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Republican requirements for access to citizenship

Iseult Honohan

Introduction

What are legitimate conditions for naturalization from a republican perspective? I argue that if citizenship is understood as membership in a self-governing community, some boundaries are justified, but the conditions for membership need not be as stringent as those currently becoming the norm in many western states. Republican citizenship is quite demanding: it requires a capacity to communicate, an awareness of interdependence among citizens, a sense of responsibility to the wider society and an inclination to engage deliberatively with others in public debate. Thus, on a republican view, the state may promote these through civic education for all citizens. Nonetheless, on this conception, citizenship may be acquired almost automatically by dint of long-term residence. The state may require participation in language classes and in certain practical political exercises for applicants for citizenship. But it does not follow that applicants should be required to achieve particular fixed standards in tests of knowledge, skills or values. Few conditions not required of native born citizens should be required of those naturalizing, and these should be more a matter of participation than of skills or identity.

Citizenship is a notoriously complex and contested concept. It has at least three principal dimensions – legal status, with its rights and obligations; activity; and membership. It is arguably legal status, the first of these dimensions, that is at stake in the process of naturalization, but membership of a community is also involved. It is this on which recent debates on conditions for naturalization have focused, with an emphasis on acculturation, with or without language or other tests. Moreover, this membership has been increasingly understood as conditional on a sense of identity of belonging that is not intrinsic to all forms of membership.

These three dimensions are prioritized and interconnected in different ways in different conceptions of citizenship. At the risk of oversimplifying, we might say that the liberal conception focuses primarily on legal status, while the communitarian conception prioritizes community membership, and the republican conception prioritizes the activity of citizenship. On this view,
citizenship may be seen as ‘strong’ - involving action and interaction between citizens - rather than ‘thick’ - involving deep commonalities among them.

But from a republican perspective the fundamental basis of citizenship is the stake that comes from subjection to an authority that citizens collectively may potentially bring to account, and the possibility of exercising some degree of self-government. The legal status of citizenship emphasized by liberals partly addresses this predicament. But republicans emphasize that citizenship also entails powers and responsibilities that cannot be defined entirely in terms of legal or binding requirements, but depend on the broader attitudes and inclinations of citizens.

**Why and how is citizenship bounded?**

Citizenship is necessarily a bounded category. It may be argued that all restrictive forms of membership are normatively undesirable. But, in response to criticisms of specific citizenship as unjustifiably particularist, there are good normative arguments for the persistence of bounded polities. Apart from a principled fear of the potential tyranny of a single world government, at any time the locus of possibility of realising any degree of freedom and self-government will be determined by the interconnections arising from factors such as geographical proximity, historical interdependencies, and common environmental and developmental issues. Citizenship is bounded because this is the only way in which politically guaranteed freedom can be constructed. As Benhabib puts it, ‘the logic of democratic representation … requires closure for the sake of maintaining democratic legitimacy’. (Benhabib 2004: 220) Even if many rights arguably can and should be guaranteed without reference to a specific population, that of collective self-government cannot, and world citizenship in this sense is not yet available to us. Moreover, bounded states may be seen as facilitating experiments in collective living, adopting alternative approaches to, for example, welfare, education or health care provision that may suit specific circumstances or be generalizable approaches from which others can learn. It should be stressed that this argument for specific units of self-government does not entail further arguments that the nation is the necessary basis of the bounded state, that no

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1 There are different emphases in contemporary republicanism. One strand emphasises the promotion of non-domination, and another participation in self-government. While in this paper I expand the second dimension, a parallel argument can be based on the non-domination account.
development towards larger scale or multilevel government is justified or required, nor that all responsibilities of justice are delimited by state boundaries. While a distinction between citizens and non-citizens may be legitimate, the way in which non-citizens are treated is subject to considerations of justice and human rights standards, and certain ways of allocating particular citizenship may be more justified than others.

Thus citizenship is bounded on the basis of the need for ‘democratic closure’, the need to be able to identify those who are collectively engaged in self-government at any time. This is, however, distinct from the bounds being determined by ethnicity, common culture or shared values, or even public culture. But it is more than a matter of adherence to liberal democratic values that can be transferred anywhere, or certain kinds of portable membership.

Republican citizenship is also demanding. It requires a certain commitment of citizens to participation in collective self-government and support for the common good, which are more demanding than the legal duties or thinner virtues associated with the liberal conception of citizenship.

It has been argued that republican citizenship rests on an over-demanding and unrealistic requirement of participation, a holist and oppressive account of the common good, and a moralistic account of virtuous citizenship. It is true that many historic accounts of republicanism displayed these features. But contemporary accounts of republicanism have shown that it can be articulated in a way that is not subject to these strictures. While I cannot deal fully with these criticisms here, they may be addressed briefly as follows.

Republicanism does emphasize active citizenship as participation in self-government, but does not necessarily identify participation in politics as the ultimate value in human life. Rather participation has intrinsic as well as instrumental value. This does not lay down a requirement of any particular level of constant participation for citizens.²

The common good and solidarity of citizens have often been defined in terms of thick moral purposes and cultural identity, but citizens in modern societies

² If participation is understood thus as having a say in shaping collectives practices, rather than as the most essentially human activity, the distinction between instrumental and strong republicanism is less sharp than is often suggested (see Kymlicka, 2001: 297).
cannot share a common good in this sense. Yet citizens are mutually
vulnerable, and share a common predicament and something like a common
fate or future insofar as they are related in multiple interdependencies in
practices bounded by the state. Rather than there being a single authoritative
account of the common good, what constitutes it in different instances always
has to be determined through deliberation among different perspectives, and
is always open to change. In this context solidarity among citizens may be
understood as a commitment to those with whom they may realise or fail to
realise the possibility of jointly exercising some collective control over their
lives. This solidarity is distinct from a sense of cultural identity. It is grounded
is a reflective acceptance of certain obligations and in practical engagement.

From this perspective, citizens need what is variously called public spirit or
civic virtue – an inclination to think of the common good – because realizing
freedom and the common good depend on their mutual commitment and
support. Under conditions of moral and cultural diversity, the virtues of
solidarity are: a willingness to acknowledge and assume the responsibilities
entailed by interdependence; self-restraint in pursuing individual or sectional
interests rather than the common good; and the inclination to engage open-
mindedly with the viewpoints of others when participating in discussion in the
public realm. These are specifically political virtues, which do not prescribe a
comprehensive morality or vision of the good life.

So while requiring less than a total transformation of individuals, nonetheless,
this involves quite demanding dispositions that do not necessarily come
naturally and will not be realised equally by all. Citizens are not born, but
made. This is the basis for the republican emphasis on education for
citizenship in the broadest sense – in knowledge, skills, and dispositions. But
though these can be promoted, they cannot be required of citizens, and we
must expect that different kinds and levels of civic virtue will be forthcoming.3

First, encouraging responsibility among citizens requires that they expand
their perceptions. They need to become aware of the multiply reiterated
dependencies between themselves and other citizens. Today this means
countering assumptions of individual self-sufficiency and misconceptions
about the impact of government and the effects of non-participation. Thus
citizens (whether privileged or disadvantaged) need to become aware of

3 These points are more fully developed in Honohan (2005)
economic and social networks in which they live. This includes the social conditions of others, the effects of differences of gender, abilities, culture or religion, and social material and power inequalities on the life-chances and effective equality of citizens.

Second, citizens will ideally develop civic self-restraint. This is less a matter of learning to defer gratification than of giving more weight to common interest than prevails in the contemporary culture of individualism but it may be understood as an expansion or re-identification of the self or individual interests in a broader sense, rather than either as self-denial, or a calculation of the balance of interests. Those who recognise interdependence (the first dimension) are more likely to accept, for example, redistributive measures that maintain political equality, individual costs incurred in taking time to recycle, limiting their own pursuit of material wealth, engaging in activities of care and giving time and energy to political concerns ranging from voting and jury service to attending hearings right up to serving in office. Active self-restraint implies an orientation to challenge infringements not only of one’s own rights, but also those of others. This commitment is not primarily to be understood as an inclination to put fellow citizens ahead of others, but also as a restraint in putting individual and sectional interests ahead of common and public concerns.

The third dimension is deliberative engagement – the ability to form autonomous judgements, consider other points of view, and deliberate as a member of a wider society. This requires developing habits of voice, responsibility in decision-making and establishing respect and trust, rather than simply tolerance. This means that when people take specific political stands, they should be prepared to engage and deliberate with others who have other views and come from different perspectives.

*Conceptions of citizenship, citizenship laws and naturalization*

What does this imply for conditions for access to citizenship?

It has been argued that ‘in all cases the nationality law expresses and consecrates the conception of the nation and reinforces the homogeneity of national populations’ (Schnapper 1994: 107). If this were the case it would not be surprising if naturalization did always require evidence of cultural and
ideological convergence. But, while citizenship laws may express a conception of the nation or political community, such membership may be conceived of in ways that are more and less inclusive and open to admitting diverse members. While citizenship laws are by definition necessarily exclusive, since they regulate particular membership, criteria for inclusion and exclusion may be more or less justifiable. These issues have considerable significance now when, on the one hand, the justification for any kind of bounded citizenship has been challenged, and, on the other, more stringent conditions of integration have been proposed for naturalization as necessary to sustain political and social solidarity in a number of western states.

In this section I distinguish some ideal conceptions of citizenship and the kinds of citizenship laws consistent with them. These reflect some more of the complexity in views of citizenship in this context than the initial simple distinction into liberal, communitarian and republican accounts. I label these conceptions ethnic nationality, value community, liberal nationality, civic voluntarism and republicanism respectively. Of course in practice citizenship regimes rarely if ever correspond exactly to one or other of these categories. But I hope that this may help to clarify the implications of conceptions of citizenship, and throw some light on the varying combinations found in actual citizenship regimes. While I briefly outline the dimensions of citizenship laws in general, the main focus here is on the implications for naturalization.4

1) To the extent that a state is based on ethnic nationality it will limit or give preference in admission to citizenship to co-nationals, ethnically defined. This will underpin laws through which citizenship is acquired principally on the basis of descent (ius sanguinis). Naturalization will be extremely difficult, and may be granted (if at all) after long periods of residence, on meeting stringent requirements of cultural integration and loyalty, and subject to discretion. Dual citizenship is not consistent with this model. On this view, it is justified to discriminate among applicants on ethnic or racial lines. Examples include the ‘White Australia’ policy that prevailed in the mid-twentieth century, and German citizenship policies (up to 2000) that granted citizenship to those of German descent, even without cultural connections. In Germany (up to 1992) naturalization required 10 years residence, and demanding conditions of cultural integration that were subject to extensive official discretion. Such

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4 I apply these categories to issues of the attribution of citizenship at birth in Honohan (2007)
citizenship laws have the effect of including or excluding people from membership solely on the basis of descent, and, in the context of immigration, lead to large numbers of people living (even if born) in a country without being members of the political community. The obverse of this is that these laws include as members descendants of emigrants who may have a minimal stake or commitment to the political community.

2) On a second model, ‘value-community’, citizens are members of a community of shared, pre-political, cultural values or ways of life, rather than ethnicity. Citizenship is bounded because ‘the distinctiveness of groups depends upon closure, and without it, cannot be conceived as a stable feature of human life’ (Walzer 1985: 39). Citizenship laws will be a matter for the community to determine. While it is a matter of choice by the community whom to accept and whom to reject, those who have been admitted and have become long-term residents should be granted citizenship through naturalization, though certain conditions may be required, emphasizing either linguistic and cultural assimilation, or allegiance to community values. Naturalization will tend to require relinquishing previous citizenship; dual citizenship is regarded as incompatible with being a member of a closed and distinctive group. Limits on dual citizenship in Austria, Denmark, the United States and Germany today, in Canada up to 1977 and Australia to 2002, and the current requirement of the oath of loyalty to Australia and its people could be interpreted as reflecting this conception. But, even if not as exclusive as the citizenship laws flowing from ethnic nationality, these provisions imply a strong degree of cultural assimilation, and in any case impose heavy requirements of belonging to a single community that may well fail to accommodate the plural identities and commitments that members may legitimately bear.

3) On a third model, ‘liberal nationality’, what citizens share is a public culture, history or institutional practices rather than pre-political culture or values. Citizenship is bounded because of the inherently limited possibilities of extending such a binding political identity (Miller 1995: 188, 2000: 88-89). This

5 We can hazard that the balance of ius soli and ius sanguinis will depend on assumptions about whether membership of a such a community is transmitted through socialization in the wider community (favouring ius soli), or through the family (favouring ius sanguinis).

6 Countries with a requirement that a single citizenship be held/that other citizenship be given up on naturalization included Sweden (up to 2001) and Finland (up to 2003). Since 2003, Dutch citizenship is, with certain exceptions, lost by those who take up another nationality.
allows for greater diversity of culture and values among citizens than either of the two previous models. Here citizenship can be awarded by ius soli as long as there is a guarantee that citizens will be socialized into the public culture. Thus French law makes children born in the state of immigrant parents citizens automatically at age eighteen if they have lived continuously in France for five years. Ius sanguinis citizenship, by contrast, is quite limited, since those who live abroad are likely to lose their connections with developments in the public culture and politics more quickly than those with the wider culture. Such a liberal nationality does not discriminate on ethnic or cultural lines among candidates for citizenship by naturalization, but requires commitment to the state and competence in the public culture. The conditions for adult naturalization may include language and a grasp of history, but in this case as evidence of participation in the public culture. On this view also, citizenship may be understood as essentially singular membership of a sovereign body, but dual citizenship is more easily accommodated than with the two previous views. Elements of such a view can be found in the oath of loyalty to the country’s democratic beliefs and laws in the current procedures for naturalization in Australia, and the affirmation of intention to observe the laws and fulfil the duties of a citizen in Canada.

While more open to diversity than either of the preceding conceptions, and susceptible to more and less demanding interpretations and implementations, the way that this view grants weight to the existing public culture may not be fully consistent with the equal treatment of all citizens. Moreover, the further one tries to specify what determines the public culture, the more it becomes evident that it is difficult to separate public and private cultures in the way that some liberal nationalists hope.

The question is whether it is possible to envisage an alternative ‘civic’ conception of citizenship. This more contested conception will require more detailed discussion than those which have just been discussed.

d) One articulation of such a civic view that I will term ‘civic voluntarist’, implies that citizenship can or should be based primarily on choice, voluntary consent or forward-looking commitment to shared principles or constitutional

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7 Naturalization is also available by choice at age thirteen. This is in addition to the rule of ‘double ius soli’ whereby children born in France to French-born foreign parents become citizens at birth.
structures. This suggests that consent or adherence to liberal democratic principles is not only a necessary, but almost a sufficient condition of civic citizenship. It might then be inappropriate to ascribe citizenship involuntarily either at birth, though *ius soli*, or automatically at majority. In contrast, naturalization may be extremely easy, once one has chosen to live in the country even after a short period, and dual nationality is not particularly problematic.

But adherence to certain principles is not what distinguishes citizens of different states. This reinforces the fact that political membership is not and cannot be a matter simply of rational commitment, but involves a stake in the society that comes with subjection to a common authority. Nor is it like membership of a club, in or out of which people can opt at will. Citizenship is inherently rooted in the fact of subjection to a particular common authority. It does not depend on sharing a common past or even on proximity alone, but neither is it based primarily on choice, but on involuntarily sharing this common predicament, in which interdependent citizens are subject to, but also share at least the possibility of calling to account, a common government, and establishing some degree of self-determination of their common future.

e) Thus a better formulation of a civic approach is a republican one that sees citizens as semi-voluntary members of a political community. In contrast to value-community and liberal nationality, on this view membership is not defined in terms of either pre-political or public culture. It has been argued that any idea of civic citizenship is illusory, as the content of any political community will always be embodied in some cultural form. Of course culture cannot be excluded, but the difference between the republican and the liberal nationality conceptions are that the existing culture and values are not given confirmed priority over those that emerge in exchanges among citizens. Any common cultural values emerge as the outcome of political interaction, provisionally embodied and open to change. In contrast to civic voluntarism,

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8 The idea that citizens may be united by adherence to common principles may be taken to support both membership of specific political communities and the possibility of cosmopolitan citizenship.

9 This would be consistent with making *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis* take second place to naturalization on open conditions of choice and residence, perhaps even shorter than the 2 years currently required in Australia.

10 I use the term ‘future’ rather than ‘fate’, as the latter tends to convey a more deterministic trajectory equivalent to a destiny laid down in the past.
citizenship should be understood as specific to a particular context rooted in a common predicament.

This civic account has, like civic voluntarism, a distinctly prospective dimension. Thus *ius soli* ascription is justified in so far as it represents the current predicament of political interdependence and participation in a common future life. Birth in a state may be taken as a reasonable predictor of a shared future in the political community. But it is not infallible; thus, if granting citizenship at birth by *ius soli* is seen as arbitrary in certain cases where other connections with the state are absent, it may be reasonable to confirm the citizenship of those continue to live in the state as adults at some point. Conversely, any element of *ius sanguinis*, reflecting the fact that citizens may leave without losing all contact, will be limited in duration and depend on continued interdependence and connection.

**Republicanism and naturalization**

In practice, liberal nationality tends to be in the ascendant in naturalization processes. While ascribed ethnicity has become less salient as a qualification for citizenship, the idea that integration into the public culture and shared political values are legitimate conditions of naturalization has become more widely advanced. And it is on these grounds that there has been increasing support for citizenship tests, not only of language and knowledge of the legal and political system, but also of social and political attitudes that do not distinguish very clearly between political and social culture and values.

The republican account of citizenship favours relatively generous conditions of naturalization. Long-term residents become citizens on a virtually automatic basis, just as natives do - taking residence in the state as shorthand for interdependence and the sharing of a common future, in virtue of living, working, paying taxes, and sending children to school, for example. Since the primary basis of citizenship is subjection to a common authority, those who are long term residents are already, in most cases, in the same predicament.

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11 Thus while, Britain and Australia have modified *ius soli*, they do grant citizenship to a child born in the country who continues to live there for 10 years.

12 In addition there is also a trend towards wider acceptance of the idea that there can be an immigration track that does not lead to citizenship, in the new guest worker programmes favoured in the USA and some European countries.
in this respect as citizens. Naturalization would be neither purely a matter of choice nor subject to state discretion. But as the nuances of politics are often one of the last aspects of a country’s life to be fully grasped by a newcomer, a somewhat longer prior residence may be appropriate than a consent-based view might suggest. Any exact period is necessarily arbitrary, but three to five years, as in France, Canada and the United States, are more appropriate than either as short as two years or as long as ten years.

On this view dual citizenship is not particularly problematic. Indeed the extension of citizenship to long-term residents tends to give rise to dual nationality. There can be real interdependencies with countries both of origin and of current residence, especially for someone who holds out hope of returning, or who supports relatives there. But dual citizenship of this kind will characteristically apply to individuals moving between countries, rather than being inherited by children over generations – the multiple identities of modern individuals must be seen as specific to each individual.

A civic republican conception of political membership, based on the possibility of self-government by interdependent citizens facing a common future, issues in citizenship laws that grant citizenship predominantly by ius soli, and on a more restricted basis by ius sanguinis, and allow relatively easy naturalization and dual nationality. Though bounded, such a conception is less exclusive and less demanding of homogeneity than ethnicity, shared value or liberal nationality. Because the citizenship laws which flow from it do not depend on a shared past or require cultural adjustment as a condition of membership, they are intrinsically more open to diversity.

**Terms and conditions for naturalization**

Apart from a significant period of residence, on what terms should long-term residents be granted citizenship?

It might be thought that because republican citizenship entails not only accepting legal rights and duties, but developing the dispositions and engaging in the practice of citizenship, that it should require stringent conditions for democratic attitudes and demonstrated loyalty to the state in which they are becoming full members.
There are several kinds of conditions for naturalization that have become standard, though none are universally required. These include length of residence, economic self-sufficiency, language abilities, knowledge of history, ‘good character’ or absence of criminal conviction, taking an oath of loyalty, and giving up previous citizenship. Apart from length of residence, these may be grouped into skills, cultural characteristics, and moral qualities and attitudes.

It is important to distinguish between characteristics, capacities and attitudes that are desirable in citizens (and which it is legitimate for states to encourage) and fixed requirements or conditions that people must fulfil in order to qualify. Tests are appropriate only be applied where there can reasonably be such fixed requirements. Tests have the advantage that, properly applied, they reduce the element of official discretion. On the other hand, if they are to fulfil this, it implies that they involve fixed standards or thresholds. From this perspective, pass-fail tests are less desirable than some process designed to promote those capacities and values desirable in citizens. 13

For example, the importance of a capacity to communicate among citizens suggests that competence in a widely-spoken public language should be encouraged. This justifies state provision or, at the very least, subsidy of language courses, and even a requirement that applicants should attend such classes. But it does not warrant the requirement that applicants should have to pass a test at any specific standard.

We have seen earlier that the attitudes desirable in citizens are those of awareness of interdependence, civic-self restraint and inclination to deliberative engagement – and that these are part of a legitimate civic education. It has also been argued that these cannot be required as legal obligations, only encouraged and fostered among citizens as they grow up. We might look at what these imply for naturalizing citizens, recognizing that there will be differences to be addressed in considering these in the case of adults who are joining a society

13 The difficulty created by failure and the connotations of rejection by long term residents must also be taken into account.
If citizens are to be aware of their mutual interdependence, it will be desirable to provide applicants for citizenship with knowledge of the structures of society and economy in their new country. But this is quite different from arguing that they need to learn about the national history and culture as a basis for a shared identity.\footnote{Cf. questions on e.g. literary figures and artists that featured in the Hesse citizenship test in 2005.} Again, reaching a fixed standard in a test is not the point here. (One of the standard exercises in the media is to demonstrate that native born citizens regularly are unable to pass this kind of test.) \footnote{It is sometimes argued that it is unnecessary or demeaning to require attendance at language or citizenship courses by native English speakers or those from liberal democracies. But it seems arbitrarily discriminating to waive the requirement in such cases. Language may be a special case, where native speakers should be exempt; but if global differences in social and political practices justify providing information and requiring courses for any applicants, they do so for all. It cannot be assumed, for example, that an American who comes to live in Ireland, for example, necessarily absorbs the knowledge necessary for Irish citizenship any more readily than someone from a non-western society.}

The second element, a sense of broader responsibility and civic self-restraint are dispositions particularly established in a person’s childhood and youth. But they are not attitudes that adhere to a specific society. And it may be argued that they are not characteristically particularly lacking in immigrants. Rather than being culturally specific to western liberal democracies, these resonate with the principles inherent in a wide range of cultural and religious perspectives which value social responsibility, commitment and self-restraint. There is no evidence that people who are public spirited in their countries of origin are less so when they travel abroad.

Finally, there is openness to deliberative engagement. This, it can be argued, is something which people from many cultures and all western liberal democracies are all relatively deficient in and need to develop further. However, it may be more culturally specific than the sense of civic responsibility. Nonetheless, we can say that it is also found in strands of many traditions, and may be less counterintuitive for some minorities that the privatization of religious beliefs and cultural values.

On this dimension, rather than any test of competence or attitudes, both the capacity to deliberate and the inclination to do so would be best fostered on a
practical basis by, for example, making part of the process of naturalization, a participatory exercise comparable to a citizens’ jury.\textsuperscript{16}

Thus we see that the required conditions for naturalization may be quite limited. It should not be subject to the shared-value community conditions of a high level of official discretion, being deemed to be ‘of good character’, or swearing an oath of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State. At least it is not clear that an oath should be required that is not required of citizens by birth, since it is sharing a common authority with others rather than loyalty to it that is fundamental to citizenship. Likewise naturalization should not be conditional on the liberal nationality criteria of assimilation to the public culture. A knowledge of language, history or institutions may be encouraged as indicating the capacity for political interaction, rather than cultural assimilation. But more important may be the forward-looking intention to live in the country, rather than acquiring citizenship as either a badge of identity or a flag of convenience.\textsuperscript{17}

Finally, there is the question of identity. Many arguments for more stringent conditions for naturalization rest on putative links between political commitment, trust, cultural integration and sense of shared identity. However, whether there is any necessary connection between cultural commonality and identity, or between a sense of identity and motivation to civic solidarity is open to question. While citizens may share an identity, it is not clear that such an identity derives from cultural commonality, or that an explicit sense of shared identity is necessary or sufficient to elicit solidarity in practice.\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, promoting cultural assimilation too strongly may not only be unjust, but also potentially counter-productive (Abizadeh 2002). It may alienate and reduce the engagement of members of minorities in broader social and political life. The kind of identity that is desirable may be more a product of interaction than something that can be required (or tested for). Naturalization may be better seen as a condition for, not depending on, a full sense of identity with the country of immigration. Thus I have deliberately not spoken

\textsuperscript{16} There is evidence that participation in citizens’ juries or deliberative polls increase participants knowledge of and interest in the political process, openness to other positions and inclination to further participation.

\textsuperscript{17} There is no objection to citizenship ceremonies if they are taken to represent a symbolic passage into full citizenship.

\textsuperscript{18} As Laborde puts it, ‘There seems to be no necessary connection between national-fellow-feeling and solidaristic attachments; what matters, more than a sense of nationality \textit{per se}, is the right kind of public spirit and social ethos’ (Laborde, 2002: 603).
directly in this paper about ‘patriotism’, ‘loyalty’, ‘social cohesion’, or sense of belonging as conditions for citizenship.

The core of citizenship is more than status, but less than identity. What is essential to citizenship is the multiply reiterated interdependencies with others through subjection to common rule and the possibility of participation in self-government. Though republican citizenship is demanding, the qualities and attitudes that are desirable in citizens can only be encouraged, not required. Thus few conditions not required of native born citizens should be required of long term residents who are naturalizing, and these should be more a matter of engagement and participation than reaching particular levels of skills or sense of identity.

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