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‘Even the Papuan is a Man and not a Beast’: Husserl on Universalism and the Relativity of Cultures

ABSTRACT
Edmund Husserl’s account, especially in his Crisis of European Sciences (1936) and Vienna Lecture (1935), of the Greek philosophical breakthrough to universal rationality has been criticized as Eurocentric. Husserl speaks of the universality inherent in ‘European’ philosophical culture of the logos and contrasts it with other communal life-worlds, which are, in his view, merely ‘empirical-anthropological’ types, with their own peculiar ‘historicities’ and ‘relativities’. In this paper, I propose to defend Husserl’s appeal to critical universal reason by situating it within the political context, especially the National Socialist inspired philosophy and anthropology of Germany in the 1930s. Husserl’s stance in favour of universal rationality as an enduring telos for humanity is an explicit rejection of National Socialist race-based ideologies that made reason relative to race. Husserl’s assertion in the Vienna Lecture that ‘there is, for essential reasons, no zoology of peoples’ must surely be read as a clear repudiation of race-based doctrines. Moreover, philosophy, for Husserl, is essentially international and every culture contains within it an implicit openness to the universal, although, as a matter of contingent history, it was the ‘a few Greek eccentrics’ who made the actual breakthrough to the concept of rationality open to infinite tasks.

KEY WORDS
Husserl, Eurocentrism universalism, relativism, race, National Socialism
‘Even the Papuan is a Man and not a Beast’: Husserl on Universalism and the Relativity of Cultures

...und in diesem weiten Sinne ist auch der Papua Mensch und nicht Tier.

(Husserl, *Krisis* Hua VI 337-8)

**Particular Historicities and Universal Reason**

In this paper I want to explore—and suggest a way of resolving—the evident tensions to be found in Husserl’s *Crisis of European Sciences* and associated texts between his commitment to the universality of reason as the goal or telos of European humanity (founded on the ancient Greek ‘breakthrough’ to philosophy and science) and his recognition of the empirical plurality and ‘relativity’ (*Relativität*) of individual peoples (e.g. Indian, Chinese, Papuan) and nations locked into their own particular ‘socialities’ (*Sozialitäten*), communal worlds and historical trajectories (in other words, what Husserl broadly includes under the term ‘historicities’, *Geschichtlichkeiten, Historizitäten*, a term he probably adopted from Dilthey). I shall examine the complex relations and tensions between Husserl’s conception of *universality*, whereby the *same* reason functions in every human as *animal rationale*, ‘no matter how primitive he is’ (*Origin of Geometry*, *Crisis*, p. 378; VI 385), and his concept of the *self-enclosed particularity* of individual ‘peoples’ with their own cultural forms. Indeed, Husserl often emphasizes that the most prominent feature of cultural plurality is precisely its relativity: ‘relativity belongs to the normal course of life’ (*Die Relativität bleibt unauffällig im normalen Gang des Lebens*, Hua XXVII 231). I shall evaluate Husserl’s response which defends the project of realizing a
critical universal rationality, by situating his discussion in terms of the cultural conflict of the time with the rising National Socialist commitment to racial particularism.

In his research manuscripts of the nineteen twenties and thirties Husserl frequently discusses the complex relationships that exist between different cultures and traditions: different cultures have their specific historicities (Crisis, p. 274; VI 320). Different cultures follow different languages, norms, ways of life, and so on. This is simply a matter of fact. There are, furthermore, some well known and controversial passages in Husserl’s Vienna Lecture of May 1935 and also in his Crisis texts (both in the main 1936 published text, Part One (§ 6) and in the then unpublished Crisis Part Three A § 36) where Husserl speaks of the universality inherent in European philosophical culture of the logos and contrasts it with various other communal life-worlds, which are, in his view, merely ‘empirical-anthropological’ types, that have their particular ‘historicities’ and ‘relativities’. Indeed, in this context, Husserl regularly invokes the idea of the ‘relativity of everything historical’ (die Relativität alles Historischen, Crisis, p. 373; VI 382). In addition, there are a number of related texts, both those collected in the Crisis Supplementary Volume (Husserliana XXIX), in the Intersubjectivity volumes (especially Husserliana XV), as well as in the recent volume on the life-world (XXXIX), which discuss the empirical difference between peoples and also the layers and strata of social groups, nations, and even the idea of the larger international collectivity or ‘supernations’ (Übernationen), such as ‘Europe’ or the League of Nations. Furthermore, there are, as Husserl indicates in his 1935 letter to the prominent French anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, even cultures that are ‘self-enclosed’ (abgeschlossene) unities, knowing no history. According to
Husserl, into this classical world of closed cultures, the ancient Greeks bring a new form of universality, which leads them, through the grasp of idealization to infinite tasks, to break through the finite horizons of the environing world (Umwelt), which presents itself to them as a ‘near-world’ (Nahwelt, Hua XXVII 228), and to arrive at the highly refined concept of the ‘true world’ or the ‘scientific world [which] is a purposeful structure (Zweckgebilde) extending to infinity’ (Crisis p. 382; VI 461).

Of course, it has become commonplace to accuse Husserl of a certain ‘Eurocentrism’. Clearly he defends the particular achievement of Western culture, i.e. philosophy that itself gave birth to the idea of science. As is well known, Husserl maintains that there is a specific entelechy of universal rationality inbuilt in European human existence since the Greeks, which is characterized by the ‘rule of an absolute meaning’ (das Walten eines absolutes Sinnes) or ‘absolute idea’ (Crisis, p. 16; Hua VI 14). This European absolute idea, according to Husserl, is one of theoria, the adoption of the purely theoretical attitude, involving the discovery of ideality and ‘the idealizing accomplishment’ (die idealisierende Leistung, Crisis, p. 346; VI 359), the commitment to evidence and justification, the recognition of the universality of reason, and the commitment to the idea of infinite inquiry and ‘infinite tasks’ (albeit a concept not clearly specified by Husserl). As Husserl puts it, a new telos was opened up for humanity by the ancient Greeks:

… that of humanity which seeks to exist, and is only possible through philosophical reason, moving endlessly from latent to manifest reason and forever seeking its own norms through this, its truth and genuine human nature. (Crisis § 6, p. 15; VI 13)
Philosophical inquiry (giving birth to rigorous science) opens up an ‘infinite human future as an infinite form of work’ (als ein unendliches Werkgebilde, Hua XXXIX 165) governed by ‘universal interests’. In other words, the Greeks invented the very form of ‘theoretical mankind, philosophizing mankind’ (Crisis, p. 350; VI 363). It is precisely this Graeco-European commitment to a theoria of infinite extent that allows Husserl to claim that other civilizations, such as the Chinese, Indian, or Papuan, are in contrast merely ‘empirical anthropological types’ (Crisis, p. 16; VI 14).10

In a text which the editor of Husserliana VI, Walter Biemel, includes as Crisis Section § 7311 Husserl calls attention both to universal rationality and at the same time to the relativity of particular cultural conceptions of reason and logic:

[To say that] philosophy, science in all its forms (Gestalten), is rational—that is a tautology. But in all its forms it is on its way to (auf dem Wege zu) a higher rationality; it is rationality, which discovering again and again its unsatisfying relativity (ihre unzulängliche Relativität), is driven on to its toils, in its will to gain the true and full rationality. But finally it discovers that this rationality is an idea residing in the infinite and is de facto necessarily only on the way (auf dem Wege); but it discovers also that there is a final form (Endgestalt) of a new sort of infinity and relativity—this, however, in the double sense of discovery which signifies, historically, two epochs of beginning (Anfang) and advance (Fortgang). (Crisis, p. 339: VI 274)

Husserl believes there is an essential teleology to Western cultural development, it is committed to the universalization of reason. In contrast to this universalizing ‘European’ culture, there are other cultures or civilizations, other forms of ‘humanness’ (Menschentum), other ‘humanities’ (Menschheiten – a word Husserl
frequently employs in the plural), different social groupings (‘socialities’, *Sozialitäten*) that are living in a more or less isolated, or ‘self-enclosed’ or ‘self-encapsulated’ manner (‘in Abgeschlossenheit lebende Menschheiten’).¹² Each of those communities has its own form of communal existence, Husserl says in the Vienna Lecture:

> Personal life means living communalized as an “I” and “we” (*als Ich und Wir*) within community horizon, and this in communities of various simple or stratified forms such as family, nation, supranational community (*Übernation*). *(Crisis, p. 270; VI 314).*

In the *Crisis* Husserl has little to say about the evolution and historical development of these cultural forms (more is to be found in the *Intersubjectivity* volumes and in the recently published Husserliana XXXIX on the life-world). He is primarily concerned to draw a sharp distinction between *scientific* and *traditional* or what one might call *pre-scientific* cultures (no matter how technologically advanced): culture untouched by theoretical science knows only finite tasks (*Crisis*, p. 279; VI 324). So called ‘prescientific’ or ‘primitive’ societies have their own conception of a ‘surrounding world’ (*Umwelt*) and within it their own conceptions of fellow humans, but they lack the understanding of the scientific world and indeed the very notion of the scientific point of view (see Hua XXXIX 53-54). In this respect Husserl often speaks of these pre-scientific cultures as entirely ‘self-enclosed’ or cut off from other cultures, or are uninterested in other cultures.¹³

In his conception of primitive culture (which he acknowledged was heavily influenced by the writings of the French social anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl)
Husserl believes that there is a particular stage which every culture goes through where it mediates to itself symbolically using myth\textsuperscript{14}. As Husserl puts it in his 1935 Vienna Lecture:

> It is a known fact, but also a necessity essentially available to insight (\textit{eine wesensmässig einsehbare Notwendigkeit}), that religious-mythic motifs and a religious-mythic praxis belong to every civilization living in the natural sphere – i.e., prior to the outbreak (\textit{Einbruch}) and effects of Greek philosophy and thus of the scientific world-view (\textit{Weltbetrachtung}). (\textit{Crisis}, p. 283; VI 330)

Note that Husserl believes it is not just an empirical fact but an \textit{eidetic necessity} that cultures go through a mythic stage on their way to reason. It belongs to the a priori form of cultural evolution. Here Husserl may have been influenced by the writings of Ernst Cassirer or of German classicists, such as Wilhelm Nestle, to whom we shall return (in the background, of course, is Hegel).

In ‘The Origin of Geometry’ text, Husserl directly addresses the ‘relativity of everything historical’ (\textit{Crisis}, p. 373; VI 382), which he cites as an objection to the kind of ‘depth-inquiry’ (\textit{Tiefenforschung}, VI 381) he is pursuing. He writes:

> Every people (\textit{Volk}), large or small, has its world, in which, for that people, everything fits well together, whether in mythical-magical or in European-rational terms, and in which everything can be explained perfectly. Every people has its “logic”, and accordingly, if this logic is explicated in propositions, “its” a priori. (\textit{Crisis}, p. 373; VI 382)

This inevitably leads, Husserl acknowledges, to the ‘objection’ (\textit{Einwand}, cf. XXXIX 158) of relativism, namely, that there are different logics for different rationalities and hence that Europeans can think and reason only \textit{as} Europeans. In his later writings
Husserl gives great force to this relativist objection, while in the end dismissing it in favour of a form of intersubjective understanding and critique through which we can come to understand the other and recognise what is universal and particular in each other’s viewpoints.

**The National Socialist Rejection of Universalism and Affirmation of Particular Racial Outlooks (Weltanschauungen)**

The cultural and political context in the nineteen-thirties surrounding this discussion of the universality of reason and the particularity of peoples cannot be ignored. In terms of internal motivations driving Husserl in the thirties, he is in part responding to the challenge of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (1927), which emphasised human finitude and historical embeddedness, to the extent that it might even amount to a kind of relativism.\(^{15}\) Husserl had come to see Heidegger’s *Being and Time* as developing an *anthropology* of human existence, and he underlines Heidegger’s use of the term ‘philosophical anthropology’ wherever it occurs.\(^{16}\) Indeed, Husserl had regarded ‘anthropologism’ as a particular form of relativism as early as the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* (1900, especially §§ 36, 39, and 40); he now addressed it as part of a general kind of historicism such was to be found in Wilhelm Dilthey’s work.

However, the external context for Husserl’s musings must surely include reference to the ‘bomb’ (as Husserl puts it in one letter) that exploded with the *Machtergreifung* of the National Socialist movement and especially the imposition of the Nuremberg Laws in 1935. Indeed, as I shall show below, Husserl’s *universalism* was specifically singled out for criticism and ridicule by quite a number of professional philosophers more or less sympathetic to the National Socialist outlook, such as Friedrich
Even the Papuan is a Man

Würzbach (about whom more below) and Ernst Krieck,\textsuperscript{17} Ernst Krieck (1882-1947), for instance, was one of the principal ideologues of National Socialism and held the Chair for Philosophy and Pedagogy at Heidelberg (from 1934 to 1945). He stressed his opposition to universalism:

> Since the National Socialist Weltanschauung has…ended any form of Universalism and replaced it with the racial-Volkish principle; philosophy, since it has always depended upon Universalism, must now also be declared over and be relieved through a racial-Volkish cosmology and anthropology\textsuperscript{18}

Similarly, the philosopher Alfred Klemmt (1895-1979)\textsuperscript{19} in 1938, contrasts spirit (Geist) that is ‘bloodless, abstract, universal humanity, rootless, and homeless’ and Geist that is ‘blood-conditioned, vitally determined, organically rooted’, ‘anchored multifariously in the terrestrial reality’, ‘firmly embedded in the eternal ordering of the natural world’\textsuperscript{20}. Universalism, in any form, was seen as a particularly Jewish plot designed to weaken claims of race.

Let us remind ourselves of the National Socialist position on race.\textsuperscript{21} Adopting Gereon Wolters\textsuperscript{22} helpful indications, we can summarize that Hitler’s vision of National Socialism was based on a number of central principles. First and foremost was the reduction of individuality to race. Belonging to a certain people, Volk, or race is the central dimension of the identity of a person, and determines his or her thinking, feeling, and acting. Second, was the claim that the so-called Aryan race is biologically and culturally the most developed. The historical culmination of the Aryan race is the ‘master race’ (Herrenrasse), i.e. the Germans. Thirdly, mixing of races leads to deterioration downwards towards the ‘inferior’ part, threateneing the purity of the
master race. Finally, world history must be conceived as a continuous war between the races for ‘space to live’ (*Lebensraum*).

There were a significant number of philosophers in Germany who for various reasons allied themselves with this National Socialist ideology, including some of Husserl’s own students, e.g. Oskar Becker (1889-1964) and Ludwig Ferdinand Klauss (1892-1974), but also others such as Hans Alfred Grunsky (1902-1988) and Friedrich Weidauer. The philosophers who wanted to support National Socialism were interested in advocating the superiority of the German race and the ‘spirit’ (*Geist*) intrinsic to the German race. They wanted to ground their ‘folk-outlook’ (*Völk Weltanschauung*) in philosophical theory.

Oskar Becker completed his Habilitation with Husserl in 1922 and had an illustrious career after the war.23 He was not a member of the National Socialist party but was a member of the Nazi Teachers Association (as was Gadamer and many others). Becker, however, was not just a passive fellow-traveller. He published a number of articles on race, including an article entitled ‘Nordic Metaphysics (*Nordische Metaphysik*)’24. Furthermore, whereas in 1935 in *Kürschners Deutscher Gelehrtenkalender* his fields of interest were listed as ‘history and philosophy of mathematics’, in the 1940/41 edition a new research field is listed: *Rassenseelenkunde* (‘race-psychology’), a term associated with the work of Ludwig Ferdinand Klauss.25 In his article ‘Nordic Metaphysics’, Becker contrasts the traits of Near Eastern desert peoples with those of Nordic peoples, drawing on the race theories of another of Husserl’s students from his Freiburg years (1917 to 1919)—the psychologist and anthropologist Ludwig Ferdinand Klauss.26
Ludwig Ferdinand Klauss (1892-1974), an arabist, traveller and colourful character who went on to have a chequered relationship with the Nazis, developed a cultural anthropology that claimed to employ phenomenological description (especially empathy) to understand and classify different cultural types (types of psyche) based on physical attributes, facial expressions, and so on. In the Preface to his 1926 work, *Rasse und Seele: Eine Einführung in die Gegenwart* [*Race and Soul. An Introduction for the Present*] Klauss records his debt to Husserl:

> In this research I am grateful first and foremost to my early teacher, Professor Edmund Husserl in Freiburg; I have learned from him the methodical approach of my research and particularly much valuable indications, for example on the relationship between soul and living body, begun in earlier years …

This dedication disappeared from editions of the book published during the Nazi years.

Klauss’s cultural anthropology accorded loosely with the National Socialist general perception concerning race, but his explicit rejection of the biological basis for race meant his views were later questioned by the Nazi theorists. Klauss claimed that peoples are experienced as foreign not based on their physical characteristics but on the experience of their souls. Klauss’s books were extremely popular and he eventually was appointed to a lectureship at the University of Berlin, with the support of the National Socialist student society.

Following Klauss’s characterisation of the Nordic ‘forest peoples’, Becker endorses the idea of a distinctive ‘Nordic’ outlook that led to science which no people absorbed in myth could ever produce. Becker writes:
The true unspoilt Nordic researcher will never acknowledge that the magic-believing world of a Congo Negro in its kind could be as good as the results of his laborious observation of nature and conscientiously thought through conclusions. … The technology grounded on the Nordic natural science has conquered the world, not the magical art of primitive people.  

Here Becker acknowledges the hegemony of Western science which he associates with the Nordic outlook in opposition to the non-scientific outlook of the African. 

Husserl has been accused of doing something similar, but, as we shall see, his intention is entirely different.

Becker and Klauss were students largely appreciative of their mentor Husserl; others were hostile from the beginning. A particularly virulent critic of Husserl was the philosopher and Nietzsche scholar Friedrich Würzbach (1886-1961), founder of the Nietzsche-Gesellschaft, and responsible for editing the Musarion edition of Nietzsche’s works in the twenties (1922-1929). Würzbach aligned himself wholeheartedly with the National Socialist cause and wrote a series of popularist articles on the importance of race and blood (one popular 1934 article is entitled ‘The Rebirth of Spirit out of Blood’). In his 1934 *curriculum vitae* (and repeated in his later mercy-plea addressed to Hitler in 1940—ironically he was considered Jewish), Würzbach particularly emphasises that he has repeatedly attacked Husserl in his writings, and has delivered a number of lectures against the ‘Jewish philosopher Edmund Husserl’.

Already, in the nineteen twenties—even before the ascent to power of the Nazis— and repeated in his 1932 book, *Erkennen und Erleben* [*Knowledge and Experience*, 1932],
Würzbach accuses Husserl of foolishness for not recognizing the Nietzschean truth that culture is based on blood and inheritance. In this work Würzbach offers his differentiation between three different types of animal: ‘Nature’s Minion or Favourite’ (Günstling der Natur), the ‘Vertebrate-Animal’ (Wirbeltier) and the ‘Brain-Animal’ (Gehirntier)– the latter two being different degrees of ‘Big-Headed beings’ (Große Kopf). The Big-Heads and Nature’s Minions are to be considered as opposite poles–Apollo and Dionysus–representing two types of knowledge, which he styles respectively ‘anthropomorphic’ (available to all) and ‘suprahuman’ (übermenschlich), which represents pure originality. Vertebrate-Animals are defined by Würzbach as creatures that

… surround themselves in a narrow objectivity, limited, and hemmed in by the law governed basis of the rationality of the Vertebrate-Animal. And that is why we call those, which can never breach these boundaries, Brain-Animals; they are, in a biological sense, a higher, but exclusively specialised, poorly developed Vertebrate-Animal.

In his 1932 Erkennen und Erleben Würzbach specifically uses Husserl as a stereotype of such a ‘big-headed’ creature. Husserl, he felt, was the perfect ‘magnifying-glass’ with which to make ‘the general, but insidious, state-of-emergency come into view; a state-of-emergency which is so widespread that there is no form of life which is not suffering under it’.

In particular Würzbach attacks Husserl for claiming, in the Prolegomena § 36 of his Logical Investigations, that truth is universal (in opposition to species relativism). Husserl there wrote:
Whatever is true, is absolutely, intrinsically true: truth is one and the same whether men or non-men, angels or gods apprehend and judge it it. Logical laws speak of truth in this ideal unity, set over against the real multiplicity of races (der realen Mannigfaltigkeit von Rassen), individuals and experiences, and it is of this ideal unity that we all speak when we are not confused by relativism.\textsuperscript{41}

Würzbach, commenting on this passage, claims that Husserl is here turning ‘truth on its head’\textsuperscript{42}. Würzbach rejects the very idea of universal, non-race-based truths:

…it did not matter if a European, a Negro or Jew, a Chinaman or Red-Indian, found a truth or solved a problem. If the knowledge was correct then it was valid for all humans, even for non-humans, angels and gods, and on in perpetuity, just as the Jewish philosopher Edmund Husserl proclaimed with immense arrogance only a decade ago. He believed the influence of blood and race would only tarnish and stain Geist; that pure Geist could get rid of the prejudices of one’s nation, and that only Geist could ordain eternal and universal truths. A so-called aristocracy of Geist is fashioned which looks down with contempt on those who philosophise as Germans, as Italians, or as Frenchmen. Once again Nietzsche slashes the mask of such chattering with a sharp smack of his blade and shows us their true face.\textsuperscript{43}

Truth, for Würzbach, is a relative to each race. For Würzbach, furthermore, it is important to aim at ‘the annihilation of the individual which means the annihilation of all private individualism, which means committing oneself to the great community (Volksgemeinschaft) through primordial Volk-ish experiences such as religion and metaphysics’\textsuperscript{44}. The triumph of the German Volk is expressed in its metaphysics and religion.
To give one further illustration of how Husserl was being characterized in National Socialist influenced publications, the 1938 edition of Meyers Lexikon, a popular standard reference work re-edited under Nazi influence, is illuminating. The entry on ‘Phenomenology’ characterizes it as largely a Jewish movement (Husserl, Reinach, Geiger, Scheler) and describes phenomenology as an ‘abstract, unproductive logical-scientific theory of essential insight through experiencing consciousness’.

Similarly, the entry on ‘Edmund Husserl’ characterizes him as ‘one of the main protagonists in the Jewish over-foreignisation of German philosophy’ (einer der Hauptschrittma cher der jud. Überfremdung der dt. Philosophie). Meyers Lexikon portrays Husserl as the author of a mystical rationalism that relies on Wesensschau. Furthermore, Husserl is accused of trying, in his ‘Philosophy as a Rigorous Science’ Logos article (1910/1911) ‘to obliterate all natural Weltanschauung’. Furthermore, Meyers Lexikon’s entry on Husserl lists in its short bibliography only works critical of Edmund Husserl, including a pamphlet, Der Einbruch des Judentums in die Philosophie, written by Hans Alfred Grunsky. Grunsky (1902-1988) had joined the National Socialist party in 1930 and quickly became one of its more fanatical ideologues. He was appointed as assistant to Alexander Pfänder at the University of Munich in 1935 and in May 1937 was promoted to the Chair of Philosophy and Psychology, personally appointed by Adolf Hitler over the wishes of the Munich philosophy faculty. In this role he was active in the denunciation of many Jewish professors including Husserl’s student, Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977), the anti-Nazi Christian resistance activist, who fled Germany for Austria in 1933 and subsequently emigrated to the USA. Grunsky’s pamphlet portrays Husserl primarily as a Jewish philosopher who engages in a sterile mysticism; his work contains the
‘seed of Talmudic thinking’ (*Kern des talmudischen Denkens*). Jewish philosophy lacks rootedness in blood and soil, hence it is rootless and adrift. Jewish philosophy has no unique theme of its own but ‘talmudises’ the themes of genuine Aryan philosophy.

One could go on citing these philosophers’ race-based criticisms of Husserlian universalism, but the point has been established. In opposition to the National Socialist promulgation of a particularist and race-based ‘worldview’ (*Weltanschauung*), Husserl was struggling to defend the universalist and rationalist core of European culture against a new race-based relativism. Husserl’s supposed Eurocentrism is actually a trenchant defense of universalist humanity against one-sided forms of racial particularism. Europe was in danger, Husserl said repeatedly, and his aim was to secure philosophy ‘in times of danger’ (*Crisis*, p. 392; VI 510) and to set philosophy as the bearer of universal rational community back on its task, and its *entelechy*, in a secure way.

**Husserl on the Limits of the Enlightenment**

Although Husserl believed philosophy was committed to the ‘life of reason’ (*Vernunftslieben*), he was no naïve rationalist and he explicitly criticised the limitations of the traditional Enlightenment conception of reason (see, for example, XXVII 236-238). Several times in the course of the main body of the *Crisis* (and in associated essays such as the Vienna Lecture), Husserl emphasizes that the current crisis is a crisis of *reason*: ‘the European crisis has its roots in a misguided rationalism’ (*Crisis*, p. 290; VI 337). He acknowledges that Enlightenment rationality was too narrow (*Crisis*, p. 290; VI 337), since it ignored the very basis of the pre-
given enironing world of practices and needs. There is need to renew the claim of reason, to renew its universality, and to commit humans to living in a ‘rational community’, defending what he calls in the *Crisis*, ‘genuine humanness’ (*echtes Menschentum, Crisis* § 3, p. 6; Hua VI 3-4). 49

The main problem facing a ‘renewal’ (*Erneuerung*) of reason in our times is that in the modern period reason has become construed in a one-sided manner, due to the success of the mathematical sciences leading to the very ‘mathematization of nature’. Husserl, like Heidegger (who made similar criticisms in his essays of the nineteen thirties) 50 and later Marcuse 51, is criticising the one-dimensionality of the technologically organised reasoning of our times. Today’s rationalism is in the grip of objectivism and naturalism and it is transcendental phenomenological reflection (*Besinnung*) especially on the genesis of these meaning-formations, that will lead our concept of reason to a new form of ‘groundedness of existence’ (Bodenständigkeit des Daseins, XXVII 238), a new universal ‘ground (Boden, ironically a frequent term in Husserl’s writings from this period probably due to Heidegger and despite the fact that the term also had strong National Socialist resonances, e.g. ‘Blut und Boden’).

For Husserl the phenomenological renewal of reason opposed all forms of naturalism, and he regarded all purely biological explanations of human nature as part of naturalism. Therefore Husserl’s assertion in the Vienna Lecture that ‘there is, for essential reasons, no zoology of peoples’ (*Es gibt wesensmäßig keine Zoologie der Völker, Crisis*, p. 275; VI 320) must surely be read as a clear repudiation of race-based doctrines. Of course, Husserl’s immediate target here is most likely Oswald Spengler who, in his Preface to *The Decline of the West* (1918-1923), approaches
culture according to a biological model.\textsuperscript{52} But Husserl must also have been alluding to the upsurge of racial particularism as promoted by National Socialist ideology, and specifically by his former student Clauss whose works were well known.

It is within the context of Husserl’s defense of reason as a universal possession of all humans that, in his Vienna Lecture, he makes his remark about Papuans, a remark that has been misconstrued as condescending or patronizing. Husserl writes

> Reason is a broad title. According to the good old definition, man is the rational living being, a sense in which even the Papuan is man and not beast (\textit{…und in diesem weiten Sinne ist auch der Papua Mensch und nicht Tier}). He has his aims, and he acts with reflection, considering practical possibilities. As products and methods grow, they enter into a tradition that is ever intelligible in its rationality. Still, just as man (and even the Papuan) represents a new level of animality - in comparison with the beast - so with regard to humanity and its reason does philosophical reason represent a new level. (\textit{Crisis}, p. 290; VI 337-338)

Although this might sound patronizing today, it is in fact a cry from the heart for the recognition of the universal rational humanity of all peoples, including those who do not participate in scientific technicity.\textsuperscript{53} Of course, Husserl also believes that the initial practical rationality of all can also be transformed through philosophy (and its offspring science) to a new and higher level of rationality which becomes the infinite goal of all humans.

Husserl always stresses this universality brought about by the Greek philosophical and ‘theoretical attitude’. It is important to get clear on Husserl’s conception of this ‘breakthrough’.
The Greek ‘Break-Into’ (Einbruch) or ‘Breakthrough’ (Durchbruch) to the Theoretical Attitude

As is well known, Husserl maintained that the ‘break-into’ (Einbruch, VI 330; VI 331) or ‘breakthrough’ (Durchbruch, Crisis p. 15; VI 13; p. 345; VI 358) to philosophy (or the ‘universal theoretical interest’, VI 358) accomplished in the broad area of the Greek lands of the sixth century BCE enabled a new possibility for humanity. Only the Greeks could have made this breakthrough which in turn created what Husserl calls portentously a ‘new humanity’:

… the breakthrough (Durchbruch) and the developmental beginning of a new human epoch—the epoch of mankind which now seeks to live, and only can live, in the free shaping (Gestaltung) of its existence, its historical life, through ideas of reason (aus Ideen der Vernunft), through infinite tasks (auf unendlichen Aufgaben). (Crisis, p. 274; VI 319)

The ancient Greek permanent ‘transformation’ (Umwandlung, Umstellung) of culture involved a revolutionary turning of interest of human beings away from the practical domain (of satisfying needs), away the all-encompassing mythical attitude, toward the new ‘detached’ theoretical attitude that made possible philosophy and, through philosophy, the sciences that have blossomed ever since. This universal theoretical interest uncovers invariant aspects of this variable world and particularly its ‘universal causal style’ (der universale Kausalstil, Crisis, p. 345; VI 358). As Husserl writes:

Man becomes gripped by a passion of a world-view (Weltbetrachtung) and world-knowledge (Welterkenntnis) that turns away from all practical interests and, within the closed sphere of its cognitive activity, in the times devoted to it,
strives for and achieves nothing but pure *theoria*. (Vienna Lecture, *Crisis*, p. 285; VI 331)

The Greek breakthrough, however, had its limitations. It is no longer possible to proceed *naively* and simply follow-through or accept the concept of reason that has devolved to us from the past. ‘Reflection is required in every sense in order to right ourselves’ (*Crisis*, p. 392; VI 510). For Husserl, we must return to the Greeks and reawaken the ‘genuine’ sense of rationality inaugurated by Greek philosophy:

> Rationality, in that high and genuine sense of which alone we are speaking, the primordial (*urtümlich*) Greek sense which in the classical period of Greek philosophy had become an ideal, still requires, to be sure, much clarification and self-reflection; but it is called in its mature form to guide [our] development.

(*Crisis*, p. 290; VI 337)

In *Crisis* Section 9, Husserl speaks of the ‘task of self-reflection which grows out of the “breakdown” situation (*Zusammenbruchs-Situation*) of our time’ (*Crisis*, p. 58; VI 59). He speaks similarly of the ‘collapse of the west’ (*Zusammenbruch des Abendlandes*) in his Prague letter of 1934 (Hua XXVII 243). Husserl frequently characterizes the necessary renewing reflection as a kind of ‘backwards reflection’ (*Rückbesinnung, Crisis*, p. 17; VI 16) or ‘questioning back’ (*Rückfragen, or Zurückfragen*, cf. *Crisis*, p. 56; VI 57; and again, p. 69; VI 70), a regressive inquiry into the ‘original motivation’ (*Ursprungs motivation, VI 58*) that gave rise to modernity. This kind of historical self-reflection does not involve an empirical tracing back of origins of philosophy to the ancient Ionians, rather it is concerned with the essential *meaningfulness* (*Sinnhaftigkeit*) of the process of philosophical/scientific idealisation (Beilage II, *Crisis*, p. 347; VI 360).
At times, as in his 1934 Letter to the Eighth International Congress of Philosophy held in Prague, Husserl explicates this self-reflection or meditation (Besinnung) as a radical questioning, in the spirit of Descartes (XXVII 244), requiring suspension of commitment or epoché towards all existing tradition and all naïve thoughts concerning philosophical ideas and positions. Elsewhere, he portrays this self-reflection in terms of a critical re-appropriation of the Urstiftung of the Greek breakthrough to philosophy, to the eidetic, and to the theoretical attitude.

Because he was a Jew Husserl was prohibited from participating as an official German delegate in the Eighth International Congress of Philosophy held in Prague in 1934. Indeed, the official German delegation was dominated by Nazi sympathizers as contemporary reports confirm. Nevertheless, Husserl wrote a letter which was read out at the Congress and later published in its Proceedings. In this Prague Letter Husserl speaks of philosophy, from its ‘primary founding’ (Urstiftung) in ancient Greece, as the great cultural product of Europe, its gift to the world. The challenge of philosophy is to live a life of self-responsibility (Selbstverantwortung):

- Philosophy is the organ for a new kind of historical existence (Dasein) of humankind, that of existing out of a spirit of autonomy. The primordial form (Urgestalt) of autonomy is that of the scientific self-responsibility. …
- Philosophical self-responsibility necessarily gets itself involved in philosophizing community. …Herewith the specific sense of European humanity and culture is designated’. (Hua XXVII 240, my translation).

As Husserl elaborates, the mission of philosophy possesses an inner ‘internationality’ (Internationalität) due to the ‘knowledge and work community’ (Erkenntnis- und
Arbeitsgemeinschaft, XXVII 242) that sustains it. Philosophy becomes a permanent possession of humankind and not of a particular people.

Similarly, a year later, in his Prague lectures in November 1935 (now given as a private citizen), Husserl writes:

What did it [modern European humanity] grasp as what is essential to ancient humanity? Nothing other than the philosophical form of existence (Daseinsform), freely giving itself in its whole life its law out of pure reason, out of philosophy. (Hua XXIX 109, my translation).

In the Crisis § 6 Husserl writes in similar manner:

To be human at all (Menschentum überhaupt) is essentially to be a human being (Menschsein) in a socially and generatively united civilization (Menschheit); and if man is a rational being (animal rationale), it is only insofar as his whole civilization is a rational civilization, that is, only with a latent orientation toward reason or one openly oriented toward the entelechy which has come to itself, become manifest to itself, and which now of necessity consciously directs human becoming. (Crisis, p. 15; VI 13)\(^{57}\)

It is this claim of the intrinsic universality and rationality of Greek culture made possible through philosophy (and through the sciences stimulated by Greek theoria, e.g. pure geometry) which allows Husserl to embrace a critical transformation and rethinking of the Enlightenment concept of the universality of reason.

Worldviews, World Representations (Weltanschauungen, Weltbetrachtungen, Weltvorstellungen) and the Concept of ‘World in itself’ (Welt an sich)
Husserl’s account of the Greek breakthrough to philosophy often involves the story of the Greeks coming to self-consciousness of their own world as a particular world involving a particular outlook, one not universally shared. The very concept of one’s own world in contrast with the ‘world in itself’ or ‘the true world’ is, for Husserl, a breakthrough achievement of philosophy. In his 1934 so called ‘Prague Treatise’ (Prager Abhandlung, a draft written for the Eighth International Congress of Philosophy but never delivered and which marks the first of the Crisis texts), he speaks of the originary founding (Urstiftung) of philosophy as cosmology (Hua XXVII 186). Philosophy (sometimes he specifically mentions the Sceptics here) allowed the Greeks to recognize their world view as a national world-view and hence to appreciate the relativity of their own national ‘world-view’ (Weltanschauung) in relation to other foreign world views (Damit wird der Grieche also der Geltungssubjektivität der Welt bewusst, Hua XXVII 188). This leads the Greeks to make the crucial distinction between a ‘world-representation’ (Weltvorstellung) and the ‘world in itself’ (Welt an sich, XXVII 189), thereby setting in train a radical ‘demythification of the world’ (eine radikale Entmythisierung der Welt, XXVII 189) and a critical stance-taking towards naively held traditional values. Indeed Husserl frequently emphasises that philosophy (and especially sceptical questioning) forced the Greeks to devolve from their own ‘world-representation’ (Weltvorstellung, VI 340, or Weltbetrachtung, VI 331), since they were forced to recognize it as one representation of the world among other possible ones.

Out of this self-differentiation arises the differentiation between mere subjective relative doxa and genuine epistēmē (XXVII 189; cf. XXXIX 336-337; Crisis VI 11, 158, 332; 359), between commonly held communal opinions and presuppositions and
genuine knowledge. This does not come about through a smooth evolution but rather through a ‘leap’ (Sprung, Crisis, p. 345; VI 359). With this demythification of experience, Husserl claims, ‘theoretical experience’ emerges as does the theoretical attitude. For Husserl, the Greek discovery of epistēmē involves recognizing a ‘non-relative’ (Irrelative) over and against relative perceptions and experiences. Initial ‘naïveté’ regarding the world is disclosed precisely as such (Hua XXXIX 336).

Husserl had been telling versions of this story since his 1906/1907 lectures Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge where he discusses the revolutionary aspect of the sceptics, such that every philosopher must at some point be a sceptic (Hua XXIV 179). Thus he retells this story as part of a ‘critical history of ideas’ in his First Philosophy (Erste Philosophie) lectures of 1923/1924. Similarly, in his London Lectures of 1922, Husserl asserts that the ideal of scientific philosophy received its ‘primal institution’ (Urstiftung) in Plato, who systematised the Socratic demand for essential definition in opposition to the destructive skēpsis of the Greek Sophists such as Gorgias. Socrates and Plato stand for the possibility of true knowledge, epistēmē, facing down the dogmatic scepticism and relativism of Gorgias and Protagoras (see Hua VII 8 and Crisis § 17). Socrates’ response to the sceptic paradoxes had been to propose reform of moral life, such that the genuinely human life became the life of reason (ein Leben aus reiner Vernunft, Hua VII 9), where the demand for evidence replaces acceptance of opinion, and knowledge is understood in terms of evidence, insight and clarification (Klärung, VII 9) as opposed to ‘unreason, blind living in unclarity’ (Die Unvernunft, das blinde Dahinleben in der Unklarheit, VII 10). The Delphic oracle’s injunction to Socrates reported in the Apology, gnōthi seauthon (Hua XXXV 476), stands as the motto for the philosophical enterprise itself,
‘the struggle to make himself true’ (*Crisis*, p. 13; Hua VI 11). Philosophy, the paradigm of grounded knowledge, begins with ‘self-experience’ (*Selbsterfahrung*) and self-knowledge, and Husserl emphasises the need for thorough self-consciousness and rational clarification of all aspects of human life.

Although the Greeks discovered the theoretical attitude and set in train the various sciences of the world, even in their most sceptical moments they did not question the ‘pregiven world’ (*die vorgegebene Welt*) itself. Indeed, quite the opposite, their sciences were pursued precisely on the basis of the acceptance of the world and its taken-for-granted ‘obviousness’ (*Selbstverständlichkeit*). Crucially, according to a 1935 research manuscript, antiquity never came to recognize the ‘correlation’ relation between subjectivity and world (see Beilage XVI, Hua XXVII 228-231). This recognition of correlation requires a further breakthrough, one confined to modernity and indeed to the breakthrough to transcendental philosophy with Descartes. Universal *epoché* is the driving force for this new approach the a priori correlation that must be uncovered and which will give birth to a new rationality (see Beilage XIX, 1934, Hua XXVII 238).

**From Mythos to Logos: Versions of an Old Theme**

Husserl’s accounts of the Greek breakthrough, involving a separation from a life absorbed in myth and practical interests and the rise of logical reason, are just one particularly interesting treatment of a theme popular among German academics of the nineteen twenties and thirties. Philosophers, classicists, historians all offered variations on this theme, e.g. Ernst Cassirer in his *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, Carl Gustav Jung, Max Weber, among others. Weber’s notion of the gradual
‘disenchantment’ (Entzauberung) of the world has become a standard topos in this regard.\textsuperscript{64} Weber, for instance, investigates the growth of rationalization and symptoms include: the increasingly systematization of religion, the development of ethical rationalism, and the decline of magic.

Social anthropology (especially in the works of, for example, Edward Burnett Tylor (1832-1917)\textsuperscript{65} and Emile Durkheim) was also developing as a science and the methods applied to so-called ‘primitive’ societies and their myths and rituals were also being turned upon ancient Greece. In part inspired by nineteenth-century discussions by Erwin Rohde (1845-1898), Friedrich Nietzsche, James George Frazer’s Golden Bough (2 volumes, 1890), as well as by the classification of the stages of religion in Durkheim and others, early twentieth-century classicists were moving away from the classical images of Greece as a balanced, rational society dedicated to the Golden Mean and were exploring aspects of Greek mystery cults, the Dionysiac, the irrational in general.\textsuperscript{66} In Britain, Jane Harrison (1850-1928), F. M. Cornford (1874-1943) and Gilbert Murray (1866-1957), for instance, developed a new approach by understanding early Greek literature from the standpoint of ritual.

German classical scholars were at the forefront of this way of interpreting the Greeks.\textsuperscript{67} However, during the 1930s, this interest in ritual and folk-culture often became entangled with National Socialist race ideology.\textsuperscript{68} For example, the German classical scholar, Wilhelm Nestle (1965-1959), produced his monumental From Mythos to Logos in 1940 but he had a long list of publications developing that theme earlier.\textsuperscript{69} Wilhelm Nestle believed that all primitive cultures were originally steeped in myth and he opens his study From Myth to Logos with a powerful image:
Just as the surface of the earth was originally completely covered by water, which only gradually withdrew and let islands and continents appear, so too for primitive man, the world surrounding him and his own nature were covered over by a mythical layer of beliefs, which only over a long period of time gradually retreated enough from larger and larger areas to be uncovered and illuminated by rational thought.\(^7^0\)

Nestle opposed mythic ‘representation’ (*Vorstellung*) and logical thought. *Mythos* is imaginative, imagistic, involuntary, unconscious; *logos* is understood as conceptual, intentional, voluntary, conscious. The path from *mythos* to *logos* is (as it was for Hegel and Marx) a movement from immaturity to maturity. He quotes approvingly Nietzsche’s view that Socrates symbolised the first appearance of ‘theoretical man’ (*der theoretische Mensch*)\(^7^1\) as the overcomer of instincts and the denier of myth. Rather like Lévy-Bruhl, Nestle thinks that myth is not ‘mere intuition’ (*Anschauung*)\(^7^2\) but involves a kind of reasoning, although of a practical kind.

However, Nestle also added a statement to the effect that this movement from myth to reason had been reserved for the Aryan peoples.\(^7^3\) Nestle had become a National Socialist supporter in the 1930s and regularly published in a German journal associated with the Nazis (it was subtitled ‘A Scientific Journal on National Socialist Foundation’). When he published his study *From Myth to Logos* in 1940, Nestle inserted remarks about the superiority of the Aryan race as ‘the most gifted of races’, remarks excised from later editions of this popular and respected work.\(^7^4\) Nestle appears to have been only an incidental Nazi fellow traveller and was actually trying to steer Nazi ideology onto a more rational path, away from what he perceived as their attempted re-mythification of society through the re-activation of the Teutonic gods,
and so on. Nevertheless, his example is indicative of a certain urge to accommodate to
the new realities of Germany under National Socialism.

In his 1935 Vienna Lecture, as elsewhere, Husserl too speaks of the withdrawal of
myth, the rise of *logos* and the disruptive practices of the Greek philosophers.

However, Husserl—like Heidegger—is anxious to combat the view that Greek culture
is best understood in anthropological terms as a ‘primitive society’. Societies
absorbed in myth do not make the crucial distinction between their own mythically-
imbued world and the idea of a ‘world in itself’. They naively take the world which
presents itself to them through their cultural perspective-- their familiar ‘near-world’
(*die NahWelt* or *Heimwelt*, see XXVII 234)--as the actual world. They do indeed have
a conception of the world as a whole or ‘totality’ (*Totalität, Allheit, Weltall, Crisis*, p.
283; VI 330), but they make this totality thematic ‘in a practical way’: ‘The gaze
(*Blick*) which encompasses it as a totality is practical’ (*Crisis*, p. 284; VI 330). Their
world is a ‘world of experience’ (XXXIX 53), this is their ‘primary historicity’
(*Urhistorizität*, XXXIX 53), that is, their way of occupying history.

Husserl does not deny that a great deal of knowledge may be gained from within this
mythic attitude but it will be a knowledge oriented to practical interests: boat building
or practical engineering rather than physics or dynamics. In fact, he acknowledges
that the a-scientific primitive world is accessible to the scientific viewpoint (as Lévy-
Bruhl has shown, XXXIX 54). But the mythic world-outlook is very different from
scientific worldview; it remains finite. Furthermore, Husserl claims it is a
‘falsification of sense’ (*Sinnesverfälschung*, *Crisis*, p. 284; VI 331) to treat the Greek
breakthrough as simply one such mythic-poetic world view. The Greeks did
something wholly different (in this respect Husserl subscribes to what has been called ‘Greek exceptionalism’).

Husserl’s position is therefore far more complex that is often recognised. On the one hand, philosophy breaks with the acceptance of the world; on the other hand, with his conception of the ‘life-world’ Husserl wants to restore the ‘much disparaged doxa’ (Crisis, p. 155; VI 158), whereby the life-world makes sense for us. But to grasp the essence of life-world is also to understand how it is capable of variation across cultures and also how is can be transformed by modern science. What is crucial for the scientific outlook, for Husserl, is the emergence of the idea of the one, true world. This indeed, as Husserl says in his 1934 Prague Letter, provides an ‘idea lying in infinity’ (XXVII 241).

One World, Universalism, and the Particularity of Cultures
Husserl’s meditations on the concept of ‘world’, ‘worldhood’, ‘world-view’ and ‘world-representation’ are complex and cannot be fully unpacked here. Furthermore, his views were evolving through the early nineteen thirties and his language tended to be quite loose and imprecise. Moreover, the concept of the pre-given world receives a complex differentiation in modern philosophy, with the emergence of the scientific concept of ‘world in itself’ or ‘true world’ (die wahre Welt). Since Ideas I, ‘world’ had been understood as the ‘horizon of horizons’ and as such it is always understood as unified and singular, a concept for which a plural makes no sense. World as such has no plural. Husserl always emphasises that human beings live in and share one world:
The world, on the other hand, does not exist as an entity, as an object, but exists with such uniqueness (Einzigkeit) that the plural makes no sense when applied to it. Every plural, and every singular drawn from it, presupposes the world-horizon (Crisis, p. 143; VI 146).

World is a ‘universal field’ for all our acts (Crisis, p. 144; VI 147), a context which allows our experience to have harmonious continuities of sense.

In contrast to the idealised scientific, ‘true’ world, each one has his or her own familiar world, or ‘folkish environment’ (völkische Umwelt, Hua XV 214). Husserl recognises that there are pluralities of peoples, each living within their own world-conceptions, although this is unknown to them, because they have not thematized world as such.

In a supplement contained in the Intersubjectivity volume XV, written in 1930 or 1931, Husserl distinguishes Umwelt from Welt. Husserl is concerned with the particular changes in motivation one has to go through to understand an alien world and somehow relate it to one’s own (whether on the same level, as lower, higher or whatever). When we encounter an alien world, Husserl says, we constitute our own ‘humanities’ (Menscheiten) over and against the distinct and separate ‘humanities’ of others (XV 215). Husserl then raises the question as to whether one can experience others’ ‘mythical convictions’ (die mythischen Überzeugungen der Anderen, XV 217), with their peculiar fetishes, gods, their mythical causality. In so far as I maintain my hold on my own beliefs, alien beliefs are unavoidably constituted or characterized as ‘superstitions’ (Aberglaube, XV 217). As Husserl puts it, if I have my world, then their world is not valid. In fact, however, a transformation has already been effected. I
have already modified my world to admit their world as a world at all, to recognise it as a variant of my world.

This leads Husserl to question how I can come to speak of an experiential world for all? For Husserl, the perceptual world is basic in being experienced as there ‘for everyone’. Or as Husserl puts it in Beilage XX: ‘the ontological form of the world is that of world for all’ (Die ontologische Weltform ist die der Welt für alle, Crisis VI 469). This shared unity is precisely the basis for our scientific investigation of the world. But what is the basis of its sameness? Phenomenologically we begin from our familiar worlds and have to grasp how these are constituted before we can grasp the sense of a universal world. We have to distinguish the sense of the ‘true world in itself’ which is a specific construction of science.

Husserl conceives of the familiar lived world as constituted by a series of levels of overlapping horizons. In this regard Husserl puts particular emphasis (contrary to what is usually assumed) on the extraordinary role of language as itself an expression of intersubjectivity. Husserl writes: ‘The human world is essentially determined by language’ (von der Sprache, Hua XV 225). Language, as he will put it in the Crisis texts, is ‘already an interrelation of egos’ (schon ichliche Verbundenheit, Abhandlung II, Crisis, p. 328; VI 307).

The Crisis maps the way from familiar, life-worlds grasped through the pursuit of practical interests to the breakthrough conception of the ‘world-in-itself’, the one true world. In this respect, the life-world is first constituted as the ‘subjective-relative life-world’ (Crisis § 50, p. 170; VI 173) by the ancient Greeks but this split becomes
canonical in modern science such that the subjective-relative world is treated as essentially false and misleading.

Is there, on Husserl’s account, one or many life-worlds? The answer is not simple. For Husserl, it belongs to the very essence of the experience of ‘world’ that it is precisely experienced as one world for all. To be world means to be somehow a unified ‘sense-complex’ (Sinnzusammenhang), albeit one with an infinite horizon. The ‘world of things’ (Dingwelt) is experienced as common and provides a kind of fundament for other forms of social and cultural world. However, the natural sciences in particular, building on the world as disclosed in the natural attitude, construe this concept of the one world of things (as the ‘true world in itself’) in a very particular determinate manner, one which shears off the subjective-relative properties and applies a grid of idealised necessary laws (including exact causation) to the mode of appearance of this world.

In the communal life-world, on the other hand, there are specificities and ‘typicalities’ to which we belong and which essentially determine us in unique ways. In one of the manuscripts on the recently published Husserliana volume XXXIX on the life-world, Husserl writes:

I was raised as German not as Chinese. But also as a small-town dweller in petit-bourgeois domesticity and schooling, not as an aristocratic, large landowner in a cadet school (Hua XXXIX 161, my translation).

Husserl then asks, in consequence of this particularity, if we can allow the objection (Einwand) that the European has his ‘European way of thinking’ with European concepts of truth, logic, its own world-view (Weltanschauung) and so on, whereas the
primitives have their logic, their worldview, etc. (see XXXIX 170). Although he acknowledges the empirical facticity of a plurality of cultures, Husserl thinks it is a fundamental mistake to settle for relativism in the sphere of culture. Each culture has, as it were, an openness to the universal. The primitive is recognised in my world; he is ‘for me’ (XXXIX 170). It is, for Husserl a ‘nonsense’ (Unsinn) that the universal (das Universum, XXXIX 170) in my thought can stand in opposition to the universal in another’s thought. Each world can be recognised as a specific kind of world. I can recognise other people have their own validities and conceptions of people, things, etc. They can become ‘co-subjects’ in my world (XXXIX 172). Amid the apparent diversity, there are, undoubtedly, universal structures of the life-world of humans as such, of humans as persons. These appear in various strata. There is the common structure of the cycle of human life (birth, childhood, maturity, death), with common feelings (pain, pleasure, etc), needs (food, sleep, companionship), and drives (sex, hunger). There is also the common sense of belonging to a home-world, sharing a language and a culture.\textsuperscript{75} One could obviously go into much deeper understanding of the concepts of shared place, shared experience of time, being-with-one-another and so on (and Husserl credits Lévy-Bruhl’s work for bringing the multiplicity of human views to light). In one sense, Heidegger’s \textit{Being and Time} is an extensive exploration of human life-world experience in the natural attitude and hence is rightly styled an ‘anthropology’ by Husserl.

Already in 1934, for instance, Husserl had written in a fragment entitled ‘human life in historicity’ (Menschlichesleben in der Geschichtlichkeit, collected in the \textit{Crisis Ergänzungsband}, Husserliana vol. XXIX):
The original animism. Man lives his spiritual life not in a spiritless world, in a world [understood] as matter, but rather as a spirit among spirits, among human and super-human, and this world-totality (Weltall) is, for him, the all of existing living, in the way of spirit, of the I-being, of the I-living among others as I subjects, life in the form of a universal I-community (Ich-Gemeinschaft). (Hua XXIX 3).

**The Primitive, Pre-scientific World: The Correspondence with Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1935)**

Husserl had a long-term interest in the structural form of the natural attitude and in the world as experienced by so called ‘primitive’ peoples. In this regard, his letter to the French philosopher, ethnologist and anthropologist, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, written in March 1935, around the time when Husserl received an invitation from the Vienna Culture Society to deliver a lecture in Vienna (which he would do from 7th to 10th May 1935), is of particular importance and relevance.

Husserl had been introduced to Lévy-Bruhl’s work through Aron Gurwitsch. In his letter to Lévy-Bruhl, Husserl says that he had deliberately interrupted his own work in order to study Lévy-Bruhl’s writings. In fact, Husserl owned several of the French anthropologist’s books including *La Mythologie primitive. Le Monde mythique des Australiens et des Papous* (1935), the book which is the explicit subject of Husserl’s letter, and which contains the author’s dedication. Husserl also possessed a German translation of Lévy-Bruhl’s *La Mentalité primitive* which he had annotated. Husserl also had in his library a copy of Alexandre Koyré’s 1930 review of *Die Seele der Primitiven, a German translation of Lévy-Bruhl’s L’âme primitive* in which Koyré
Even the Papuan is a Man

claims that the primitive and modern scientific worlds are so qualitatively different as to be incommensurate and he claimed it was not possible to go from one to the other. Husserl himself believes a ‘leap’ or ‘breakthrough’ is necessary to move from an essentially closed to an open world.

Lévy-Bruhl is best known for his proposal that pre-literate or ‘primitive’ peoples possess a ‘primitive mentality’ (la mentalité primitive) with its own kind of ‘prelogical’ rationality. This primitive way of thinking, with its mythical outlook, different conception of causation, reliance on memory rather than reasoning, lack of conceptualisation, and so on, is, according to him, quite alien to contemporary European cultural forms and exhibits a different logic and a different understanding of the world and its objects. The fact that modern European thinking cannot accommodate to the primitive outlook does not mean that primitive thinking does not have its own inner richness and consistency; indeed, their world appears richer than the modern. Following Durkheim, he thinks of the primitive mind as governed by ‘collective representations’. Furthermore, in primitive culture, the individual cannot be differentiated from the collectivity. Whereas, for example, the European mind assumes an order of causality, the primitive mind ascribes everything to more or less spiritual powers. Primitive thought is essentially ‘mystical’ – there is a felt participation and unity with all things; objects are never merely natural, but there is a life-force running through the universe, neither completely material nor completely spiritual, a unifying power running through diverse things. Primitives do not perceive the objects of the natural world in the same way modern Europeans do. Europeans experience nature as ordered and reject entities incompatible with that order. Primitives, on the other hand, experience nature as including what is
supernatural. They experience the world holistically, e.g. if one animal is wounded then the whole species feels its pain. ‘To be is to participate’, as he puts it in the *Notebooks*. If a primitive feels unity with a particular totem, then the primitive thinks naturally that he or she is that totem. There is a single unity to all things, although it can be transmuted into many different things. Thus, primitives can identify many different species of trees and plants, but also believe in the most incredible metamorphoses between different entities. Primitives attribute spiritual powers to animals and entities in nature such that nature itself belongs within a ‘supernature’ (*surnature*) which is primarily spiritual. Lévy-Bruhl famously hypothesised that primitive thought obeyed a ‘law of mutual participation’ whereby the primitives felt a unity with the world around them. This amounts to a panpsychism or universal animism. Similarly, Lévy-Bruhl held that the primitive mind is untroubled by certain contradictions (at least as modern Europeans would perceive them) and that mythical thinking follows a kind of dream logic not a typical subject-predicate logic. Indeed, the requirements of strict contradiction can only arise when literacy is achieved (compare Husserl’s views on the fixing of ideal concepts by written signs in his 1936 essay ‘Origin of Geometry’). Lévy-Bruhl believed that the primitive mind attached equal value to dream experience as to awake experience and made no distinction between them.

Of particular relevance to Husserl is the manner in which primitives relate to temporality and history. Lévy-Bruhl claims that primitives do not have a sense of ‘historical evolution’ (*évolution historique*), and have a sense of the tribal past which goes back only as far as living memory (four or five generations). He recognises that many studies have compared primitives in other cultures (Bushmen,
Papuans, etc.,) to pre-historical cultures as discovered in Europe, and, while acknowledging that analogies are deceptive, Lévy-Bruhl does acknowledge that both Neolithic cultures in Europe and contemporary primitive cultures elsewhere may share an inherently mystical attitude to the world.\textsuperscript{86} For Lévy-Bruhl, the primitive world attests to a kind of ‘pre-religion’ (\textit{pré-réligion})\textsuperscript{87} which differs structurally from more organised religion, and on this point he indicates his departure from Durkheim’s view in his \textit{The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life}.\textsuperscript{88}

In the Autumn of 1934 Husserl wrote a text on the ‘naiveté of science’ (Hua XXIX No. 3), where he is reflecting on the different levels of historicity and the manner in which human beings live in history with a sense of past, present and future. Humans live in groups, nations, and other supra-national unities (such as ‘Europe’, ‘China’, and so on). Strictly speaking, Husserl writes, there are no ‘first’ humans (XXIX 37); rather families give rise to families, generations to generations. Nations live in a ‘homeland (\textit{Heimat}, XXIX 9) or ‘home world’ (\textit{Heimwelt}),\textsuperscript{89} with a sense of what is familiar and what is strange and foreign (each nation has its opposing nation, XXIX 38-39, 41). Already in these musings, Husserl is thinking about the lack of history in the ‘stagnant’ world of the primitive (XXIX 39) and the mythical reasoning that essentially belongs to it— with its own cosmology: ‘The first surrounding world is the in-between-realm between earth and heaven’ (XXIX 38). Already nations have their own different senses of myth and of their place on earth, yet each myth conceives its people in relation to what is for them earth as a whole and there is a kind of shared universality (XXIX 44). There is, for Husserl, a natural ‘animism’ (XXIX 4; 38) whereby nature itself is experienced as a living person. The mythic perception of the world is animistic. Things are not experienced as pure things; the dead, for instance,
are considered to continue to inhabit the world (Husserl is echoing similar claims to
be found in Lévy-Bruhl). However a second stage of historicity is arrived at with the
breakthrough to science enabled by the theoretical attitude (XXIX 41). In this text
from November 1934 Husserl speaks of the differences between the French, German
and other nations with their specific senses of history and indeed the manner in which
they form ‘higher order persons’ and the Papuan who has strictly speaking no
biography, life-history (*Lebensgeschichte*) or ‘history of the people’

(*Volksgeschichte*):

A Papuan has in the genuine (pregnant) sense no biography and a Papuan tribe
has no life-history, no history of the people. (Hua XXIX 57)

In the unpublished convolute numbered K III 7 on Lévy-Bruhl, Husserl recognises
that humans necessarily live in communities and that ‘culture’ is a correlate of the
‘human’. Primitive life, however, is life lived without history (K III 7):

The existence of primitive humanity is history-less, is ‘timeless’. It is lived
always in the present; past and future have no teleological sense. (K III 7 7a)⁹⁰

In his letter, Husserl says that Lévy-Bruhl has brought home to him something
completely new and important, namely, the need to *empathise with* the primitive
human community and come to an understanding of their world:

… it is a possible, and highly important, and great task to “empathize”
*einzufühlen* with a humankind [*Menschheit*], living self-contained in living
generative sociality [*lebendiger generativer Sozialität*] and to understand this
humankind as having, in and through its socially unified life, the world [*die
Welt*], which for it is not a “world-representation” but rather the world [*wirklich
seiende Welt*] that actually exists for it.⁹¹
The primitive knows their world only as actual world. Clearly, primitives have not yet made the distinction between apparent world and real world, which the breakthrough between reality and appearance in Greek philosophy achieves. Hence even the split between dream and actual has not been accomplished. Primitive world lacks that differentiation. But, for Husser, it is necessary for us to find a way to think this – and this is what he compliments in the work of the armchair anthropologist Lévy-Bruhl.

Husserl’s Plurality of Life-Worlds and Universal Structures

In Crisis Section 36 Husserl explores the problem associated with the discovery of the life-world. Life-world was discovered when the ‘objective’ world of science had been peeled back through the operation of the epochē. But Husserl’s question then is – after we peel back what was universal as constituted by science is there anything left that is still universal or rather are we left with many different life-worlds (Crisis § 36)? He writes that we encounter relativity as a fact of human cultural life:

But when we are thrown into an alien social sphere (in einem fremden Verkehrskreis), that of the Negroes in the Congo, Chinese peasants, etc., we discover that their truths, the facts that for them are fixed, generally verified and verifiable, are not the same as ours. (Crisis § 36, p. 139; VI 141)

The dilemma is that if we focus on what is common to all worlds, we bypass the life-world and are back on the road to universal science with its conception of the ‘true world’. This ‘surpassing’ (Überschreitung) of the life-world is precisely what the performance of the epochē wished to avoid. Husserl continues:

But if we set up the goal of a truth about the objects which is unconditionally valid for all subjects, beginning with that on which normal Europeans, normal Hindus, Chinese, etc., agree in spite of all relativity -- beginning, that is, with
what makes objects of the life-world, common to all, identifiable for them and for us (even though conceptions of them may differ), such as spatial shape, motion, sense-quality, and the like-then we are on the way to objective science. When we set up this objectivity as a goal (the goal of a “truth in itself”) we make a set of hypotheses through which the pure life-world is surpassed (übierschritten ist). We have precluded this [type of] “surpassing” through the first epoché (that which concerns the objective sciences), and now we have the embarrassment of wondering what else can be undertaken scientifically, as something that can be established once and for all and for everyone.

But this embarrassment disappears as soon as we consider that the life-world does have, in all its relative features, a general structure. This general structure, to which everything that exists relatively is bound, is not itself relative. We can attend to it in its generality and, with sufficient care, fix it once and for all in a way equally accessible to all. (Crisis § 36, p. 139; VI 141-42)

Husserl, then, defends a certain universality within the life-world. The life-world has a ‘general structure’ (algemeine Struktur, p. 139; VI 142) with ‘invariant’ features (Crisis § 37). This world, in fact, has the ‘same’ structures as that of the scientific world – space, time, corporeality, causality – although they achieve an idealization and exactitude in the scientific purification of the life-world. There is, Husserl claims, a ‘universal a priori’ of the life-world. Husserl furthermore speaks of the ‘prelogical a priori’ upon which everything logical is founded (Crisis § 36, p. 141; VI 144).

Husserl, then, makes a very particular shift towards incorporating the pre-logical mentality within our life-world conception. Overall, as Husserl acknowledges in his letter to Lévy-Bruhl, historical relativism has ‘undisputed justification’ (zweifelloses Recht) as a kind of surface fact about human cultures. But he is not content to remain
with this apparent relativism or irreducible pluralism. Husserl will want to uncover the necessary eidetic laws that govern the very nature of social acculturation and even historicity. This is the ‘universal a priori of history’ about which Husserl will speak in the famous ‘The Origin of Geometry’ text from 1936 (Crisis, p. 371; VI 380), and elsewhere. The a priori of science is grounded on the a priori of the life-world (Crisis § 36, p. 140; VI 143).

**Conclusion**

Husserl’s meditations on cultures have to be understood within the context of his larger mission in phenomenology. Furthermore, it is only from the standpoint of the Husserlian idea of the ideal of universal reason, with its intrinsic commitments to ideality and infinity, that his discussion of cultural particularities and his remarks about cultural ‘types’ must be situated. He does acknowledge that this discussion must presuppose some notion of development, of ‘ascending culture’ (aufstiegende Kultur, Crisis, Beilage II, p. 350; VI 362), as he calls it, and, similarly, something he calls ‘essential history’ (Wesenshistorie, VI 362). Husserl undoubtedly embraced the view (found in Cassirer, Schelling, and elsewhere) that all cultures pass through some kind of non-historical mythic stage before becoming historically differentiated. But, for Husserl, that mythic stage is really a kind of ‘captivation’ or involvement in the natural attitude. It is not something necessarily that remains in the past but is actual integral to ongoing life in the natural attitude.

It is clear that Lévy-Bruhl’s conception of the primitive mentality had an enormous imaginative influence on Husserl’s thinking concerning the development of cultural
forms. He obviously has Lévy-Bruhl in mind when he writes in his 1936 ‘Origin of Geometry’:

One will object: what naïveté to seek to display, and to claim to have displayed, a historical a priori, an absolute, supertemporal validity, after we have obtained such abundant testimony for the relativity of everything historical, of all historically developed world-apperceptions, right back to those of “primitive” tribes. Every people, large or small, has its world in which, for that people, everything fits well together, whether in mythical-magical or in European-rational terms, and in which everything can be explained perfectly. Every people has its “logic” and, accordingly, if this logic is explicated in propositions, “its” a priori.92

The recognition of other cultures as other than one’s own is already a first step towards this universality. Husserl in fact believes that the possibility of idealization and of free variation must be something essential to human nature ‘even if it remains undeveloped for factual reasons’ (Crises, p. 350; VI 363). Furthermore, Husserl does not think that Indian or Chinese civilizations were essentially incapable of breakthrough to the theoretical attitude. But he does think the great ‘fact’ of history is that this breakthrough took place in Greece. Only in Greece did the right constellation of factors coalesce to produce this breakthrough; and even there it was the work of a ‘few Greek eccentrics’ (Crises, p. 289; VI 336).

The Italian phenomenologist Enzo Paci, commenting on Husserl’s letter to Lévy-Bruhl and associated notes, recognises that Husserl’s concept of the primitive is of a layer of experience that still inhabits our contemporary world-outlook.
There is a rational entelechy of humanity, as Husserl puts it, which is yet to be established. There is therefore no distinction between the barbarous, primitive man and the civilized European. Despite the accomplishments of science and technology, European man must recognize his own barbarity, sometimes tamed, but often erupting (Freud). Primitive man discovers that his own world, the precategorical, non-abstract world, is more than ever necessary to European man, who has lost it, because he has lost what Lévy-Bruhl called *participation*, that is the universal correlation, the relational life, the connection of our thought with the body, with lived nature, with the “secret art of nature” (the inexhaustible fecundity of “transcendental schematism”). Thus the valorization of the primitive is not the return to the barbaric and the irrational. That is what European man, who considers himself definitely civilized, thinks.

Paci sees that for Husserl it is imperative to discover the essence of human nature and in part this requires grasping the specific difference between the nature of historical existence and that lived in the flowing present without a sense of history.

Both, European man and primitive man, must find a deeper rational essence of man. To discover the “primitive world” is to discover the rooting of *logos* in matter, in nature, in corporeity, in the concrete precategorical operations from which scientific categories originate (the value of rhythm: all that we indicate abstractly, primitive man lives). It means to discover the life of reason, relational reason rooted in concrete relationships, constituted by concrete operations. It means to keep life concretely lived in logic and to understand logic as the expression of real operations. European man is in a crisis because he no longer knows how to find in himself what is valid in primitive man, in the “total” world in which primitive man lives. And, in turn, primitive man must arrive at logic, at
science, not fetishized science, but that science of sciences according to which mankind must realize itself (the science of history? phenomenology?). We must teach primitive man our science, if we do not fetishize it, and our technology, if we free ourselves from our barbarism, from our irrationality. Primitive man can teach us his own way of feeling and of living in participation, in relationship, in communion, if he frees himself from his barbarism, from his irrationality. But it is a question of mere reciprocity. Primitive man has become aware that his view of life is necessary to European man … To the extent that European man does not understand primitive man, he does not understand himself, and the revolt of primitive man is the self-alienation of European man, the self-destruction of European “civilization.”

Husserl ends his ‘Origin of Geometry’ text by saying we stand on the boundary of a great problem, namely the problem of reason – ‘the same reason that functions in every man, animal rationale, no matter how primitive he is’ (Crisis, p. 378; VI 385). All facticities have their root ‘in the essential structure (Wesensbestande) of what is generally human’ (Crisis, p. 378; VI 386). In his final writings Husserl is struggling to find the essential a priori of history that demonstrates precisely the human universal rationality at the heart of all relativities. Husserl believes this rationality can take different shapes, e.g. Cartesian, modern Enlightenment, transcendental phenomenological, and so on. The very notion of reason can be expanded and enhanced; it can also be deformed.

1 [acknowledgements]

2 E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, hrsg. W.

3 Husserl uses two terms, *Crisis*, p. 336; VI 271; David Carr translates *Historizität* as ‘historical development’. Husserl speaks of nations having their own ‘living historicity’ (*lebendige Geschichtlichkeit*, XXVII 187).

4 Parts One and Two were published in *Philosophia* in 1936 (the issue actually appeared in 1937). Part Three was prepared by Husserl for publication in *Philosophia* but withdrawn for further emendation. A typescript by Fink is the basis of Biemel’s edition of 1954.


Husserl characterises this idealisation in several ways, including the idea of ideal exactitude, the taking of the exemplary individual instance as representative of the totality, the conception of the *immer wieder*, going beyond actuality to the ideal possibility, the idea of a thing as existing through its properties (Hua VI 359), and so on.

By ‘type’ (*Typus*) Husserl means an empirical generalisation or a cluster of notions that empirically belong together (see *Experience and Judgment* §§8-85) and are pre-constituted in passivity through relations of similarity, e.g. I see a fox as much like a dog. He discusses ‘types’ of humanness in his *Kaizo* articles for instance. In general Husserl uses the term ‘*Typik*’ (or ‘typology’) in the *Crisis* to refer to an a priori set of essential ‘concrete’ differentiations, e.g. those given to us in empirical experience (see especially *Crisis*, § 62, p. 218n; VI 222n and § 66 p. 226; VI 229). Husserl speaks of ‘*Typik*’ also in the *Crisis* at VI 126, 168, 169, 176, 182, 183, 184, 230, 249, 251, 303, 310, 349, 358, 389, 442, and 530.

Walter Biemel added this section as *Crisis* § 73 but David Carr has disputed its placing at the end of the *Crisis* and has located it as Appendix IV of his translation.

13 In some of his discussions, Husserl acknowledges the importance of trade and commerce for opening up connections between cultures and hence appreciations of difference.


16 See Thomas Sheehan, ‘Husserl’s Marginal Remarks in Martin Heidegger, Being and Time’, in Thomas Sheehan and Richard Palmer, eds, Psychological and

17 Ironically, in his writings of the early 1930s, Husserl uses much of the language that is politically in vogue to discuss communal culture: e.g. the terms *Volk, Weltanschauung, Vaterland, Boden,* and so on, albeit without racist overtones.


21 For a most interesting study of the National Socialist theorists of race, see Hans-Christian Harten, Uwe Neirich, Matthias Schwerendt, *Rassenhygiene als Erziehungsideologie des Dritten Reichs: Bio-bibliographisches Handbuch* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2006).


25 I am grateful to Gereon Wolters for bringing this entry to my attention.

Ruth Hein (University of Missouri Press, 1997). For an excellent biographical study, see Peter Weingart, *Doppel-Leben. Ludwig Ferdinand Clauss: Zwischen Rassenforschung und Widerstand* (Frankfurt, New York: Campus, 1995). Klauss’s racial theories were extremely popular but in fact were not genetically based and eventually he got into trouble with the Nazis (denounced by his second wife) because of his amorous liaison with his Jewish assistant, Margarete Landé, whom he hid in his house during the war. For a general discussion of Klauss’ cultural conception of race, see Christopher Hutton, *Race and the Third Reich: Linguistics, Racial Anthropology and Genetics in the Dialectic of Volk* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005).


29 See Hans-Christian Harten, Uwe Neirich, Matthias Schwerendt, *Rassenhygiene als Erziehungsideologie des Dritten Reichs*, op. cit., p. 145. According to this account, see especially, pp. 140-150, Klauss was an early member of various anti-Semitic societies in Germany and, although he preached a ‘value-free’ anthropology, his writing is replete with racial stereotypes, see ibid., p. 147.

30 Becker, ‘Nordische Metaphysik’, as translated in Eckart Menzler-Trott,
31 Both Husserl and Heidegger also use the example of the African native. See M. Heidegger, *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, Gesamtausgabe Vol. 56/7 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1987, 2nd ed. 1999), § 14, p. 72; trans. by Ted Sadler, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy* (London & NY: Continuum, 2000), p. 61, where he speaks of the non-scientific Senegal Negro ‘suddenly transplanted from his hut’ (*ein Senegalneger als plötzlich aus seiner Hütte*) who has no familiarity with college-style furniture, lecterns and so on. Such a native would see the lectern not just a ‘bare something’, a material object, but as ‘something which he does not know what to make of’. Heidegger insists that an object presents itself from out of a particular ‘environment’ (*Umwelt*).


34 F. Würzbach, ‘Wiedergeburt des Geistes aus dem Blute’, Völkischer Beobachter 14 January 1934. I am grateful to Gereon Wolters for providing me with a copy of this article.

35 Würzbach wrote a number of critiques of Husserl, especially in his Erkennen und Erleben: Der große Kopf und der Günstling der Natur (Berlin: Wegweiser-Verlag, 1932). In his book, Würzbach, having criticised materialism, realism, and idealism, then claims that a mystical substance called ‘seed-energy’ (Keimplasma) flows through human beings as a kind of energy, and is responsible for transferring culture to humans through their blood, each race having its own form of Keimplasma. This Keimplasma enriches our biological inheritance and mixes with the mind in a well known area of the brain called the pineal gland (Zirbeldüsse) -- the same place which Descartes claimed was where the mind met the body. According to Würzbach, Keimplasma is what the pure ‘minions of nature’, such as Goethe, Kant, Nietzsche and Hitler, harness to lead the masses on to their glorious future. Würzbach claimed that the existence of Keimplasma had been established. Those who do not use Keimplasma and think that rational argument can explain and ground cognitive thought and experience, are Gehirntiere, ‘intellectuals’, ‘cripples’, ‘big heads’ (große Kopfs), all terms that Würzbach uses and which he also applies to Husserl. For Würzbach, Husserl’s call for philosophy to be a rigorous science is ‘un-German’ (undeutsch) and ‘Jewish’ (jüdisch), see his nstling der Natur’.

36 Würzbach claimed to have given a series lectures, including attacks on Husserl, in Berlin 1925, Freiburg 1926, Basel 1926, Paris 1026, Riga 1928 (Würzbach, BR, 30-4-34; BR, 21-5-40). This is contained in his Personell File’ from Reichsender
München, Bayerische Rundfunk Historisches Archiv [BRHA], Friedrich Würzbach, RV. 16. Würzbach’s attraction to Nazism is all the more curious as Würzbach himself was, in the language of the Nazi Racial-Purity Department (Reichsstelle für Sippenforschung) ‘half-Jewish’ (Halbjude, BRHA 14-9-39). A fact he himself denied by falsely claiming that he had been born to a different mother, whose name his father had never told him, and thus, he urged, he was of ‘true’ Aryan stock (BRHA, 21-5-40). Würzbach was eventually dismissed from his position at the radio-station when his final plea for clemency, petitioned to Hitler, was declined. The Director of the station, Helmuth Habersbrunner [1899-1959] wrote a number of letters in an attempt overturn Würzbach’s suspension, in one such letter to a high ranking Nazi official, Habersbrunner wrote,

When one works closely with someone for six years, one ought to have, at least once, felt the Jew coming through. Especially me, who can usually sense a Jew from a hundred metres, against the wind. I have never spotted the slightest trace of Jewish Geist. On the contrary, a true Aryan mentality. (BRHA, 27-5-40).


Würzbach, Erkennen und Erleben, op. cit., pp. 110-111.

40 Würzbach, ‘Husserl ist wirklich ein starkes Vergrößerungsglas, mit dem man einen allgemeinen, aber schleichenden Notstand sichtbar machen kann, einen Notstand, der so allgemein ist, das es heute kein form des Lebens gibt, die nicht unter ihm zu leiden hat’, _Erkennen und Erleben_, op. cit., p. 121.


42 „Die Wahrheit auf den Kopf“, _Erkennen und Erleben_, op. cit., p. 119.


44 ‘Vernichtung des Individuums aber bedeutet Vernichtung alles privaten Individualismus, bedeutet Eingehen in die große Volksgemeinschaft, in uranfänglich völkische Erlebnisse wie Religion und Metaphysik’, see Würzbach, _Völkischer Beobachter_ 26th January 1934.

45 _Meyers Lexikon_ (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1938), p. 1124. The term _Überfremdung_ means literally to make something too foreign and was a distinctive
National Socialist term. The term continues to occur in racially charged discussions about immigration. An appropriate rendering might be: ‘foreign infiltration’.

46 See the entry ‘Edmund Husserl’ in Meyers Lexikon, op. cit., Band 5, pp. 1542-1543.

47 Hans Alfred Grunsky, Der Einbruch des Judentums in die Philosophie [The Breakthrough of Judaism into Philosophy], Schriften der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik. I. Idee Und Gestalt des Nationalsozialismus, Heft 14 (Berlin, Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1937). This is a short pamphlet (37pp.) not a scholarly monograph. Grunsky was known after the war mostly for his work on Jacob Boehme, but he was a notorious and unrepentant National Socialist, having been an early member of the NS party, joining in 1930. He was personally made ordinarius professor on the orders of Hitler.

48 Dietrich von Hildebrand began his studies in Munich under Lipps and then moved to Göttingen 1909-1911 to study with Husserl and Reinach. He completed his PhD with Husserl in 1912 and it was published in 1916 as Die Idee der Sittlichen Handlung ['The Nature of Ethical Action']. He became a close friend of Max Scheler and converted to Catholicism in 1914. He was sentenced to death in his absence by the Nazis for his efforts to counter Hitler’s propaganda. He later taught at Fordham University. See the biography written by his second wife, Alice von Hildebrand, The Soul of A Lion (New York: Ignatius Press, 2000).

49 In his later writings Husserl employs a barrage of terms to express different aspects of humanity. He speaks of different traditions of human self-understanding as giving rise to different ‘humanities’ (Menschheiten). He also speaks of a universal ‘humanness’ (Menschentum).

51 See Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon, 1964).


53 Husserl’s reference to Papuan natives in several places in his work is presumably an indirect allusion to the work of Lévy-Bruhl and especially his Primitive Mythology which specifically discusses the Papua. Papua was a particular figure for German thinkers because it had been a German protectorate.


56 The Acts of the Congress were published as Actes du Huitième Congrès International de Philosophie à Prague 2-7 Septembre 1934 (Prague: Comité d’organisation du Congrès, 1936) and Husserl’s letter appears on pages xvi-xliv. For a
report on the Congress see Ernst Nagel, ‘The Eighth International Congress of Philosophy’, *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 31 no. 22 (Oct. 1934), pp. 589-601. Nagel reports: ‘Professor Hellpach of Heidelberg, a former Social Democrat and minister of education, pontifically laid down the thesis that *das Volk* is the central subject-matter of sociology, and that common descent and common purposes are constitutive marks of a *Volk*. From this norm for the social sciences he drew the interesting conclusion that every genuine culture is intolerant toward all others. The murmurs of protest from the audience at these words almost drowned out the speaker's voice’ (op. cit., p. 593).

He also records: ‘Professor Meyer of Hamburg defended the racial theories of the Third Reich, and perhaps only the lateness of the hour and the fatigue of the audience saved the day for law and order’ (ibid., p. 598).

57 One can sympathise with the difficulties the translator David Carr encountered in attempting to render this sentence. The original reads: ‘Menschentum überhaupt ist wesensmäßig Menschsein in generativ und sozial verbundenen Menschheiten, und ist der Mensch Vernunftwesen (*animal rationale*), so ist es nur, sofern seine ganze Menschheit Vernunftmenschheit ist latent auf Vernunft ausgerichtet oder offen ausgerichtet auf die zu sich selbst gekommene, für sich selbst offenbar gewordene und nunmehr in Wesensnotwendigkeit das menschheitliche Werden *bewußt leitende Entelechie*.’ (Hua VI 13)


59 Husserl frequently employs the term ‘*Weltbetrachtung*’ e.g. in *Cartesian Meditations* § 35, Hua I 107; § 61 Hua I 171, 174, 190), he contrasts the natural and
the transcendental consideration of the world. At *Crisis* VI 424 he talks of the ‘theological-teleological worldview’ of the Scholastics which Descartes sought to overcome. David Carr offers varying translations of the term including ‘consideration of the world’ and ‘view of the world’. For occurrences of *Weltbetrachtung*, see *Crisis* VI 54 VI 116; 178; 196; 205; 262; 312; 330; 331; 352; and 424. *Weltvorstellung* is used somewhat less frequently in the *Crisis*, see VI 182, 210, 317, 332, 340, 416, and 501. Of the three terms, *Weltanschauung* appears least frequently, see *Crisis* VI 3, 72, 199, 509, and 550. Sometimes ‘*Weltanschauung*’ is associated more with ‘personal outlook’ but it is also used interchangeably with the other terms to mean an overall ‘cultural’ or even ‘natural’ worldview.


In this regard Husserl is in agreement with recent scholars such as Burnyeat who see radical scepticism about the very existence of the world as a specific product of modernity and indeed of the split between mind and world, see Myles Burnyeat, “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed,” *Philosophical Review* XCI (1982), pp. 3-40, reprinted in Godfrey Vesey, ed., *Idealism - Past and Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1982), pp. 19-50; but see also Dermot Moran, ‘Idealism in Medieval Philosophy: The Case of Johannes Scottus Eriugena’, *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* Vol. 8 (1999), pp. 53-82.


E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1871; reprinted New York: Cambridge U. P., 2010). Husserl cites Tylor in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (Hua XII 83 and 248). Tylor was an advocate of cultural evolution whereby cultures became more complex but also believed that the structure of the human mind was more or less stable across cultures.


69 Wilhelm Nestle, Vom Mythos zum Logos, die Selbstentfaltung des griechischen Denkens von Homer bis auf die Sophistik und Sokrates und Griechische Geistesgeschichte von Homer bis Lukian in ihrer Entfaltung vom mythischen zum rationalen Denken dargestellt (1940; 2nd edition, Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1942; reprinted, 1975). In 1947 this book was awarded the Kuno-Fischer prize.


71 Nestle, Vom Mythos zum Logos, op. cit., p. 8.

72 Nestle, Vom Mythos zum Logos, op. cit., p. 17.

73 Most, ibid., p. 30.


Compare the Prague treatise, Hua XXVII 188 where he says that animism is not a detachable part of the prescientific outlook but represents an essential way of making human action meaningful in the world.


According to Karl Schuhmann, in his Briefwechsel edition of the letter, Husserl is commenting on La Mythologie primitive; Waldenfels and Luft, however, claim that the text under discussion is Die geistige Welt der Primitiven. It is entirely likely that Husserl, although he could read French, consulted the German text of Lévy-Bruhl more closely than the French texts at his disposal.

81 Lévy-Bruhl, *La Mythologie primitive*, op. cit., p. 41.
83 Lévy-Bruhl, *La Mythologie primitive*, op. cit., p. 80.
84 Lévy-Bruhl, ibid., p. xxv.
85 Lévy-Bruhl, ibid., p. 42.
86 Lévy-Bruhl, ibid., p. 146.
87 Lévy-Bruhl, ibid., p. 217.
88 See É. Durkheim, *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse: Le système
totémique en Australie* (Paris: Alcan, 1912), original English translation by Joseph
Swain as *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1915); new translation by
Karen E. Fields as *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (New York: The Free
Press, 1995).
89 Husserl frequently uses the term ‘*Heimwelt*’ (Hua XV, Hua XXXIX 335) to express
the manner the world always appears within a familiar context (the world as ‘*normale
Lebenswelt*’ Hua XV 210). The world is constituted according normality and
abnormality (Hua XXXIX, Nr. 58) and unfolds necessarily within relations of
proximity and remoteness.
90 This is a translation of the passage quoted in Sebastian Luft, ‘Europa am Kongo. Zu
Husserls kulturphilosophischen Meditationen’, in *Journal Phänomenologie* vol. 10
91 ‘Edmund Husserl’s Letter to Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, 11 March 1935’, *New Yearbook
for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 350.