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Governing the City: Institutional Innovation and its Consequences

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Introduction

An exploration of issues of governance through the changing process of urban renewal allows us to chart the changing patterns of co-operation and dialogue between different actor groups over time. Regeneration allows distinct and specific issues of urban governance to come to the fore, which would otherwise be lost if looking at a city as if it were ‘stopped.’ Indeed, some have argued that the study of regeneration projects allow the viewer to see the development of urban governance speeded up as if through time lag technology (Kubler, 2004). The process from incubation to regeneration through to completion can take only ten to fifteen years, providing the observer with a short time period and a defined area to explore. Likewise, a regeneration project facilitates close examination of the make-up of and the interaction between actor groups such as metropolitan elites, community organisations and national organisations in a sometimes fast moving and complex environment.

This chapter is a study of the regeneration of the Temple Bar area of Dublin. Through this case study, the chapter explores innovative patterns of governance in Ireland’s principal city, through the process of the regeneration of one of its most distinct areas.

This changing pattern of governance is highlighted through a period of urban regeneration in the 1990s in Dublin. During this period, the capital city of Dublin witnessed a huge expansion in the level of infrastructure, including office complexes, tourism and leisure facilities and residential areas. Some of Dublin’s most derelict and crime-ridden inner-city areas have been rejuvenated and regenerated as flourishing focal points for tourism, housing and business activities. This chapter seeks to explore the political dimension – and issues of democratic governance, or lack thereof – surrounding this process.
This chapter highlights a number of key findings from our research on the regeneration of the Temple Bar area of Dublin. Our analysis shows the unwillingness in Irish central public administration to transfer any major responsibility to the sub-national level, even for political decisions and policy initiatives in the area of local development and urban regeneration. While there has been some expansion in the role and responsibilities of local government and its’ elected and appointed officials, there is a much stronger tendency toward agency proliferation and ad hoc institution building. This type of policy response, while flexible and responsive, has tended to enhance the influence of Irish central administration rather than strengthen local democratic capacity and responsibility.

Any inner-city urban regeneration project requires strong policy co-ordination across different administrative domains. In the nineties, the tendency was for Irish government departments to regard their work as autonomous of each other and take a sector-oriented view towards to policy making. All the more remarkable then our research finding that the Department of the Taoiseach, played a central role in pulling together the various interests from across the relevant government departments in order to push the Temple Bar regeneration project forward.

The research demonstrates well how quickly and astutely political ‘grassroots’ actors, the local residents, can learn which actors are likely to be most powerful and perhaps more importantly, which actors are likely to be ineffective in the political process. In this research we also see the importance of informal network ties between actors in the political process. Network ties such as those based on collegiality and friendships, can provide the opportunity for efficient access to political influence through more
informal channels, rather than taking the tardier route to political influence through formal institutional representation.

**Regenerating Temple Bar**

This research examines metropolitan governance, Irish style, through the lens of urban renewal policy in inner city Dublin. In particular, this chapter explores the regeneration of Temple Bar, Dublin’s much vaunted “cultural quarter.” Regeneration projects have been undertaken in other Irish cities, but a Dublin-based regeneration project can provide interesting factors not seen elsewhere. Like many European countries, Ireland’s capital city is its largest and most complex. As some Scandinavian case studies have shown, capital cities often provide especially interesting examples of innovative forms of urban governance, especially in smaller states which are dominated by their capital, or where that capital city has experienced large-scale speedy economic growth and immigration (Hansen, 2004). Like many fast-growing European cities, Dublin has experienced changes in its local government, not least in matters of planning and regeneration, where many actors are forced to play “catch-up” in regarding their role in such matters.

Many actors involved in planning and local government in the city have looked to Temple Bar as one of Dublin’s most significant and interesting renewal projects. Previously completed regeneration projects, such as Dublin Corporation buildings on Wood Quay, had usually involved the large-scale destruction of the existing architecture and the building of completely new buildings – as well as being important in terms of regeneration, Temple Bar was arguably one of Dublin’s most important restoration projects. It was also on a scale much larger than previous
renewal projects – 28 acres of dense buildings in the heart of the city centre including sites of Viking archaeology as well as other sites of historical importance.

More importantly, the Temple Bar project has been hailed as a turning point in the city government’s attitude towards regeneration. Rather than retrospective repairs of buildings as they become derelict, the process of Temple Bar’s regeneration saw the Council become more pro-active and planning for future regeneration. There was also a cultural aspect to regeneration. Temple Bar became Dublin’s cultural quarter, with pedestrianised streets, street theatre and pavement cafes. One senior architect involved in the plans believed that Temple Bar began the process of “re-Europeanisation” of the city centre after the decline of its Georgian heyday.

A body of literature is emerging on Irish urban planning, driven not least by discussions on Ireland’s recent economic boom, the so-called Celtic Tiger period which took off in the late 1990s, as well as the publication of various scandals regarding matters of corruption which occurred in some planning issues. The Irish Times newspaper journalist Frank McDonald has written a number of books on issues of local area and urban regeneration as well as environmental protection (1985, 1989, 2000, 2005). A common theme across these books is specifically the destruction and the rebuilding of Dublin, from an architectural and environmental aspect. The Destruction of Dublin (1985) was written in the “bleak period of the mid- to late-1980s” while his second book, The Construction of Dublin (2000) “was written in the midst of a maelstrom of activity generated by Ireland’s booming economy.”(McDonald, p.7, 2000). In terms of Dublin regeneration projects, a handful of scholarly work is appearing. See, for example, the work of McGuirk, especially Power and policy networks in Urban Governance: Local government and property
led speculation in Dublin (2000) and Changing approaches to Urban Planning in an “entrepreneurial city”: The Case of Dublin (2001). For the most part, existing research findings have described or mapped out the types of involvement that different types of political actors have in the policy process around the urban renewal of the Dublin area (Marshall, 2002). In our research, the emphasis is on understanding how and why these particular mechanisms of governance have evolved over time and how they operate so as to successfully co-ordinate the actions of a range of very different policy actors in the urban renewal policy process.

The analytical framework for this study

In seeking to understand the process of regeneration of Temple Bar and to fully explore the issues of metropolitan governance contained therein, the different successive phases of development will be explored in turn. Our research, like that of others, which have charted movements in urban governance, has split the regeneration process into three periods: The first is the initial start-up period where actors are gathered and motivated (Kuhlmann, 2004). Secondly, the formalisation period where legislation or public policy sets out the aims and the scope of regeneration. Thirdly, the implementation phase where responsibilities are given and a longer-term post-regeneration outlook are taken (Blatter, 2004). In this research, we identify and explain the evolution of the governance structure for the regeneration of Temple Bar within the broader changing political and social context. As this chapter shows, the governmental context within which the Temple Bar project began its first phase of regeneration was different from the post-Celtic Tiger city in which the restored Temple Bar began to flourish?
By the time this research was being conducted, Temple Bar is very well established and flourishing as a major commercial and cultural area of Dublin city. Examining the Temple Bar project at this stage allowed us to raise some conclusions about the innovative form of urban governance, which it has experienced through the process of its renewal. In 2003, Temple Bar Properties commissioned a study to examine the regeneration of the area in the dozen years since the formal legislation (i.e. Temple Bar Area Renewal and Development Act, 1991) was passed. In doing so, it noted that Temple Bar now needed to reflect on which aspects of its regeneration had been successful, which had not and how different bodies could work to rectify failures and continue success. It also called for stakeholders to be identified and the responsibilities they should have to be listed. In doing so, Howley-Harrington, a team of Dublin-based architects, undertook a large-scale consultation process, finding out from various actors as well as citizen groups what they thought of the governance of Temple Bar and how it could be improved. Thus, by 2004 and the publication of the report, Temple Bar had been regenerated and the patterns of its governance for the next decade had been outlined.

**Institutional and Network Embeddedness in policy making**

Public policy making in Ireland and particularly those concerned with local development initiatives involves a range of different interested actors in a multileveled network. Finding a way to co-ordinate and build collaboration across these different policy interests poses a real challenge, the so-called collective action problem. An institutionalist perspective provides a useful middle range theory that highlights the importance of institutions in framing and structuring processes of public policy making (Hall and Taylor, 1996; March and Olsen, 1997; Akkerman and Torennvlied, 2001). Sociological theory suggests that institutions can reduce the
uncertainty attached with public policy making, particularly where new policy actions are being initiated and where the future benefits are uncertain (Millar, 2003, Mule, 1999). These institutions are best viewed as multidimensional – consisting of formal and informal attributes (Raub, 1997). The dimensions of institutions of relevance to this study are formal organisational structures, contractual based agreements and established rules for managing the urban renewal measures implemented in Ireland. The informal dimensions encompass social norms, values and customs that influence the way things are done and how the policy process is handled. Also of relevance to this study is how embedded actors are in their policy network as previous work suggests that networks have effects on cooperation through mechanisms, such as the dispersion of information about the credibility of actors and informal sanctioning mechanisms (Raub 1997).

Over the nineties in Ireland, there has been a proliferation of public/private, partnership-based local development initiatives, often funded under the EU Structural Funds, which have led some authors to suggest “these developments in Irish sub-national governance might be construed as evidence of a move away from governance as hierarchies to new forms of network governance” (Adshead, 2003). This new 'network governance' in Ireland is often described as ‘bottom-up’, flexible, consensus based with an ad-hoc and open membership involving multiple agencies and multi-leveled. In this study it is argued that while the flexibility allowed by network governance often might lead to very productive arrangements, network governance can also lead to conservatism as well as to openness to innovations. Therefore this research identifies the type of network characteristics of the relationships between the actors involved in the policy process. This network analysis is useful as it can help us understand how the position of the actor in the network may act as a resource or a
constraint on the actor reaching his or her goals in the policy process (Dowding, 1995).

**Broad institutional framework and case study methodology**

Ireland’s highly centralised and sector-oriented system of policy making is closely modelled on the British structure of public administration, under which key decisions affecting the type of urban regeneration projects are adopted and the financial and policy implementation are all taken at the central government level. Local government in Ireland consists of a number of local and regional authorities at three levels. These are: at *county/city level*: thirty-four local authorities are the mainline providers of local government services - twenty-nine county councils and five cities; at *sub-county level*: eighty town authorities carry out a representational role for the town with a varying range of local government functions; at *regional level*: eight regional authorities co-ordinate some of the county/city and sub-county activities; they play a monitoring role in relation to the use of EU structural funds; two regional authorities, known as [Regional Assemblies](#), were established in July 1999 under new structures for regional development. Executive decision-making and day-to-day management of local government is the responsibility of the city or county manager, who is directly appointed by the Minister for Environment and Local Government. The City and County Councils, comprising publicly elected representatives or ‘county councillors’ as they are generally referred to, have very limited decision-making powers. They have “reserve powers” which implies that under some exceptions they may act to amend the county or city development plan.

The most striking characteristic of the Irish public policy system is the persistent tendency to establish a single function state body that is first answerable to the
central state authorities and often to a particular government department (NESC, 1979; Marshall, 2002). In the absence of functioning sub-national local and regional authorities, many semi-state bodies and public bodies had regional levels of organisation. At this level of organisation, one finds the ad-hoc growth of single function agencies and offices – quangos – arising mainly from decentralisation of government departments and state agencies and operating as autonomous actors and independent of each other. Coyle and Sinnott point to "a proliferation of regional bodies operating in differently constituted sets of regions" (1993, p.79). More often than not, the boundaries of the territorial areas for which these different statutory bodies have responsibility, do not coincide with one another. Over the nineties, very substantial funding and impetus was given by the European Commission for local development and urban renewal initiatives in Ireland, including the Temple Bar project (Payne, 1999; 2000). Whilst by-passing local and regional authorities in Ireland, working partnerships have been formed instead between Ireland’s central government ‘lead’ departments, these arm’s length agencies or quangos, the social partners, including business interests, trade unions and farmers, and micro-level groups at the community level, thereby satisfying the Commission’s demand for broad participation and consultation.

The case study methodology for this research

This study was conducted using an extensive and in-depth analysis of relevant public documents and existing research on urban renewal, including spatial planning, and with particular reference to the urban area of interest. Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with a wide range of senior officials from public and private organisations, who were involved in the regeneration of Temple Bar. As outlined earlier, in examining this regeneration case study, we identified a number of phases of development, ranging from a start-up phase through to an implementation phase. The
policy network of actors involved in each of the phases and for each case study was identified and measured (Akkerman & Torenvlied, 2001). A non-technical overview of these network findings for each of the case studies is presented in this paper. We also sought to identify the types of formal institutional arrangements in place and emergent during each of these phases of development.

**The Temple Bar case study**

The Temple Bar case study is the story of the renovation and development of a mostly derelict twenty-eight acres site, situated in the inner city of Dublin on the south bank of the River Liffey. Composed of Georgian brick buildings, and cobbled streets, Temple Bar is one of the oldest parts of the city. Originally it was earmarked for demolition to be the site of Dublin’s proposed central bus depot. Buildings were rented out on short-term leases at low rent, attracting independent clothes and music shops. Over time, Temple Bar became known as Dublin’s bohemian quarter. By the mid-1980s the proposal for a bus depot had become more unlikely and tentative steps were taken by the tenants of the area to preserve the unique nature of Temple Bar as Dublin’s cultural quarter. From that point, regeneration gathered more actor groups and both the fabric and the purpose of the buildings were changed, and improved.

**Network and Institutionalist Embeddedness**

**Phase 1 (1965-1989)**

The chapter traces the development of Temple Bar through the three phases sketched in the table below. In doing so, it notes the critical junctures, or the points at which the patterns of co-operation in the governance of regeneration shifted.
Table 1. Phases and Key Events for Temple Bar

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<td>Phase 1: Start up (1965-1989)</td>
<td>1965: <em>Transportation in Dublin</em> document</td>
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<td>1976: Skidmore, Owens and Merrill Report proposes Temple Bar as CIE depot</td>
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<td>1989: Temple Bar Development Council is established; Dublin City Council prepares an Area Action Plan for Temple Bar.</td>
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<td>1991: Dublin City Council's Temple Bar Area Action Plan included in Dublin City Development Plan, 1991:</td>
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<td>The Finance Act, 1991</td>
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<td>The Temple Bar Area Renewal and Development Act, 1991</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1994: EU Structural Funds Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural Development – Sub Programme 3, Measure 5</td>
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<td>2000: Development of Cultural Centres completed with the opening of the Project</td>
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The following sections do not aim to tell the story of Temple Bar, but rather they outline the network and institutionalist embeddedness of the regeneration project, as described earlier. Ireland's heavily centralised political system and administration identifies the central government departments responsible for the proper auditing and management of
programmes and policy. In the absence of either trusted informal, network type mechanisms or formal mechanisms of co-ordination, there is always a chance that 'other actors' will strongly deviate from the policy recommendation of the central departments. These central government departments must have the guarantee that other actors with whom they collaborate at the implementation phase and will stick to the agreed programme of policy measures. Central government actors will overtly regard credibility as an extremely important attribute, in determining trustworthy partners in the networks for policy decision-making and subsequent policy implementation. Given the lack of real involvement afforded to the Irish local authorities by central government at the planning and decision making phases (phases 1 and 2), it is perhaps unsurprising difficulties arise at the implementation phase regarding compliance in planning and execution (Torenvlied, 2000).

By 1976, the national Bus and Rail Company, Córas Iompair Éireann (CIE) had moved squarely behind the proposal to locate the central depot in the Temple Bar area. CIE began acquiring property in the area and leasing buildings at low rent to artists, retailers, etc. CIE were unwilling to invest in the upkeep of the fabric of the buildings so it was the tenants and residents of Temple Bar themselves who initiated the process of redevelopment in the late 1970s about the future of the area. The most important development during the start-up phase (i.e. phase 1) was the establishment of the Temple Bar Development Council (TBDC), which represented the local, small-scale business and cultural interests and residents living in the area. In terms of the structure of the relationships between the various interests, the TBDC actor became the focal point (i.e. high centrality) of communication and influence in policy network, particularly during this first phase of the regeneration of the Temple Bar area. Many of the initial actors knew each other because of their involvement with
local art projects, but as one participant noted, it was unusual to work as allies rather than competitors for funding. Managers of art projects were unused to sharing their time and staff with other bodies, and the culture of co-operation was difficult to create outside the inner circle of enthusiasts. Great effort was made to draw in local residents and businesses, and maintain internal unity when producing public statements.

The effect of the highly centralised Irish political system is seen in the way in which the local actors such as Temple Bar Development Council and Dublin City Council interacted with each other in the first phase of the Temple Bar project. The Temple Bar Development Council produced a document with several proposals for the regeneration of the Temple Bar area. These proposals were deliberately submitted to various bodies ranging from national to city level. This was because the TBDC quickly recognised that it was important to engage key actors at the national central level of government, in the hope that this would put downward pressure from national government onto the City Council. The TBDC had also approached the Dublin City Council to look for assistance, financial and other, for their proposal for the regeneration of the Temple Bar area. In the research interviews, which were conducted with the senior officials from Dublin City Council (then known as Dublin Corporation), it was indicated that at this early stage the City Council had no cohesive over-arching development plan for Dublin, nor did it have the finances to undertake one. For example, the suggestion that the TBDC approach the central government Department of Finance came from Dublin City Council itself, who were unable to make financial provisions of that level and to raise the public profile of the whole proposal.
During the first phase of Temple Bar regeneration project, the active policy network comprised mainly local sub-national actors including relevant departments of Dublin City Council, with the EU Commission and the Department of an Taoiseach involved only the periphery of the network. However during the later part of 1988, the policy network began to change as personal contacts and friendships facilitated informal contact between the Temple Bar Development Council and Paddy Teahon, the dynamic and influential General Secretary of the Department of an Taoiseach, Charles Haughey. His access to the Taoiseach allowed the Temple Bar residents to by-pass the normal formal and time consuming political ladder and instead to have access to the heart of government.

**Phase 2 (1990 – 1991)**

In the second phase of the project, there is a remarkable change in the composition and structure of the policy network. A number of new actors joined the network, which primarily included several central government departments and semi state agencies such as the national Tourism Board, Bord Failte. These were vital actors as they were able to give professional advice and credibility to the voluntary and self-confessed amateurs within TBDC. Moreover the most central actor in the network became the Department of the Taoiseach. The Taoiseach was in a position to pluck “pet projects” from the pool of schemes for his own attention. One actor involved in the plans believed that the Taoiseach, Charles Haughey, saw Temple Bar as a visible cultural initiative in which he could promote himself as a statesman in the dying days of his premiership.
In a conference on the future of Dublin’s infrastructure and fabric, Haughey noted: “Temple Bar is one of the most important, traditional, attractive and noteworthy parts of the city, and it has to be refurbished and kept, and I won’t let CIÉ near it.” In order to motivate other residents, and to demonstrate the commitment of the Taoiseach, Temple Bar activists repeated Haughey’s words, almost as a mantra.

Once the Temple Bar project is taken on board as a key area of responsibility of the Department of the Taoiseach, the administrative, financial and political resources effectively become available to the TBDC. The Taoiseach’s Department worked directly with TBDC and Dublin City Council to submit a proposal for funding under the EU Urban Pilot Project programme and this proposal was ultimately successful. More notable perhaps, was the speed and relative ease with which the subsequent legislation was passed in 1991 to establish the new institutional structure or quango to manage the development of the Temple Bar area into the future. Temple Bar Renewal Ltd. was set up with the remit to approve development proposals to enable them to avail of the incentives provided for in Chapter VII of the Finance Act, 1991. The Temple Bar Properties Ltd. is the Development Company for the Temple Bar Area, so designated under the Temple Bar Area Renewal and Development Act, 1991. The establishment of these two new companies provided the organisational and management framework to give form and focus to the renewal process (Montgomery 1995). In order to keep the momentum of progress, legislation was introduced on the last day of the sitting of Dáil Éireann, rather than wait until after the summer recess. In such moments, support of the national government came into its own. It is also useful to note that some of the key individuals involved in the original Temple Bar Development Council also subsequently took management responsibilities within

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1 Charles Haughey, Dublin Crisis Conference, Dublin, February 1987, quoted in “Temple Bar Development Council’s Submission to Dublin Corporation Planning Department” April 1988
Temple Bar Properties, and over a decade since the legislation was passed, continued to do so.

In the second phase of this project's development, again we see the impact of the centralised political system in Ireland and in this case, the major role of the Department of the Taoiseach. Over the course of the first (1989-1993) and second (1994-1999) rounds of Structural Funds for Ireland, Temple Bar attracted some IR£40.6m (€51.55m) in EU and State funding, of which IR£22.1m (€28.06m) came directly from the European Regional Development Fund. Despite the European Commission’s strong desire for subsidiarity – policy-making and implementation at the lowest possible level – the Temple Bar project was managed in a way wholly consistent with the centralised Irish approach to governance (Marshall, 2002). A key principle of the Reform of the Structural Funds legislation was the call for multilevel partnerships involving the public and private actors, at the relevant local, regional and central levels of administration within the member state. However, the lead department, in the case of Temple Bar, was that of the Department of the Taoiseach which implemented partnership and subsidiarity on its own terms, creating a brand-new State body, Temple Bar Properties Ltd., to serve as an implementing authority with the participation of local-level actors and the social partners. The development of Temple Bar remained a project under the auspices of the Department of the Taoiseach, up until 1993, when there was a general re-organisation of government departments. Responsibility for the Temple Bar project was then shifted to the Department of the Environment, a body better suited to overseeing the implementation of the project, following its incubation period in the Department of the Taoiseach. Throughout this time, the partnership between the local community in
Temple Bar and central and sectoral oriented government departments, particularly the Department of the Taoiseach, remained strong.

Whatever way we judge the Temple Bar project, the impact of the legislation introduced in 1991 is clear: it gave a new dynamic to the regeneration project and created new working patterns amongst the key partners to the process. However one key actor who remained unsatisfied with the process was the Dublin City Council, formally known as Dublin Corporation. Within Dublin City Council there is a deep sense of grievance that it has been effectively sidelined in terms of the executive decision making regarding the development of the Temple Bar area. Marshall has suggested that while “Dublin Corporation was included on both of Temple Bar’s management committees”… “day-to-day executive decisions remained the province of Temple Bar Properties, the city’s elected government played a comparatively minor role in the formulation of redevelopment policy. The Corporation’s only leverage over the Temple Bar project was in planning approvals; unlike the Docklands, Temple Bar was not designated an independent planning area” (2002. Our research interviews with senior officials within the Dublin City Council indicated that during the nineties, considerable organisational change took place within Dublin City Council and that it increased its internal capacity for strategic planning and development as well as its ability to take on large-scale regeneration projects. However, in the late eighties and early nineties, this level of capacity and perhaps organisational confidence was lacking within the Dublin Corporation.

In 1991, an architectural competition was launched to restore many of the Georgian buildings which give Temple Bar its character, and which were now crumbling. During the 1980s a group of former Architecture students in Dublin began
undertaking small commissions on a partnership basis. By 1991, these architects, despite working in different practices around the city, came together to put in a joint bid for the contract of restoring Temple Bar architecturally, under the name Group 91. Thus within the teams of architects involved in the restoration of Temple Bar, we can see a smaller network taking place. By awarding the contract to a group of likeminded architects, both they and Temple Bar Properties felt comfortable that every group would produce plans basically similar in outlook. Working with friends and colleagues which they had known for nearly twenty years, the architects believed that they has a supportive environment in which to create, with the added benefit of small rivalries, which they knew would not escalate and threaten the projects. Once again, the relative smallness of the city had a direct impact on the look of the fabric of the buildings, and the absence of Dublin City Council’s own architects is striking.

The speed at which the second phase moves into the third, largely post regeneration, phase has been seen by some as testimony to the involvement of the Taoiseach and the success in attracting European funding. Indeed, there can be seen something of a virtuous circle – public support by the Taoiseach leading to successful funding bids, which in turn raises the profile of the project, thus attracting further governmental support. Of all the ministerial support that Temple Bar Development Council could have hoped for, that of the Taoiseach was the most welcome. His support for the project shaved years off the project, revealed hitherto hidden pools of financial support and facilitated access to experts. Having the architectural framework in place following Group ‘91’s winning of the competition meant that planning applications could be now made. This put the regeneration of Temple Bar firmly in the sight of the city’s residents. Full-page newspaper advertisements were taken out describing the
buildings, which would be restored. The architectural framework devised by Group ’91 has subsequently been described as “brilliant” (Howley Harrington Architects, 2004) and the manner in which it was presented to the public – as a realistic but large-scale restoration project, not creating office blocks, but creating something for them – meant that the feedback from the public was largely supportive.

In 1992, the regeneration of Temple Bar turned its second corner. Legislation had been passed and the second part of Temple Bar – the West End – was earmarked for further regeneration into a mixed-use development of accommodation and housing. The cultural programmes, meanwhile, were secured with further European and domestic exchequer funding. The improved economy, coupled with the first cheap flights from the United Kingdom and Europe, brought tourists and money into the area, making it an attractive location in which to open a business and raised its profile as a holiday destination.

In 1993, the support of the regeneration project moved from the Department of the Taoiseach to the Department of Environment, and the Minister for the Environment became the sole shareholder of Temple Bar Properties. In 2001, once the fabric of regeneration had been completed, the shareholder again moved, this time to the Dublin City Council. In each move, many feared that the project would be lost within the sea of departmental responsibilities as it competed with other projects and responsibilities for ministerial attention, but the steady networking between grassroots activists and the government bodies ensured that this was not the case, and that Temple Bar received full attention. Grassroots actors became formalised in this period, forming Traders in the Area Supporting the Cultural Quarter Limited (TASCQ
TASCQ members include the pubs, restaurants and shops in the area. In return for a financial contribution, these businesses are promoted by Temple Bar Properties.

This changed with the advent of the third period of regeneration in Temple Bar. In 2003, TASCQ and Temple Bar Properties commissioned a future framework plan for the area. The last large-scale development plan for the area had been in 1993, with Temple Bar’s Development Plan. Since then, Temple Bar had changed, and it was felt that a consultation exercise amongst actor groups and the production of a definitive and detailed plan for the next decade of the area was needed, to put the development back on track. In the completed report issued in 2004, the architectural firm commissioned with the report noted: “It is about ten years since the ‘new’ Temple Bar was born and is now about time to assess a way forward for the next decade. Every city centre is in a constant state of change and flux, not least Temple Bar” (Howley Harrington Architects, 2004). By 2003, the regeneration of the main part of Temple Bar was complete, the buildings were all occupied and the West End development had recently been completed. A decade after legislation was introduced, its most major flaw was clearly discernable – the large number of “super pubs” which had been listed as a cultural service in the 1991 legislation and to whom it was difficult to refuse planning permission. Indeed, the excessive amounts of alcohol available in Temple Bar has meant “Temple Bar has become more renowned for its drinking than anything else” rather than for the cultural events (Howley Harrington Architects, 2004). The 2004 Plan aimed to redress the balance away from Temple Bar (“The temple of bars”) to the cultural quarter, which would open up the area to more people than those on stag weekends or an extended pub-crawl. A responsibility for the cleanliness and the character of the area was given to the traders, through the auspices of TASCQ, but there was clearly a role for the City Council, not just in street lighting and street
cleaning, but also in the training and supervision of door staff and the investigation of breaches of planning laws in the area.

More importantly, by 2003, the role of the City Council had changed, as well as the attitude of the Temple Bar authorities towards it. The 2004 Urban Framework Plan listed the City Council as a major stakeholder in Temple Bar, having a strong role to play in the further development of the area. There had traditionally been an ambiguous relationship between Temple Bar and the City Council, characterised by an unwillingness to get involved, and then a readiness to undertake some small actions when pressurised from the national government or from Temple Bar activists. In the 2004 Framework Plan, the City Council had become a needed and welcome stakeholder in the continued development of the plan, and many within the Council were pleased, at last to do so.

**Conclusion: metropolitan governance in Ireland**

Our empirical research has spanned a critical time period in the urban regeneration of Dublin’s inner city. From the case study presented, it is clear that the formal and informal institutions of Ireland’s centralised government remain deeply rooted and powerful. While recognising the innovative character of partnership based policy coordination, this research also points to the important underlying governance mechanisms at work which primarily depend on central government departments initiating or directly engaging with micro level community actors and social partners in the early stages of a local development initiative. Moreover over the 1990s there was a significant increase in the capacity of central government departments to effectively engage directly with local level actors and social partners more generally, often for the purposes of managing EU funds (Payne, 1999). With regard to the EU
Structural funded urban projects, such as Temple Bar, the central government sectoral department established a separate body to manage the structural funded urban projects, rather than go through the existing local authority structures and the elected base of local representatives. For some commentators, the new institutional structures created such as Temple Bar Properties are seen in a negative light. Marshall argues that “the creation of a special regime for Temple Bar further eroded the power of existing local authorities” (Marshall, 2002). For others, such as Montgomery (1995), “the government was careful and very sure to keep Dublin City Council at arm’s length from the whole initiative…the effect has been to free the area from the dead hand of bureaucracy”, thereby ensuring efficient implementation and progress (in Marshall 2002). Russell suggests that “local authorities acted as facilitators and enablers of private sector development, rather than as the key drivers or implementing agencies of urban renewal (Russell, 2001). Certainly these contrasting critiques go to the heart of the debate about the principle of local democratic participation and representation in this emergent Irish urban governance model. Moreover, this issue becomes more relevant when it is noted that the Temple Bar governance structure was later replicated throughout the Dublin area as additional European funds were directed to urban initiatives.

The story of evolving governance patterns in Dublin is also one of growing and persistent calls for greater representation in the policy process. While this call has been echoed across the Irish political system, in particular, public and private actors at sub-national level have become more aware and confident in their own potential contribution to the policy process. Moreover the impact of the various EU financed initiatives directly targeting local communities has allowed new actors to enter the policy networks, which have traditionally been centralist and hierarchical. Marshall
suggests that “grass-roots actors, accustomed to a place at the table following a
decade of EU-mandated partnership arrangements, show no intention of withdrawing
from the urban policy process despite the progressive wind-down of EU funding for
Dublin city-region” (2001). The ad-hoc approach to partnership governance in Ireland
has led to a kind of confusion about the distinction between participative and
representative democracy. Often this has resulted in the pursuit of partnership led
governance for its own sake, with little attention paid to who is representing who, on
what basis and with what capacity to do so. This research points to the general lack of
trust, which characterises local level relationships between the local public elected
representatives and the local private sector and community interests. Local urban
development initiatives are seen to be successful often in spite of local government,
which has usually felt threatened and sidelined by these activities.

The introduction of the various local government reforms from the mid-1990s
onwards promises a stronger co-ordinating role for democratically elected local
government in Ireland. Moreover, these reforms also attempt to incorporate into their
model of local government the widespread demand and popularity of participatory
form of local governance. However the research findings presented here show that, by
themselves, these reforms are quite limited and do not adequately facilitate city and
county councils to engage constructively with local partners and establish a clear
advisory role or voice for the local community and social partners in local
government policy. While this move towards a more formalised approach to
partnership at the local level and within local government is welcomed by many of
those involved, the really difficult and thorny issues of enhancing the financial and
other resources, management capacity and policy remit of democratically elected
local government in Ireland remains essentially untouched. In the absence of real
progress on this front, Ireland’s favourite response, innovative but ad-hoc, effective but of dubious democratic credentials, the ubiquitous quango seems likely to remain the only game in town.
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