Developmental Immigration in the Republic of Ireland and Taiwan

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Abstract

Both the Republic of Ireland and Taiwan have followed distinct developmental nation-building projects of economic development since the 1950s. Both late-developing countries have since transformed from predominantly agricultural societies to ones characterized by the rapid expansion of human capital and high levels of recent immigration. The main focus of the paper is upon explaining the influence of Irish developmental goals and choices upon recent immigration policy. Irish choices are contextualized by reference to similarities and differences with Taiwan. This approach highlights the role of national ideological and political influences on economic goals, responses to globalization, and immigration policies.

Introduction

The notion of a ‘Celtic Tiger’ resulted from comparisons drawn with East Asian ‘tiger states’. The initial analysis was facile (Ireland had achieved levels of economic growth akin to, but of far lesser duration than, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan), but the name stuck. Subsequent comparative analyses of the Irish and East Asian tiger economies found some commonalities and several differences between the nature of inward investment by Multi-National Companies (MNCs) and where it came to the roles of states in fostering economic development. Ireland and Taiwan both embarked on developmental nation-building projects of economic modernization from the 1950s, and in both cases these intersected in complex ways with political nationalism. Developmental modernization resulted in societies with ‘new immigrant’ populations, a term needed to distinguish these from immigration by co-ethnics in both cases. In seeking to understand how Ireland, a mono-ethnic nation-state with a long history of emigration, came to proactively promote immigration, the aim here is to make comparisons and draw contrasts with Taiwan, where nationalism and ethnic politics are uniquely configured. Firstly, this analysis fleshes out the comparisons drawn between Ireland and Taiwan during the 1990s. It then locates the narrative of Irish economic modernization – a story of conflicts between developmental and cultural nation-building goals – alongside that of Taiwan. A focus on comparative nation-building narratives, as distinct from economic comparisons (the initial
comparisons were between ‘tiger’ economies), is employed to interrogate how both
countries instigated large-scale immigration and responded to its consequences.

Until its mid-1990s boom, Ireland had a long history of large-scale emigration,
punctuated by a few short periods during which some members of the diaspora
(former emigrants and descendants of emigrants) returned to live in Ireland. By
European standards Ireland’s experience of immigration – immigrants became
more than 10 per cent of the population in less than a decade – is unusual, but so
too, the academic literature on the ‘Celtic Tiger’ phenomena has argued, was
Ireland’s trajectory of economic development. When Ireland began to achieve very
high growth rates compared to other European countries, attention turned towards
comparison with the East Asian tiger countries that included Taiwan. This literature
suggests some value in further comparisons between Ireland and the so-called
East Asian tiger countries. A key focus of comparison is upon how both states
precipitated and responded to large-scale immigration. To a considerable extent in
both cases the drivers of immigration were indigenous labour shortages. Both
cases suggest developmental nation-building projects within which economic
growth potentially superseded other political goals. Yet the economic nationalisms
that in both cases sanctioned immigration were accompanied by essentialist
ethno-nationalist legacies that again in both cases influenced how immigration was
regulated.

Tales of Two Tigers

The term ‘Celtic Tiger’ was first coined on 31 August 1994 in an article published in
the newsletter of the American investment bank Morgan Stanley, suggesting
comparisons with the East Asian tiger economies (Gardiner 1994). It was quickly
adopted by Irish financial journalists and economists and soon became ubiquitous
within media and political debates. That this re-branding of Ireland coincided with
the Irish Republican Army ceasefire was significant; one of the themes of this
article is the complexity of intersections between economic nationalism and ethnic
nationalism. The Northern Ireland peace process dominated Irish politics, yet a key
element of this was the abandonment by the Republic of Ireland of aspirations to a
united Ireland except by the consent of the Northern Irish population. In effect, the
‘Celtic Tiger’ was a metaphor for a break with the past as well as one for rapid
economic growth. Comparative analyses on how and to what extent the Irish
‘economic miracle’ bore resemblance to East Asian experiences came later.

In Inside the Celtic Tiger: The Irish Economy and the Asian Model (1998), Denis
O’Hearn argued that the few widely agreed characteristics of tiger economies were
largely descriptive and superficial. The deeper that one looked at particular cases
the more disparate these ‘tigers’ appeared to become and the greater the
differences seemed to be how and why particular countries achieved their
economic success. Yet, the original four East Asian ‘tigers’ shared some core
economic characteristics. Each had maintained average annual economic growth
rates of more than 8 per cent from the 1960s until the 1990s (O’Hearn 1998: 3–5). Between
1960 and 1990 Taiwan’s GDP rose by an average of 9.3 per cent per annum. Such growth rates were very high compared to European averages of 2
per cent across the same period. During the same period Ireland’s GDP expanded
at almost twice the European rate (averaging 3.9 per cent per annum) but also at
about half the rate of those East Asian countries to which it was being likened (O’Hearn 1998: 61). Whilst Irish growth rates stood out compared to the rest of the European Union, these were modest compared to Taiwan and the other East Asian economic tigers. But by the early 1990s Irish growth had begun to accelerate, for reasons that suggested that comparisons with East Asian economic development were valid. During the 1970s, productivity per capita was only half that of the United Kingdom. By 1996 it had exceeded British levels (O’Hearn 1998: 65).

Ireland and Taiwan were still poor, peripheral, and technologically backward societies in 1950. By the end of the 1960s, state-led industrial development policies had emerged in both. Both countries rapidly expanded levels of indigenous human capital between 1960 and 1980 (Breznitz 2007: 7), and in both cases the state actively promoted economic development. There are some similarities in how they went about this. Both countries introduced duty-free export processing zones (at Shannon Airport in Ireland in 1961 and near Kaolsuing in Taiwan in 1964) aimed at encouraging foreign manufacturers to establish factories. Ireland attracted a mixture of European- and American-owned companies, Taiwan attracted predominantly Japanese firms. Both have sought to attract Multi-National Companies (MNCs) and pressure these to source a significant percentage of their components locally (Breznitz 2007: 194).

There were some broad similarities between the development trajectories of the Irish and Asian tiger economies. All benefited from large-scale inward-investment MNCs. Each developed strong niche sectors in high tech production – computers in all cases and also pharmaceuticals in the Irish case. However, the nature of MNC investment differed in the Irish case from that experienced in East Asia. Inward investment into Europe and Ireland predominantly came from the United States. American MNCs typically established US-owned subsidiaries whereas in East Asian cases inward investment was predominantly from Japan and Japanese MNCs had tended to established joint-owned enterprises. Partly, this came about because Japanese MNCs favoured sub-contracting over direct investment in subsidiaries. Its domestic labour supply was small compared to that of the United States and labor shortages precipitated the shift of productive capacity to other countries. This encouraged the growth of domestic industrial sectors in countries where they invested. This involved the downward shedding of technologies and was met in host countries by concerted efforts to then upgrade their technological capacity. For example, Taiwan built steelworks to supply Japanese industry and then used the steel to build a machine-tool industry (O’Hearn 1998: 22).

There were also some crucial differences. Since the late 1960s Ireland has focused mainly on foreign direct investment-based industrial development policies. In Taiwan the ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), mistrusted large-scale private industry. The state took on a larger role in fostering industrial innovation, for example through state-led research agencies. In Ireland the role of the state in co-ordinating industrial development was more hands-off. The state actively solicited inward investment and provided through its Industrial Development Authority (IDA) advance factory sites and other facilities to attract inward development, but the nature and extent of state co-ordination in both cases came to differ. Taiwan had a Japanese-style state bureaucracy where civil servants and even politicians tended to have specialist skills: for example, qualifications in engineering. Ireland inherited
an English-style bureaucracy dominated by non-specialist civil servants. This contributed to a less-direct management of industry by the state in the Irish case.

Both states successfully attracted foreign-owned computer industries. Unlike Ireland, Taiwan then pushed these to procure an increasing number of components locally and to transfer production expertise to local suppliers. The state also promoted the use of Taiwanese venture capital to expand the information technology sector (Breznitz 2006: 684). Taiwan developed a viable computer manufacturing industry that included internationally successful brands such as ACER. In the Irish case, the state neither prioritized capital investment into computer manufacturing nor did it seek to compel foreign-owned companies to foster Irish supply chains. Partly for these reasons computer manufacturing faltered. American MNCs characteristically shared technology with and purchased components from their own subsidiaries. More sustainable successes were achieved in software design where human capital was a key factor of production.

Different models of inward investment were met by somewhat different state-led developmental policies. Comparative analyses have emphasized differences between the East Asian Bureaucratic Developmental State (BDS) model and what emerged in the Irish developmental state approach. The BDS model adopted from Japan combined elements of protectionism and state enterprise that differed considerably from what pertained in the West. East Asian developmental states articulated projects of economic nationalism by means of state control over finance and the labour market. These blurred distinctions between public and private ownership and, more generally, between the state and the market (Woo-Cummings 1999: 21). Characteristically, the state intervened directly in the economy, for example by controlling wage levels and promoting indigenous capital formation (Huff 1995).

Academic comparative analyses of the Celtic and East Asian tigers have identified much stronger state controls over the factors of production in East Asia than were evident in the Irish case. During the 1980s the Irish state put in place a system of developmental corporatism or 'social partnership' that negotiated national development plans and wage agreements with employers and trade unions which fell considerably short of the degree of state control and coordination of economic activity found in the East Asian tiger countries (ÓRiain 2000: 158). In Ireland, through semi-state agencies like the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) the state gave grants and subsidies to MNCs. It expanded the education system to provide skilled workforces. However, it also removed all protectionisms against foreign capital in 1964. It also introduced low rates of corporation tax that succeeded in attracting disproportionate levels of inward investment into the European Union to Ireland. Between 1988 and 1998 Ireland attracted 40 per cent of American electronics investment into Europe. A similar but smaller agglomeration of pharmaceutical companies occurred during the same period (O’Hearn 1998: 73).

Taiwan’s Bureaucratic Development State approach to economic modernization emerged through top-down directives within a system of authoritarian capitalism. During the period of martial law between 1948 and 1988 strikes were illegal and labour was organized into a government-controlled union (L. Cheng 2002: 95). The policy-making processes of the ruling Kuomintang KMT party and the state were effectively indistinguishable (Lin 2008: 53). Later, during the 1980s and 1990s
social movements and civil society emerged to open out political decision-making. An opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was founded in 1986. Martial law was lifted in 1987 after thirty-eight years. Democratic elections to the National Assembly were held in 1991 and to the Legislative Yuan in 1992. In 1994 the constitution was amended to allow presidential elections. In 2000 the DPP won the Presidential election for the first time.

In the Irish case, according to Ó’Riain (2006), a ‘flexible-developmental state’ emerged whereby the state encouraged (rather than coerced) corporatist planning along neo-liberal responses to globalization. Unlike Taiwan, Ireland was a multi-party democracy where the state had a limited capacity to command the economy and direct the productive capacities of society. Free-market neo-liberal responses to globalization were managed through a system of ‘social partnership’ agreements between the state, employers, and trade unions. Under Ireland’s ‘competitive corporatist’ or ‘competition state’ model the role of government was to facilitate the free movement of capital, goods, services, and labour (Roche and Craddon 2003: 73). In articulating these neo-liberal goals Irish politicians and media used terms such as Ireland Inc. or Ireland PLC.

Between 2001 and 2004 Ireland was ranked as the most globalized country in the world according to the AT Kearney/Foreign Policy Magazine Globalization Index. During the same period Taiwan was ranked as considerably less globalized: 32nd in 2002, 34th in 2003, and 36th in 2004. The index measures four kinds of global integration: ‘economic integration’, ‘personal contact’, ‘technological connectivity’, and ‘political integration’. ‘Economic integration’ (where Ireland ranked highest), contains combined data on trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), capital flows, and investment income payments and receipts. Taiwan ranked 27th in this category in 2004; in 2002, an AT Kearney/Foreign Policy Magazine report noted that Ireland attracted an FDI inflow of US$ 24.7 billion. ‘Personal contact’ compares international tourism and cross-border remittances; Ireland ranked second for 2004, while Taiwan ranked 32nd. In the ‘technological connectivity’ category, Ireland ranked 14th and Taiwan ranked 17th. The ‘political integration’ category tracks state membership of international organizations and ratification of international treaties; Ireland ranked 11th, while Taiwan ranked as the lowest of all 62 countries included in the Index. That Singapore ranked 2nd on the composite index for 2004 (high on economic integration, low on political and personal integration) suggests the need for caution about grouping all East Asian ‘tigers’ (Hesham 2006: 7). However, comparisons between Ireland and Taiwan reveal that the Irish economy is considerably more open, and that the Taiwanese economy is considerably more protected. This suggests considerable underlying differences in the nature of state developmental approaches in both cases.

Cultural Contexts of Economic Development

Taiwan’s experiences of state formation and ethnic politics clearly differ from any norm (Chun 2007: 77). Taiwan formally became a province of China (the Taipei Prefecture) in 1886, but was ceded to the Japanese Empire in 1895 and remained under colonial rule until after World War Two. The dominant sense of ethnic nationality in Taiwan – The Republic of China (ROC) – has developed in complex symmetry with that of the mainland People’s Republic of China. Lucie Cheng
identifies the emergence of a diasporic concept of ethnic Chinese as *Zhongguoren* during the early twentieth century. Both Chinese states came to enshrine ethnic conceptions of nationality whilst at the same time contesting the legitimacy of one another since 1948 (L. Cheng 2002: 92). The arrival of over a million migrants from mainland China in the aftermath of Chiang Kai-Shek’s defeat by the People’s Liberation Army, in essence China’s old government and army in exile, profoundly changed Taiwan’s ethnic and cultural composition. Before 1949 mainlanders made up just one quarter of Taiwan’s population. By the early 1950s two million refugees from the mainland were claimed to live Taiwan, forming one third of a total population of six million. Excepting only small minorities of Aboriginal peoples, most of the rest of the Taiwanese population consisted two Han Chinese ethnic groups, Minnan and Hakka. Other accounts in Taiwanese peer-revised journals put the number of mainland migrants at a much lower figure (Lin and Lin 2005: 71).

Post-1949, Taiwan has been characterized as ‘a newly formed quasi-nation seeking a new republican identity to mark itself off from the colonial past, as a capitalist society performing some socialist practices and as an allegedly democratic polity under military dictatorship’ (Wang and Heath 2008: 22). The Republic of China (ROC) based in Taiwan retained a government structure that claimed sovereignty over all 35 provinces of China as well as layers of ‘local’ government. The ROC was based in Taiwan but symbolically and institutionally distinct from the province of Taiwan. By the 1950s, as the exile of the ROC in Taiwan looked increasingly long-term but political goals of preparing for return to power remained, a new state-led modernization project emerged. The population of Taipei rose from 200,000 in 1949 to more than one million by the mid-1960s. By 2005, Taiwan had a population of 23 million. Mainlanders and their children comprised 13 per cent of this population (Lin and Lin 2005: 71).

The cultural politics of post-1949 Taiwan encompassed a period of de-Japanization followed by a pronounced ‘Sinic Revival’ during the 1960s (Wang and Heath 2008: 35). In reaction to Mao’s 1966 Cultural Revolution on the mainland Chinese culture was strongly promoted by the ROC in school curricula and other areas. As put by Cheng-Yi Lin and Wen-Cheng Lin:

Through politically-screened teachers and deliberate design of the school curriculum, the ROC government promoted China as the motherland as well as a Chinese national identity among Taiwanese. Mandarin was stipulated as the sole language, and other dialects were banned at schools, in the military, and at all levels of the government. TV and radio programming in dialects was kept to a minimum. To an extent, political socialisation in Taiwan was successful during the first four decades of KMT rule. The majority of the people in Taiwan identified themselves as Chinese and supported Taiwan’s unification with China in 1989.

(Lin and Lin 2005: 72)

In effect, the post 1949 period witnessed the growing dominance of Chinese culture. As summarized by Wang and Heath, citing the work of Alan Chun, this occurred in several phases (Wang and Heath 2008: 37, Chun 1996: 55). Firstly, a period of ‘cultural reunification’ (1945–1967) saw emphasis on reconsolidating Chinese culture, purging Japanese influences, and upon suppressing local
Taiwanese cultural expression. This included imposing Standard Mandarin as the official language and banning Taiwanese and Japanese from the mass media. It also saw, through the ‘Model Taiwan’ policies of the 1950s, a strategic focus on modernization and industrial development (Chun 1996: 45). Secondly, a ‘cultural renaissance’ period witnessed a systematic attempt ‘to cultivate a large-scale societal consciousness’ of traditional Chinese culture. Here the ROC deployed the classic nation-building techniques as depicted in the West by Benedict Anderson (1983) and Ernest Gellner (1987). As put by Chun: ‘By invoking “tradition”, the authorities appeared to resuscitate elements of the past, but they were clearly inventing tradition (by virtue of their selectivity). The government in effect played an active role (as author) in writing culture’ (Chun 1996: 56). However, this did not result in an uncontested ‘Chinese’ national identity.

Ireland achieved independence in 1922, having been part of the United Kingdom since 1801. Its post-independence politics were preoccupied with cultural nationalism and de-colonization. Its education system prioritized the intergenerational reproduction of Catholicism and cultural identity (the Irish language) over the expansion of human capital. Cultural protectionism was paralleled after 1932 by economic protectionism that included a prohibition on the investment of foreign capital. Its politics were preoccupied to a considerable extent with the ideal of a 32-county united Ireland, meaning the incorporation of Northern Ireland into the 26-county Irish Free State that in 1948 was declared the Republic of Ireland.

The political sanctioning of large-scale immigration would have been difficult to foresee given the mono-ethnic history the Irish nation-state constructed for itself and given Ireland’s long history of emigration (Fanning 2010). In many respects Ireland was a typical European kulturnation, built upon the foundations of nineteenth-century romantic nationalism to create a dominant shared sense of ethnic shared identity made possible by mass literacy, education, and other aspects of modernity. This Irish-Ireland nationalism came symbolically to dominate the new state from the 1920s to at least the 1960s (O’Tuataigh 1991). After independence Irish-Ireland cultural nationalism served to promote both cultural and economic isolationism. According to Garvin:

> From the 1890s to 1960s, nationalist and nativist themes were used to erect ideological and organisational defences against the cultural and political assaults seen to be emanating from the Anglo-Saxon world and elsewhere... In particular, the fear of secular individualism, seen as threatening Irish communal values, was often associated with a fear of the modern and an imperfectly camouflaged hatred of Protestant culture.

(Garvin 1998: 146)

The 1932 Fianna Fáil government was elected on a platform of economic isolationism. Eamon de Valera, the dominant political figure for the next two decades, promoted a doctrine of economic self-sufficiency, preventing imports, discouraging foreign capital, and promoting import substitute manufacturing. Once elected in 1932 he introduced the Control of Manufactures Act. This required that the majority of capital in Irish companies should be Irish-owned. The aim was to undermine British dominance within Irish industry. De Valera also imposed tariff
barriers aimed at fostering import substitution. This precipitated the so-called ‘economic war’ with the United Kingdom, of mutual tariff barriers, that lasted until 1938 when the British removed restrictions on imports from Ireland (Garvin 2005: 113).

To some extent the economic development policies of the post-independence era resembled those of the KMT. In addition to restrictions on foreign capital, these centred on the formation of semi-state companies to produce electricity (ESB), harvest turf for use as fuel (Bord na Mona), process sugar beet (Comhluacht Súchra Eireann), or develop air travel (Aer Lingus). This predominance of state-led capital investment in the Irish economy coincided with a de-colonizing period of pronounced cultural nationalism.

‘Irish-Ireland’ nationalism depicted the new state as homogenous, even though there were a number of distinct minority communities. These include the Travelling People, whose claims of ethnic distinctiveness continued to be opposed by the state; a small Jewish community, who experienced overt discrimination before, during, and after the Holocaust (Irish anti-Semitism resembled that found in other European nation-states); and the once-dominant Protestant minority, who became marginalized within the new state (Fanning 2012). Catholic nationalism became the bearer of a sectarian and exclusionary religious-ethnic conception of nation.

From the 1950s the ‘Irish-Ireland’ nation-building project became contested by a developmental modernizing one, which came to emphasize economic and human capital reproduction as utilitarian nation-building goals. Political conflicts centred on the education system as a mechanism for cultural reproduction. The institutional narrative of Irish developmental modernization has tended to focus on influential state-of-the-nation reports seen to exemplify emerging new political and economic orthodoxies. Protectionism unravelled during the 1950s when import substitution policies proved unable to sustain employment (O’Grada and O’Rourke 1996: 141). The emergence of a new developmental paradigm was signalized by the high-profile publication in 1958 of a report entitled Economic Development. Its significance was that it institutionalized the perspective that protectionism did not work. An OECD/Irish Government report of 1965, Investment in Education, has been credited with jolting the focus of Irish education from character development and religious formation to one on economic development and the human capital needed for industrial development. Investment in Education amounted to a paradigm shift whereby a combined mercantile and human capital paradigm broke earlier approaches to education. The state promoted educational reform to support economic development objectives. For example, in the Second Programme for Economic Expansion, expenditure on education was described as ‘an investment in the fuller use of the country’s primary resource – its people – which can be expected to yield increasing returns in terms of economic progress’ (Government of Ireland 1964: 193).

Key landmarks in the liberalization of trade included the removal of restrictions on foreign capital investment in 1964, the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement in 1965, and EEC membership in 1973 (Fitzgerald 2000: 3). In an example of developmental realpolitik a 1976 report from the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) argued that if the foreign investment needed to provide new jobs were discouraged Irish people would still have to work for foreign capital, but would be doing so outside of Ireland rather than at home (1976: 20). The Irish
developmental settlement occurred partly due to the co-option of erstwhile blocking coalitions within a competitive corporatist system of social partnership. Trade unions and employers repeatedly signed up for the pursuit of economic growth as a national project (O’Riain 2006: 213). Symbolic political preoccupations with a United Ireland seemed unfeasible. Urbanization and the expansion of education fostered secularism. Economists achieved an influence once held by clerics (Garvin 2005; Fanning 2008). In sociological terms a modernization of belonging occurred that prioritized human capital over forms of cultural capital (Fanning 2010). In the language of sociologists, the pursuit of economic growth became a hegemonic neo-liberal ‘competitive corporatist’ national project. ‘Social partnership’ agreements negotiated by the Irish state with employers and unions were in effect national plans for economic development. In this context, large-scale immigration later became justified within ‘a national interest discourse’ of economic growth (Boucher 2007: 6).

In summary, in Taiwan cultural nation-building co-existed with economic nation-building whilst in the Irish case the main phase of cultural nation-building proceeded developmentalism. Irish academic narratives emphasize the role of developmental modernizers who broke with the shibboleths of cultural nationalism. The ideological conflict was one between economic liberalism and protectionism. Having abandoned all forms of protection by the mid-1960s Ireland was open to a neo-liberal development project that resulted in it becoming the most globalized economy in the world. The underlying political acceptance of such openness – exemplified by various social partnership agreements – contrasted with a resistance to some forms of globalization in Taiwan. Clearly the uneasy relationship between the ROC and the PRC has kept the politics of nationality in the foreground whereas there has been little emphasis on cultural nation-building for several decades in the Irish case. Simply put, the goal of economic development came to subordinate other political goals in the Irish case more than it appears to be the case in Taiwan. Both states – Ireland before the 1960s and Taiwan until more recently – witnessed the subordination of education systems to cultural-nationalist goals. Sociological accounts of Irish modernization infer that increased emphasis on human capital alongside a corresponding de-emphasis upon religious or ethnic rules of belonging produced de-ethnicized rules of belonging. Such an analysis suggests a hypothesis that Irish society might be more open to immigration than in the case of Taiwan where cultural nationalism remains in the political forefront.

Developmental Contexts of Immigration

A 2004 report prepared for the World Bank grouped Ireland and Taiwan together amongst a small group of countries that have benefited economically from recruiting from their diasporas. It noted that both countries had ‘reverse brain drain programs that offer generous research funding and monetary incentives, as well as services and assistance to attract medical professionals’ (Lucas 2004: 14). Another attributed Taiwan’s leapfrog technology advancement in no small degree to returning scientists (Saxenian 2002). For example, Taiwan’s Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park, a government-led initiative to attract Taiwanese R&D professionals back to Taiwan, had 2,563 returnees in 1996. This number had more
than doubled by 2000, reaching 5,025 (Lucas 2004). By 2000, over half of the companies in the Hsinchu Industrial Park had been started by expatriates returning from Silicon Valley (Saxenian 2000). Taiwan has tended to recruit professionals and highly skilled workers from Taiwanese working abroad (Lee 2009: 335). However, the number of such migrants was miniscule when compared to Taiwan’s 23 million plus population.

The East Asian tigers experienced rapid economic growth from the 1960s that led to chronic labour shortages. Economic growth was initially concentrated in labour-intensive activities, which used up more unskilled and semi-skilled labour than was being supplied by migration from rural to urban areas and rising female participation in paid work (Breznitz 2007: 113–114). Taiwan reached full employment by the late 1960s and chronic labour shortages became a problem thereafter. Between 1976 and 1980 wages doubled due to these pressures (Gold 1986: 98). By the mid-1960s in Taiwan one third of the workforce consisted of young women who moved in and out of the workforce according to their marriage and child-bearing status (Gold 1986: 89). Low-skilled labour shortages in export-orientated manufacture and other sectors were exacerbated by rising levels of education and skills and the increased unwillingness of Taiwanese to undertake so-called 3D (‘difficult, dangerous, and dirty’) low paid jobs (L. Cheng 2002: 95).

Since the late 1980s Taiwan has recruited temporary unskilled foreign migrant labour. In 2008 some 373,336 low-skilled migrants were resident in Taiwan out of a total 417,385 foreign residents. Those other than low-skilled migrants included 3,474 traders, 2,072 engineers and 6,009 teachers, again very small numbers when put beside the population of Taiwan. Well over half of all foreign residents were female. In 2008 only 7,332 of Taiwan’s foreign population were children under 15 years of age. The majority of migrants entered Taiwan with temporary visas, administered restrictively (Lee, 2009: 345, Table 22-5).

In Ireland, as in Taiwan, labour shortages fostered immigration following a period of growing female participation in paid employment. During the late 1990s women took some 70 per cent of new jobs (O’Hearn 1998: 99). However, labour shortages persisted in the face of continued economic growth. As in Taiwan, the state encouraged the return of highly-skilled Irish working abroad, though the scale of returnees was proportionally much larger than in the Taiwanese case. The return of highly-skilled Irish migrants was one of the factors of paramount importance behind the fast and successful development of the Irish IT industry (Asish and Gambardella 2004). The aforementioned World Bank report concluded that Irish efforts to tap into its diaspora exceeded those of other countries that tried to do so, including Taiwan (Lucas 2004: 14). A state-funded ‘Jobs Ireland’ initiative ran from 2000–2002, aimed at attracting skilled co-ethnics in areas such as information technology. It held employment fairs in cities around the world with Irish emigrant populations (Hayward and Howard 2007: 50). However, as the pool of such highly-skilled Irish appeared to become exhausted the Jobs Ireland campaign then extended its remit to potential high-skilled immigrants from Britain, EU member-states, Eastern European states, and non-EU English-speaking countries like India. The demographic profile of immigrants shifted over time as the supply of persons of Irish ancestry willing to migrate to Ireland declined over time. Between 1995 and 2000 almost one quarter of a million people (248,100) immigrated to Ireland. This amounted to an aggregate figure of seven per cent of the total population as
recorded in the 1996 census. About half were returned Irish emigrants: some 18 per cent (45,600) were immigrants from the United Kingdom; 13 per cent (33,400) came from other EU countries; 7 per cent (16,600) came from the United States; and 12 per cent (29,400) came from the rest of the world. From 2000, non-Irish migrants exceeded migrants with Irish citizenship or ancestry: 18,006 work permits were granted to migrants from non-EU countries in 2000, 36,436 in 2001, 40,321 in 2002, 47,551 in 2003, and 34,067 in 2004. When the EU enlarged in 2004, the Irish state decided to permit migrants from the ten new Eastern European member states to live and work in Ireland without visas. All other pre-2004 EU states except Sweden and the United Kingdom delayed doing so for several years. This accelerated the pace of immigration. Between 1 May 2004 and 30 April 2005 some 85,114 workers from the new EU-10 were issued with National Insurance numbers entitling them to work in Ireland. This amounted to more than ten times the number of new work permits admitted to migrants from those countries in the preceding 12 months (National Economic and Social Council 2005: 26). By 2005 Ireland’s proportion of 10.4 foreign-born (as estimated by the OECD; see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2007) exceeded that of the United Kingdom (8.3 per cent), and was a similar proportion to countries with a longer history of immigration. By 2005 this included an estimated 75,000 migrants from China admitted on student visas as part of a policy by the Irish state to pursue economic links with China. In effect, Ireland became more open to migration from mainland China than Taiwan, even though under the Taiwanese constitution mainlanders have a right to citizenship. The 2006 Irish census identified 610,000 (14.7 per cent) of the population of 4,239,848 persons to have been born outside the state.1 Taiwan in 2006 had a smaller foreign-born population even though its overall population was four times greater than that of Ireland.

A 2006 National Economic and Social Council (NESC) report, Managing Migration: A Social and Economic Analysis, strongly advocated large-scale and on-going immigration as a means of sustaining economic growth (2006: xxi). The foreword of the report stated that ‘immigration did not create the Irish economic miracle but, properly managed, migration can sustain Ireland’s economic growth and generate many other benefits’ (2006: xxi). The report argued that from the 1960s and 1970s government policies concerning trade liberalization and foreign direct investment began to improve the domestic economic situation and hence, eventually, reversed the net loss of population due to migration. Weak economic performance during the 1980s was accompanied by a net outflow of migrants, a trend that was reversed in the mid- to late-1990s. Economic growth during the 1990s saw the rapid expansion of the labour force from about 1.4 million in 1994 to just over 2 million in 2005. This increased labour demand was met initially by Irish nationals who had been previously unemployed or outside the labour market and then by returning Irish migrants, whose proportion in relation to in-migration by non-Irish migrants became smaller; by 2004 Irish returnees constituted less than 25 per cent of the total number of immigrants. Managing Migration claimed that on-going immigration was likely to make the Irish economy more adaptive and boost economic competitiveness (2006: 93).

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1 See the Central Statistics Office Ireland: www.cso.ie.
In 2007 the Office of the Minister of State for Integration Policy published its first major report, *Migration Nation: Statement on Integration Strategy and Diversity Management*. This stated that recent immigration was the result of the developmental ‘opening to the world’ institutionalized as a political project during the 1960s. Other key reports have emphasized education, welfare, and labour market policies aimed at promoting social conditions that would nurture and sustain individual adaptability, flexibility, and risk-taking; a ‘sustainable balance between dynamism and security’ (National Economic and Social Council 2005: 36). In this context, it was unsurprising that subsequent major statements about immigration and integration policy examined here have de-emphasized ethnocultural rules of belonging.

In summary, state-fostered recruitment of migrant workers in both Taiwan and Ireland occurred when the labour needs of both respective expanding economies could no longer be met domestically by the entrance of women into the labour market. From the 1960s in both countries female participation rose significantly, although high percentages of married women remain outside the labour market. Both countries also encouraged the recruitment of high-skilled co-ethnics. Taiwan was restricted in doing so due to its problematic relationship with mainland China. Ireland, by contrast, overtly encouraged co-ethnic migration. This included descendants of Irish emigrants to the United States, Britain, and Australia. Once the available supply of skilled migrants declined the move towards actively encouraging non-Irish migrants was seamless. Irish labour migration policy in many respects reflected its economic openness to globalization.

**Ethnic Politics, Citizenship, and the Regulation of Immigration**

Ireland is considerably more open to immigration than is the case with Taiwan. It operates no visa or residency restrictions for citizens of EU states. In effect a country of about 4 million people has opened its borders to a population 100 times this size. It has also effectively opened its borders to over 70 million people of Irish ancestry who are entitled to claim Irish citizenship under *jus sanguine* criteria. In Ireland much of the debate on the regulation of immigration has related to non-EU migrants, where the state continues to have latitude. Taiwan, because of its problematic relationship with mainland China, at once entitles mainlanders to Taiwanese citizenship yet effectively restricts their access to this and to work visas. The 1992 Employment Act made a clear distinction between *guonin*, a term that translates as ‘nationals’ or ‘citizens’, and *waiguoren* or ‘aliens’.

In 1992 Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council proclaimed that nationals of mainland China were also nationals of the Republic of China and that they had permission to enter Taiwan to live and work, but the edict also contained a caveat that because of ‘population pressure, national security and social stability, it is necessary to impose certain limitations’ (Mainland Affairs Council 1992, cited by L. Cheng 2002: 9). Entitlements to citizenship in Taiwan were on the basis of descent and ancestry, and whilst the key basis for solidarity was ethnic there were limits to this solidarity. As explained by Lucie Cheng:

> The principle of descent and ancestry gave the Taiwan state a rationale for claiming special affinity with Chinese in the diaspora, but political and economic
considerations operate to differentiate among them. While mainland Chinese are excluded, overseas Chinese, especially who are highly trained or from whom Taiwan can benefit, are given preferential treatment in law and in practice. The fact that the Nationality Law specifically allows some highly skilled occupational positions to be held by Chinese with dual citizenship, while excluding other positions, is a clear example.

(L. Cheng 2002: 92)

The Constitution of the ROC defines mainland Chinese as compatriots rather than foreigners – a colloquial term for ‘foreign workers’, wailao, distinguishes these from benlao, meaning ‘local labour’. According to Cheng, wailou are presumed to be temporary migrants and to some extent mainland Chinese are treated as such, exempt from some of the restrictions applied to wailou, but not to others. The specific concern that distinguishes their treatment from that given to other members of the Chinese diaspora is anxiety within the state about being overrun by mainland China (L. Cheng 2002: 93).

Under Article 67 of the Employment Services Act (1992), Chinese persons (Zhongguoreu) resident in the state who hold foreign nationality are regarded as guonin irrespective of what other nationality they possess. Yet Article 68 stipulates that the hiring and regulating of ‘people of the mainland region’ must adhere to criteria affecting foreign workers. This ambivalence towards mainland co-ethnics reflects sovereignty conflicts between the ROC and the PRC (L. Cheng 2002: 93).

In Taiwan, when the Act was introduced to regulate immigration, there were 44,441 foreign residents living in the country. By 2009 some 403,700 foreign residents lived in Taiwan, constituting just 1.75 per cent of the then-estimated population of 23,063,027. The restrictions on foreign workers in Taiwan imposed by the 1992 Act were strict by international standards. In common with many other countries, work permits were generally temporary (restricted to three years) and more restrictive conditions applied to unskilled workers than to professionals and high-skilled foreign workers. Employers in designated industries, including domestic employers, were required to apply for a quota permit before they could hire a foreign worker. Under the 1992 Act employers had to demonstrate that posts could not be filled by Taiwanese workers and non-transferable work permits were granted to the employers rather than to the migrants themselves; similar measures applied in the Irish case. In both cases, this fostered exploitation of migrants by employers. Specifically, such restrictions undermined the rights of migrants under employment legislation. Cheng, for example, described how employment standards mandated by the Council on Labor Affairs have not applied to migrant workers:

...The Council clearly violated this position by prohibiting foreign workers from organizing unions or going on strike, rights that are accorded to local labor. According to law, foreign workers should be paid the same wages as locals, work the same hours, enjoy the same numbers of days off, and have the same mobility. But in actuality none of the above obtain. Such inconsistencies abound but are almost never challenged, partly due to the underdevelopment of administrative law and partly to the way the legal profession is structured.

(L. Cheng 2002: 101–102)
In the Irish case, migrant workers faced similar barriers as a result of state neglect, although from poor enforcement of employment standards rather than from having lesser rights under employment law. The end result is the same. Both countries have Filipino migrant populations who have experienced quite similar forms of exploitation, especially in domestic work. In both cases this pattern of exploitation is influenced by trans-national factors, as well as by the acts or omissions of host societies (S.-J. Cheng 2003; Nititham 2011).

In Taiwan, the criteria for admitting foreign workers under the 1992 Act were broadly similar to those imposed on non-EU emigrants by Irish legislation, yet somewhat more stringent when it came to preventing entry by family members (L. Cheng 2002: 93). Under the 1992 Act migrants were required to have regular physical examinations, including pregnancy tests, with pregnancy deemed grounds for deportation (until 2003 according to Lee 2009: 338). Migrant workers were prohibited from bringing their spouses to Taiwan or getting married, all measures designed to prevent permanent settlement (L. Cheng 2002: 98). These restrictions account for the very low numbers of migrant children living in Taiwan. Some of these restrictions have been removed or ameliorated over time.

Hsiao-Chuan Hsia locates such restrictions on immigrant families and state antipathy towards immigrant children within a discourse of national anxiety about immigration. In particular, popular anxiety about ‘foreign brides’ has been highlighted as a pivotal issue in immigration debates. In a 2003 *The Earth Geographic Monthly* survey, 60 per cent of respondents believed that the number of foreign brides, whether from Southeast Asia or from mainland China, should be restricted. A sociological study reported beliefs amongst officials and journalists that such marriages would cause the quality of the Taiwanese population to deteriorate (cited in Hsia 2007: 75). This emphasized a mixture of essentialist chauvinism – a general antipathy towards immigration shared with other Asian countries like Korea and Japan (Skrentny, Chan, Fox, and Kim 2007: 797–802) – with entrenched beliefs amongst policy makers (contradicted nevertheless by research) that ‘foreign brides’ were predominantly from lower socio-economic groups and that their children would lag behind Taiwanese children in schools. A statement in 2004 by the Junior Minister of Education exhorting foreign brides ‘not to give too many births’ exemplified a wider moral panic (Hsai 2007: 77).

Prior to the 2000 Nationality Act there was no specific provision for naturalization except through marriage. The 2000 Act sets out conditions for naturalization. These include five years of continuous residence in the ROC, having no criminal record, and the possession of a certain amount of property or professional skills. Lucie Cheng has argued that this Act, taken together with the 1992 Employment Services Act, enforces a very strong conception of *jus sanguine* dominated by the notion that ‘blood is a very special juice’:

When we juxtapose the Nationality Act with the Employment Services Act we find that it is impossible for a designated foreign worker to acquire ROC nationality, since she is prohibited from marrying or residing in Taiwan for more than three years! As the Chinese adage goes: ‘For every policy issued by the state there is a way to circumscribe it by the people.’ A foreign worker who intends to marry a Chinese national will leave Taiwan according to the legal requirement and return as his
spouse. Quite a large proportion of so-called ‘foreign brides’ are a result of this arrangement.

(L. Cheng 2002: 103)

According to Article 3 of the 2000 Nationality Act, long-term migrants (those resident for more than 183 days each year for more than five years) can apply for citizenship. However, the Act appears to be administered in concert with visa requirements for migrant labour so that many migrants do not become eligible to apply for citizenship. The Law also allows spouses of Taiwanese citizens to naturalize after three years. In 1990, two thirds of foreigners naturalized as Taiwanese citizens were women. By 2007 this rose to 99 per cent (Lee 2009: 346). Most of these were naturalized as spouses of Taiwanese citizens. In 2007 some 10,764 persons were naturalized, of whom 10,670 were female. The intention to prevent foreign workers becoming citizens of the ROC was explicitly stated in the 2002 revision of the Employment Services Act. Article 52 extended the length of permissible employment from three to six years. However, to guard against foreign workers applying for naturalization on the grounds that they had met the residence requirements stipulated in the Nationality Act, the revised Employment Services Act mandated a 40-day break in residence after the first three days of employment (L. Cheng 2002: 103). The defining political response to immigration in the Republic of Ireland has been the 2004 Referendum on citizenship. In 2004 more than eighty per cent of the Irish citizens who voted in the Referendum endorsed an amendment to the constitution that removed the birthright to Irish citizenship of the children of immigrants. This removed the jus soli citizenship criteria that had never previously been problematic, because Ireland historically had rather experienced emigration. The new settlement retained jus sanguine provisions which permitted the descendants of Irish emigrants to claim Irish citizenship. Specifically, the Referendum was directed against asylum seekers, who were not entitled to work, rather than migrant workers and their families (Fanning and Muwarasibo 2007). The contemporaneous government decision in 2004 to engineer rapid large-scale immigration from within the EU barely caused a political ripple. This suggests a distinction between immigration and naturalization debates in the Irish case, with stronger opposition amongst existing citizens to the latter than to the former. The main political party in government ran a campaign in 2004 using the slogan ‘Commonsense Citizenship’. However, the crucial cognitive distinction in the debate leading up to the referendum, made repeatedly by government officials, politicians, and the media was a distinction between ‘nationals’ and ‘non-nationals’. Immigrants were generally referred to as ‘non-nationals’.

The term ‘non-national’ derived from the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act (2001) that superseded the Aliens Act (1935). This systematically replaced the term ‘alien’ in Irish legislation, and was used by the Department of Justice Equality and Law Reform in security debates – in reports about crime, human trafficking, and illegal immigration – and by the Department of Enterprise and Employment to describe immigrant workers. By 2004 the ‘national/non-national’ dualism had become the prevalent common-sense conceptual framework for political and media debates about immigration. Various opinion surveys on immigration have reported a similarly large majority of citizens supportive of ethnic chauvinism. All Irish political parties contain significant numbers of supporters who endorse strict
limits on the numbers of immigrants coming to Ireland. The findings of the Irish National Election Study (INES) 2002–2007 indicate that some 62.4 per cent of respondents in 2002 (falling to 58.8 per cent in 2007) agreed or strongly agreed that there should be ‘strict limits’ on immigration (Marsh and Sinnott 2009: 137). To a considerable extent, Ireland’s strongly pro-immigration settlement has been managed by elites, whether in politics, social partnership, or business. Irish immigration policy is consistent with the country’s wider neo-liberal openness to globalization. During 2010, in the midst of an economic recession precipitated by an international banking crisis and economic mismanagement by the Irish state, both GNP and GDP levels fell into decline. Emigration reached its highest levels since the 1980s (second quarter of 2010). Yet non-Irish nationals accounted for 12.4 per cent of the workforce (and 46,000 of these were unemployed; see Economic and Social Research Institute 2010).

Discussion and Analysis

This article has examined how intersections of cultural and economic nation-building goals might account for the respective immigration policies of Ireland and Taiwan. Simply put, a different balance of cultural and economic preoccupations seems to have informed the modernizing projects of the Irish and Taiwanese states. In Ireland, economic development became foregrounded when a post-colonial cultural nation-building project had become exhausted. In Ireland, this seems to have contributed to a seamless acceptance of large-scale immigration during the ‘Celtic Tiger’ boom years. Ireland’s political acceptance of large-scale immigration was in keeping with other aspects of Irish open economy developmentalism. One sociological reading of the Irish case might be that cultural rules of belonging have come to matter less than human capital, or, put otherwise, that neo-liberalism has crowded out nationalism (Fanning 2010). Comparisons with the Taiwanese case, where opposition to immigration is strong and where cultural nation-building goals co-exist with economic ones, seem to bear out this analysis (see Figure 1 overleaf).

Taiwanese responses to immigration are dominated, according to Chen, by a ‘monocultural nationalist hegemony’ that, if anything, has deepened in the post-Kuomintang era:

In many regards the DPP has extended the KMT’s cultural nationalist mindset and policies to new heights, evidenced partly by the first revision of the Immigration and Nationality Act in seventy years, with its slow phasing out of dual nationality, bringing in new containment policies regarding foreign labour and more ‘liberal’ policy towards permanent residence, which now enables non-ethnic Chinese to live long-term in Taiwan but only as a permanently invisible caste, like Japan’s Koreans… People seem to have only recently discovered the advent of foreign labour, e.g. Filipino maids and Thai construction workers, despite their long presence. Even at Academia Sinica, when colleagues talk about the massive influx of foreign researchers (mostly South Asian and East European post-docs), they are not referring to their ethnic Chinese research fellows (a quarter of whom probably have US green cards or passports).

(Chen 2007: 80)
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<td>A post-independence cultural nation-building period coincides with economic protectionism and high emigration. After 1958 the state plays a key role in shifting towards a new phase of developmental nation building. Developmental nation-building coincides with constitutional claims on Northern Ireland. However, Ireland becomes anti-isolationist, abandoning protectionism in 1964, joining the EEC in 1973. Notwithstanding a political focus on the Northern Ireland conflict (1969–1994), Irish-Ireland cultural nationalism declines in influence. Emigration persists from much of this period particularly during the 1950s and 1980s. Economic nation-building coordinated by the state and legitimized through corporatist politics. Ireland becomes a flexible developmental state with a strategic focus on encouraging unrestricted MNC capital investment (incentives include low corporation tax and tariff-free access to European Community markets) and availability of Irish human capital. Economic nation-building directed by the state within a Bureaucratic Development State/ Authoritarian capitalist model. The state retains the power to direct economic development. It fosters inward capital investment but prioritizes Taiwanese ownership of capital. Cultural nation-building coincided with economic nation-building in the post 1947 period. An authoritarian state plays a strong command role in both cultural and economic nation-building. Economic expansion occurs in a context of problematic relationships between the Republic of Taiwan (ROC) and the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC). It coincides with decolonization, yet Japan becomes a key inward investor. Taiwanese development emphasizes indigenous control of capital investment and bottom-up growth of industrial capacity. Taiwan categorized as a Bureaucratic Development State. Economic nation-building unhampered by cultural nation-building goals. National interest predominantly defined in terms of GNP. Although martial law is abandoned and multi-party democracy emerges, cultural nation-building persists as a political priority under the DPP. Celtic Tiger fed by on-going expansion of labour market to include women, return Irish migrants and, from 2000, new immigrants. Taiwanese economic expansion produces labour shortages leading to expansion of labour market to include women, return Taiwanese migrants, and new immigrants.</td>
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Figure 1: Cultural, Developmental and Immigration Nation-Building Trajectories in Ireland and Taiwan (continues on next page)
In both Taiwan and Ireland academic debates about immigration seem to have focused to a considerable extent on dominant ethnic group narratives of diaspora and return migration. Wider cultural and economic nation-building narratives present national stories that in each case have yet to come to terms with new immigrants. A combination of domestic economic prosperity and new patterns of global migration have in both countries resulted in immigration by co-ethnics and by new immigrants. In both countries, new immigrants have been at once invisible within nation-state identity politics and narratives of belonging, yet the subject of state regulation. When Irish or Taiwanese scholars write about immigration it is often difficult for them to break free of dominant nation-building narratives that find no place for outsider ‘non-nationals’ or ‘waiguorem’. In both countries there has been considerable debate about relationships with co-ethnics – Han Chinese in the case of Taiwan and descendants of emigrants in the Irish case – but there seems to have been scant discussion about how new immigrants fit into either nation.

For example, a 2006 academic study of second-generation migrants from mainland China drew analogies with post-1960s migrations from Castro’s Cuba to the United States and with migrations of asylum seekers into Fortress Europe from the 1990s (Tsay 2006: 751). The thesis of the article, that the descendants of post-1947 migrants shared characteristics with refugee migrants in other countries, is curious, not least because migrants from mainland China dominated Taiwan. Generally, refugees do not manage to politically dominate a host state or arrive with a large standing army. How such second-generation migrants have fared is obviously of immense interest to Taiwanese policy debates. Yet obvious comparisons (from a non-Taiwanese perspective) with new immigrants in Taiwan

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<td>Irish state proactively recruits skilled emigrant Irish from abroad and explicitly encourages immigration from Irish diaspora (those with Irish ancestry entitled to Irish citizenship). Low-skilled co-ethnics not encouraged to migrate to Ireland.</td>
<td>Policy of ethnic preference for high-skilled overseas Taiwanese and Chinese migrants. Taiwan state proactively recruits skilled emigrants, opposes immigration by low-skilled Chinese entitled to Taiwanese citizenship. Low-skilled co-ethnics prevented from migrating to Taiwan.</td>
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Figure 1 (continued)
who, like Cubans in America or refugees in Europe, are not co-ethnics of the host population are not discussed. A non-Taiwanese reader such as this author might wonder why, until informed that the numbers of second-generation new immigrants (children of foreigners born in Taiwan) are very low because of strict labour migration rules.

Ireland by contrast already has a large rising second-generation immigrant population. It placed some restrictions on family immigration by non-EU migrants, but has otherwise not sought to prevent immigrant family formation. The defining response of the Irish state to immigrant children was to remove the citizenship birthright from these in 2004. Although overt essentialist nationalism has declined in the post-‘Irish Ireland’ developmental era, some vestiges of cultural chauvinism have continued to be politically influential. For example, the Belfast Agreement in 1998 stated that ‘the Irish nation cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage.’ New immigrants and their children to a considerable extent remain invisible within social policy debates that tend to focus on the social inclusion of citizens. In the Irish case there remains a disjuncture between economic rules of belonging and those pertaining to naturalization and citizenship. Ireland’s inclusive response to its diaspora and its ambivalence to the integration of new immigrants through naturalization suggest that essentialist ethnic conceptions of Irishness continue to have considerable salience. Yet, in Ireland as in Taiwan the response of the state to co-ethnics abroad has often been ambivalent. The Irish state actively recruited high-skilled Irish living abroad and high-skilled descendants of emigrants, but it also prioritized the recruitment of high-skilled migrants from other countries. Prior to the 1990s economic boom, and now once again, the Irish state has presided over high levels of emigration in the national interest.

Writing in 2002, Lucie Cheng argued that Taiwan ‘as a state-in-formation in need of outside labour, must re-evaluate its state-building ideology’. There were, she argued, two possible routes, both calling for new modes of incorporation. Taiwan could either privilege foreign labour over mainland Chinese and change its descent-centred exclusionist policy, or privilege ethnic Chinese and relax its political vigilance towards PRC residents. What seems to have happened is the persistence of vigilance towards both. Irish debates have not presented such either/or options. During the Celtic Tiger era, the diaspora proved incapable of meeting Irish labour shortages, and while symbolic expressions of solidarity with the Global Irish play well within Irish debates the dominance of developmental over cultural nation-building goals resulted in large-scale immigration from both within the EU common travel area and from non-EU countries such as China.

Comparative analysis of Taiwan and Ireland has much to contribute to self-understanding as well as to mutual understanding, particularly in the domains of sociology and political economy. In the Irish case the dominant academic literature sets up conflicts between cultural and economic nation-building, the dominant perception being that hegemonic post-colonial cultural nationalism held the country back. Cultural and economic modernization co-existed to a greater extent in the Taiwanese case, suggesting that this need not have been the case in Ireland. The kind of economic nationalism attempted by the Irish during the 1930s – since represented by Irish historians as reckless, but perhaps now worthy of reappraisal as an attempt to achieve economic sovereignty – proved successful in Taiwan. At
a time when Irish sovereignty appears to have been seriously undermined by the
global economic crisis, Ireland could learn useful lessons from the Taiwanese
approach to globalization.

Bibliography


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