are standardized within party and we take the mean of the six non-missing observations. On average, this MP is .28 standard deviations above the mean of his party, which is our aggregate measure of parliamentary activity. Table A1b gives a similar example for a Swedish MP from the Center Party in the 2006/10 legislative term.

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¹⁶ Unlike in the Swedish case, there are no official parliamentary years in the Czech Republic, so the unit is an “artificial” year.

Table A1a: Example case for calculating the degree of parliamentary activity in the Czech case

	Raw count	Duration	Full period	Party mean	Party sd	Standardized
Single-authored bills						
First year	0	0	NA	.06	.23	NA
Second year	0	0	NA	.04	.19	NA
Third year	0	.73	0	.02	.13	-.15
Fourth year	0	1	0	0	0	0
Amendments						
First year	0	0	NA	.53	.82	NA
Second year	0	0	NA	2.39	2.50	NA
Third year	4	.73	5.48	2.09	2.84	1.19
Fourth year	6	1	6	4.15	5.88	.31
Interpellations						
First year	0	0	NA	0	0	NA
Second year	0	0	NA	0	0	NA
Third year	0	.73	0	.18	.53	-.34
Fourth year	1	1	1	.28	1.05	.69
SUM						1.70
MEAN						.28

Table A1b: Example case for calculating the degree of parliamentary activity in the Swedish case

	Raw count	Duration	Full period	Party mean	Party sd	Standardized
Single-authored bills						
First year	6	.69	8.70	3.62	3.76	1.35
Second year	2	.60	3.33	3.79	3.39	-.14
Third year	5	1	5	3.00	2.75	.73
Fourth year	9	1	9	3.80	3.57	1.46
Interpellations						
First year	0	.69	0	.74	1.10	-.67
Second year	0	.60	0	.30	.61	-.49
Third year	0	1	0	.25	.52	-.48
Fourth year	0	1	0	.21	.96	-.22
Written questions						
First year	3	.69	4.35	1.46	1.81	1.60
Second year	1	.60	1.67	.65	1.20	.85
Third year	4	1	4	.57	1.07	3.21
Fourth year	3	1	3	.79	1.03	2.15
SUM						9.35
MEAN						.78

Appendix A2: Descriptive statistics

Table A2a: Descriptive statistics for Czech MPs

Discrete variables

	Mean	Sum	N
2002-2006			
Rerunning for same party	0.79	143	182
Rerunning for same party in same constit.	0.79	143	182
Good list position	0.76	108	143
Lag list leader	0.16	30	182
Lag good list pos.	0.86	157	182
Replacement MP	0.13	23	182
Sole representative	0.02	4	182
Seniority: no experience	0.48	88	182
Seniority: 1 term experience	0.22	40	182
Seniority: >=2 terms experience	0.30	54	182
Female	0.17	31	182
Sub-national politics	0.51	93	182
2006 list leader	0.22	31	142
2006-2010			
Rerunning for same party	0.73	124	171
Rerunning for same party in same constit.	0.72	123	171
Good list position	0.82	101	123
Lag list leader	0.21	36	171
Lag good list pos.	0.92	158	171
Replacement MP	0.04	7	171
Sole representative	0.06	10	171
Seniority: no experience	0.46	78	171
Seniority: 1 term experience	0.29	49	171
Seniority: >=2 terms experience	0.26	44	171
Female	0.16	28	171
Sub-national politics	0.55	94	171
2010 list leader	0.25	31	122
2010-2013			
Rerunning for same party	0.71	115	161
Rerunning for same party in same constit.	0.71	114	161
Good list position	0.72	82	114
Lag list leader	0.22	35	161
Lag good list pos.	0.73	118	161
Replacement MP	0.06	10	161
Sole representative	0.07	12	161
Seniority: no experience	0.52	84	161
Seniority: 1 term experience	0.21	34	161
Seniority: >=2 terms experience	0.27	43	161
Female	0.22	36	161
Sub-national politics	0.59	95	161
2013 list leader	0.26	30	114

Continuous variables

	Min	Mean	Median	Max	N
2002-2006					
Parl. activity years 1-3 (party-std.)	-0.58	-0.02	-0.17	2.14	182
Missed RCV years 1-3 (party-std.)	-2.14	0	-0.1	3.09	182
Parl. activity years 1-4 (party-std.)	-0.60	-0.01	-0.13	2.11	182
Missed RCV years 1-4 (party-std.)	-2.28	0	-0.12	3.15	182
Lag logit pers. vote	-6.13	-3.57	-3.55	-1.44	182
Lag diff in log pers. vote	-6.09	-3.51	-3.5	-1.28	142
Lag intra-p. comp	3.6	6.33	5.67	17	182
PPG leadership	0	0.1	0	1	182
Opposition years 1-3	0	0.53	1	1	182
Opposition years 1-4	0	0.53	1	1	182
Age	21	47.59	49	73	182
Age squared/1000	0.44	2.36	2.4	5.33	182
Current list rank	1	4.2	3	30	142
Current personal vote	0	0.04	0.03	0.18	142
2006-2010					
Parl. activity years 1-3 (party-std.)	-0.67	-0.01	-0.16	2.72	171
Missed RCV years 1-3 (party-std.)	-1.86	0	-0.15	3.3	171
Parl. activity years 1-4 (party-std.)	-0.52	-0.01	-0.14	2.12	171
Missed RCV years 1-4 (party-std.)	-2.08	0	-0.14	2.89	171
Lag logit pers. vote	-6.41	-3.66	-3.67	-1.69	171
Lag diff. in log pers. vote	-6.32	-3.5	-3.5	-1.76	122
Lag intra-p. comp	2.57	6.5	4.75	36	171
PPG leadership	0	0.11	0	1	171
Opposition years 1-3	0	0.53	0.97	1	171
Opposition years 1-4	0	0.45	0.73	1	171
Age	25	48.39	49	77	171
Age squared/1000	0.62	2.42	2.4	5.93	171
Current list rank	1	4.19	3	23	122
Current personal vote	0	0.05	0.04	0.21	122
2010-2013					
Parl. activity years 1-3 (party-std.)	-0.47	-0.01	-0.13	1.42	161
Missed RCV years 1-3 (party-std.)	-1.69	0	-0.14	3.64	161
Parl. activity years 1-4 (party-std.)	-0.40	0	-0.09	1.22	161
Missed RCV years 1-4 (party-std.)	-1.8	0	-0.17	3.57	161
Lag logit pers. vote	-5.08	-2.99	-2.9	-1.51	161
Lag diff. in log pers. vote	-4.22	-2.8	-2.75	-1.33	114
Lag intra-p. comp	4.38	8.32	6.8	22	161
PPG leadership	0	0.15	0	1	161

Opposition years 1-3	0	0.47	0	1	161
Opposition years 1-4	0.06	0.5	0.06	1	161
Age	23	48.31	49	73	161
Age squared/1000	0.53	2.44	2.4	5.33	161
Current list rank	1	4.11	2.5	27	114
Current personal vote	0.01	0.07	0.06	0.19	114

Table A2b: Descriptive statistics for Swedish MPs*Discrete variables*

	Mean	Sum	N
2006-2010			
Rerunning for same party	0.77	256	331
Rerunning for same party in same constit.	0.76	253	331
Good list position	0.84	213	253
Lag list leader	0.36	120	331
Lag good list pos.	0.85	283	331
Replacement MP	0.12	40	331
Sole representative	0.27	89	331
Seniority: no experience	0.42	138	331
Seniority: 1 term experience	0.28	93	331
Seniority: >=2 terms experience	0.30	100	331
Opposition	0.49	162	331
Female	0.47	154	331
2010 list leader	0.41	103	253
2010-2014			
Rerunning for same party	0.78	245	316
Rerunning for same party in same constit.	0.77	243	316
Good list position	0.81	198	243
Lag list leader	0.34	109	316
Lag good list pos.	0.82	260	316
Replacement MP	0.13	42	316
Sole representative	0.25	80	316
Seniority: no experience	0.35	111	316
Seniority: 1 term experience	0.35	110	316
Seniority: >=2 terms experience	0.30	95	316
Opposition	0.47	147	316
Female	0.47	147	316
2014 list leader	0.37	89	243

Continuous variables

	Min	Mean	Median	Max	N
2006-2010					
Parl. activity years 1-3 (party-std.)	-0.81	-0.01	-0.18	4.26	331
Missed RCV years 1-3 (party-std.)	-1.89	0	-0.21	4.29	331
Parl. activity years 1-4 (party-std.)	-0.79	0	-0.18	3.58	331
Missed RCV years 1-4 (party-std.)	-1.83	0	-0.18	4.37	331
Lag logit pers. vote	-8.6	-3.9	-3.7	-1.27	331
Lag diff. in log pers. vote	-8.6	-3.8	-3.57	-1.27	253
Lag intra-p. comp	2.59	11.79	7.33	55	331
PPG leadership	0	0.04	0	1	331
Age	23	47.43	49	76	331
Age squared/1000	0.53	2.36	2.4	5.78	331
2010 list rank	1	3.15	2	43	253
2010 personal vote	0	0.04	0.03	0.33	253
2010-2014					
Parl. activity years 1-3 (party-std.)	-0.81	0	-0.14	2.71	316
Missed RCV years 1-3 (party-std.)	-1.93	0	-0.25	4.93	316
Parl. activity years 1-4 (party-std.)	-0.79	0	-0.13	2.83	316
Missed RCV years 1-4 (party-std.)	-1.92	0	-0.2	5.28	316
Lag logit pers. vote	-8.26	-3.78	-3.6	-0.7	316
Lag diff. in log pers. vote	-8.25	-3.79	-3.55	-0.7	243
Lag intra-p. comp	3.33	12.47	8	59	316
PPG leadership	0	0.04	0	1	316
Age	18	46.95	48	77	316
Age squared/1000	0.32	2.31	2.3	5.93	316
2014 list rank	1	3.64	2	33	243
2014 personal vote	0	0.04	0.03	0.25	243

Appendix A3: Robustness Checks

This section presents the results of several robustness checks. The first set of tables (A3a to A3c) shows models with preference votes as dependent variable. The models shown in Tables A3a and A3b include additional party-specific fixed effects. For the Swedish case, Table A3c uses an activity measure that only considers activities from the first three years of the legislative term in (before candidate selection typically starts). Overall, the results (especially for variables measuring parliamentary activity) are similar to those presented in Tables 3 and 4.

Tables A3d to A3g present results of re-running all the models from the main text, after leaving out (of the activity index) one of the three types of parliamentary behaviour at a time. We observe some changes, typically regression coefficients dropping in size. However, this is not unexpected and in line with both a pattern of specialization or division of labor within party groups and the argument that the activities can in some cases be substitutes.

Table A3a: Robustness check for Table 3: Results from binomial-logistic regression of preference vote share in the Czech Republic with party dummy variables

	<i>Dep. var: Log of preference votes relative to reference category</i>		
	<i>2006</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2013</i>
Parl. activity year 1-4 (party-std.)	0.15* (0.08)	0.29*** (0.08)	0.07 (0.09)
Missed RCV year 1-4 (party-std.)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.05)
List leader	0.17 (0.11)	0.05 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.10)
List rank (linear)	-0.10*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Lag list leader	0.06 (0.13)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.10)
Lag good list pos.	0.46*** (0.12)	-0.03 (0.13)	-0.05 (0.11)
Lag of depend. var	0.55*** (0.06)	0.67*** (0.05)	0.74*** (0.09)
Lag intra-p. comp	0.04 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)
Replacement MP	0.59*** (0.12)	0.41*** (0.13)	0.11 (0.22)
Sole representative	-0.05 (0.18)	0.23 (0.17)	0.05 (0.18)
PPG leadership	-0.17 (0.11)	0.08 (0.12)	0.04 (0.10)
Seniority: 1 term	0.15 (0.15)	0.07 (0.11)	0.12 (0.11)
Seniority: >=2 terms	0.19 (0.12)	0.05 (0.10)	0.06 (0.10)
Age	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Age squared/1000	0.003 (0.32)	0.37 (0.35)	0.20 (0.33)
Female	0.31** (0.13)	-0.004 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.10)
Sub-national politics	0.005 (0.11)	-0.10** (0.05)	0.12 (0.10)
KDU-ČSL (vs. ČSSD)	0.43*** (0.15)	0.93*** (0.31)	
KSČM (vs. ČSSD)	0.11 (0.12)	0.02 (0.14)	0.06 (0.16)
ODS (vs. ČSSD)	-0.15 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.10)	0.47*** (0.17)
SZ (vs. ČSSD)		0.95*** (0.34)	

TOP09 (vs. ČSSD)			0.24 (0.17)
Constant	-1.66** (0.80)	0.76 (0.76)	-0.08 (0.86)
Adjusted R-sq.	.84	.80	.67
<i>N</i>	142	122	114

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients, standard errors clustered by party-list in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A3b: Robustness check for Table 4: Results from binomial-logistic regression of preference vote share in Sweden with party dummy variables

	<i>Dep. var.: Log of preference votes relative to reference category</i>	
	<i>2010</i>	<i>2014</i>
Parl. activity year 1-4 (party-std.)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)
Missed RCV year 1-4 (party-std.)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)
List leader	0.59*** (0.12)	0.45*** (0.06)
List rank (linear)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)
Lag list leader	-0.30*** (0.09)	-0.37*** (0.07)
Lag good list pos.	-0.57*** (0.22)	0.03 (0.09)
Lag of depend. var	0.80*** (0.06)	0.78*** (0.06)
Lag intra-p. comp	-0.001 (0.01)	0.01* (0.005)
Replacement MP	-0.30 (0.28)	0.17 (0.10)
Sole representative	0.14 (0.14)	0.02 (0.14)
PPG leadership	0.04 (0.15)	0.03 (0.11)
Seniority: 1 term	-0.13* (0.07)	-0.12** (0.06)
Seniority: >=2 terms	-0.15* (0.09)	-0.07 (0.06)
Age	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)
Age squared/1000	0.08 (0.39)	0.13 (0.24)
Female	0.10 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.04)
FP (vs C)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.12)
KD (vs C)	0.14 (0.13)	0.15 (0.10)
M (vs C)	-0.01 (0.10)	0.11 (0.15)
MP (vs C)	-0.36** (0.17)	0.07 (0.14)
S (vs C)	0.36*** (0.12)	0.09 (0.14)

V (vs C)	0.03 (0.11)	0.07 (0.10)
Constant	0.19 (0.56)	-0.10 (0.46)
Adjusted R-sq.	.91	.94
<i>N</i>	253	243

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients, standard errors clustered by party-list in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A3c: Robustness check for Table 4: Results from binomial-logistic regression of preference vote share in Sweden with year 1-3 effort measures

	<i>Dep. var.: Log of preference votes relative to reference category</i>	
	<i>2010</i>	<i>2014</i>
Parl. activity year 1-3 (party-std.)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Missed RCV year 1-3 (party-std.)	0.03 (0.04)	0.05* (0.03)
List leader	0.65*** (0.12)	0.44*** (0.06)
List rank (linear)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)
Lag list leader	-0.46*** (0.09)	-0.35*** (0.07)
Lag good list pos.	-0.58*** (0.20)	0.03 (0.09)
Lag of depend. var	0.83*** (0.06)	0.79*** (0.05)
Lag intra-p. comp	-0.002 (0.01)	0.01 (0.005)
Replacement MP	-0.29 (0.27)	0.15 (0.11)
Sole representative	0.03 (0.14)	0.001 (0.12)
PPG leadership	-0.05 (0.17)	0.02 (0.11)
Seniority: 1 term	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.13** (0.06)
Seniority: >=2 terms	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.07)
Opposition	0.17** (0.08)	-0.01 (0.06)
Age	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)
Age squared/1000	0.04 (0.38)	0.06 (0.23)
Female	0.09 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.04)
Constant	0.22 (0.53)	-0.06 (0.42)
Adjusted R-sq.	.90	.94
<i>N</i>	253	243

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients, standard errors clustered by party-list in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A3d: Robustness check for Table 1 (reselection outcomes in the Czech Republic): Coefficients for parliamentary activity variables when leaving out one activity at a time

Single-authored bills, amendments, interpellations (from Table 1)

	<i>Dep. var.: Re-running for same party</i>			<i>Dep. var.: Good list position</i>		
	2006	2010	2013	2006	2010	2013
Parl. activity year 1-3 (party-std.)	0.65 (0.57)	0.05 (0.62)	1.43** (0.59)	0.41 (0.69)	-0.67 (0.73)	-0.44 (0.61)
Missed RCV year 1-3 (party-std.)	-0.61*** (0.23)	0.34 (0.25)	-0.46** (0.24)	0.10 (0.30)	0.30 (0.40)	0.10 (0.33)

No bills, only amendments and interpellations

	<i>Dep. var.: Re-running for same party</i>			<i>Dep. var.: Good list position</i>		
	2006	2010	2013	2006	2010	2013
Parl. activity year 1-3 (party-std.)	0.26 (0.49)	0.06 (0.49)	0.96** (0.45)	0.48 (0.47)	-0.12 (0.59)	-0.27 (0.43)
Missed RCV year 1-3 (party-std.)	-0.61*** (0.24)	0.34 (0.26)	-0.45** (0.23)	0.13 (0.30)	0.34 (0.40)	0.08 (0.33)

No amendments, only bills and interpellations

	<i>Dep. var.: Re-running for same party</i>			<i>Dep. var.: Good list position</i>		
	2006	2010	2013	2006	2010	2013
Parl. activity year 1-3 (party-std.)	1.06** (0.49)	0.36 (0.66)	1.45 (0.94)	0.44 (0.69)	-0.63 (0.62)	0.01 (0.60)
Missed RCV year 1-3 (party-std.)	-0.65*** (0.23)	0.35 (0.25)	-0.45* (0.23)	0.08 (0.30)	0.31 (0.40)	0.10 (0.32)

No interpellations, only bills and amendments

	<i>Dep. var.: Re-running for same party</i>			<i>Dep. var.: Good list position</i>		
	2006	2010	2013	2006	2010	2013
Parl. activity year 1-3 (party-std.)	0.31 (0.42)	-0.24 (0.48)	0.87* (0.45)	0.06 (0.44)	-0.84 (0.63)	-0.66 (0.59)
Missed RCV year 1-3 (party-std.)	-0.61*** (0.24)	0.34 (0.25)	-0.47** (0.23)	0.08 (0.30)	0.33 (0.38)	0.14 (0.33)

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients, standard errors clustered by party-list in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A3e: Robustness check for Table 2 (reselection outcomes in Sweden): Coefficients for parliamentary activity variables when leaving out one activity at a time

Single-authored bills, interpellations, written questions (from Table 2)

	<i>Dep. var.: Re-running for same party</i>		<i>Dep. var.: Good list position</i>	
	2010	2014	2010	2014
Parl. activity year 1-3 (party-std.)	0.59* (0.36)	0.62** (0.28)	0.21 (0.33)	-0.45 (0.38)
Missed RCV year 1-3 (party-std.)	-0.02 (0.11)	-0.17 (0.15)	-0.24 (0.35)	0.32 (0.30)

No bills, only interpellations and written questions

	<i>Dep. var.: Re-running for same party</i>		<i>Dep. var.: Good list position</i>	
	2010	2014	2010	2014
Parl. activity year 1-3 (party-std.)	0.59 (0.40)	0.08 (0.26)	-0.03 (0.27)	-0.35 (0.40)
Missed RCV year 1-3 (party-std.)	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.15 (0.16)	-0.21 (0.34)	0.31 (0.30)

No interpellations, only bills and written questions

	<i>Dep. var.: Re-running for same party</i>		<i>Dep. var.: Good list position</i>	
	2010	2014	2010	2014
Parl. activity year 1-3 (party-std.)	0.30 (0.28)	0.39* (0.23)	0.30 (0.31)	-0.25 (0.30)
Missed RCV year 1-3 (party-std.)	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.18 (0.15)	-0.25 (0.34)	0.31 (0.30)

No written questions, only bills and interpellations

	<i>Dep. var.: Re-running for same party</i>		<i>Dep. var.: Good list position</i>	
	2010	2014	2010	2014
Parl. activity year 1-3 (party-std.)	0.51* (0.28)	1.10*** (0.28)	0.24 (0.36)	-0.44 (0.29)
Missed RCV year 1-3 (party-std.)	-0.03 (0.11)	-0.15 (0.15)	-0.25 (0.35)	0.30 (0.29)

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients, standard errors clustered by party-list in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A3f: Robustness check for Table 3 (personal vote in the Czech Republic): Coefficients for parliamentary activity variables when leaving out one activity at a time

Single-authored bills, amendments, interpellations (from Table 3)

	<i>Dep. var: Log of preference votes relative to reference category</i>		
	<i>2006</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2013</i>
Parl. activity year 1-4 (party-std.)	0.15*	0.35***	0.07
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Missed RCV year 1-4 (party-std.)	-0.02	0.02	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)

No bills, only amendments and interpellations

	<i>Dep. var: Log of preference votes relative to reference category</i>		
	<i>2006</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2013</i>
Parl. activity year 1-4 (party-std.)	0.13	0.24***	0.10
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Missed RCV year 1-4 (party-std.)	-0.01	0.02	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.05)

No amendments, only bills and interpellations

	<i>Dep. var: Log of preference votes relative to reference category</i>		
	<i>2006</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2013</i>
Parl. activity year 1-4 (party-std.)	0.10	0.26***	-0.14*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Missed RCV year 1-4 (party-std.)	-0.03	0.01	-0.00
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)

No interpellations, only bills and amendments

	<i>Dep. var: Log of preference votes relative to reference category</i>		
	<i>2006</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2013</i>
Parl. activity year 1-4 (party-std.)	0.10	0.26***	0.11
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Missed RCV year 1-4 (party-std.)	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients, standard errors clustered by party-list in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A3g: Robustness check for Table 4 (personal vote in Sweden): Coefficients for parliamentary activity variables when leaving out one activity at a time

Single-authored bills, interpellations, written questions (from Table 4)

	<i>Dep. var.: Log of preference votes relative to reference category</i>	
	<i>2010</i>	<i>2014</i>
Parl. activity year 1-4 (party-std.)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)
Missed RCV year 1-4 (party-std.)	0.03 (0.04)	0.05* (0.03)

No bills, only interpellations and written questions

	<i>Dep. var.: Log of preference votes relative to reference category</i>	
	<i>2010</i>	<i>2014</i>
Parl. activity year 1-4 (party-std.)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Missed RCV year 1-4 (party-std.)	0.03 (0.04)	0.05* (0.03)

No interpellations, only bills and written questions

	<i>Dep. var.: Log of preference votes relative to reference category</i>	
	<i>2010</i>	<i>2014</i>
Parl. activity year 1-4 (party-std.)	0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Missed RCV year 1-4 (party-std.)	0.02 (0.04)	0.05* (0.03)

No written questions, only bills and interpellations

	<i>Dep. var.: Log of preference votes relative to reference category</i>	
	<i>2010</i>	<i>2014</i>
Parl. activity year 1-4 (party-std.)	0.03 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)
Missed RCV year 1-4 (party-std.)	0.03 (0.04)	0.05* (0.03)

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients, standard errors clustered by party-list in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.