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Equality in Education: An Equality of Condition Perspective

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Most of the discussion about equality in education is focused on how to equalize access to and participation within different levels of formal education for different social groups (Lynch, 2000). While equalizing access and participation are key equality objectives, we need a more holistic and integrated approach to the achievement of equality in education if we are to make schools truly egalitarian institutions. Drawing on extensive empirical research we have undertaken on education and our work in *Equality: From Theory to Action* (2004) we begin by setting out the basic principles of equality of condition that we believe are essential for promoting equality in education. We then outline how these principles apply to four major equality problems in education. We suggest that equality in education can only be achieved if we recognize the deeply integrated relationship that exists between education and the economic, political, socio-cultural and affective systems in society.

Equality of Condition

There has been an immense amount of philosophical work on the idea of equality in the last thirty years, resulting in a number of different conceptions of equality. In this paper, we define equality in a robust sense as ‘equality of condition’. The most general way of defining equality of condition is simply to say that it is the belief that people should be as equal as possible in relation to the central conditions of their lives. Equality of condition is not about trying to make inequalities fairer, or giving
people a more equal opportunity to become unequal, but about ensuring that everyone has roughly equal prospects for a good life.

It is tempting to call equality of condition ‘equality of outcome’ in order to contrast it with the idea of equal opportunity, but that can be a little misleading, because there is no plausible egalitarian theory that says that the outcomes of all social processes should be the same for everyone. Equality of condition is about equalizing what might be called people’s ‘real options’, which involves the equal enabling and empowerment of individuals.

We believe that there are five key dimensions along which it is vital to pursue equality of condition so that people can pursue a good life. While each one of these dimensions can be analysed as a discrete entity, each one is also deeply implicated in the others. These five dimensions of equality are: resources; respect and recognition; love, care and solidarity; power; and working and learning. By equality of resources we mean not just equality in obvious economic forms of capital such as income and wealth, but also in forms of social capital like family and social networks and affiliations and in forms of cultural capital such as educational credentials. Other important resources are time itself, and health and environmental resources, such as high quality health care and a clean environment. Equal respect and recognition is not just about the liberal idea that every individual is entitled to equal rights and the privileges of citizenship in the country in which they live, and indeed that we are all, in a real sense, citizens of the world. It is also about appreciating or accepting differences rather than merely tolerating them. Having said that, it is important to note that this does not mean that we have an obligation to refrain from criticizing other points of view. None of us has to give up the belief that some ideas and practices are
unacceptable. What we do need is to engage in a critical dialogue with others. We call this approach ‘critical interculturalism’.

The third dimension of equality of condition is love, care and solidarity. Being cared for is a fundamental prerequisite for mental and emotional well-being and for human development generally. Consequently it is vital that people are enabled to provide for, and benefit from, care, love and solidarity. Of course we cannot always institutionally guarantee that everyone’s needs for love, care and solidarity are met but we can try to arrange societies in ways that make this more or less likely. We can ensure that the balance between paid and generally unpaid care, love and solidarity work is such that the latter is facilitated, and is equally distributed. We can ensure that people are educated about care, love and solidarity relations, that employment, transportation networks and neighbourhoods are structured in a manner that facilitates caring, and that vulnerable groups, especially those who are institutionalized, have adequate protections for their care needs.

The central aim of equality of condition in its fourth dimension is to reduce power inequalities as much as possible. To do this, first of all we need to endorse traditional liberal civil and political rights, but with less of a commitment to property rights. We also have to support certain group-related rights, such as the right of groups to political representation or their right to education in minority languages. Finally, equality of power is about a more egalitarian, participatory politics and about the extension of democratic principles to all areas of society, particularly the economy and the family.

The fifth dimension of equality is working and learning. In all societies, work plays a very important role not just in access to resources but also in shaping relations of status, power, and love, care and solidarity. But work is also important in its own
right, as a potential source of personal development and as a potential burden. So work has to be looked at from both these directions when considering equality, to ensure that everyone has a right to some form of potentially satisfying work, that there should be limits to inequality in the burdens of work, and that people should be compensated for unequal burdens when they occur. We should consider all kinds of work, paid and unpaid, including the work done to sustain relations of love, care and solidarity. Equality of work would obviously require a major restructuring of the division of labour. Learning is more than a preparation for work: it, too, is important for its own sake. The objective is to ensure that everyone has engaging and satisfying learning – learning that develops themselves as people. And we should think in terms of the whole range of sites of learning, not just formal educational institutions. In the remainder of this paper, however (due to the limitations of space), we outline what equality in education would involve, focusing in particular on the formal institutions of learning. (For a more detailed exposition of what we mean by equality of condition see Baker, Lynch, Cantillon and Walsh, 2004).

**Four major equality problems in education**

Equality in education has generally been viewed as a matter of dividing educational, and education-related, resources more equally or fairly (Lynch, 2000). In the policy sphere in particular, much of the focus of research attention has been on determining the relative success or failure of different education strategies for the promotion of socio-economic equality in different countries (Breen, Heath and Whelan, 1999; Clancy, 2001; Erikson and Jonsson, 1996, Euriat and Thelot, 1995; Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993). Inequalities of status and power have been defined as secondary considerations in equality debates (Connell, 1993), while issues of care in education have not generally been defined in egalitarian terms among educationalists. Where
educationalists have addressed the issue of care, it has been generally in instrumental terms, in terms of how a caring environment can facilitate learning in other fields. Much of the literature focuses on how various emotions impact on learning generally or in particular subject areas (Bower, 1994; Omrod, 1999, McLeod and Admas, 1989).

In this paper, we treat the subject of equality in education in a holistic manner. We examine key dimensions to equality that are central to both the purposes and processes of education: equality in educational and related resources; equality of respect and recognition; equality of power; and equality of love, care and solidarity. We indicate in each case some of the major changes that need to occur if we are to promote equality of condition in each of these areas of educational practice.

Given the defining role that education plays in selecting and allocating people within the economy in particular, and the reciprocal role that inequality of economic resources has on inequalities within the education process itself, we give particular attention to the issue of equality of resources, focusing on its relationship to social class.  

**Equality of resources and economically generated inequalities in education: the primacy of social class**

Education is intimately integrated into the economic systems of society in two distinct ways. On the one hand, access to, and successful participation in, education is generally dependent of having the economic resources to avail fully of the opportunities that education can offer. On the other hand, schools and colleges are major institutions of selection and stratification for the labour market; they mediate life chances within the economy. Because the distribution of economic resources plays such a key role in determining the quality of education one receives, and
because education is such a powerful determinant of life chances, equality in education cannot be thought of separately from economic equality.

In capitalist societies, economically generated inequality manifests itself fundamentally as a social class problem in education, a problem of unequal access, participation and outcome arising from unequal access to resources. Economic capital can be relatively easily converted into the kind of cultural capital that schools and colleges both require of their students and go on to value and accredit (Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). It is therefore inevitable that those who lack the cultural capital that schooling demands, and who lack the resources and social capital (networks) to acquire it, will experience relative educational failure. That this has happened across several countries is now well established (Erikson and Jonsson, 1996; Green, 2003; Mayer, 2001; Shavit and Blossfel, 1993). In many societies the correlation between social-class background and highest level of education attained has become so strong that education credentials are operating in practice, albeit not in principle, as a kind of state-supported systems of inherited privilege (Bourdieu, 1996). There is a ‘State Nobility’ being created through the education system, whereby academic titles (one becomes a
Doctor, Master, Bachelor (note the gendered titles!), an ‘A’ or ‘D’ grade person) are bestowed in a class- and family-differentiated way that is reminiscent of the way titles were and are bestowed by royalty on each other.\(^4\)

*The role of educational institutions in promoting social class inequality*

To recognize that social class background, mediated through the ‘habitus’\(^5\) of family of origin, plays such a major role in determining educational outcomes is not to deny the role that schools play in the process. Schools are organizational entities with their own priorities and values, a central one of which is survival. Schools and colleges can and do contribute to class-based inequalities of educational resources through a host of mechanisms and procedures that are too complex and diverse to document in one paper. Among the processes and procedures that we have identified as being within some degree of the control of the education system itself are the *selection or admission* procedures controlling school entry, the *grouping* procedures used to locate students in tracks or streams, and the systems of *curriculum and syllabus design and assessment* (Lynch, 1989; Lynch and Lodge, 2002; Lyons, et al., 2003). Our analysis of audio and video recording of classes also indicates that pedagogical styles are important but we will not examine these here.

*Selection and admission and the ideology of the market*

Although several countries seriously limit the choices available to schools in selecting students (and the choices available to parents in terms of where they can choose to send their child), the practice of many schools in market-driven systems is to try to enrol the most educationally attractive students. By targeting the educationally attractive, schools are inevitably operating an admission systems that is deeply class-biased (Gewirtz et al., 1995; Lareau 1989; Lynch and Lodge 2002; Reay 1998).
In a market system what schools want are parents who will invest time and resources in their children thereby boosting performance, and correlatively the status of the school (Carroll and Walford 1996; Whitty and Power 2000). Middle class and upper class parents fit this profile more fully than those from working class households (Ball, Bowe and Gewirtz 1995; Hanafin and Lynch, 2002; Hanley and McKeever 1997). Working class students are more likely to be perceived as a liability, a risk to the status of the school in a market-driven system (Reay and Ball 1997). In any case, professional parents in particular are more likely to operate as active consumers in an education market; they have the knowledge, contacts, confidence, time and money to exercise choice and promote high educational performance (Crozier 1997; Gewirtz et al. 1995; Lynch and Lodge 2002; Lyons et al. 2003).

The ideology of school choice and educational markets obscures the negative impact of market systems on less well-resourced students, especially in societies where the state fails to intervene to offset the adverse effects of choice (Cole and Hill 1995, Reay 1996; Teese and Polesel, 2003). It conceals the practice whereby educationally disadvantaged students are systematically discouraged from entering schools with higher levels of attainment, thereby fostering ghettos of advantage and disadvantage within the school system itself.

**Grouping and Tracking: the ideology of ‘ability’**

Grouping students on the basis of prior attainment (so-called ‘ability’) is a standard practice in most educational systems. The only significant differences concern the timing, procedures and scope of the stratification. While Northern European countries (including Finland, Norway and the Republic of Ireland), some East Asian countries (Korea, Japan and Taiwan) and Canada have relatively unselective admission systems for second-level education, some other European
countries (including Germany, Switzerland and Luxembourg) have more selective systems, while others (Portugal, Spain) practise openness at entry, but have relatively strong stratification via streaming within schools (Green, 1997, 2003).

Although practices of streaming, tracking or banding are portrayed as social-class-neutral methods of organizing learning groups, this is not the case in practice. Students from working class and lower socio-economic backgrounds, and those from subordinated ethnic minorities, are most likely to be allocated to the lower tracks, streams or bands (Boaler 1997; Cooper and Dunne, 1999; Hannan and Boyle 1987; Lynch 1989; Lynch and Lodge 2002; Rees et al. 1996; Taylor 1993). (We know little about how disability relates to grouping, as the subject is not well researched. This is not unrelated to the fact that segregated schooling has been the norm for students with disabilities in several countries.)

That tracking and streaming is a deeply classed issue is evident from the fact that powerful middle class parents pressurize schools to provide advance tracks or streams (Kariya and Rosenbaum 1999; McGrath and Kuriloff 1999; Wells and Serna 1996). They threaten schools with what is sometimes termed ‘bright’ flight’ (Kariya and Rosenbaum 1999; Lyons et al. 2003). Within a tracking system, middle and upper class parents have a greater knowledge of how things work and a greater capacity to exert influence over, or manipulate, decisions on grouping (Brantlinger et al. 1996; Crozier 1997; McGrath and Kuriloff 1999; Oakes and Guiton 1995). This helps to explain both why they favour tracking systems in the first place and why these systems operate to the advantage of their children.

A host of highly essentialist and scientifically questionable classifications are used to rationale the allocations to streams and tracks (see Gardner, 1983, Sternberg, 1998 for critiques of intelligence-type testing and the essentialist views of ability
associated with it). While countries do use various types of ‘intelligence’ tests, verbal reasoning tests, aptitude tests etc., to grade students, what is conveniently ignored also is the deeply structured class biases that are built into most tests of ‘ability’, something identified by Labov (1972) over 30 years ago and reiterated in the 1990s by Fischer, et al. (1996). And the biases that are built into such tests are not just confined to social class. Selection and allocation within schools on the basis of such linguistically and mathematically loaded tests works against those whose capabilities are not within a narrowly defined linguistic or mathematical range (Gardner, 1983, 1991, 1999).

Remarkably the deeply inegalitarian implications of grouping and tracking are often taken as a given, an inevitable by-product of the educational processes. Yet we know that they are social constructs with the most profoundly inegalitarian outcomes for those who are placed in low tracks in particular (Berends, 1991; Gamoran et al. 1995; Hallam and Toutounji 1996; Kubitschek and Hallinan 1998; Oakes 1985; Smyth 1999; Sorenson and Hallinan 1986; Wang and Haertal 1995).

Curriculum and assessment matters: bias towards linguistic intelligences

The curricula, syllabi and modes of assessment adopted in most formal educational systems are heavily biased towards students with (written) linguistic and logical-mathematical capabilities, with the priority being given to one or the other varying cross-culturally (Gardner 1983, 1993, 1999). Linguistic capabilities in particular are differently developed across classes because of differences in culture, lifestyle, work and opportunity. The most conspicuous example of this is how oral traditions are much stronger in some cultures and classes, while written language is
prioritized in others. Oral and written linguistic capabilities are not equally valued in schools, and even within the oral tradition, the codes of the upper classes are prioritized over the codes of working class or ethnic minority students. (Bernstein 1971; Labov 1972). This inevitably means that students who are not proficient in the linguistic skills required in schools and colleges (what Bernstein (1971) has termed the elaborated codes) are defined as failures or lacking in intelligence simply by virtue of the way they relate to and know the world. They are required to work through the linguistic (mostly written) modes of expression that schools and colleges require, but generally do not teach in a systematic way (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). The problem is compounded by the fact that pen and paper tests dominate the assessment procedures and thereby the processes of education. These tests are often remote from the reality that they purport to examine. As Gardner (1991, p. 133) has observed, ‘academic knowledge is typically assessed with arbitrary problems that a student has little intrinsic interest in or motivation to answer, and performances on such instruments have little predictive power for performances outside of a scholastic environment.’

Research on human intelligences has demonstrated how claims regarding the singular and hierarchical views of human ability are unfounded (Devlin et al. 1997; Gardner 1983, 1993, 1999; Simon 1978; Sternberg 1998). Yet schools and colleges give most credit to those forms of knowledge, capabilities and intelligences that are associated with occupations and statuses that are already privileged in society. Abilities and intelligences associated with subordinate statuses and class positions are either excluded, minimally assessed, or accorded a lower status within a given subject when fully assessed. Subjects specifically associated with spatial, bodily kinaesthetic and musical intelligences are included in the curriculum but are generally given
limited space in terms of time allowed and course options (see Hanafin, Shevlin and Flynn 2002 for examples of this in Ireland).

The prioritization of the linguistic and mathematically based subjects is paralleled by class biases within the subject syllabi themselves. Within art, it is fine art and art history (the art and knowledge of the upper classes) that have highest status, with design work (the art traditionally associated with more working class occupations such as printing) being accorded a lower status on the syllabus and in assessment systems. Within English, it is the literature, poetry and plays written by the upper classes, especially the male upper classes that have pride of place in the syllabus, especially in the syllabus for the higher-level courses. While there is no doubt that the upper classes, especially men of that class, have traditionally had more time and education at their disposal to enable them to write, and in that sense their work is more extensive than that of women or economically oppressed groups (as Bourdieu (1984) noted, one needs freedom from necessity to write, to create art, etc.), this does not undermine the argument that it is the tastes and interests of the elite in society, especially the male elite, that are institutionalized as legitimate knowledge in every field including history, art, literature, science, mathematics and music. Whatever the reason may be for its lower status or exclusion from the syllabus, the fact that the life and culture of the economically subordinate are not studied in schools reinforces the sense of their subordination in society.

Resolutions

While social class inequality in education manifests itself in terms of individual injustice, its origins lie in the institutionalized inequality in access to wealth and income that directly influences one’s capacity to buy educational services on equal terms with others. Income differentials also impact indirectly on class inequality by
determining how the cultural capital relevant for educational consumption is distributed across classes. There is no easy answer to the issues we have raised about class-based inequalities of educational resources, because they are rooted in wider economically-generated inequalities. There is evidence to show that where states are willing to tackle these inequalities directly, by investing in high quality child care and related educational and welfare supports for children, as well as by providing high quality universalized welfare provision for adults, they can offset negative class effects on educational attainment (Sweden being a case in point: see Shavit and Blossfeld 1993). By contrast, the overall evidence from many economically more unequal countries indicates that attempts by states to improve the educational prospects of disadvantaged groups are generally neutralized by the efforts of economically advantaged households to increase their private investment in their own children. Thus there is no comprehensive ‘internal settlement’ to the problem of class inequality in education, as the defining source of class inequality lies outside the educational system. Eliminating income and wealth inequalities outside of school is essential if we are to ensure that excess resources cannot be used to undermine more egalitarian policies within schools.

To say that educational resources and advantage can be bought to a considerable degree is not to deny that education itself contributes to class-based inequalities or that schools and colleges can help to challenge them. Selection and grouping procedures are obvious areas where schools can cease to collaborate with, and even challenge, class inequality. In most school systems, school managers and teachers have considerable freedom in how they group students into classes and, albeit to a lesser degree, in how they select students at entry. If they are committed to more egalitarian principles, they can and do implement more egalitarian practices. For
example, girls’ single sex schools in Ireland stream and band far less rigidly than their male counterparts although in social class terms their schools are no more socially or academically selective than boys’ schools. The net effects of the more inclusive policies adopted in girls’ schools are higher retention rates, a more inclusive social climate and higher aggregate rates of attainment (Hannan and Boyle 1987; Hannan et al. 1996; Lynch 1989).

To confront the reality of class inequality in education, as it operates through selection and grouping, would also require the democratic institutions of the state, as well as schools and colleges, to confront organized upper and middle class interests. This is a difficult task and is certainly unlikely to succeed if initiated purely on an individual school basis, as research on how economically powerful parents exercise influence on schools has shown. As a first step, it is necessary to make public not only school selection and admissions procedures but also their grouping procedures, opening up the inside life of schools to democratic scrutiny and public challenge.

Changing curricula and modes of assessment that are class biased is generally not possible at school level. This is a decision for the bodies controlling curriculum and syllabus design and assessment procedures, and these vary considerably across countries. Again however, there is a need to democratize the decision-making about these processes. The social class and other biases encoded in the deep structures of curriculum design and assessment are unlikely to be challenged by ‘experts’ who are not only socialized into the received wisdom of the codes, but who are the net beneficiaries of the system itself. Because the domain assumptions of experts and academics are as significant as their paradigmatic assumptions, and the former play a powerful role in defining the latter (Gouldner, 1970), it is vital that there are
democratic structures in place to name what has been made invisible within the academic regimes of power (Lynch, 1999b).

As we have seen, the division of subjects into higher, ordinary and foundation levels or into different tracks is a tool for stratifying students in social class, ethnic and/or disability terms. What must be ended therefore is the stratification of knowledge itself. We have also seen that the whole system of subject and syllabus definition is deeply class biased, as are the modes of assessment. Forms of knowledge and understanding that have hitherto been defined as inferior and unworthy of study and investigation need to be recognized and accredited systematically. Correlatively, there is a need for *intelligence fair* testing, so that the multiple intelligences that people possess can gain recognition in schools and colleges and be awarded credentials on a par with the more traditionally recognized intelligences (Gardner 1993). Although it might be suggested that giving schools the authority to develop and accredit all forms of intelligence would give them too much power to define human capabilities, the fact is that schools and colleges already exercise that authority, but within a very narrow frame. Students’ life opportunities are strongly influenced by the educational grades they attain regardless of their anticipated career trajectories (Breen, Hannan and O’Leary, 1995). Nor is it necessary or desirable to assess and accredit all human capabilities in the standard hierarchical, and generally pencil-and-paper test form that is currently operational in the academic field. As noted above, recognizing different capabilities would mean using intelligence-appropriate assessment procedures. Accrediting other forms of human capability or intelligence would be merely levelling the playing field for those whose talents are not currently recognized and credentialized. There have been several initiatives across the US to devise alternative curricula and modes of assessment that are more sensitive to
students’ different capabilities. The portfolio approach in Central Park East Secondary School in New York City is one of the better known successful initiatives (Meier and Schwarz 1999). There has also been a body of schools in the US that has introduced a Multiple Intelligences approach to schooling based on the work of Howard Gardner and his associates in Harvard (Gardner 1983, 1993). In Ireland the introduction of the Leaving Certificate Applied has introduced more innovative and inclusive assessment procedures for final year second-level students. The Transition Year Programme is another innovative curriculum initiative now operating in a majority of Irish second-level schools, allowing students to develop a wide range of skills and competencies over a one year period in which academic subjects constitute but one element (Jeffers 2002).

To be able to challenge social class inequality in education, there also needs to be a widening and deepening of education on social class issues. We discuss this subject in more depth when we outline the responses needed to overcome the silences and devaluations that are endemic to the more cultural aspects of class politics in the following section on respect and recognition.

To sum up, we have highlighted some of the key practices that need to change so that schooling can operate in a more egalitarian mode in terms of economically-generated inequalities. We recognize that given the deep injustice in the constitution of economic relations, there is no long-term internal settlement to the problem of social class inequalities in education. These will only be eliminated in full when class systems themselves are eliminated. Yet, education does occupy a contradictory location in relation to class reproduction: while it is an agent of class inequality it is also a potential site for developing resistance to inequality. In its role as unquestioning selector and stratifier, education reinforces class inequality; however, as a site of
learning and conscientization, it can and does challenge social class and other injustices.

**Equality of respect and recognition in education: recognizing diversity**

One of the main inequalities that many groups experience in education is lack of respect and recognition. These status-related inequalities, relating to age, sexuality, religious beliefs, disability, language, gender, class, race or ethnicity, need to begin to be resolved through status-related initiatives. They are important not just for their own sake, but also because a failure to accommodate differences in schools and colleges can generate inequalities of resources as well (Connell 1993).

Inequalities of respect and recognition in education are rooted in the symbolic realm, in patterns of interpretation, definition and communication. Institutionally, they involve practices of denial and depreciation (Fraser 2000). They are expressed in the educational system in degrees of inclusion and exclusion, both within and between schools, and within and between texts, syllabi and subjects. The culturally marginal are identified as ‘other’ and are treated as irrelevant and/or inferior as a status group. They are subjected to a kind of cultural imperialism that renders them either invisible or, if visible, subject to negative stereotyping or misrecognition (Lynch and Lodge, 2002). Negative images portray subordinate groups variously as ‘native’, innocent, inferior, deviant, ugly or threatening. In so doing they legitimate acts of disrespect, disdain and violence (Harding 2003; Said 1991; Young, 1990). Because the values, perspectives and life worlds of dominant groups permeate cultural and institutional norms, members of oppressed groups have their lives interpreted through the lens of the dominant, defined as ‘common sense’. Furthermore, they can and do internalize the negative stereotypes to which their group is subjected (Bell 1997).
In schools, cultural non-recognition or misrepresentation is grounded in the practices and processes of curriculum provision and assessment, pedagogical approaches, peer culture and organizational norms. Drawing on our recent studies of schools we identify three educational practices are particularly important in sustaining inequality of respect and recognition: a general silence or invisibility that is often accompanied by devaluation or condemnation, a systematic bias in the syllabi and organizational practices of schools, and segregation into different classes or schools. In this section, we illustrate briefly some of the ways these practices affect different groups and suggest some remedies.

_Silence, invisibility and devaluation: sexuality and class_

One of the most common forms of non-recognition in education is for a group to be generally left outside educational discourse by not being named or known. This form of non-recognition is often accompanied by an undercurrent of devaluation or condemnation, so that on the exceptional occasions on which the group is named, it is only for the sake of depreciation. The empirical evidence available to us suggests that a presumption of heterosexuality underpins educational policy and practice in many countries. Consequently, people who are gay, lesbian, bisexual or transsexual experience deep forms of non-recognition in schools (Cole 2000; Epstein and Johnson 1994; Harris 1990; Lynch and Lodge, 2002; O’Carroll and Szalacha 2000). They have to ‘pass’ as heterosexual and experience the personal and social trauma that goes with living a lie (Goffman 1968). They are also frequently subjected to the taunts and homophobic bullying (Epstein, O’Flynn and Telford, 2003; Mason and Palmer 1995; Rofes 1989). The silence and denial about sexual orientation also affects lesbian, gay or bisexual teachers, forcing them into deceptions and denials about their personal lives (Gowran 2000). While higher education programmes do provide space for the
gay and lesbian studies either within existing programmes or as separate subjects, 
education generally proceeds as if there are gays, lesbians, bisexual or transgendered 
people are peripheral to its core business (Epstein, O’Flynn and Telford, 2003).

Another silence that is typical of many educational settings is their failure to 
advert to the reality of social class. In cultural terms, schools are fundamentally 
middle class institutions (Mahony and Zmroczek 1997; Reay 1998; Walkerdine and 
and mores assume a life style and set of resources that middle and upper class 
households are most likely to possess. Parents and children who are outside this frame 
are variously defined by middle class teachers as culturally deficient or deviant (Ball, 
Bowe and Gewirtz 1995; Lareau, 1989). Students are expected to have class-specific 
skills that the schools themselves do not teach (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). The 
failure of schools to acknowledge the cultural dissonance that exists between their 
mores and practices and those of students from diverse class (and ethnic and racial) 
backgrounds exacerbates their educational failure and their sense of alienation from 
the education process itself (O’Neill 1992; Archer et al. 2002).

The deeply classed culture of schools, and in particular of universities, is 
exacerbated by a lack of systematic education about social class. In most countries, 
for example, there is no programme of education that deals directly with social class. 
Certain European countries do have formal education about social and political 
processes and institutions such as the human rights education programme in France 
and the relatively lightweight compulsory course on civil, social and political 
education (CSPE) in Ireland. However, neither of these have a specific remit to 
educate about social class. (The closest the CSPE programme gets to the subject of
class is through the analysis of poverty, which is by no means focused on either the
causes or outcomes of social class inequalities and is in any case entirely optional.)

The failure to name social class inequalities has several indirect effects on the
process and procedures of schooling. It leaves the attitudes of students and teachers in
relation to class inequality untouched. There is no non-stigmatized nomenclature for
the injustices of class when issues arise. Both students and teachers resort to the
stereotypes of so-called common sense, often individualizing responsibility for
differences in performance that are largely structurally determined. They lack a
vocabulary-of-analysis to name class-based inequalities, thereby allowing them to
persist unchallenged over time (Lynch and Lodge 2002).

Systematic bias: the subordination of the feminine

There is a very real sense in which formal educational institutions are designed to
impose the ‘cultural arbitraries’ of more powerful groups on those who are
subordinate. This occurs in social class terms (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977), in
colonial (including language) terms (Harding 2003; Said 1991), and in gender terms
(Harding 1986, 1991; Smith 1987; Weiner 1994). A similar process occurs for Deaf
people who see their differences as primarily cultural and linguistic, but who are
defined by others as disabled (see Ladd, 2003, Lane, 1996).

In gender terms there are many ways in which educational institutions
subordinate the feminine. It happens when women’s work and feminist perspectives
are marginalized in literature, art, science, history, etc.; when girls do not get equal
attention in class; when their extracurricular interests as defined as secondary to those
of boys; and when positions of authority are disproportionately held by men.

Even more significant, however, is the lack of attention given to developing the
capabilities and intelligences that are associated the types of work undertaken
disproportionately by women. Care, love and solidarity work are highly gendered activities, being undertaken disproportionately by women, yet little attention is given to them in formal education. The interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligences that are essential to undertaking this work (and to many other paid forms of human service work) are not prioritized in educational programmes (Gardner, 1983; Goleman, 1995, 1998). The lack of concern for the development of personal intelligences means that those who are interested in developing their capabilities in this field are denied the opportunity to excel. Furthermore, the work associated with such intelligences is implicitly devalued, either by being excluded entirely or by being defined as optional or peripheral.

While the neglect of the personal may represent a very profound form of cultural imperialism in gender terms, it impoverishes education for all students. It means that all young people, men and women, are deprived of a very real opportunity to develop an understanding of care, love and solidarity work, work that is as central to the business of human well being (Kittay 1999; Nussbaum 1995).

The neglect of personal intelligences is not solely a gender matter, either. It is indicative of a wider problem in society whereby the emotional and affective world generally has been defined as separate from the rational world, and even a threat to it. A false dichotomy has been created between the rational and emotional, leading to a serious neglect of education about the emotions generally, and in relation to care and love work in particular.

Segregation and disability

Segregation has been a common institutional response to the management of differences in education. The degree of segregation varies historically and cross-culturally for different social groups, and often occurs invisibly through broader
patterns of residential segregation, selection procedures and parental choice. However, almost all societies practice some forms of overt educational segregation, especially for children and adults with disabilities (Ballard 1999; Vlachou 1997). The segregation of people with disabilities into separate schools has frequently resulted in their receiving non-standard, poorer quality education. The long-term effects have been overwhelmingly negative, resulting in lower educational qualifications, fewer job opportunities, lack of job choice, lower pay and higher unemployment (Barton, 1996; McDonnell, 2003).

Although segregated education arguably benefits certain groups at certain times (it has been sought by deaf students in particular to enable them to work through the medium of sign or bilingually), it seems undesirable that anyone’s education should take place entirely in a segregated setting. What is particularly relevant to equality of respect and recognition is that the practice of segregation prevents people with different cultures, religious beliefs, abilities or genders from learning about each other’s differences on an informal day-to-day basis. Insofar as it deepens ignorance of differences, segregation is anti-educational in and of itself.

Resolutions

In contrast to the problem of unequal resources, the task of resolving inequalities of respect and recognition within schools and colleges is much more amenable to action within education itself. Research on effective pedagogical practices has shown how education can play a major role in developing the kind of critical thinking and inclusive ethical perspective that underpins respect for differences (Adams et al., 1997: 30-43).

Educating people to respect the values, beliefs and lifestyles of others is not a simple matter for which one can provide a blueprint in one paper. There are already
several examples available of the kind of pedagogical principles that should underpin such programmes at both curriculum and school level. It is possible, however, to outline one of the key principles that would guide such education, the principle of inclusion.

If students and teachers are to learn to respect and recognize diversity, they need to experience it; they need to live with differences, rather than merely learning about them in the abstract. Respect is internalized not only through the development of a critical and empathetic perspective, but also through the experience of dealing with diversity on a daily basis. And in many societies, schools are the only places where such learning can safely take place, although this is sometimes impossible due to severe hostility, conflict or separation between groups. The first principle that must guide us in respecting difference in education, therefore, is that of inclusion.

A second principle that is needed to educate for mutual respect is that of critical interculturalism, not only in relation to the personal values and cultures of others, but also in relation to curriculum, pedagogy and assessment systems (examples of how such a critical perspective can be developed are outlined by Freire (1972), King and Kitchener (1994) and Shor (1992)). To be able to engage in critical dialogue requires education about equality in and of itself, not only of students but also of teachers and lecturers.

To promote egalitarian ways of seeing the world, students must be educated about the subject of equality and other cognate concepts such as human rights and social justice. In particular, schools and colleges need to educate their staff and students about the equality-specific issues that arise in relations of social class, gender, colour, nationality, ethnicity, ability, religion and other differences. Syllabi should be social-class-proofed, gender-proofed, abilities-proofed, etc. so that the lives
of all peoples are allowed to be read, recognized and critiqued in a critical inter-cultural manner (see Baker et al., 2004 for a discussion of critical interculturalism). Equality education could become part of the formal curriculum of subjects dealing specifically with social issues (such as Civics, Geography, History, Politics and Home Economics) as well as being mainstreamed into other subjects including literature, art, music, engineering, mathematics and science. Education about differences and how to eliminate inequalities arising from the non-Recognition or misrecognition of differences could also be made a core part of education courses for teachers, lecturers, educational decision-makers and managers, including the civil service and curriculum and assessment bodies.

An essential part of any initiative to educate people about inequality is to include members of oppressed groups in the design of educational programmes. Without such engagement there is a danger of privileged experts colonizing the experience of subordinate groups, with all the dangers this presents (Lynch and O’Neill 1994). On the positive side, a cooperative practice of educating about inequality can help create alliances for social change between those with experiential knowledge of inequality and those with professional knowledge. Such alliances would also be mutually beneficial educationally.

By promoting the principle of inclusion through formal study, and the practice of inclusion through the adoption of difference-respectful procedures and processes, schools and colleges can help challenge inequalities of respect and recognition. However, while education is a very powerful cultural institution it is by no means the only one and its work needs to be complemented by wider initiatives in the media, workplaces, law and politics if it is to be fully effective.
Equality of power: democratizing education

Inequalities of power occur in educational decision-making and in the exercise of educational authority. Power inequalities take many forms, and include processes of exclusion, marginalization, trivialization and misrepresentation when people are engaged in decision-making or policy-making in schools and other educational institutions. Power relations exist not just in the exercise of organizational authority, but also in aspects of curricula, pedagogy and assessment. Across the world, schools and colleges select, classify and stratify students in a hierarchically ordered way. In so doing, they not only exercise power over students but also assign them to positions of relative power and powerlessness. The business of education is never neutral politically, therefore, either in terms of what it teaches, to whom, how and when, or in terms of how it assesses attainment in particular fields (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; Freire, 1972).

Arising from the work of Foucault (1980, 1991) in particular, there is a growing realization among educators of the importance of power as a focus for educational research (Francis 1998). Power is increasingly regarded as a series of relations that may not be readily observable, but are of profound egalitarian importance nonetheless (Epp and Watkinson 1996).

The negative outcomes of powerlessness have also been documented. Schooling practices that fail to respect the autonomy and individuality of the student and fail to manage power relations between students and teachers in a respectful manner have been found to have quite negative educational consequences in different countries (Collins 2000; Fagan, 1995; John 1996; Pomeroy 1999).

There are therefore two reasonably distinct levels at which equality of power is an issue in education. At the macro level, it concerns the institutionalized procedures
for making decisions about school management, educational and curriculum planning, and policy development and implementation. At the micro level, it concerns the internal life of schools and colleges, in terms of relations between staff and students and among the staff themselves.

*The need to democratize educational relations*

When educators have addressed the issue of power and authority, it has frequently been from a managerial perspective: how to manage schools more effectively, how to ‘keep discipline’ (Ball, 1989). In new managerial discourse schools have been increasingly defined, within a management science framework, as hierarchical bureaucracies (Bennett Demarrais and LeCompte 1999; Packwood 1988). Hierarchy itself has been routinized and made unproblematic. Yet, such hierarchical relations are fundamentally inegalitarian as well as organizationally dysfunctional, not least because educational institutions of all kinds are highly complex organizations requiring careful management of both internal and external social relations (Phelan 2001; Richie et al. 2000; Westoby et al. 1988). There is also a growing body of empirical evidence indicating that all types of students are increasingly opposed to hierarchical forms of control and authority (Devine 2000, 2004; Humphreys and Jeffers 1999; Lynch and Lodge 1999; Yoneyama 2000). There are also important ethical and political reasons for democratizing education, including higher education and research in particular, but we will not address these in detail here (see chapter 9 in Baker et al., 2004).

More importantly, however, democratization of schooling relations is necessary because of its intrinsic educational value. If we are to educate students to engage in public life as democratic citizens, it is essential that they learn how to participate democratically in the public domain. (Dewey, 1916; 1950).
Resolutions

Resolving inequalities of power in schools involves democratizing the pedagogical and organizational relations of schooling. At the level of teacher-student-relationships, it involves substituting dialogue for dominance, co-operation and collegiality for hierarchy, and active learning and problem solving for passivity (Freire, 1972). At the level of school and college organization, it involves institutionalizing and resourcing democratic structures such as student and parent/community councils that exercise real authority and responsibility. It also requires initiating new systems of dialogue with students, teachers, parents and local communities. The latter can be advanced though the use of new and old technologies, including the internet, systematic surveying of opinion and open discussion forums. Creating curriculum-specific experiences that are democratic in practice as well as in theory is also a fundamental part of the democratizing project of education. In effect, it involves devolved governance requiring trust and education of all parties to the education process (Apple and Beane, 1999; Wood, 1988).

We recognize however, that democratizing schools is highly problematic in any society that is unequal in power and income terms. As with class inequalities, there is no internal settlement to power inequalities in education. The powerful and the wealthy have influence disproportionate to their status and numerical strength in capitalist democracies (Held, 1995). The power inequalities generated outside of education impact on the operation of power relations within the sector.

Democratizing education is not simply about democratizing schools and colleges. It also involves democratizing the wider set of relations within which schools and colleges operate, including relations between the state and service providers and between the state and educational participants. It is about developing a participatory
politics in which those who are affected by policy decisions have a say in all levels of educational planning and decision-making. It is not just about having a consultative role, consultations that can be easily ignored when the relevant party leaves the table. It is about listening, engagement and accountability in a participatory democratic context. (See Chapter 6 in Baker et al., 2004)

Unless educationally disadvantaged groups in particular are involved in the planning and development process in education, other inequalities cannot be meaningfully challenged. They are the people with the day-to-day experiential knowledge of injustice that is a necessary condition for informed decision-making. And they are the ones with the emotional and political will to pursue the changes required.

**Equality of love, care and solidarity: the emotional dimensions of education**

*Emotional Work and Care matters*

Education is human service work based on a dialogue between students and teachers and between students themselves. Like all human service work, education involves emotional work (Hargreaves, 2000; 2001). Good teachers engage their students in learning. They are inspired and enthusiastic about their subjects and communicate this inspiration to their students. Good teachers love their students, in the sense that they are deeply committed to their development in a way that enables them to be free (Freire 1972). So the first reason we must learn about the emotions and about the emotional work involved in education is because they are central to teaching and learning itself. Failure to recognize this results in a denial of the educational needs of both teachers and students as emotional beings.

Emotional work is not only central to the business of teaching and learning, it also plays a key role in human service work generally, especially in fields such as
nursing and counselling, but also in human resource management and politics, and in developing and maintaining intimate personal relationships. To deprive students of learning about the emotional work involved in caring is to disempower them in terms of their future work and responsibilities.

Emotions play a key role also in developing a politics of solidarity and concern for others, something that is fundamental to the functioning of an inclusive democratic society. It is only by being in touch with one’s own vulnerability that one can develop empathy and concern for others, while having an appreciation of one’s own dependency needs enables one to be compassionate. Educating people about their emotions *per se*, and about the role of caring and solidarity within the affective sphere of life, is necessary therefore for enhancing our sense of other-centredness. Without such understanding, it is difficult to develop the empathy (and the sense of justified anger and urgency) that local, and particularly global, solidarity often requires.

A final reason why we must focus on the emotions is because of the way they impact on young people’s ability to realize their educational rights generally. Students do not simply engage with schooling intellectually, they also engage with it emotionally. The feelings of failure, purposelessness or isolation that many students experience in schools cannot be addressed unless the language of emotions is allowed to enter educational discourse in a legitimated way. Respecting the rights of the child means educating them holistically, including emotionally (Epp and Watkinson 1996).

*The neglect of the emotions*

Despite the centrality of emotional work to teaching and learning, and the focus of much of educational psychology on the impact of emotional and psychological development on learning, there has been relatively little attention paid to the subject of emotional education. Emotional development and affective relations have been
analysed principally in terms of their impact on the teaching and learning of academic subjects, not as phenomena about which people should be educated for the sake of promoting equality (Blackmore 1996; Hargreaves 2000, 2001).

Formal education has been premised on the assumption that the principal function of schooling is to develop intellect. Many of the most influential thinkers in education (Bruner 1963; Piaget 1950; Rousseau 1911), and indeed contemporary information processing and cognitive science researchers, equate educational development with intellectual development. In recent times, the intellectual has become increasingly equated with the logical-mathematical so that ‘in common with Piagetian psychology, nearly all the problems examined by information-processing psychologists prove to be of the logical-mathematical sort’ (Gardner 1983, p. 23). Because reason has been defined as distinct from emotions, education about the emotions and about human service work that is heavily emotionally driven, particularly care and love work, has been seriously neglected. The neglect of the emotions has been paralleled by the neglect of education of the personal intelligences involved in emotional work.

The devaluing of the emotional realm as an area of legitimate concern for educators has its origins in the dualism of Western thought that characterized the emotions as being in opposition to reason, and therefore subordinate and morally suspect (Williams and Bendelow, 1998; Lupton 1998; Sevenhuijsen 1998).

Recent developments in education internationally that emphasize the outcomes of schooling in terms of grades and league tables rather than the process of learning also marginalize interest in the emotions. They focus attention on education as a product rather than as a process and in so doing disregard the fact that both teaching and learning are highly emotionally engaged activities. They distract attention from the ways in which learning is often seriously impaired because students lack emotional
support and care in their personal lives, or because of their negative emotional response to particular subjects (Boaler, 2000; Boylan and Lawton 2000; Nardi and Steward, 2003). The Japanese experience of students opting out of school for emotional reasons, despite being academically quite successful, is another indication of the centrality of emotions to the experience of learning (Yoneyama 2000).

*The emotional turn*

There is, however, an ‘emotional turn’ in education discourses in certain fields. As noted above, educational psychologists increasingly recognize the role that emotional intelligence or personal intelligences play in our work and personal lives. It is also increasingly appreciated that emotional competencies are essential for good teaching (Hargreaves 2000, p. 814; Noddings 1992). In addition, feminist scholars have challenged the legitimacy of drawing a neat dichotomy between reason and emotions, and highlighted the centrality of the emotions to the care, love and solidarity work that is disproportionately undertaken by women (Bubeck 1995; Daly, 2001; Nussbaum, 1995, 2000; Delphy and Leonard 1992; Sevenhuijsen 1998), a work for which people need education.

*Resolutions*

There has been little research on issues such as personal or emotional intelligences and no major advance in devising methods for developing or assessing emotional capabilities. While Bloom’s (1956, 1964) taxonomy of cognitive skills has gained global recognition, the taxonomy of emotional skills devised at the same time has received little attention. It is difficult to define precisely what the goals and purposes of emotional education should be in the absence of a clearly defined framework.
Despite the dearth of research on the development of emotional capabilities, it is possible to identify some of the issues pertaining to the promotion of equality in the affective domain within education. And in that regard, developing an appreciation of the intrinsic role that emotions play in the process of teaching and learning is crucial. There is a need to name the emotions so that students and teachers have a language and a space to talk about their feelings and concerns. A conspicuous example of the need for education is evident in the field of mathematics, where research suggests that the prevailing emotional reaction of adults generally to mathematical tasks is one of panic: being asked to complete mathematical tasks evokes feelings of anxiety, fear and embarrassment as well (Buxton 1981, cited in McLeod 1992). Feelings of anxiety, vulnerability, isolation, insecurity and depersonalization are also prevalent among second-level mathematics students (Boylan and Lawton 2000; Lyons et al. 2003; Nardi and Steward, 2003). Yet students and teachers are rarely given the space to talk about their feelings about learning and teaching, nor do they always have the language to name what they feel (Lyons et al. 2003).

Because our emotions are as endemic to our humanity as is our rationality, it is necessary to develop educational experiences that will enable students to develop their emotionally driven personal intelligences per se, that is, as a discrete area of human capability. This area of education is particularly important in preparing students for care, love and solidarity work, given that all people live their lives in relations of dependency and interdependency. But it can also play an important role in making the process of education itself more satisfying for all concerned.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, we have examined some of the ways that education reinforces inequalities in the dimensions of resources, respect and recognition, power, and love,
care and solidarity, and some of the ways this could be changed. We have indicated how education can be either an agent of oppression or emancipation in the ways it interfaces with and defines economic relations, political relations, cultural relations and affective relations. Throughout the paper we have been implicitly concerned with the fifth dimension of equality, because all of issues we have discussed have powerful effects on students’ learning and on the work of teaching. We have demonstrated the close link that exists between all the dimensions of equality. All five dimensions of equality are relevant within education, and all are mutually reinforcing.

While we recognize there is no internal settlement to the problem of class and certain power inequalities in education in particular, we have identified several ways in which education could be much more egalitarian. Focusing on the formal educational system, we have argued for major changes in the way schools and colleges are run and in the structure and content of the curriculum. Current practices of selection and grouping need to be abandoned, while the syllabus design and assessment systems that facilitate them also need reappraisal. Approaches to curriculum and assessment need to be dramatically widened to embrace the full range of human intelligences and the full range of human achievements. Schools and colleges need to be inclusive institutions that teach students and teachers to engage critically with difference and to analyse and challenge inequality. Relations between teachers and students, as well as decision-making about education in general, need to be democratized in a participatory way. Education needs to take the emotional work involved in caring seriously, and to foster the emotional development of both students and teachers. The need to develop students’ abilities to engage in affective relations is especially urgent as education has been deeply neglectful of this fundamental (and hitherto privately defined) sphere of human activity.
As we have emphasized, the educational system is strongly integrated into the society around it. We cannot expect equality in education without progress towards equality in the economic, cultural, political and affective systems in which it is embedded. But by the same token, changing education is a vital part of those transformations. It is a central part of the egalitarian agenda.

References


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Notes

2 The discussion below is based on Chapter 8 of Baker et al. 2004, to which we refer readers for further elaboration of the issues discussed.
3 This is not to suggest that the distribution issue in education is purely a class issue, it is not. The failure to provide the resources for all types of social groups to avail fully of education, be it women availing of technological or scientific education, or disabled people or migrant workers being able to participate equally with others in education is essentially a distributive problem. However, because the generative cause of the inequality that the latter groups experience in education is not in the first instance economic but cultural (see Baker et al. 2004, Chapter 4) we concentrate on class here.
4 While educational titles are clearly not inherited in the way that titles of nobility are, nevertheless there is a structural similarity between the outcomes of both systems. In both instances, family of origin places a central role in determining access to the title; in both cases having the title grants one privileges to which others without the title are denied; in both instances also, having the title is a mark of respect and honour that cannot be denied to one once the title is granted. While there is widespread publicised ideology that educational nobility titles are given on merit, the facts belie this. Just as in feudal times, economically privileged families have superior access to privileged titles and credentials. While the offspring of economically privileged households mediate access to the educational titles they receive, nevertheless there is a remarkable structural similarity between the structures and outcomes of the two processes.
5 The habitus refers to the socially patterned matrix of preferences and dispositions that are developed across social classes. The habitus of particular classes produces a series of durable, transportable dispositions of mind and body, most of which are learned unconsciously. These provide an unconscious and internalised roadmap for action which the individual defines and regulates continually (see Bourdieu, 1984; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977)
6 The terms used for grouping students vary cross-culturally. In the US, ‘tracking’ is used to refer to the practice of dividing students into vocational or academic groups or bands. In other countries, ‘streaming’, ‘setting’ and ‘banding’ are used to refer to similar processes, particularly where these take place within a given school, varying according to whether students are grouped differently for different subjects (setting) or across all subjects (streaming and banding). While most research on education treats the concept of ‘ability’ as an unproblematic singular entity, this is far from being the case (Nash, 2001). Even a cursory analysis of psychological research on education indicates that what constitutes ‘ability’ is a hotly contested subject (Devlin et al., 1997). Although the IQ-generated view of ability has been largely discredited by developmental psychologists, most recently by Howard Gardner and his team in the Harvard Zero Project, the concept of fixed and immutable intelligence has a strong hold in public consciousness, including that of teachers (Fontes and Kellaghan, 1985). Students are frequently classified as ‘bright’ or ‘dull’, ‘gifted’, ‘slow’ or ‘weak’ without any reference to the insights of developmental psychology or education research. Moreover, students themselves have internalised and accepted these codes (Lynch and Lodge, 2002). In our view, it is better to abandon terms such as ‘ability grouping’ as they underwrite the false assumption that there is a singular, reifiable entity called
ability. Abilities are multiple, fluid and open to change. Moreover, what is generally called ‘ability grouping’, is a misnomer, as most grouping in school is based on measured levels of attainment. For a more detailed discussion of the problems associated with grouping both conceptually and institutionally see Lynch and Lodge 2002, pp. 64-86.

Gardner (1983, 1999) has identified at least 8 core intelligences: linguistic, logical mathematical, musical, bodily kinaesthetic, spatial, interpersonal, intrapersonal and naturalist.

Bourdieu and Passeron referred to the cultural products offered in school as cultural arbitraries to indicate the highly arbitrary way in which they are selected and assessed. In particular, they highlighted the social class biases in what is taught, to whom, when and how.

There is a vast literature on the cognitive, affective and pedagogical principles that should underpin social justice-related education. This work has its origins in very different intellectual traditions including developmental psychology, feminist, anti-racist and multicultural education, black and ethnic studies, Freirean-inspired critical pedagogy and the Deweyian tradition of experiential learning. A useful synopsis of these approaches is provided in Adams et al., (1997). One of the best-known examples of an alternative school, which was deeply committed to the principles of respect for difference, was Summerhill in the UK. Another programme designed specifically to educate about difference was the Education for Mutual Understanding Programme in Northern Ireland.