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“The Sexual Division of Labor within Households: Comparisons of Couples to Roommates”

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Abstract:

Becker's theories of labor-market specialization predict that couples will allocate the time of the man mainly to the labor market and the time of the woman mainly to the home market. Previous studies fail to find evidence to support this allocation of labor. We compare cohabiting couples to roommates to study the extent to which couples specialize. Roommates make an interesting comparison group. Like couples, they live together. Unlike couples, they have no incentives to specialize with respect to labor-market traits. We include same-sex couples in our study because by definition, they are unable to specialize by gender. Couples, however, have incentives to pool household resources and to specialize. We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that, with respect to earnings, couples specialize and roommates do not. With respect to hours worked, however, same-sex couples are indistinguishable from male and female roommates.

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## **1. Introduction**

Becker (1974) models the process of selecting a mate as similar to the process of selecting any other consumer good designed to increase a person's level of happiness or utility. An individual maximizes his or her utility by selecting a mate based on the set of characteristics that the prospective mate possesses. Becker (1991) suggests that traits such as age, education, race, and religion are complements. Thus, he predicts positive assortative mating, the pairing of individuals with similar characteristics, across complementary personal traits. Due to his theories on the sexual division of labor within families, Becker classifies traits such as wages and hours worked as substitutes. Becker predicts negative assortative mating, the pairing of individuals with dissimilar characteristics, for substitutable traits.

Our main contribution to the empirical literature on labor-market specialization is that we use roommates as a comparison group to study empirically the extent to which couples specialize. Roommates share the cohabiting aspects of couples but not the intimate, personal relationship. Many roommates also meet either at school or through their employment, so they are likely to be quite similar with respect to all traits, including age, race, education, and earnings. However, no one expects that roommates would exhibit any labor market specialization.

When we consider couples, we include same-sex couples as well as opposite-sex couples. Although the vast majority of the specialization literature has focused on married couples, same-sex couples are particularly interesting to study. Same-sex couples have incentives to pool their household resources, but they are unable to specialize by gender in the division of household duties. Further, same-sex couples lack the legal protections of marriage.

We find that both same-sex and opposite-sex couples exhibit more labor-market specialization than roommates with respect to earnings. Opposite-sex couples, and married couples in particular, are also more likely to specialize with respect to hours worked, whereas gay couples are indistinguishable from male roommates and lesbian couples are indistinguishable from female roommates.

## **2. Theory**

Becker (1974) discusses the efficiencies of marriage by comparing households to firms. The inputs into the marriage are the traits of the spouses. Households produce goods such as meals, companionship, and children. The goal of the household is to maximize output. When traits are complements, positive assortative mating maximizes output; when traits are substitutes, negative assortative mating maximizes output.

Many couples and roommates meet either at school or at work, which increases the probabilities that couples will share many similar characteristics such as age, race, and years of schooling. Further, there are many studies that show that people prefer a mate with characteristics similar to their own (see Jepsen and Jepsen, 2002, for a review). Because some of these traits such as education and race are correlated with earnings, we might expect that members of couples as well as roommates have similar earnings. That is, we might expect positive assortative mating with respect to earnings.<sup>1</sup>

Specialization changes the prediction. Couples maximize household utility rather than individual utility. They may exhibit specialization by allocating more of the hours of one member to the labor market and more of the hours of the other to the home. For opposite-sex couples, Becker's theories predict that high-wage men will pair with low-wage women (negative assortative

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<sup>1</sup> Empirical evidence suggests that same-sex and opposite-sex couples exhibit positive assortative mating across most traits, including wages and hours (Blumstein and Schwartz 1983, Jepsen and Jepsen 2002, Klawitter 1995,

mating) and that once a man and woman form a household, the woman will specialize more in home production and the man will specialize more in market production.<sup>2</sup> The key to specialization by gender is the assumption that “an hour of household or market time of women is not a perfect substitute for an hour of the time of men when they make the same investments in human capital...If women have a comparative advantage over men in the household sector when they make the same investments in human capital, an efficient household with both sexes would allocate the time of women mainly to the household sector and the time of men mainly to the market sector” (1991, p. 38). Thus, within opposite-sex couples, we would expect the man to have higher earnings than the woman.

For married couples, we would expect specialization for many reasons: the predicted comparative advantages, the long-term nature of these relationships, and the legal protections afforded to women who specialize in the home. If the wife stays home full-time or even part-time, thus foregoing the opportunity to pursue a full-time career, she has some legal recourse to claim lost earnings in the event that she and her husband divorce.

Unmarried partners in both same-sex and opposite-sex couples generally do not have the same legal protections as do married couples. However, unmarried couples still have incentives to pool their resources. Many unmarried couples have children, which gives them additional reasons to specialize. Becker suggests that labor-market specialization applies less to same-sex couples because they are “unable to profit from the sexual difference in comparative advantage” (1991, pp. 38-39). Badgett (1995) also provides theoretical reasons for why same-sex couples would not follow the same matching patterns as opposite-sex couples. Within unmarried

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Nakosteen and Zimmer 2001, Suen and Lui 1999).

<sup>2</sup> The data used in the assortative mating literature cited above, as well as our data, do not contain the values of hours worked or earnings by individuals prior to the individuals becoming a cohabiting couple. Therefore, we cannot separate the mating effects from the specialization effects. Further, the data do not contain information about

couples, therefore, opposite-sex couples have higher predicted levels of specialization due to the ability to divide household duties by gender, something that same-sex couples cannot do.

Theory predicts that couples, regardless of gender composition or legal status, have incentives to specialize. The incentives are strongest for married couples. Unmarried, opposite-sex couples can specialize by gender, whereas same-sex couples cannot. In contrast to the incentives for all couples, roommates have no incentives to specialize.

### **3. Data**

The data come from the five-percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS) of the 1990 Census for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Observations in the data set include all gay couples (n=3,040), all lesbian couples (n=2,395), and random samples of opposite-sex couples (married and unmarried) (n=14,663), male roommates (n=2,438), female roommates (n=2,194), and opposite-sex roommates (n=2,398). When we compare same-sex couples to same-sex roommates, our total sample sizes are 5,478 for men and 4,589 for women. When we compare opposite-sex couples to opposite-sex roommates, our total sample sizes are 17,061 for all couples and roommates, 8,516 for unmarried couples and roommates, and 10,943 for married couples and roommates.

Because this paper focuses on labor-market characteristics, we limit the sample to households where both individuals (the head of household and the roommate/partner) are aged 18 to 65 and are not in the military. We exclude households where the values for sex or for relationship to head of household are imputed from other observations.

Roommates are identified as those pairs of individuals in which one individual selects “roommate” for the category “relationship to head of household,” whereas the other individual

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hours spent on household activities such as childcare. Such variables would be useful in our analysis of specialization.

selects “head of household.” Gay and lesbian couples are identified as those couples where the partner selects “unmarried partner” (bypassing the choice of roommate) for the category relationship to head of household, and both the unmarried partner and head of household have the same gender. The 1990 Census was the first time that unmarried partner was offered as a category for relationship to head of household. Census documentation defines unmarried partner as a “person who is not related to the householder, who shares living quarters, and who has a close personal relationship with the householder,” (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992, p. 196). Given the negative stigma attached to homosexuality, the likelihood that platonic roommates of the same sex would accidentally select unmarried partner is minimal. We exclude households where more than one person claims to be the unmarried partner or roommate of the head of household.

#### **4. Methods**

We use binary logit models to compare couples to roommates to find positive or negative assortative mating with respect to labor-market variables. As previously discussed, negative assortative mating would be consistent with specialization. We hold constant the gender composition of the couple to produce meaningful comparisons. Since women and men are quite different with respect to labor-market decisions and outcomes (different participation decisions, different wages), comparing pairs of women to pairs of men has the potential to confuse differences in gender with differences between couples and roommates. We compare gays to male roommates, lesbians to female roommates, and opposite-sex couples to opposite-sex roommates. Specifically, this paper tests the hypothesis that differences in labor-market variables such as earnings or hours worked between two individuals in a household affect the predicted probability that the pairing is a couple rather than roommates.

Equation (1) depicts the binary logit model:

$$(1) \quad \text{Prob}(Y_i = 1) = \frac{e^{B'x_i}}{1 + e^{B'x_i}},$$

where  $Y_i$  is the dependent variable which takes on the value of one for couples and zero for roommates,  $i$  denotes the couple, and  $x_i$  is a vector of characteristics for household  $i$ . This specification is similar to the binary logits used in Jepsen and Jepsen (2002) to draw comparisons between same-sex and opposite-sex couples.<sup>3</sup>

Equation (2) provides a detailed description of the components of the binary logit model represented by equation (1).

$$(2) \quad \beta'x \equiv \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{age difference} + \beta_2 \text{race difference} + \beta_3 \text{schooling difference} + \beta_4 \text{labor-market variable difference} + \beta_5 \text{investment income difference} + \beta_6 \text{blue collar difference} + \beta_7 \text{white collar difference} + \varepsilon,$$

where the labor-market variable is either annual earnings, an earnings ratio, hours worked, or an hours ratio.

The individual-level data are converted to couple-level data as described in the next paragraph. *Age* is measured in years. *Race* is divided into four categories: white, black, Hispanic, and other. *Schooling* is the highest year of formal schooling completed (converted from Census codes). *Earnings* is the individual's annual wage, salary, and self-employment income, measured in thousands of dollars. *Hours* is the average number of hours worked per week. *Investment income* is interest, dividend, and net-rental income, also measured in thousands of dollars. In order to study specialization, we include individuals who report zero earnings, hours, and/or investment income. *Blue collar* is a dummy variable for blue-collar occupations, *white collar* is a dummy variable for white-collar occupations, and *service* is a dummy variable for service occupations. We omit the dummy variable for service occupations from the models.

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<sup>3</sup> Jepsen and Jepsen (2002) draw comparisons across couple types, but they do not consider roommates.

Although not reported, we also create a dummy variable to control for those individuals who do not report an occupation.

The choice of partner/roommate depends on how the characteristics of the partner relate to the characteristics of the chooser. Therefore, the independent variables for the logit model are defined as the absolute value of the difference between the partner's and the chooser's characteristics. For example, if person A works 40 hours per week and person B works 35 hours per week, then the value of the independent variable of "hours" would be equal to 5. If A and B are members of a couple, then the value of the dependent variable would be one. For race and occupation variables, which are themselves dummy variables, the independent variable is more easily interpreted as another dummy variable equal to one when the two individuals have different values of the variable (such as a mixed-race household) and zero if they have the same value. One limitation is that some mixed race households where both members are in the "other race" category will not appear as a mixed-race pairing. A black woman married to an Hispanic man, however, would be classified as a mixed-race couple. Although the focus is on labor-market variables, we include nonlabor-market variables such as age, race, and education as control variables. Our results for these variables are comparable to previous research which finds positive assortative mating for complementary traits.

Although we are interested in both earnings and hours worked as labor-market measures, we are concerned about potential multicollinearity between these two variables. Thus, we consider each model using earnings only (omitting hours) and hours only (omitting earnings). Defining earnings in terms of dollar amounts has a potential limitation, as illustrated by the following example. Household 1 consists of person A, who earns \$40,000, and person B, who earns \$0. Household 2 consists of person C, who earns \$70,000, and person D, who earns

\$30,000. For each household, the earnings variable would be 40 (in thousands). However, household 1 appears to specialize more than household 2. We create an earnings ratio variable to study specialization more precisely. The earnings ratio is the difference in earnings divided by total household income. The earnings ratio for household 1 would be 1; the earnings ratio for household 2 would be 0.4. Thus, a higher earnings ratio suggests more specialization, just as a higher earnings difference suggests more specialization.

The same argument applies to the hours worked variable. We define an hours ratio in the same way. The hours ratio is the difference in hours worked divided by the total hours worked within the household. The interpretation of the hours ratio is similar to the earnings ratio: A higher hours ratio suggests more specialization.

As mentioned above, in the actual estimation of equation (1), we create different samples based on the gender composition of the household. We have three sample types: female households, male households, and opposite-sex households. We hold constant the gender composition of the household for several reasons. Men have higher labor-force participation than women, and women have more childcare and household responsibilities than men.<sup>4</sup> There are a total of five couple/roommate comparisons: gays versus male roommates, lesbians versus female roommates, and three samples for opposite-sex couples versus opposite-sex roommates (all, married, and unmarried). We estimate one equation for each of the four labor-market variables (earnings, earnings ratio, hours, hours ratio), yielding a total of 20 specifications. Although we can compare characteristics between one type of couple and one type of roommate,

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<sup>4</sup> In binary logits combining all the couples and roommates into a single sample, we can reject at the one-percent level the hypotheses that the coefficients for each household type (male, female, and opposite-sex) are equal.

a limitation of the binary logit model is that we cannot draw comparisons across all couple types.<sup>5</sup>

Because the independent variables are defined as the absolute value of the difference in a trait between either roommates or couples, we interpret the logit coefficients in the following manner. A larger value of a coefficient means that the two people are less alike with respect to that trait than if the value were smaller. For example, if person A works 40 hours per week and person B works 45 hours per week (A and B are members of the same household), then the value of “hours” will be smaller than if person C works 40 hours per week and person D works 20 hours per week (C and D are members of the same household). In this example, A and B are more alike with respect to hours than are C and D. Thus, a positive coefficient means that *larger differences* in the trait (such as hours worked) are associated with being a *couple* (dependent variable equals one) rather than being roommates (dependent variable equals zero). In other words, a positive coefficient is consistent with couples being *less* alike than roommates, whereas a negative coefficient is consistent with couples being *more* alike than roommates.

If Becker’s theories of labor-market specialization hold, then we would expect couples to exhibit greater differences in hours worked than would roommates. If high-wage men pair with low-wage women, as Becker’s theories of specialization predict, then opposite-sex couples would exhibit greater differences in earnings (and a higher earnings ratio) than would roommates. Roommates have no incentive to specialize with respect to hours worked or earnings, since neither trait is substitutable between roommates. Further, if roommates choose each other based on their ability to afford a similar level of housing, we would expect similar earnings levels (and

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<sup>5</sup> In response to a suggestion from an anonymous referee, we estimated several multinomial logit models to compare characteristics across all couple/roommate types. Unfortunately, these models failed the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption, which means that the estimators were not consistent. Therefore, we do not report the results.

probably hours worked) between roommates. However, the size and significance of the coefficients may differ across couple types. Becker predicts lower levels of specialization for same-sex couples relative to opposite-sex couples, whereas the predictions for roommates do not depend on gender composition.

## 5. Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 contains the correlation coefficients and their standard errors for each household type.<sup>6</sup> One concern with the 1990 Census data is the potential for couples, especially same-sex couples, to misidentify themselves as roommates. If the samples of roommates contain a high number of couples, then we would expect very little difference between the correlation coefficients of couples and roommates. In fact, most are statistically different from zero.<sup>7</sup> Lesbian couples have lower correlations for earnings than pairs of women who are female roommates. Gay couples have lower correlations for all variables of interest (age, race, schooling, hours, and earnings) than do male roommates. Opposite-sex couples have higher correlations for non-labor market traits (age, race, schooling, and investment income) and lower correlations for labor-market traits (hours and earnings) than do opposite-sex roommates. Finally, within opposite-sex couples, married couples have higher correlations for non-labor market traits and lower correlations for labor-market traits than do unmarried opposite-sex couples.

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<sup>6</sup> We thank J.S. Butler for his assistance in calculating these standard errors. We also estimate tetrachoric correlations for the dummy variables of interest, the results of which are similar to those reported in Table 1. See Stuart and Ord (1991) for a detailed explanation of tetrachoric correlations.

<sup>7</sup> We test the significance of correlation coefficients across household types (1 and 2) using the following test

statistic (from a standard normal distribution):  $\frac{Z_1 - Z_2}{\sigma(Z_1 - Z_2)}$ , where  $\sigma(Z_1 - Z_2) = \sqrt{\frac{1}{N_1 - 3} + \frac{1}{N_2 - 3}}$ ,

$Z_i = \frac{1}{2} * \ln\left(\frac{1+r}{1-r}\right)$ ,  $r$  is the correlation coefficient, and  $i$  is 1 or 2. See Hays (1973), p. 664.

Descriptive statistics for couples and roommates are presented in Table 2.<sup>8</sup> The table provides the mean and standard deviation for the absolute value of the difference in a trait between either roommates or couples. The means are calculated for the variables as they are defined in equation (2). When we consider differences in earnings, all couples have higher earnings differences than roommates. In other words, gay couples are less alike than male roommates, lesbian couples are less alike than female roommates, and opposite-sex couples are less alike than opposite-sex roommates.

When we consider differences in hours worked, lesbian couples are less alike than female roommates, and married couples are less alike than opposite-sex roommates. There is no statistical difference in hours worked, however, between gay couples and male roommate and between unmarried couples and opposite-sex roommates.

The differences in means for the labor-market variables of earnings and hours worked suggest specialization. However, the means do not control for the influences of other variables such as education. The results from the logit analyses will be more meaningful because they will control for affects of other variables.

## **6. Results**

Table 3 reports the marginal effects, calculated at the mean, for the binary logit models that compare gay couples to male roommates. The first column reports the results for the model that includes annual earnings. The second column reports the results for the model that includes the earnings ratio. The third column reports the results for the model that includes hours worked in the labor force, and the fourth column reports the results for the model that includes the hours ratio.

When we consider labor-market variables, gay couples are less alike with respect to annual

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<sup>8</sup> Although not reported, individual-level means are quite similar to the means of data used in other studies of same-sex couples (Black et al. 2000; Blumstein and Schwartz 1983; Kurdek 1992), which suggests that the Census data

earnings than male roommates. For example, a \$1,000 increase in the absolute value of the earnings difference between members of the household is associated with a 0.40 percentage-point increase in the probability that the two individuals are a gay couple rather than roommates. Gay couples are also less alike with respect to the earnings ratio. However, gays are indistinguishable from male roommates with respect to hours worked and the hours worked ratio.

We report the marginal effects for the models that compare lesbian couples to female roommates in Table 4. Lesbian couples are less alike with respect to annual earnings than female roommates, with a marginal effect of 0.47 percentage points for a \$1,000 increase in the earnings difference. Unlike male-only households, there is no difference between lesbian couples and female roommates with respect to the earnings ratio. In other words, the degree to which lesbian couples specialize with respect to earnings is significant in levels (dollars) but not in percentages. Lesbians are indistinguishable from female roommates with respect to hours worked and the hours worked ratio. When we compare members of same-sex couples to same-sex roommates, regardless of whether the couples/roommates are male or female, we do not observe any statistical differences with respect to hours worked in the labor force.

We report the results for the models that compare opposite-sex couples and opposite-sex roommates in Table 5. Opposite-sex couples are less alike with respect to all labor-market variables than are roommates. A \$1,000 increase in the absolute value of the earnings difference between members of the household is associated with a 0.21 percentage-point increase in the probability that the two individuals are an opposite-sex couple rather than roommates. The size of the hours effect is much smaller: a one-hour increase in the absolute value of the hours difference corresponds with only a 0.09 percentage-point increase in the probability that individuals are a couple. Thus, when we compare opposite-sex couples to opposite-sex roommates, we do find

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are appropriate for our analysis.

small but statistically significant differences in the hours worked in the labor force, whereas we did not for same-sex couples as compared to roommates.

In addition, we estimate logit models in which we separate opposite-sex couples into unmarried and married couples. That is, we estimate two models: one comparing opposite-sex roommates to unmarried couples and one comparing opposite-sex roommates to married couples. The results from these models, shown in Table 6, suggest that specialization is much stronger in married couples than in unmarried couples. The marginal effects for the earnings ratio, hours worked, and the hours ratio are not significant in the specifications for unmarried couples (columns 2, 3, and 4, respectively), and the marginal effect for earnings (0.0009) is much smaller than in the specification for married couples (0.0044). The marginal effects for all four labor-market variables are positive and highly significant in the specification for married couples. The significant results for married couples, in contrast to the insignificant results for unmarried (opposite-sex) couples, suggest that the legal protections of marriage may encourage specialization.

One concern with these results, especially those including same-sex couples, is the possibility that some of the people we classify as roommates are actually couples (and vice versa). If so, the differences between roommates and couples would be reduced, and all coefficients would be biased toward zero. Because of this potential measurement error, the coefficients should be treated as lower bounds in terms of magnitude. However, the t-statistics for the hours coefficients in the male (Table 3), female (Table 4), and unmarried opposite-sex (Table 6) samples are below one. The measurement error would have to be quite large in order for the true effect of hours to be statistically significant.

## 7. Conclusion

Our paper is the first to compare couples to roommates to study labor-market specialization. Roommates are similar to couples in that they live together. Roommates, however, have no incentives to specialize with respect to labor-market traits. Theory predicts that couples can maximize household resources by specializing. Theory also predicts that male/female couples will exhibit more labor-market specialization than will same-sex couples.

When empirically comparing roommates to same-sex couples, we find that both gays and lesbians are less similar to their partners than are female or male roommates with respect to earnings. However, gay and lesbian couples are indistinguishable from same-sex roommates with respect to hours worked. We find that opposite-sex couples are less alike than opposite-sex roommates with respect to earnings and hours worked.

All couples show some evidence of specialization for earnings compared to roommates, but same-sex couples do not show evidence of specialization for hours worked. In other words, we see less positive assortative mating with respect to labor-market variables in couples than in roommates, just as the theory would predict.

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**Table 1:  
Pearson Correlation Coefficients**

	Females		Males		Opposite-Sex			
	Roomates	Lesbian Couples	Roomates	Gay Couples	Roomates	Couples	Unmarried Couples	Married Couples
Earnings (000s)	0.4376 (0.0053)	0.3710 (0.0050)	0.3592 (0.0049)	0.2658 (0.0042)	0.2677 (0.0042)	0.1133 (0.0021)	0.2943 (0.0044)	0.0521 (0.0011)
Hours	0.3387 (0.0048)	0.2908 (0.0044)	0.3473 (0.0048)	0.2014 (0.0034)	0.1534 (0.0028)	0.0825 (0.0016)	0.1177 (0.0022)	0.0891 (0.0017)
Blue Collar	0.2596 (0.0041)	0.1979 (0.0034)	0.3326 (0.0047)	0.2222 (0.0037)	0.0114 (0.0002)	0.0285 (0.0006)	-0.0161 (0.0003)	0.0943 (0.0018)
White Collar	0.3343 (0.0048)	0.3443 (0.0048)	0.3423 (0.0048)	0.2798 (0.0043)	0.2206 (0.0037)	0.2071 (0.0035)	0.2031 (0.0035)	0.2106 (0.0035)
Service	0.2624 (0.0041)	0.1766 (0.0031)	0.2442 (0.0039)	0.2185 (0.0036)	0.0520 (0.0011)	0.0671 (0.0013)	0.0689 (0.0014)	0.0546 (0.0011)
Investment Inc	0.0995 (0.0019)	0.1283 (0.0024)	0.1896 (0.0033)	0.1964 (0.0034)	0.0739 (0.0015)	0.1689 (0.0030)	0.1562 (0.0028)	0.1704 (0.0030)
Race	0.6333 (0.0050)	0.6218 (0.0048)	0.5996 (0.0049)	0.3637 (0.0042)	0.6992 (0.0043)	0.7824 (0.0014)	0.7339 (0.0025)	0.8254 (0.0016)
Age	0.7527 (0.0040)	0.4459 (0.0053)	0.6846 (0.0046)	0.5685 (0.0052)	0.7118 (0.0044)	0.8651 (0.0025)	0.7286 (0.0042)	0.9094 (0.0018)
Schooling	0.5590 (0.0053)	0.5759 (0.0052)	0.6136 (0.0051)	0.4377 (0.0053)	0.4929 (0.0053)	0.5595 (0.0053)	0.4927 (0.0053)	0.5958 (0.0051)
N	2,194	2,395	2,438	3,040	2,398	14,663	6,118	8,545

Standard errors are in parentheses.

**Table 2:  
Descriptive Statistics**

	Females		Males		Opposite-Sex			
	Roomates	Lesbian Couples	Roomates	Gay Couples	Roomates	Couples	Unmarried Couples	Married Couples
Earnings (000s)	9.22 (14.08)	13.66 (17.39)	11.62 (16.71)	20.27 (27.35)	12.86 (16.14)	19.71 (25.27)	13.71 (17.94)	24.01 (28.65)
Hours	10.13 (13.18)	11.17 (13.95)	10.65 (13.61)	11.23 (14.21)	14.38 (17.03)	17.68 (18.33)	14.49 (16.87)	19.96 (18.99)
Blue Collar	0.126 (0.332)	0.191 (0.393)	0.279 (0.449)	0.178 (0.383)	0.421 (0.494)	0.434 (0.496)	0.464 (0.499)	0.413 (0.492)
White Collar	0.257 (0.437)	0.270 (0.444)	0.326 (0.469)	0.287 (0.453)	0.391 (0.488)	0.399 (0.490)	0.394 (0.489)	0.403 (0.490)
Service	0.179 (0.384)	0.164 (0.370)	0.162 (0.369)	0.158 (0.365)	0.264 (0.441)	0.199 (0.400)	0.238 (0.426)	0.172 (0.377)
Investment Inc	0.847 (4.120)	1.537 (5.942)	0.848 (4.033)	2.360 (7.876)	0.764 (4.024)	1.180 (5.255)	0.726 (3.901)	1.504 (6.019)
Race	0.105 (0.307)	0.112 (0.315)	0.126 (0.331)	0.167 (0.373)	0.124 (0.330)	0.071 (0.257)	0.103 (0.304)	0.048 (0.215)
Age	4.526 (5.828)	6.689 (7.546)	4.496 (5.881)	6.598 (6.191)	6.132 (6.150)	4.371 (4.450)	5.335 (5.081)	3.680 (3.789)
Schooling	1.367 (1.803)	1.867 (2.046)	1.353 (1.849)	2.094 (2.091)	1.740 (2.104)	1.666 (2.004)	1.651 (2.016)	1.678 (1.995)
N	2,194	2,395	2,438	3,040	2,398	14,663	6,118	8,545

Standard errors are in parentheses.

**Table 3:**  
**Marginal Effects for Binary Logit Models**  
**That Compare Gay Couples to Male Roommates**  
**(Dependent Variable: Couple=1; Roommate=0)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Earnings	0.0040** (0.0004)			
Earnings Ratio		0.0666** (0.0244)		
Hours			0.0001 (0.0005)	
Hours Ratio				-0.0181 (0.0286)
Blue Collar	-0.1394** (0.0202)	-0.1518** (0.0200)	-0.1511** (0.0200)	-0.1513** (0.0200)
White Collar	0.0211 (0.0181)	0.0201 (0.0181)	0.0228 (0.0181)	0.0236 (0.0181)
Investment Income	0.0080** (0.0016)	0.0104** (0.0017)	0.0108** (0.0017)	0.0109** (0.0017)
Race	0.0583** (0.0195)	0.0572** (0.0195)	0.0588** (0.0194)	0.0591** (0.0194)
Age	0.0110** (0.0013)	0.0119** (0.0013)	0.0123** (0.0013)	0.0124** (0.0013)
Schooling	0.0367** (0.0038)	0.0398** (0.0038)	0.0403** (0.0038)	0.0403** (0.0038)
Observations	5,478	5,478	5,478	5,478

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistics denoted with \* are significant at the 5 percent level, while those denoted with \*\* are significant at the 1 percent level.

**Table 4:**  
**Marginal Effects for Binary Logit Models**  
**That Compare Lesbian Couples to Female Roommates**  
**(Dependent Variable: Couple=1; Roommate=0)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Earnings	0.0047** (0.0006)			
Earnings Ratio		0.0175 (0.0255)		
Hours			0.0005 (0.0006)	
Hours Ratio				-0.0215 (0.0295)
Blue Collar	0.1405** (0.0221)	0.1346** (0.0222)	0.1346** (0.0222)	0.1354** (0.0222)
White Collar	-0.0473* (0.0197)	-0.0476* (0.0196)	-0.0472* (0.0196)	-0.0455* (0.0196)
Investment Income	0.0053** (0.0017)	0.0071** (0.0018)	0.0071** (0.0018)	0.0072** (0.0018)
Race	0.0204 (0.0244)	0.0181 (0.0242)	0.0183 (0.0242)	0.0178 (0.0242)
Age	0.0105** (0.0013)	0.0108** (0.0013)	0.0108** (0.0013)	0.0109** (0.0013)
Schooling	0.0243** (0.0042)	0.0287** (0.0042)	0.0288** (0.0042)	0.0288** (0.0042)
Observations	4,589	4,589	4,589	4,589

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistics denoted with \* are significant at the 5 percent level, while those denoted with \*\* are significant at the 1 percent level.

**Table 5:**  
**Marginal Effects for Binary Logit Models**  
**That Compare Opposite-Sex Couples to Opposite-Sex Roommates**  
**(Dependent Variable: Couple=1; Roommate=0)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Earnings	0.0021** (0.0002)			
Earnings Ratio		0.0566** (0.0076)		
Hours			0.0009** (0.0002)	
Hours Ratio				0.0368** (0.0082)
Blue Collar	0.0105 (0.0055)	0.0015 (0.0058)	0.0030 (0.0058)	0.0029 (0.0058)
White Collar	-0.0009 (0.0056)	0.0016 (0.0058)	0.0011 (0.0058)	0.0013 (0.0058)
Investment Income	0.0010 (0.0007)	0.0022** (0.0007)	0.0022** (0.0007)	0.0023** (0.0007)
Race	-0.0658** (0.0106)	-0.0706** (0.0110)	-0.0722** (0.0111)	-0.0724** (0.0111)
Age	-0.0070** (0.0004)	-0.0074** (0.0005)	-0.0074** (0.0005)	-0.0074** (0.0005)
Schooling	-0.0013 (0.0012)	-0.0009 (0.0013)	-0.0008 (0.0013)	-0.0008 (0.0013)
Observations	17,061	17,061	17,061	17,061

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistics denoted with \* are significant at the 5 percent level, while those denoted with \*\* are significant at the 1 percent level.

**Table 6:**  
**Marginal Effects for Binary Logit Models**  
**Further Analysis of Hours and Earnings in Opposite-Sex Households**  
**(Dependent Variable: Couple=1; Roommate=0)**

	Unmarried Couples vs. Opposite-Sex Roommates				Married Couples vs. Opposite-Sex Roommates			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Earnings	0.0009** (0.0003)				0.0044** (0.0002)			
Earnings Ratio		0.0158 (0.0149)				0.1298** (0.0112)		
Hours			0.0001 (0.0003)				0.0022** (0.0002)	
Hours Ratio				-0.0077 (0.0156)				0.0978** (0.0122)
Blue Collar	0.0395** (0.0107)	0.0371** (0.0107)	0.0378** (0.0107)	0.0382** (0.0107)	0.0029 (0.0082)	-0.0181* (0.0088)	-0.0140 (0.0088)	-0.0144 (0.0088)
White Collar	-0.0142 (0.0110)	-0.0137 (0.0110)	-0.0139 (0.0110)	-0.0142 (0.0110)	0.0057 (0.0082)	0.0100 (0.0087)	0.0086 (0.0087)	0.0087 (0.0087)
Investment Income	-0.0006 (0.0012)	-0.0001 (0.0012)	-0.0001 (0.0012)	-0.00004 (0.0012)	0.0028** (0.0010)	0.0048** (0.0011)	0.0049** (0.0011)	0.0050** (0.0011)
Race	-0.0384* (0.0161)	-0.0387* (0.0161)	-0.0389* (0.0161)	-0.0388* (0.0161)	-0.1671** (0.0186)	-0.1821** (0.0191)	-0.1846* (0.0191)	-0.1855** (0.0191)
Age	-0.0054** (0.0009)	-0.0052** (0.0009)	-0.0051** (0.0009)	-0.0051** (0.0009)	-0.0156** (0.0008)	-0.0170** (0.0008)	-0.0169** (0.0008)	-0.0170** (0.0008)
Schooling	-0.0026 (0.0024)	-0.0024 (0.0024)	-0.0023 (0.0024)	-0.0023 (0.0024)	-0.0014 (0.0018)	-0.0008 (0.0019)	-0.0006 (0.0019)	-0.0007 (0.0019)
Observations	8,516	8,516	8,516	8,516	10,943	10,943	10,943	10,943

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistics denoted with \* are significant at the 5 percent level while those denoted with \*\* are significant at the 1 percent level.