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Authors(s)	Fidrmuc, Jan, Doyle, Orla
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***Voice of the Diaspora: An Analysis
of Migrant Voting Behavior***

By: Jan Fidrmuc and Orla Doyle

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Voice of the Diaspora: An Analysis of Migrant Voting Behavior[▽]

Jan Fidrmuc* and Orla Doyle**

July 2004

Abstract

This paper utilizes a unique dataset on votes cast by Czech and Polish migrants in their recent national elections to investigate the impact of institutional, political and economic characteristics on migrants' voting behavior. The political preferences of migrants are strikingly different from those of their domestic counterparts. In addition, there are also important differences among migrants living in different countries. This paper examines three alternative hypotheses to explain migrant voting behavior: adaptive learning; economic self-selection and political self-selection. The results of the analysis suggest that migrant voting behavior is affected by the institutional environment of the host countries, in particular the tradition of democracy and the extent of economic freedom. In contrast, there is little evidence that differences in migrants' political attitudes are caused by self-selection based either on economic motives or political attitudes prior to migrating. These results are interpreted as indicating that migrants' political preferences change in the wake of migration as they adapt to the norms and values prevailing in their surroundings.

Keywords: Voting, elections, migration, political resocialization, transition.

JEL Codes: J61, P26, P33, Z13.

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* ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles; ZEI, University of Bonn; CEPR, London; and WDI, University of Michigan. Address: ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 50 Avenue F.D. Roosevelt, CP 114, 1050 Brussels, Belgium. Email: JFidrmuc@ulb.ac.be. Phone: +32-2-650-4462, Fax: +32-2-650-3369.

** Department of Economics and IIIS, Trinity College Dublin; and CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University. Address: Department of Economics, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland. Email: odoyle@tcd.ie.

1. Introduction

Social and political assimilation of immigrants is of great interest to political scientists and economists alike. Lack of assimilation may engender a segmented and possibly polarized society, with immigrant communities espousing political, cultural and religious values that may be very different from those prevailing in the host country.¹ Political assimilation, or the lack thereof, may also have an important impact on the migrants' country of origin, especially for countries with large diaspora communities. For example, migrant communities of Moslems in Europe, which largely succeeded in retaining their religious norms and political attitudes, are sometimes seen as providing refuge and breeding grounds for Moslem extremism. This, in turn, undermines the stability of their ancestral countries.² On the other hand, returning immigrants from Western democracies to Central and Eastern Europe played a crucial role in facilitating the post-communist countries' transition from communism to democracy and overcoming the Soviet legacy, in regards politics, the economy, education and cultural life.³ Hence, both the actual presence of the diaspora and the political attitudes which they espouse can have important bearings on political developments in the ancestral countries.

The existing literature has identified a number of channels through which the experience of migrating and living in a foreign country affects the migrants' economic and social outcomes. Firstly, migrants build up their human capital stock by acquiring new languages and productive skills, participating in formal education in the host country, and becoming acquainted with new

¹ Huntington (2004) presents a particularly gloomy and controversial assessment of the dangers posed by the growing Hispanic community in the US and their lack of assimilation.

² This is especially the case in moderately democratic and/or secular countries such as Turkey, Morocco or Algeria.

³ This was particularly pronounced in, though not limited to, the Baltic countries: the current presidents of Latvia and Lithuania, Vaira Vike-Freiberga and Valdas Adamkus, respectively, are both former political refugees who spent most of their adult lives in emigration and only returned after the Baltic countries seceded from the Soviet Union. A naturalized US citizen, Muhamed Sacirbey, played an important role in building support for Bosnia's independence during his term as Bosnia's ambassador to the UN in early 1990s. In 2000, the then Czech president Václav Havel designated Madeleine Albright (who was born in Czechoslovakia as Marie Korbelová) as his preferred successor (though the invitation was eventually declined). A somewhat unconventional example of a returning émigré is the current prime minister of Bulgaria – the former king Simeon II. In a celebrated example, the economic reforms in Chile under Pinochet were conceived and carried out by the “Chicago Boys”: a group of Chicago-educated economists. Argentinean reform effort of early 1990s, similarly, was lead by US-educated economists: Domingo Cavallo (Harvard) and Roque Fernandez (Chicago). Finally, the diaspora played an important role in the recreation and defense of Israeli statehood: a notable example is that of Golda Meir, prime minister during the 1967 war, who was a naturalized American citizen.

social and cultural norms.⁴ Secondly, migrants typically accumulate savings, thus building up their stock of physical capital, which can then be used to aid self-employment in the destination country or to set up businesses, either themselves or through relatives left behind in the country of origin.⁵ Finally, migrants also acquire social capital through contacts with the indigenous population, in addition to becoming part of a migrant network in the destination country.⁶

This paper considers another potentially important implication of migration that has to date been largely unexplored: the impact of migration on the migrants' political opinions and, especially, their voting behavior. Migration often entails moving between two different political systems with diverse political standards, norms and traditions, and occasionally, different economic systems. Through exposure to local news, culture, formal schooling or through contacts with co-workers, neighbors and friends, migrants are confronted with fundamental norms and values that may be different from, or are even in outright conflict with, those prevailing in their home countries. Important examples of such differences include attitudes towards democracy and a market-oriented economic system, religious tolerance and secularism, and political attitudes in general. The paper at hand studies whether such exposure through migration induces migrants to adopt the norms and values prevailing in their destination country. To this end, we utilize an original data source which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been previously used in studies of voting or migration: votes cast by citizens living abroad who participate in their home country's elections.

In addition to introducing the political dimension into the study of migration and its implications, this paper also sheds new light on one of the most widely raised questions within the voting literature: how do voters formulate their political opinions and attitudes? The political socialization literature disagrees as to whether one's political preferences are largely determined in young age by family environment and upbringing, or whether they are continuously shaped and updated by changes in one's socio-economic characteristics and/or the social, political and institutional environment. Typically, empirical analyses of voting behavior, particularly in established democracies, take the external environment as given and stable over time – as typically it changes at a very slow rate. Even in countries undergoing radical political and

⁴ Friedberg (2000), Chiswick and Miller (2004) and Hartog and Winkelmann (2004) analyze migrants' labor-market return to skills brought from the home country and adopted in the host country.

⁵ See Stark (1991) Chapters 26-28, and Lofstrom (2004).

⁶ Rauch and Trindade (2002) find that ethnic Chinese networks increase bilateral trade flows among South-east Asian countries by as much as 60%.

economic transformations (such as the Central and East European countries), all voters are exposed to essentially the same process of change. It is therefore difficult to determine the extent to which one's external environment, and changes therein, influence voting decisions. This restriction, however, does not apply to migrants who are often subject to dramatic changes in their external environment. Furthermore, migrants living in different countries become exposed to different economic, political and social norms and values. The data used in this paper, therefore, are akin to a natural experiment, whereby we observe votes cast by migrants from the same country of origin who, at the time of the election in their home country, live in a broad variety of host countries. By relating the migrants' voting behavior to the economic, political and institutional characteristics of the destination countries, we can make inferences about the nature of interactions between these characteristics and voters' political preferences. For example, will the institutional setting of Canada or Ireland exert the same type of cues as that in Russia or Iran? The analysis is based on the most recent parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic (2002) and Poland (2001). These countries are particularly suited for this kind of analysis as they are currently undergoing transition from communism to democracy and from central planning to a market economy, which involves dramatic political, economic and institutional changes. Therefore, Czechs and Poles are already likely to be amenable to change, and, additionally, the changes they experience in the wake of migration are often substantial (certainly more so than the changes experienced by a migrant from a developed country moving to another developed country).

While the numbers of migrant voters are by no means small, their potential impact on political developments in their home countries is modest at best. The 3,742 Czechs and 26,211 Poles who voted abroad (in 85 and 90 countries, respectively) accounted for only 0.08% and 0.20% of the total number of votes in their respective countries. Yet, the most striking characteristic of these results from abroad is that they differ dramatically both from the political preferences at home, and they vary across the countries and regions where Czech and Polish migrants live. In both countries, the national elections resulted in victories by left wing parties, whereas the Czechs and Poles living abroad overwhelmingly voted for right wing (and in case of Poland also religious conservative) parties. Yet, this difference is driven mainly by votes received from migrants in Western Europe, North America and Australia. In contrast, the preferences of Czechs and Poles

in the former communist countries, the Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and, to a lesser extent Asia, do not differ overtly from those of the electorate at large.

This paper considers three alternative explanations for these differences. First, migrants may be subject to a selection bias (either due to self-selection or because of the destination countries' immigration policies) whereby those characteristics that determine which country they emigrate to are correlated with their political preferences or their economic characteristics. Alternatively, through living in a foreign country, migrants' political attitudes and preferences are shaped by the institutional, political and economic environment and the cultural norms prevailing in that country. To assess the relative importance of these explanations, the shares of votes cast by migrant voters for each home political party are related to variables reflecting the host countries' level of economic development, recent economic performance, political institutions (such as the level of political and economic freedom and the nature of the political system in place) and social characteristics.

The following section compares the voting behavior of Czechs and Poles who voted in their home countries and those who voted from abroad, and describes the data used in the analysis. Section 3 outlines the main theoretical explanations of voting behavior developed in the literature, and relates them to theories of migration. Section 4 describes the methodology employed and Section 5 presents the results of the analysis. The final section then summarizes the main findings.

2. Migrants' Voting Behavior

The legal framework regulating voting by nationals living abroad is similar in both the Czech Republic and Poland. Both countries require advance registration and only allow voting in person; hence, voting by postal ballot or by proxy is not possible. Those who permanently live abroad must register with the embassy or consulate in the country of their permanent residence. Those with permanent residence in the home country, on the other hand, can vote when abroad upon presenting a voter's card issued by the municipal council in their district of permanent residence.⁷ The Czech Republic only allows voting at embassies and consulates. Poland, in contrast, also established a number of polling stations in Polish clubs and émigré associations in countries with large emigrant populations (for instance, there were eight polling stations in

⁷ We have no information on the number of votes cast by permanent residents in the host countries and short-term visitors; hence we cannot distinguish between migrants and tourists.

Chicago and four in New York City) and also within a few large overseas installations of Polish firms (including, for example, the Polish permanent research station in Antarctica).

Poland was generally more successful than the Czech Republic in persuading its citizens abroad to vote, with voters' abroad accounting for 0.08% of the electorate in the Czech Republic and 0.20% in Poland. While this may simply reflect the fact that Poles are more inclined to leave their country, it is undoubtedly also due to the greater density of Polish polling stations (both because Poland, as a larger country, tends to have multiple consulates in larger countries and because voting was also possible at additional polling stations outside of embassies or consulates). In addition, Poland adopts a more liberal attitude to dual nationality than the Czech Republic, such that Poles who live permanently abroad and have acquired the host country's nationality are often able to remain Polish citizens.

Overall, 3,742 Czechs and 26,211 Poles cast their votes in 85 and 90 different countries, respectively. Tables 1 and 2 report the main election results for both countries. The country with the largest number of Czech voters is Slovakia with 374 votes (not surprisingly given the common history) followed by the US (285), France (260), Italy (200) and Germany (196). The country with the largest number of Polish votes is the US with 7,061 votes, followed by Germany (2,872), Canada (1,641) and France (1,406). Quite surprisingly, relatively few votes were received from other former socialist countries. Russia, for example, only accounts for 96 Czech and 606 Polish votes, while 410 Polish votes were received from the Czech Republic and 70 Czechs voted in Poland.

2.1 Czech Migrant Voting Behavior

Table 1 shows the percentages of votes received by the five main political parties in the Czech Republic from both home voters and from those living abroad. The most striking difference between the two sets of results is in the support for the *Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia* (KSCM), which received 18.55% of the vote in the Czech Republic and only 2.75% from Czech citizens living abroad. The 2002 election saw the KSCM receive its largest share of the vote in the post-communist period to date (a gain of 7 percentage points since the 1998 election), with the majority of its support being derived from mainly rural areas: southern and eastern Moravia in particular. While support for the KSCM is far lower among migrant voters than among the Czech electorate at large, there is considerable variation across the various

migrants' host countries. The communists fared relatively well in the countries of the former Soviet Union where they polled 7.37%, closely followed by 6.90% in Central and East European countries and 3.17% in the Middle East and North Africa. In contrast, they did poorly in Asia and North America, receiving only 0.53% and 0.54% of the vote, respectively.

Table 1 Czech Election Results 2002

Political Parties	CSSD %	KSCM %	ODS %	Coalition %	ODA %	Others %	No. of Votes
Overall Results¹	30.12	18.55	24.51	14.28	0.51	12.04	4,757,884
Results from Abroad	25.33	2.75	27.71	33.99	1.71	8.50	3,742
Former Soviet Union	37.79	7.37	25.35	17.51	2.30	9.68	217
Central and East European	30.28	6.90	28.03	25.35	0.99	8.45	710
Western Europe	20.72	1.20	26.95	42.07	1.32	7.75	1,588
Asia	19.25	0.53	39.57	24.60	2.67	13.37	187
North Africa and Middle-East	44.96	3.17	24.78	15.85	1.15	10.09	347
Sub-Sahara Africa	17.89	1.05	35.79	32.63	5.26	7.37	95
Australia	8.47	1.69	27.12	54.24	1.69	6.78	59
Central and South America	32.74	1.79	23.81	27.98	3.57	10.12	168
Northern America	14.29	0.54	28.30	47.17	2.70	7.01	371

Notes: The party acronyms stand for Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), Civic Democratic Party (ODS), Coalition of Christian Democratic Union-Peoples Party of Czechoslovakia, Union of Freedom and Democratic Union (Coalition), and Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA).

¹ Includes votes from abroad.

Source: Czech Statistical Office.

The domestic and migrant votes for the center-left incumbents, the *Czech Social Democratic Party* (CSSD), do not display as much contrast as those for the KSCM, receiving 30.12% of the overall vote and 25.33% of the migrant vote. The CSSD won the 2002 election, however, they did lose 2 percentage points and four seats compared to the 1998 election. Similarly to the KSCM, the majority of their support comes from rural areas. Again, there is considerable variation in support for the CSSD within the votes cast abroad, ranging from 8.47% in Australia to 44.96% in North African and Middle Eastern countries. They also derived a large portion of votes from other post-communist countries (37.79% in FSU and 30.28% in CEE) and Central and South American countries (32.74%).

The right-wing *Civic Democratic Party* (ODS) stands out in that its overall vote share and its support among migrant voters are remarkably close. The ODS received 24.51% of the overall

vote (down 4 percentage points since 1998 election) and 27.71% of the migrant votes. Overall the ODS gained more support from voters in urban areas of the Czech Republic, such as Prague, Brno, Plzen and Ostrava, than rural areas. Among migrants, the ODS fared poorly in Central and South America (23.81%), North Africa and the Middle East (24.78%) and the former Soviet Union (25.35). In contrast, it did well in Sub-Saharan Africa (35.79%) and in Asia (39.57%).

While support abroad for the two main political parties in the Czech Republic (CSSD and ODS) did not display much deviation from the overall votes, support from migrant voters for the *Coalition* party significantly deviates from its support at home. The Coalition was formed in February 2000 and originally consisted of the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL), Democratic Union (DEU), Freedom Union (US) and Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA). However, the "Quad Coalition" collapsed in 2001 and only US-DEU (which merged into a single party) and KDU-CSL remained. While the Coalition party was at one point the most popular party formation in the Czech Republic according to opinion polls, they eventually only succeeded in winning 14.28% of the overall vote in the Czech Republic. Yet they managed to garner a surprising 33.99% of the migrant votes, and hence effectively "won" the election in terms of the abroad votes. The considerable difference in support for the Coalition party between Czech's abroad and the domestic electorate is one of the most interesting aspects of this analysis. Support for the Coalition party reaches a high of 54.24% in Australia and a low of 17.51% in the FSU countries. The Coalition is the most popular party among voters living in Europe (42.07%), Northern America (47.17%) and Australia.

The *Civic Democratic Alliance* (ODA) was an offspring of the original Civic Forum (along with the ODS), and maintained above threshold (5%) support in earlier elections. It then voluntarily withdrew from the 1998 election in the wake of a scandal about murky fund-raising and allegations of corruption. In the run-up to the 2002 election, the ODA was eventually barred by the other three parties from participating in the Quad Coalition after it failed to credibly document that its finances were 'clean'. As Table 1 shows, it only gained 0.51% of the overall vote and 1.71% of the abroad vote.

Finally, the penultimate column shows the percentage of votes received by various small parties that did not pass the 5% threshold for representation. Within the Czech Republic, 12.04% of the overall vote went to such small parties, while only 8.50% of votes from abroad went to smaller parties. This suggests that Czech migrants were more decisive in their voting decisions and only

cast votes for parties which had a high probability of entering parliament. There are two potential reasons for this, firstly, Czech's abroad may only receive information about the larger parties and, depending on how long they have been living outside the country, they may not be aware of the smaller parties which tend to be more regionally or issue based. Alternatively, the reasoning could be based on the paradox of voting hypothesis: given that the cost of voting is higher for Czech's living abroad⁸ than for citizens within the country, they will be less inclined to waste their vote by voting for parties which are unlikely to enter parliament and hence will only vote for the larger parties.

Overall, the results display a great deal of disagreement between the Czech electorate at large and Czech voters living abroad. If Czechs abroad had their say, the government arising from the election would most probably be a coalition of right-wing parties rather than a government lead by the Social Democrats with the Coalition as their junior partner, as ensued from the total votes. However, there is also considerable disagreement among migrant voters living in different countries. Czech citizens living in the former communist countries tend to favor left-wing parties, with support for the KSCM being highest in the former Soviet Union and support for the center-left CSSD reaching its height in Central and East European countries. In contrast, Czech's living in Western democracies tend to support more center-right parties such as the ODS and the Coalition party. Those residing in Asian and African countries also display higher levels of support for the ODS, while those in Central and South American countries and North African and Middle Eastern countries tend to support the CSSD.

2.2 Polish Migrant Voting Behavior

Table 2 shows the percentage of votes received by the eight main Polish political parties from citizens living abroad and the overall election results of the 2001 election to the *Sejm* (the lower chamber of the Parliament). The September 2001 election was the first parliamentary election to take place under the new electoral law introduced in March 2001⁹. The election brought about a dramatic change in the political make-up of the new parliament, with the two incumbent parties (AWSP and UW) even failing to pass the threshold (5% for parties and 8% for coalitions)

⁸ Czech's living abroad had to register at the embassy weeks before the election and they had to go to the embassy in person to vote.

⁹ The new electoral law reduced the number of districts from 52 to 36, abolished the national list and changed the allocation method from d'Hondt to Modified Sainte-Langue, hence increasing the proportionality of the elections results and reducing the share of the largest party. For a more detailed account please see Benoit and Hayden (2002).

required for representation in the parliament. The preferences of Poles abroad also differ notably from the sentiments of their domestic counterparts, although perhaps not as dramatically as in the Czech case. The main divergences occurs, on the one hand, with respect to the winner of the election, the Democratic Left Alliance-Labor Union (SLD-UP) and, on the other hand, in regard to the various fringe parties.

Table 2 Polish Parliamentary Election Results 2001

Political Parties	SLD-UP %	AWSP %	UW %	SO %	PiS %	PSL %	PO %	LPR %	Others %	Total Votes
Overall Results¹	41.04	5.60	3.10	10.20	9.50	8.98	12.68	7.87	1.02	13,017,929
Results from Abroad	25.98	7.37	10.02	1.37	19.04	1.90	15.88	17.84	0.60	26,200
Former Soviet Union	44.55	7.30	8.83	0.84	11.06	2.84	13.29	10.83	0.46	1,302
Central and East Europe	44.49	5.28	10.02	1.58	11.02	2.54	18.21	5.86	1.00	2,405
Western Europe	25.65	9.54	12.88	1.45	17.55	1.55	18.28	12.66	0.45	10,651
Asia	43.56	5.81	19.96	0.18	7.99	1.63	18.87	1.63	0.36	551
North Africa / Middle-East	48.93	1.98	12.69	2.39	8.81	2.55	17.87	3.46	1.32	1,214
Sub-Sahara Africa	29.37	12.21	19.80	1.65	8.91	3.63	19.80	3.30	1.32	303
Australia	27.15	10.60	10.60	1.55	27.15	0.44	11.26	11.04	0.22	453
Central/South America	26.33	11.47	16.32	1.29	10.18	3.55	22.46	5.65	2.75	619
Northern America	13.97	5.53	4.87	1.22	26.96	1.83	11.85	33.31	0.46	8,702

Notes: The party acronyms stand for Coalition of Democratic Left and Union of Labor (SLD-UP), Solidarity Electoral Action (AWSP), Union of Freedom (UW), Self defense of the Polish Republic (SO), Law and Justice (PiS), Polish People's Party (PSL), Citizens' Platform (PO), and League of Polish Families (LPR).

¹ Includes votes from abroad.

Source: Polish Central Electoral Commission.

The *Democratic Left Alliance-Labor Union* (SLD-UP) received 41.04% of the overall vote in Poland, while only securing 25.98% of the vote from Poles living abroad. The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) has its roots in the original Polish Communist Party, however, unlike the Czech KSCM, it has largely succeeded in shedding its communist heritage and transformed into a Western European style socialist party. Due to this successful transformation, the left-wing but anti-Communist Labor Union (UP) was willing to form an alliance with SLD for the 2001 election, with the objective of forming a modern social-democratic coalition. This election saw the SLD-UP receive its largest share of the vote in the post-communist era, gaining 14 percentage points over the 1997 election. However its support varied considerably among migrant Poles, reaching a high of 48.93% from Poles living in North Africa and the Middle-East, closely followed by the Former Soviet Union (44.55%), Central and Eastern Europe (44.49%) and Asia (43.56%). Unsurprisingly, they derived least support in North America (13.97%). Yet, despite these differences, the SLD-UP ended up being the most popular party in every region apart from North America, hence following the trend of the overall election results. Another party with roots in the communist era is the Polish Peasants' Party (PSL), which won 8.98% of the national vote yet only received 1.90% of the migrant vote. PSL is largely a rural based party which may explain its lack of support among Poles living abroad.

One of the most interesting outcomes of the 2001 election was the collapse in support for the two incumbent parties – the conservative *Solidarity Electoral Action of the Right* (AWSP) and the liberal *Freedom Union* (UW) – who saw their vote shares plummet from 33.80% to 5.60% and from 13.40% to 3.10%, respectively, since the 1997 election. Both parties thus failed to enter the parliament as they did not clear the electoral threshold of 5% for parties and 8% for coalitions (the AWSP is a coalition of a number of conservative and Christian democratic parties). Among the migrant Poles, the AWSP received 7.37% of the vote and the UW garnered 10.02%. There is considerable variation in support for the AWSP from those living abroad, with their support reaching a high in Sub-Sahara Africa (12.21%) and Central and South America (11.47%) and a low in North Africa and the Middle East (1.98%) and Central and Eastern Europe (5.28%). Hence, they consistently failed to reach their former level of support in any region. On the other hand, while UW also lost a considerable amount of support among domestic voters, they remained popular among Poles abroad, receiving 10.02% of the overall migrant vote, reaching a

high of 19.66% in Asia, closely followed by 19.80% in Sub-Sahara Africa, while faring poorly with a mere 4.87% in North America.

The 2001 election also saw four new political parties enter the Polish parliament. The most successful of these was *Citizens' Platform* (PO), which gained a substantial share of both the domestic (12.68%) and the migrant (15.88%) vote. This liberal party, which was formed in 2001, received considerable support among Poles voting from Central and South America (22.46%), while only receiving 11.85% of the vote from migrants in North America.

The second most favored party among Poles living abroad is the *Law and Justice* Party (PiS) which received 19.04% of the migrant vote, while only receiving 9.50% of the overall domestic vote. PiS is a right-wing anti-corruption party which was also formed in 2001. It proved to be popular among Poles living in Australia (27.15%), North America (26.96%) and Western Europe (17.55%), while faring badly in Asia (7.99%), North Africa and the Middle East (8.81%) and Sub-Sahara Africa (8.91%).

The final two additions to the Polish political scene are both radical parties. *Self Defence of the Polish Republic* (SO) is a radical farmers' movement, which derives its support from those discontented with the political and economic changes that occurred since 1989. As with the PSL, its mainly rural following explains the lack of support from Poles living abroad (1.37%) compared to its domestic support (10.2%). Indeed, SO failed to receive more than 2.39% from any region in which migrant Poles are living. Finally, the *League of Polish Families* (LPR) is a nationalist-Christian based far-right party, which is among the most vocal opponents of Poland's entry into the EU. Interestingly, while it only received 7.87% of the overall domestic vote, it received 17.84% of the vote from migrant Poles. Somewhat surprisingly, the majority of this support abroad comes from voters living in North America (33.31%), followed by Western Europe (12.66%) whereas it fared relatively poorly in Asia (1.63%), Sub-Sahara Africa (3.3%) and North Africa and the Middle East (3.46%).

The 2001 Polish election originally resulted in a coalition of SLD-UP and PSL (although subsequently the PSL withdrew from that coalition, leaving the SLD-UP with a slim parliamentary majority). However, had the migrant votes been the deciding factor, this coalition would not have been viable and a coalition of the PO, PiS and UW, would have been more

likely.¹⁰ Overall, while the divergence between the domestic votes and migrant votes is not as great as in the Czech case, there is still a marked difference in the political preferences of Poles living at home and those living abroad.

3. Theories of Voting, Political Socialization, and Migration

The economic theory of voting builds on the seminal contribution of Downs (1957) who applied rational choice theory to voting behavior. Downs posited that individuals vote in order to maximize their expected utility, given the information available to them at the time of the election. A number of factors can enter the voters' utility function (and these factors may enter with different weights across voters and/or across time). Nannestad and Paldam (1994) differentiate between the economic and political components of the voters' utility function. The economic component stands for indicators of voters' material well being associated with voting for a particular party (the literature further distinguishes between egocentric and sociotropic voters, the former are primarily concerned with their own individual well being while the latter put greater weight on aggregate economic outcomes). Rational voters will support parties that they expect to implement policies that are favorable to them and will increase their overall welfare. The political component corresponds to the utility which the voters derive from ideology, religion, patriotism and nationalism, racial, ethnic or linguistic identification, etc. All else being equal, one will prefer a party that stands for similar values as their own. Finally, voters can also behave strategically, such that voting for a specific party will have greater bearing on the voter's utility if that party eventually participates in the government or is included in the legislature. Therefore, voters may shy away from voting for fringe parties and may instead support their second-best choice, which is more likely to receive enough votes from other voters. Alternatively, voters can use their votes to send a signal to the future government, as argued by Piketty (2000) and Castanheira (2003). Accordingly, by voting for extremist parties, the voters may induce the mainstream parties to shift their post-election policies closer to those of the extremists.

In a stylized way, the expected utility of voter i derived from voting for party j can be expressed as follows:

¹⁰ These three parties in fact jointly fielded candidates in the election to the Senate, the upper chamber of the Polish Parliament.

$$U_{ij}^e = \lambda_i C_{ij}^e - (1 - \lambda_i)(x_i - x_j)^2 + \varepsilon_i$$

In this expression, the first term represents the economic component of the voter's utility function while the second term stands for the political consideration, with λ_i determining their relative weights (although λ_i may vary over time, time subscripts have been omitted for simplicity). The economic component primarily measures the future consumption opportunities (with consumption defined broadly) that result from party j 's actions while in government or in the legislature. The political term measures the distance between the voter's ideological position, x_i , and that of the party in question, with the voter's utility falling as the distance increases. The last term, ε_i , collects all the remaining aspects of the voting decision, such as random swings in political attitudes but also potential strategic considerations.

Both the economic and political terms of the voter's utility function may change over time. A voter's political and ideological attitudes are likely to change when her socio-economic characteristics have changed (for example, imagine two workers within a now bankrupt firm, of whom one became a successful entrepreneur whereas the other remained unemployed). Finally, attitudes may also respond to changes in the political and institutional environment. While political systems and institutions in most countries are generally very slow to change, the changes experienced by migrant voters are often dramatic. Moreover, migrants moving to different countries are exposed to different institutions and political systems. Therefore, by relating migrants' votes to political and institutional variables in the destination countries, we can learn how the external environment affects political attitudes and voting behavior specifically.¹¹

While several studies have analyzed the voting behavior of migrant communities in the national elections of their new country of residence¹², to the best of our knowledge, none to date have examined the impact of a new political, social and cultural environment on the voting behavior of migrants participating in elections in their country of origin. As already stated, empirical

¹¹ As migrant voters, by definition, live outside the jurisdiction of their national government, the economic environment in the country that they live in is less likely to have much bearing on their voting behavior. Of course, migrant voters' decisions may be affected also by economic considerations, either out of concern for friends and family in the home country of because they expect to return in the future. In that case, however, their voting behavior is likely to be shaped by economic developments back home rather than those in the country where they currently live. Yet, we might find a significant effect if, for instance, migrants in high-inflation countries perceive anti-inflationary policies as important also for their home country, and accordingly vote for parties that they expect to be tough on inflation.

¹² Black et al. (1987); Cho (1999); Correa (1998); Finifter and Finifter (1989); Garcia (1987); Gitelman (1982); Glaser and Gilens (1997); Wong (2000).

analyses of voting have to take the external environment as given and stable over time. Therefore, by analyzing the voting behavior of migrant populations in a large number of diverse countries, we can infer to what extent the external environment matters in the formation of a person's core political values, beliefs and subsequent behavior, a process referred to in the literature as *political socialization*.

While the literature on the formation of political attitudes is vast, the two main conflicting theories in the field are the Social Psychological model and the Rational Choice model. The social psychological theorists (Campbell et al., 1960) tend to emphasize the importance of parental socialization and downplay the role of short-term influences, while the rational choice theorists (Downs, 1957) stress the continuous incorporation of new information into the cumulative evaluations of various parties. *Political resocialization* therefore can be defined more in terms of the rational choice hypothesis, whereby the migrants incorporate information about their new political environment into their decision sets. The influence of such new information, however, may be dependent on the extent to which the migrant is immersed in the host country's cultural, political and social life. Brown (1988), in an examination of voting behavior among those who move across states in the US, found that if the new political environment differs from the old political environment, then both voting behavior and party identification tend to become similar to those in the new state. However, research by Black et al. (1987), which examined the political adaptation of immigrants to Canada, found that the country of origin was not a strong influence on post-migration political adaptation. Finifter and Finifter (1989) find that both past party identification and political ideology influence the political adaptation of American emigrants in Australia. They conclude that new political learning is dependent upon both previous ideological views and the new political environment. However, these studies are based on emigrants attitudes towards the new political system in which they are living, as such, these emigrants may be more influenced by their new environment as they can actively participate in it i.e., they can vote in the national elections and thus will be more susceptible to absorbing the social norms/ideologies of the new political environment.

This analysis, however, examines the extent to which the migrants' new environment will influence their voting behavior in elections in their country of origin. Therefore the effect of their new external environment may be less influential than in these previous studies. Nannestad, Paldam and Rosholm, (2003) examine the speed at which immigrants converge to native voters

in their evaluations of the economic competence of the government, using pre-election poll data for both native Israelis and immigrants from the former communist countries who are now living in Israel. They find very little difference between the two groups, hence suggesting that immigrants quickly adopt the economic evaluation patterns of the natives. While this case differs somewhat from our study, it does suggest that migrants are influenced by their new environment and can readily learn and assess new economic systems with relative accuracy.

A key issue in this respect is whether migrant voters adopt the norms and values prevailing in the host country or whether the choice of the destination country is in fact affected by the migrant's original political attitudes. Clearly, correlation between institutional and political variables and voting behavior is not indicative of causality going in either direction. Migrants are likely to have different socio-economic characteristics than the stayers (as is evident from the fact that typically only a small fraction of a country's population leaves). For instance, migrants may be more entrepreneurial and respond more readily to economic opportunities. In this respect, theories of migration can help us understand what determines the choice of destination. Building on Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970), the migration literature assumes that migrants are attracted by higher expected earnings in the host country. This line of reasoning, however, cannot explain why certain types of migrants are more likely to go to specific countries than other migrants. Borjas (1987 and 1991, building on Roy, 1951) argues that migration decisions also depend on the dispersion of earnings in the alternative destinations. Highly productive workers will move to countries with widely dispersed earnings, as that is where their skills will yield the highest return. In contrast, unproductive workers are more likely to choose destinations with highly equal distribution of earnings, as in these countries their low productivity will be penalized less. Accordingly, highly productive and entrepreneurial individuals – who tend to form the natural constituency of right wing parties – would gain from moving to countries such as the US but also post-communist and developing countries with high levels of wage inequality (e.g. Russia or Brazil). On the other hand, blue-collar and less productive white-collar workers would gain more from moving to highly egalitarian countries such as continental Western Europe.

Another source of self-selection of migrants involves political motivations. Dissenters and political refugees accounted for a considerable part of emigration from the Czech Republic and Poland during the communist period. Thus, those who moved to communist countries at that time are likely to be more left leaning, while those who moved out of the Soviet Block were

more likely to be right leaning. There seems, however, little reason for political factors to weigh heavily in migration decisions after 1990 – as political repressions ceased in both countries when the communist regimes collapsed in nearly all countries of the former Soviet Block. Therefore, inasmuch as the pre-1990 emigrants remained abroad and retained their original nationality, one can expect more left-wing (and in particular pro-communist) voters in other post-communist countries and more right-wing (and possibly also social democratic) voters in Western countries. The distribution of post-1990 emigrants, however, is different – left-wing sympathizers are more likely to move to relatively egalitarian Western countries, while right-wing individuals should be more prone to migrate to developing and other post-communist countries, in line with the Roy-Borjas theory.

4. Methodology

The principal variable of interest in this analysis is the proportion of votes, V_{ij} , that party j receives from voters living in country i . Therefore, the data display two specific properties that need to be taken into account in the analysis: the individual observations lie between 0 and 1, and the proportion of votes received by all parties sum to one.

The majority of voting studies to date have been estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).¹³ Yet, as argued by Jackson (2001) and Tomz et al. (2002), OLS is inappropriate for analyses of elections in multiparty systems as it does not satisfy either of the above conditions. In particular, in situations when small parties take part in elections, OLS can result in predicted vote shares that are negative. Therefore, in order to avoid this, we transformed the vote shares, V_{ij} , into the following logit form:

$$\log\left(\frac{V_{ij}}{1-V_{ij}}\right)$$

The resulting dependent variable is unbounded (i.e. it takes values between $-\infty$ and ∞) but is not defined for vote shares of either 0 or 1. As there are several zero observations in the data, especially for the communist party, we added 0.001 to all vote shares before performing the logit transformation.

¹³ Tomz et al. (2002) report that out of nineteen articles analysing multiparty election data published in leading political science journal between 1996-2000, eighteen use OLS.

All regressions are estimated using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model, which takes account of the adding-up constraint characteristic of election data. SUR is a special case of generalized least squares, which estimates a set of equations with cross-equation constraints imposed, specifically, it allows for the possibility that the residuals are correlated across parties. Therefore, if one party has a large positive residual, the others will have small and some negative residuals for that observation. Estimating a set of seemingly unrelated regressions jointly as a system yields more efficient estimates than estimating them separately, especially as the correlation among the errors rises and the correlation among the independent variables falls (Greene, 2000). SUR is also particularly efficient when the independent variables differ from one equation to the next. Overall SUR is at a minimum more convenient and no less efficient than estimating individual OLS equations for each party (Tomz et al., 2002).

The analysis utilizes information on votes cast by Czech and Polish migrants in 85 and 90 countries, respectively. Countries in which less than 10 migrants voted were omitted from the analysis due to the small sample size representing those particular countries (this issue only arose in the Czech data where 19 countries had to be dropped; whereas all countries in the Polish data set had more than 10 votes). Furthermore, analytic weights are applied in all regressions to account for the differing number of migrant voters in each country. Analytic weights are the most appropriate weights to use given the dependent variable in the analysis is the average of all votes cast by migrants in a particular country, therefore weighting by the number of voters in each country takes account for the fact, for example, that there were 260 votes cast by Czech citizens in France and only 11 votes cast in Costa Rica.

As there are no preceding theories to prescribe which factors may influence migrant voting behavior, the analysis follows a somewhat agnostic approach: we relate migrant votes to a wide array of explanatory variables selected so as to account for three alternative hypotheses of migrant voting behavior:

Skill-based economic self-selection (Roy-Borjas model of migration): Accordingly, highly skilled and educated potential migrants are more likely to migrate to countries with a high degree of income inequality. Given that highly skilled, highly educated and entrepreneurial individuals tend to vote right-wing parties, income inequality should therefore be positively correlated with support for right-wing parties and negatively correlated with support for left-wing and former communist parties.

Political self-selection: Migrants located in former socialist countries should display greater support for left-wing and especially former communist parties than those in Western democracies, and vice versa for right-wing parties.

Adaptive learning: Migrants adapt to the norms and values prevailing in the host country. According to this hypothesis, higher support for democratic and liberal parties and lower support for former communist parties should be observed in countries with a long tradition of democracy and a market economy. Similarly, the voting preferences of migrants may be correlated with the prevailing political attitudes (captured by the political orientation of the government) and/or economic conditions in the host country.

To test the *adaptive learning hypothesis*, we include a number of institutional, political and socio-economic indicators pertaining to the host countries. These include firstly, various measures of democracy¹⁴: indexes of civil liberties and political freedom (compiled and reported by the Freedom House); fraction of years between 1972 and 2001 in which the country was classified by the Freedom House as either free, partially free or not free. Secondly, measures of economic freedom¹⁵ (reported by the Fraser Institute) as captured by the following sub-indexes¹⁶: size of government, legal structure and security of property rights, sound money, foreign trade liberalization, and regulation. Thirdly, various measures of economic development, such as GDP per capita (as of 2000 in thousands US dollars), the economic growth rate and inflation in 2000. Finally, they include measures of the political environment as captured by an indicator of the political orientation of the government (left wing, centrist/mixed, right wing, autocratic or ethnically/religiously dominated); and the nature of the political system (strong or weak presidential or parliamentary).¹⁷ Next, the Gini index is included to account for the *skill-based economic self-selection hypothesis* in line with the Roy-Borjas model. Finally, the *political self-selection hypothesis*, which stresses the impact of current or past political ties and their

¹⁴ Two alternative democracy measures were initially used: the Freedom House Democracy Index and the Polity Democracy Index. As the correlation between the 2 indexes (for 2001) is a very high 0.92, we use the Freedom House Index due to greater country coverage.

¹⁵ Two alternative measures of economic freedom were also originally used: the Heritage economic Freedom Index and the Fraser Economic Freedom Index. The correlation between the 2 indexes is a high 0.91, and therefore we use the Fraser Index which has greater country coverage.

¹⁶ See Appendix for bivariate correlations of the various sub-indexes.

¹⁷ Data definitions and sources are discussed in greater detail in the Appendix.

legacies, is accounted for by including a number of regional dummy variables in all the regressions.¹⁸

There is a non-negligible degree of correlation between some variables (for example, developed countries tend to display relatively high degrees of both economic freedom and democracy). Therefore, the coefficient estimates may change substantially depending on the other variables included in the model. In addition, given we have only limited a priori expectations about which particular host country characteristics may influence migrant voting behavior, we apply a general-to-specific procedure (for an explanation and assessment of this methodology, see Hoover and Perez, 1999, and the references therein) to determine which factors are robust. This procedure starts off with a general unrestricted regression specification, including all possible explanatory variables, which is then tested against more parsimonious models (nested within the general model), repeating the testing-down procedure until no further variables can be excluded. The result is a model that is less complex than the general model but nonetheless contains all the relevant information. Although this procedure is sometimes likened to sophisticated data mining, Hoover and Perez (1999) show that in most cases (on average 80%), the general-to-specific procedure succeeds in identifying the true data-generating model or a closely related model (i.e. one that encompasses the true model but contains additional irrelevant variables that the procedure fails to eliminate). We implemented the procedure manually, using STATA, repeating the step-wise testing down procedure until the exclusion tests became significant at least at the 10% level (we choose this moderate threshold in view of the relatively low number of observations). At each step, the least significant variable for each party was tested and eliminated, taking care to test for variables at similar levels of significance (as a general rule, only variables whose significance was no more than 30 percentage points off the least significant one were included at each step, i.e. if the lowest significance level was 50%, variables that appeared with up to 20% significance level were included in the exclusion test).

¹⁸Both a distance variable (distance from capital to capital as measured by www.geobytes.com/CityDistancetool.htm.) and border dummies were also included, however they are only significant when the regional variables are not included. As a migrant in the US, for example, may be able to sustain a closer relationship with his Polish roots than, for example, one in Romania, due to the larger Polish immigrant community in the former and easier access to information.

5. Determinants of Migrant Voting Behavior

This section reports the results of the empirical analysis of migrant votes in the last Czech and Polish parliamentary elections. As discussed above, in the absence of a theory of migrant voting behavior and in view of the large number of potentially relevant variables, the analysis is carried out using the general-to-specific procedure, starting with the most general unrestricted model, which is gradually slimmed down until all insignificant variables are dropped (with the significance threshold set at the 10 % level). The analysis is performed using two alternative indexes of democracy (both compiled by the Freedom House). The indexes measure two different aspects of democracy: civil liberties (freedom of expression and association, religious and educational freedom) and political rights (universal franchise, organization of free elections with participation open to all groups within society). The two indexes are very closely correlated (the correlation coefficient across the countries in our sample is 0.94). Therefore, to avoid multicollinearity, we estimate two models for each country, one including the civil liberties index and one with the political rights index, rather than including both indexes in parallel as we do with the remaining variables.

As discussed above, the migrant votes are regressed on a number of host country institutional, political and economic characteristics, a measure of income inequality, and a number of regional dummies (with Western Europe being the omitted category), so as to control for the three alternative hypotheses of migrant voting behavior. In addition, two country specific dummies were also included. First, the votes from Italy include also those from the Czech and Polish consulates in the Vatican, a large fraction of which was probably cast by clergymen and theology students. Therefore, as their political attitudes may be significantly different from the rest of the electorate, especially with respect to support for Christian-democratic parties, a dummy for Italy was included. Second, the US has a large number of Polish immigrants, who are often allowed to retain their Polish nationality after acquiring US citizenship. This potentially makes the American-Polish immigrant community different from Polish migrants in other countries (where typically they would have to give up their Polish nationality in order to become naturalized citizens of the host country – and thus would not be eligible to vote in Polish elections): the former have lived in the host country much longer (or may even have been born there) and therefore probably keep much looser contacts with the ancestral country. Furthermore, being a relatively large and geographically concentrated community, American Poles are more likely to

retain their own unique identity (which may also be markedly different from that in present-day Poland) than migrants living in other countries where they are less numerous and more dispersed. Although the Czech migrant population in the US appears neither particularly large nor geographically concentrated, for the sake of comparability we also included the US dummy in the Czech regressions.

The results obtained for the general unrestricted models are reported in Appendix A. Tables 3 and 4 then present the final results for those explanatory variables that survived the elimination by the general-to-specific procedure. We analyze the votes cast for five Czech and seven Polish political parties; the results for each party are reported in separate tables labeled A-E in the Czech regressions and A-G in the Polish regressions. Not surprisingly, given the large number of explanatory variables and the low number of observations, not many variables appear significant in the general unrestricted models. Applying the general-to-specific methodology, however, greatly reduces the number of explanatory variables. Out of a total of 130 explanatory variables in the Czech regressions, 78 and 74 are eliminated as insignificant in the regression with civil liberties and political rights, respectively. For Poland, the ‘drop-out’ rate is even higher: 147 and 130 variables out of a total of 196.

Table 3 Czech Republic: General-to-Specific Results

A. Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom	0.114***	(0.037)	0.443***	(0.114)
Civil/Political Freedom Squared			-0.043***	(0.010)
EF: Sound Money	-0.136***	(0.037)	-0.099***	(0.038)
EF: Regulation			0.180***	(0.063)
Inflation [%]			-0.020**	(0.008)
Gov.: authoritarian	0.774**	(0.322)		
Parliamentary	0.255**	(0.105)	0.374***	(0.109)
Central/Eastern Europe	-0.423***	(0.146)		
South East Asia	0.680***	(0.230)		
Central/Latin America			-0.445**	(0.211)
Italy	-0.609***	(0.192)	-0.476**	(0.206)
Constant	-0.883***	(0.249)	-1.651***	(0.428)
R-squared	0.400		0.410	

Excluded and Omitted Variables: Fraction years free and Partially free (Fraction years not free omitted); Size of government, Legal/property rights, Foreign trade; GDP per capita, GDP growth, Centrist/mixed, Left-wing and Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential electoral system (strong presidential omitted); Former Soviet Union, Middle East and North Africa, Anglo-Saxon, United States (Europe omitted).

B. Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom	0.470**	(0.213)	0.275***	(0.080)
Civil/Political Freedom Squared	-0.045***	(0.014)		
Fraction Years Free	-1.417**	(0.693)	-2.080***	(0.805)
Fraction Years Partially Free	-1.639***	(0.591)	-2.532***	(0.622)
EF: Legal/Property Rights	0.444***	(0.133)		
EF: Sound Money			0.181*	(0.102)
EF: Regulation	-0.369***	(0.117)	-0.293***	(0.115)
GDP per capita (US\$ thousands)	-0.058***	(0.021)	-0.046***	(0.016)
Inflation [%]	0.028***	(0.011)	0.036**	(0.015)
Gov.: Left wing	-0.375*	(0.198)		
Gov.: authoritarian	2.050***	(0.556)	2.376***	(0.534)
Parliamentary	-0.507***	(0.202)	-0.298*	(0.170)
Central/Eastern Europe	-1.089***	(0.412)	-1.315***	(0.433)
Former Soviet Union	-1.942***	(0.630)		
South East Asia	-0.902***	(0.363)		
Middle East/North Africa	-2.592***	(0.654)	-1.184**	(0.533)
Italy	-1.031***	(0.344)	-1.117***	(0.334)
Constant	0.130	(0.908)	-0.357	(0.844)
R-squared	0.529		0.515	

Excluded and Omitted Variables: Fraction years not free (omitted); Size of government, Foreign trade; GDP growth, Centrist/mixed, and Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential electoral system (strong presidential omitted); Central/Latin America (Europe omitted).

C. Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom	1.698***	(0.450)		
Civil/Political Freedom Squared	-0.137***	(0.036)	0.026***	(0.010)
Fraction Years Free	-5.057***	(1.079)	-3.350***	(1.144)
Fraction Years Partially Free	-5.468***	(1.153)	-3.442***	(1.092)
EF: Size of Government	0.242**	(0.128)		
EF: Legal/Property Rights	1.022***	(0.250)	1.013***	(0.288)
EF: Foreign Trade	0.477**	(0.262)	0.710***	(0.271)
EF: Regulation	-0.999***	(0.313)	-0.752**	(0.269)
GDP per capita (US\$ thousands)			-0.116***	(0.055)
Inflation [%]			0.054**	(0.023)
Parliamentary	-1.623***	(0.420)	-2.031***	(0.458)
Italy	-2.260***	(0.795)	-1.590**	(0.794)
Constant	-9.762***	(2.285)	-9.224***	(2.405)
R-squared	0.526		0.544	

Excluded and Omitted Variables: Fraction years not free (omitted); Sound Money; GDP growth, Centrist/mixed, Left-wing, Authoritarian and Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential electoral system (strong presidential omitted); Central/Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union, South-east Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Central/Latin America, Anglo-Saxon, United States (Europe omitted).

D. Coalition (KDU-US)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom			-0.142**	(0.062)
Fraction Years Free			1.447**	(0.662)
Fraction Years Partially Free			0.917*	(0.499)
EF: Legal/Property Rights	-0.350***	(0.098)	-0.275***	(0.089)
EF: Regulation	0.590***	(0.096)	0.501***	(0.107)
GDP per capita (US\$ thousands)	0.077***	(0.017)	0.057***	(0.016)
Gov.: Left wing	0.349**	(0.162)	0.253*	(0.132)
Parliamentary	0.428***	(0.147)	0.363***	(0.142)
Central/Eastern Europe	0.516***	(0.169)	1.057***	(0.340)
South East Asia			-0.389*	(0.234)
Middle East/North Africa			-0.630**	(0.318)
Anglo-Saxon	-0.365**	(0.150)	-0.289*	(0.154)
Italy	1.558***	(0.261)	1.464***	(0.253)
Constant	-3.800***	(0.526)	-3.263***	(0.560)
R-squared	0.763		0.794	

Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/Political Freedom Squared; Fraction years free and Partially free (Fraction years not free omitted); Size of government, Sound money, and Foreign trade; GDP growth, Inflation, Centrist/mixed, Authoritarian and Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential electoral system (Strong presidential omitted); Former Soviet Union, Central/Latin America (Europe omitted).

E. Others	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom	0.225***	(0.068)		
Civil/Political Freedom Squared			0.014**	(0.007)
Fraction Years Free	-0.926**	(0.428)	-2.680***	(0.642)
EF: Legal/Property Rights			0.380***	(0.098)
EF: Sound Money	-0.234**	(0.107)	-0.384***	(0.120)
EF: Foreign Trade			-0.205*	(0.114)
EF: Regulation	0.374***	(0.111)	0.264**	(0.137)
Inflation [%]	-0.067***	(0.016)	-0.070***	(0.017)
Gov.: Centrist or mixed ¹	-0.570***	(0.153)	-0.573***	(0.174)
Gov.: Left wing ¹			-0.490**	(0.208)
Gov.: authoritarian ¹	-2.007***	(0.665)	-1.960***	(0.664)
Central/Eastern Europe			-1.462***	(0.404)
Former Soviet Union	1.956***	(0.612)		
South East Asia	0.904**	(0.379)		
Middle East/North Africa	3.680***	(0.711)	1.746***	(0.647)
Anglo-Saxon			-0.614***	(0.235)
United States	-0.707**	(0.290)		
Constant	-3.494***	(0.819)	-0.360	(1.054)
R-squared	0.471		0.472	

Excluded and Omitted Variables: Fraction years partially free (Fraction years not free omitted); Size of government; GDP per capita, GDP growth, Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential and Parliamentary electoral system (Strong presidential omitted); Central/Latin America, and Italy (Europe omitted).

Breusch-Pagan Test of Independence

Civil Liberties	Political Rights
$\chi^2(10) = 36.30***$	$\chi^2(10) = 36.98***$

Notes: Number of observations is 54. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model and applying the General-to-Specific procedure. Analytic weights are applied using the total number of votes per country. A dummy for Italy is added because votes from Italy also include those from the Vatican. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). The Breusch-Pagan test of independence indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis of independence of the residuals across the equations in each of the Polish and Czech regressions. Therefore, OLS estimates would be inconsistent and the choice of SUR is justified.

Table 4 Poland: General-to-Specific Results

A. Coalition of Democratic Left and Union of Labor (SLD-UP)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom Squared	-0.005***	(0.002)		
EF: Legal/Property Rights			-0.112***	(0.033)
EF: Foreign Trade			0.178***	(0.047)
EF: Regulation	-0.296***	(0.055)	-0.421***	(0.039)
Gini Index			0.014**	(0.006)
Gov.: Centrist or mixed	0.296***	(0.077)	0.383***	(0.076)
Gov.: ethnic/religious	0.401**	(0.185)	0.613***	(0.214)
Parliamentary	0.313***	(0.081)		
Former Soviet Union			-0.706***	(0.196)
Sub-Saharan Africa			-0.794***	(0.239)
Central/Latin America			-0.692***	(0.190)
Anglo-Saxon	-0.216**	(0.097)		
United States	0.366***	(0.116)		
Italy	-1.331***	(0.129)	-1.516***	(0.122)
Constant	1.011***	(0.304)	0.742*	(0.393)
R-squared	0.856		0.865	

Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom; Fraction years free and Partially free (Fraction years not free omitted); Size of government, Sound money; GDP per capita, GDP growth, Inflation, Left-wing and Authoritarian government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential electoral system (strong presidential omitted); Central/Eastern Europe, South East Asia, Middle East and North Africa (Europe omitted).

B. Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
EF: Regulation	0.235***	(0.083)	0.245***	(0.083)
GDP Growth [%]	-0.186***	(0.045)	-0.199***	(0.046)
Former Soviet Union	0.990***	(0.371)	1.136***	(0.392)
United States	-0.567***	(0.185)	-0.545***	(0.184)
Italy	1.760***	(0.299)	1.830***	(0.295)
Constant	-3.477***	(0.592)	-3.516***	(0.591)
R-squared	0.509		0.513	

Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom (linear and squared); Fraction years free and Partially free (Fraction years not free omitted); Size of government, Legal/property rights, Sound money, Foreign trade; GDP per capita; Gini Index; Inflation, Centrist/mixed, Left-wing, Authoritarian and Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential and Parliamentary electoral system (strong presidential omitted); Central/Eastern Europe, South East Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central/Latin America, Anglo-Saxon, (Europe omitted).

C. Union of Freedom (UW)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom	-0.096***	(0.037)		
Fraction Years Partially Free	0.751***	(0.285)	0.674***	(0.269)
EF: Regulation	0.366***	(0.078)	0.334***	(0.077)
GDP per capita	0.015*	(0.009)	0.018**	(0.009)
Gov.: Centrist or mixed			0.370***	(0.116)
Gov.: Left wing			0.334***	(0.116)
Gov.: authoritarian			0.734**	(0.351)
Gov.: ethnic/religious			0.542**	(0.242)
Parliamentary			-0.304**	(0.128)
South East Asia			0.400*	(0.235)
Anglo-Saxon	-0.702***	(0.135)	-0.616***	(0.131)
United States	-1.043***	(0.127)	-1.310***	(0.180)
Constant	-3.840***	(0.405)	-4.503***	(0.431)
R-squared	0.747		0.793	

Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom squared; Fraction years free (Fraction years not free omitted); Size of government, Legal/property rights, Sound money, Foreign trade; Gini Index; GDP growth, Inflation, Centrist/mixed, Left-wing, Authoritarian and Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential electoral system (strong presidential omitted); Central/Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central/Latin America, Italy (Europe omitted).

D. Law and Justice (PiS)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom Squared	0.004*	(0.002)		
EF: Foreign Trade	0.200***	(0.071)		
GDP per capita (US\$ thousands)			0.022***	(0.006)
Gini Index	0.025***	(0.008)	0.024***	(0.008)
Gov.: Centrist or mixed	-0.300***	(0.122)	-0.310***	(0.124)
Gov.: Left wing	-0.313***	(0.120)	-0.344***	(0.107)
Gov.: ethnic/religious	-0.772***	(0.269)	-0.825***	(0.257)
Parliamentary	-0.226**	(0.104)		
South East Asia	-0.449*	(0.271)	-0.661**	(0.273)
Sub-Saharan Africa	-1.204***	(0.373)	-0.946**	(0.409)
Central/Latin America	-1.270***	(0.279)	-1.097***	(0.311)
Constant	-3.963***	(0.627)	-2.664***	(0.312)
R-squared	0.705		0.698	

Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom; Fraction years free and Partially free (Fraction years not free omitted); Size of government, Legal/property rights, Sound money, Regulation; GDP growth, Inflation, Authoritarian government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential electoral system (strong presidential omitted); Central/Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union, Middle East and North Africa, Anglo-Saxon, United States, Italy (Europe omitted).

E. Citizens' Platform (PO)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom			-0.555***	(0.143)
Civil/Political Freedom Squared			0.043***	(0.013)
Fraction Years Partially Free			0.597*	(0.339)
EF: Size of Government	-0.089***	(0.028)	-0.076***	(0.021)
EF: Legal/Property Rights			0.064*	(0.037)
EF: Regulation	0.083**	(0.043)		
GDP Growth [%]	0.060**	(0.027)	0.068**	(0.028)
Inflation [%]			0.018***	(0.007)
Gov.: Centrist or mixed	0.468***	(0.092)	0.555***	(0.085)
Gov.: Left wing	0.457***	(0.102)	0.424***	(0.087)
Gov.: authoritarian			-0.710*	(0.427)
Weak presidential			0.930**	(0.396)
Former Soviet Union			-0.633**	(0.317)
South East Asia			-0.696**	(0.296)
Middle East/North Africa			-0.622*	(0.362)
Central/Latin America	0.619***	(0.231)	0.678***	(0.257)
Constant	-2.212***	(0.316)	-1.118**	(0.492)
R-squared	0.457		0.561	

Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom; Fraction years free (Fraction years not free omitted); Sound money, Foreign trade; GDP per capita; Gini Index; Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government omitted); Parliamentary electoral system (strong presidential omitted); Central/Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Anglo-Saxon, United States, Italy (Europe omitted).

F. League of Polish Families (LPR)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Fraction Years Free	2.009***	(0.389)	1.702***	(0.394)
EF: Regulation	0.482***	(0.083)	0.373***	(0.123)
GDP Growth [%]			-0.095**	(0.048)
Gov.: Centrist or mixed	-1.148***	(0.188)	-1.383***	(0.225)
Gov.: Left wing			-0.370*	(0.205)
Gov.: ethnic/religious	-2.179***	(0.532)	-2.448***	(0.584)
Parliamentary			0.565***	(0.221)
Central/Eastern Europe	1.523***	(0.317)	1.340***	(0.294)
Former Soviet Union	3.709***	(0.500)	4.247***	(0.559)
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.968*	(0.595)		
United States			0.671**	(0.295)
Constant	-6.801***	(0.557)	-5.807***	(0.783)
R-squared	0.732		0.756	

Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom (linear and squared); Fraction years partially free (Fraction years not free omitted); Size of government, Legal/property rights, Sound money, Foreign trade; GDP per capita; Gini Index; Inflation, Authoritarian government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential electoral system (strong presidential omitted); South East Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Central/Latin America, Anglo-Saxon, Italy (Europe omitted).

G. Others	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom Squared			0.009***	(0.004)
EF: Legal/Property Rights	0.211**	(0.091)		
GDP per capita (US\$ thousands)	-0.058***	(0.018)	-0.045***	(0.012)
Gov.: Centrist or mixed	-0.292*	(0.157)	-0.321**	(0.158)
South East Asia	-1.212***	(0.413)	-1.064***	(0.414)
Anglo-Saxon	-0.553***	(0.186)	-0.398**	(0.178)
United States	1.029***	(0.233)	0.923***	(0.209)
Constant	-3.654***	(0.447)	-3.079***	(0.251)
R-squared	0.343		0.349	

Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom; Fraction years free and Partially free (Fraction years not free omitted); Size of government, Sound money, Foreign trade, Regulation; Gini Index; GDP growth, Inflation, Left-wing, Authoritarian and Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential and Parliamentary electoral system (strong presidential omitted); Central/Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central/Latin America, Italy (Europe omitted).

Breusch-Pagan Test of Independence	
Civil Liberties	Political Rights
$\chi^2(21) = 77.13***$	$\chi^2(21) = 80.51***$

Notes: Number of observations is 66. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model and applying the General-to-Specific procedure. Analytic weights are applied using the total number of votes per country. A dummy for Italy is added because votes from Italy also include those from the Vatican. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). The Breusch-Pagan test of independence indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis of independence of the residuals across the equations in each of the Polish and Czech regressions. Therefore, OLS estimates would be inconsistent and the choice of SUR is justified.

The key question of interest, however, is which variables survive the testing down procedure and what does that tell us about the validity of the three hypotheses formulated in the preceding section. The evidence is least favorable for the skill-based self-selection hypothesis, which posits that host-country income inequality is correlated with migrants' skills: highly skilled migrants choose high-inequality destinations, while those with low skills prefer more egalitarian societies. To test this motive for migration, the Gini coefficient was included among explanatory variables. However, the general-to-specific procedure eliminated it completely from the regressions with Czech migrant votes. In the Polish regressions, income inequality survived the testing-down and is correlated with votes for the SLD-UP (coalition of the Party of Democratic Left and the Union of Labor) and the PiS (Law and Justice) parties only. The skill-based self-selection hypothesis predicts that votes for right wing parties are positively correlated with income inequality while those for left-wing parties display a negative correlation. This prediction is confirmed for the PiS which, being a right-wing party, indeed derives greater support from countries with high income inequality. The votes for the SLD, however, are also positively correlated with income inequality

(in the regression with political rights), contrary to the hypothesis. For all the remaining parties, the indicator of income inequality was eliminated by the testing-down procedure.

Tables 3 and 4 also reveal that several of the regional dummy variables survive to the end, thus potentially indicating support for the political self-selection hypothesis. This hypothesis stipulates that support for left-wing and post-communist parties should be greater, and support for right wing parties lower, in the former communist countries. The opposite should hold for Western democracies i.e. support for left-wing parties should be lower compared to support for right-wing parties. The evidence, however, is at best mixed. While many regional dummy variables are eliminated by the general-to-specific procedure, when they do remain, they frequently appear with the wrong sign. In particular, the support for the KSCM (Czech Communist Party) is not any higher in the former communist countries than in Western Europe or in Anglo-Saxon countries (in fact, the only regional variable that survives the testing down for the Communists is the dummy for Italy where it appears with a negative coefficient). In addition, the CSSD (Czech Social Democrats), contrary to the political self-selection hypothesis, draws significantly fewer votes from Central/Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Similarly, the Polish SLD-UP fared poorly in the former Soviet Union, whereas it fared well in the US. The results are similarly mixed for right-wing parties. Among Czech parties, the ODS (Civic Democratic Party) draws lower support in Central/Eastern Europe, as predicted by the hypothesis, but the opposite is true for the KDU-US (coalition of Christian Democrats and Union of Freedom). Among Polish migrant voters, the AWSP (Solidarity Electoral Action) fared well in the former Soviet Union despite its deep anti-communist roots – and poorly in the US. The support for the UW (Union of Freedom) is low in the Anglo-Saxon countries and especially in the US, despite its liberal pro-market nature. Only the PO (Citizens' Platform) received fewer votes from the former Soviet Union, as predicted by the hypothesis. Surprisingly, the support for the LPR (extreme-right League of Polish Families) is high in Central/Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and also in the US.

In contrast to the two self-selection hypotheses, the evidence with respect to the adaptive learning hypothesis is more encouraging. We account both for the extent of democracy (measured with the Freedom House indexes of civil liberties and political rights) and the tradition of democracy (measured as the fraction of years between 1972 and 2001 that the country was classified by the Freedom House as free or partially free) in the host countries. The

latter may be important as it distinguishes countries that democratized recently from those that espoused high degrees of democracy for decades. Striking similarities appear both across parties, and across the two countries included in our analysis. On the one hand, the effect of democracy on migrant votes is mixed: it is positively significant and hump shaped for every Czech political party, (with the maximum effect attained at an intermediate level of democracy), apart from the KDU-US¹⁹, for either one or both of the civil liberties/political rights indexes, while in the Polish regressions, high levels of democracy are positively related to votes for the AWSP, PiS and LPR and negatively related to votes for SLD-UP, UW and U-shaped for the PO. However, the impact of the tradition of democracy is quite consistent: countries with a longer tradition of full or moderate democracy show less support for the left wing parties – CSSD and KSCM – and stronger support for the right wing parties – KDU-US, UW, PO and, somewhat surprisingly (given its extremist nature), also LPR.

The results obtained with the various sub-indexes of economic freedom are mixed but again with some consistencies. Most notably, migrants in countries with less pervasive regulation are more likely to vote in favor of right-wing parties – ODS, KDU-US, AWSP, UW, PO and LPR than left-wing parties – CSSD, KSCM and SLD-UP. The estimated effects of the other sub-indexes are more mixed, often with one or two sub-indexes appearing significant and with signs opposite to that of regulation.²⁰ Due to this, the joint impact of economic freedom is in fact weaker than it would appear if only the regulation sub-index was included. Nonetheless, comparing the sizes of the estimated coefficients for the various sub-indexes, the impact of economic freedom appears clearly positive for the KDU-US, AWSP, UW and LPR, and negative for SLD-UP.²¹

The impact of economic development (measured by the GDP per capita) is similar to that of economic freedom: migrants in richer and more advanced countries show greater support for right-wing parties, KDU-US, UW and PiS, at the expense of left-wing parties, CSSD and KSCM. This pattern, however, appears somewhat less robust as it is only obtained for a subset of

¹⁹ For KDU-US, the pattern appears U-shaped, however, with the minimum attained at the political rights index equal to 0.05. As the index ranges between 0 and 10, the impact of political rights on votes for this party is effectively positive.

²⁰ The various sub-indexes of economic freedom are moderately strongly correlated with each other (correlation coefficients between 0.51 and 0.66), with the exception of the size of government, which is essentially uncorrelated with the other sub-indexes (correlation coefficients range between –0.32 and 0.20), see table C1 in the Appendix.

²¹ As for these parties, either regulation is the only sub-index that remains significant after performing the general-to-specific procedure, or it dominates, in absolute value, the coefficients obtained for the other sub-indexes.

parties. In contrast to economic development, the results for economic performance (economic growth and inflation), while appearing significant for some parties, are mixed and do not conform to a clear-cut pattern across parties and the two countries. Czech migrants in high-inflation countries show greater support for left-wing parties, CSSD and KSCM, than for ODS, but this pattern is not replicated in the Polish data. The weak and mixed results for economic performance variables should not come as surprising though. Typically, the literature on economic voting finds that voters punish the government for bad economic performance by voting for the opposition and reward it for good performance by reelecting it. However, the host country's economic conditions have little relevance for passing a verdict on the competence of the government in the migrants' home country.

Similarly, variables reflecting the nature of the political environment in the host country – political orientation of the government and the type of political system (parliamentary, strong presidential or weak presidential) frequently appear significant but it is difficult to identify a systematic pattern in the results. Sometimes, the results defy expectations. For example, the KDU-US, UW and PO, being all right-of-center parties, do well among migrants who live in countries with left-wing governments, whereas the CSSD does poorly in such countries. For other parties, the pattern is more as expected: the UW also does well in countries with a centrist or mixed government, while the PiS and LPR do poorly in countries with either centrist/mixed or left-wing government. Therefore, while political environment seems to have an effect on migrants' political preferences, the precise nature of this effect is not very clear.²² Overall, the results provide more consistent support for the adaptive learning hypothesis than either the political or economic self-selection hypotheses, suggesting that migrants' political attitudes and behavior are indeed influenced by their new environment.

6. Conclusions

This paper analyzes the voting behavior of Czech and Polish migrants who participated in their countries' most recent national elections by casting their votes from abroad. Evidence from these

²² Note that finding a strong impact of the political orientation of the host country's government on migrant voting behavior could be interpreted also as evidence in favor of the political self-selection hypothesis. One would need information of the migrants voting histories to differentiate between political self-selection and adaptive learning. Given that the results are mixed, this problem does not arise in our case though.

elections indicates that the voting behavior of migrants differs substantially from those cast by their compatriots back home. Moreover, the preferences of migrants vary considerably across the various host countries. In this paper we consider three alternative hypotheses that could potentially explain these differences: the adaptive learning hypothesis (i.e. migrants gradually adopt the norms and values prevailing in the host country and this influences their voting political preferences accordingly), the economically-based self-selection hypothesis (migrants move to countries where the payoff to their human capital is highest), and finally the political self-selection hypothesis (migrants choose destination countries based on their pre-migration political attitudes).

The analysis is comprised of a wide range of potential determinants of migrant voting behavior, motivated by the three alternative hypotheses. To determine which factors robustly affect voting from abroad, the general to specific methodology is applied to the long list of potential explanatory variables. This method reduces the general unrestricted model to a more parsimonious one, containing only significant variables. The results of the slimmed-down model provide only little support for the self-selection hypotheses which stipulate that differences in migrants' political preferences are driven by self-selection of migrants – whether on economic or political grounds. In contrast, the results give strong indications that migrants' voting behavior is indeed shaped by the institutional environment prevailing in the host country. In particular, right-wing parties tend to fare well, and left-wing parties do poorly, among migrants living in countries with a long tradition of full or partial democracy and/or a greater extent of economic freedom. Similarly, right-wing parties derive more support from migrants living in economically advanced countries, while the opposite holds true for left-wing parties. The results, however, are more mixed and less clear-cut in regards the impact of economic performance (growth and inflation) and the political environment (i.e. political orientation of the incumbent government, and whether the political system is presidential or weakly/strongly presidential) on migrant voting behavior. While these variable appear significant in regressions for some parties, there does not appear to be a systematic pattern across the different parties.

These findings further our understanding of how changes in the voters' institutional environment have an important effect on voting behavior. These results suggest that voters tend to adapt to the values and norms prevailing in their current surroundings and as these norms change, so too does

voting behavior. Migration is an extreme case of such a societal change but a similar process is likely to be at play in countries undergoing fundamental economic and political transitions. Finally, the results underscore the importance of migration (permanent or temporary) in facilitating political and economic changes in countries that currently are, or recently were, ruled by authoritarian and interventionist governments. Migrants can play an important political role, as the examples enumerated in footnote 3 illustrate. Even more importantly, returning migrants, who have adopted democratic and liberal views, are likely to strengthen the demand for democratic institutions and liberal economic policies and join grass-roots support for likewise minded parties. Not surprisingly, repressive regimes often curtail their citizens' freedom to travel. Communist countries (whether the former Soviet block or present day Cuba and North Korea) are prime examples of this. Turkmenistan – a post-Soviet dictatorial regime in Central Asia – went even further: not only does it severely restricts its citizens' movement across borders, but recently, Turkmen nationals who also held Russian passports (and as such were relatively free to travel) were forced either to relinquish their Russian nationality or emigrate. Furthermore, Turkmen teachers who obtained their education abroad have been prohibited from exercising their profession.²³ Clearly, it is not emigration that repressive regimes are concerned about; in fact, communist countries would occasionally even force particularly steadfast dissenters to emigrate; in this respect, the case of East Germany where the collapse of the regime was precipitated by massive emigration is exceptional. Rather, the threat is posed by returning migrants who have been exposed to more liberal economic and political norms and may therefore pose a threat to the stability of the regime.

²³ See RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 7, No. 73, Part I, 16 April 2003.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Table A1 Czech Republic: General Unrestricted Model Specification

A. Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom	0.109	(0.210)	0.417**	(0.211)
Civil/Political Freedom Squared	-0.001	(0.014)	-0.038**	(0.017)
Fraction Years Free	0.129	(0.645)	0.005	(0.706)
Fraction Years Partially Free	0.083	(0.582)	-0.329	(0.637)
EF: Size of Government	0.049	(0.057)	0.072	(0.054)
EF: Legal/Property Rights	0.077	(0.117)	0.025	(0.117)
EF: Sound Money	-0.132	(0.110)	-0.145	(0.106)
EF: Foreign Trade	0.022	(0.092)	0.003	(0.089)
EF: Regulation	0.077	(0.127)	0.113	(0.127)
GDP per capita	-0.024	(0.025)	-0.010	(0.024)
GDP Growth [%]	0.007	(0.031)	-0.002	(0.029)
Inflation [%]	-0.002	(0.014)	-0.015	(0.015)
Gov.: Centrist or mixed ¹	0.051	(0.163)	-0.025	(0.155)
Gov.: Left wing ¹	0.059	(0.192)	0.041	(0.181)
Gov.: authoritarian ¹	0.667	(0.552)	0.387	(0.511)
Gov.: ethnic/religious ¹	-0.137	(0.405)	-0.276	(0.379)
Weak presidential ²	-0.140	(0.362)	-0.130	(0.349)
Parliamentary ²	0.154	(0.197)	0.240	(0.193)
Central/Eastern Europe	-0.350	(0.411)	-0.317	(0.407)
Former Soviet Union	0.110	(0.700)	-0.387	(0.680)
South East Asia	0.666*	(0.374)	0.234	(0.375)
Middle East/North Africa	0.022	(0.718)	-0.390	(0.677)
Central/Latin America	-0.247	(0.437)	-0.767*	(0.452)
Anglo-Saxon	-0.049	(0.204)	-0.040	(0.198)
United States	-0.089	(0.341)	-0.187	(0.332)
Italy	-0.443*	(0.258)	-0.556**	(0.241)
Constant	-1.903*	(1.118)	-1.164	(1.035)
R-squared	0.4579		0.4910	

B. Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom	0.401	(0.329)	0.609*	(0.334)
Civil/Political Freedom Squared	-0.042*	(0.022)	-0.027	(0.026)
Fraction Years Free	-1.519	(1.011)	-3.102***	(1.117)
Fraction Years Partially Free	-1.519*	(0.911)	-2.960***	(1.007)
EF: Size of Government	-0.046	(0.089)	-0.158*	(0.085)
EF: Legal/Property Rights	0.420**	(0.183)	0.213	(0.185)
EF: Sound Money	0.208	(0.172)	0.178	(0.168)
EF: Foreign Trade	0.007	(0.143)	-0.019	(0.141)
EF: Regulation	-0.451**	(0.198)	-0.264	(0.201)
GDP per capita	-0.066*	(0.038)	-0.058	(0.038)
GDP Growth [%]	0.008	(0.048)	0.038	(0.047)
Inflation [%]	0.048**	(0.022)	0.032	(0.024)
Gov.: Centrist or mixed ¹	0.051	(0.256)	0.158	(0.245)
Gov.: Left wing ¹	-0.345	(0.301)	0.053	(0.286)
Gov.: authoritarian ¹	1.551*	(0.864)	2.092**	(0.808)
Gov.: ethnic/religious ¹	-0.081	(0.635)	0.553	(0.599)
Weak presidential ²	0.337	(0.568)	0.264	(0.552)
Parliamentary ²	-0.282	(0.308)	-0.234	(0.305)
Central/Eastern Europe	-0.981	(0.643)	-1.750***	(0.643)
Former Soviet Union	-1.556	(1.096)	-0.663	(1.075)
South East Asia	-0.795	(0.585)	-0.261	(0.593)
Middle East/North Africa	-2.892**	(1.124)	-1.178	(1.071)
Central/Latin America	0.001	(0.685)	0.596	(0.714)
Anglo-Saxon	-0.134	(0.319)	-0.128	(0.312)
United States	0.844	(0.534)	0.755	(0.525)
Italy	-1.186***	(0.404)	-0.771**	(0.382)
Constant	-0.548	(1.750)	-1.050	(1.636)
R-squared	0.5823		0.5999	

C. Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom	1.666**	(0.716)	0.173	(0.765)
Civil/Political Freedom Squared	-0.124**	(0.048)	0.018	(0.061)
Fraction Years Free	-3.903*	(2.201)	-3.193	(2.561)
Fraction Years Partially Free	-5.898***	(1.984)	-4.424*	(2.311)
EF: Size of Government	0.159	(0.193)	0.020	(0.195)
EF: Legal/Property Rights	0.828**	(0.400)	0.710*	(0.424)
EF: Sound Money	-0.387	(0.374)	-0.292	(0.385)
EF: Foreign Trade	0.686**	(0.313)	0.726**	(0.324)
EF: Regulation	-0.893**	(0.432)	-0.737	(0.461)
GDP per capita	-0.033	(0.084)	-0.059	(0.088)
GDP Growth [%]	-0.124	(0.105)	-0.123	(0.107)
Inflation [%]	0.012	(0.048)	0.026	(0.055)
Gov.: Centrist or mixed ¹	0.195	(0.557)	0.445	(0.562)
Gov.: Left wing ¹	-0.206	(0.655)	0.102	(0.656)
Gov.: authoritarian ¹	1.786	(1.882)	1.862	(1.853)
Gov.: ethnic/religious ¹	1.347	(1.383)	1.584	(1.375)
Weak presidential ²	1.380	(1.236)	1.281	(1.267)
Parliamentary ²	-1.531**	(0.671)	-1.714**	(0.700)
Central/Eastern Europe	-1.109	(1.401)	-0.588	(1.476)
Former Soviet Union	-3.109	(2.387)	-1.097	(2.467)
South East Asia	-1.103	(1.275)	-0.046	(1.360)
Middle East/North Africa	0.113	(2.448)	0.699	(2.457)
Central/Latin America	-0.824	(1.491)	0.075	(1.639)
Anglo-Saxon	0.291	(0.695)	0.302	(0.717)
United States	0.122	(1.162)	0.033	(1.204)
Italy	-2.356***	(0.879)	-1.684*	(0.875)
Constant	-7.202*	(3.813)	-6.681*	(3.754)
R-squared	0.6192		05954	

D. Coalition (KDU-US)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom	-0.076	(0.243)	-0.300	(0.244)
Civil/Political Freedom Squared	0.008	(0.016)	0.014	(0.019)
Fraction Years Free	0.783	(0.747)	1.756**	(0.817)
Fraction Years Partially Free	0.371	(0.673)	1.200	(0.737)
EF: Size of Government	-0.095	(0.066)	-0.060	(0.062)
EF: Legal/Property Rights	-0.440***	(0.136)	-0.378***	(0.135)
EF: Sound Money	-0.109	(0.127)	-0.075	(0.123)
EF: Foreign Trade	-0.082	(0.106)	-0.038	(0.103)
EF: Regulation	0.603***	(0.146)	0.528***	(0.147)
GDP per capita	0.086***	(0.028)	0.075***	(0.028)
GDP Growth [%]	0.015	(0.036)	0.003	(0.034)
Inflation [%]	-0.008	(0.016)	0.002	(0.018)
Gov.: Centrist or mixed ¹	0.071	(0.189)	0.068	(0.179)
Gov.: Left wing ¹	0.332	(0.222)	0.209	(0.209)
Gov.: authoritarian ¹	0.884	(0.638)	0.724	(0.591)
Gov.: ethnic/religious ¹	0.439	(0.469)	0.220	(0.438)
Weak presidential ²	0.570	(0.419)	0.537	(0.404)
Parliamentary ²	0.582**	(0.227)	0.513**	(0.223)
Central/Eastern Europe	0.481	(0.475)	0.947**	(0.470)
Former Soviet Union	-0.134	(0.810)	-0.354	(0.786)
South East Asia	-0.396	(0.433)	-0.532	(0.433)
Middle East/North Africa	-0.155	(0.830)	-0.847	(0.783)
Central/Latin America	0.351	(0.506)	0.141	(0.522)
Anglo-Saxon	-0.158	(0.236)	-0.141	(0.228)
United States	0.013	(0.394)	0.048	(0.384)
Italy	1.522***	(0.298)	1.415***	(0.279)
Constant	-2.087	(1.293)	-1.995*	(1.197)
R-squared	0.8007		0.8130	

E. Others	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom	0.749**	(0.301)	-0.207	(0.323)
Civil/Political Freedom Squared	-0.036*	(0.020)	0.032	(0.026)
Fraction Years Free	-2.832***	(0.926)	-2.165**	(1.082)
Fraction Years Partially Free	-1.227	(0.835)	0.335	(0.976)
EF: Size of Government	0.079	(0.081)	0.089	(0.082)
EF: Legal/Property Rights	0.153	(0.168)	0.308*	(0.179)
EF: Sound Money	-0.374**	(0.157)	-0.351**	(0.162)
EF: Foreign Trade	-0.116	(0.132)	-0.181	(0.137)
EF: Regulation	0.354*	(0.182)	0.329*	(0.195)
GDP per capita	0.024	(0.035)	0.024	(0.037)
GDP Growth [%]	0.004	(0.044)	-0.020	(0.045)
Inflation [%]	-0.085***	(0.020)	-0.071***	(0.023)
Gov.: Centrist or mixed ¹	-0.804***	(0.234)	-0.818***	(0.238)
Gov.: Left wing ¹	-0.282	(0.276)	-0.487*	(0.277)
Gov.: authoritarian ¹	-2.000**	(0.792)	-2.563***	(0.783)
Gov.: ethnic/religious ¹	-0.122	(0.582)	-0.561	(0.581)
Weak presidential ²	-0.699	(0.520)	-0.493	(0.535)
Parliamentary ²	-0.124	(0.282)	-0.146	(0.296)
Central/Eastern Europe	-0.963	(0.589)	-0.478	(0.623)
Former Soviet Union	1.098	(1.005)	1.614	(1.042)
South East Asia	0.754	(0.537)	0.971*	(0.574)
Middle East/North Africa	3.743***	(1.030)	2.892***	(1.038)
Central/Latin America	0.085	(0.627)	0.316	(0.692)
Anglo-Saxon	-0.411	(0.292)	-0.480	(0.303)
United States	-1.011**	(0.489)	-0.997**	(0.509)
Italy	-0.068	(0.370)	-0.050	(0.370)
Constant	-2.884*	(1.604)	-1.714	(1.586)
R-squared	05774		0.5473	

Breusch-Pagan Test of Independence

Civil Liberties	Political Rights
$\chi^2(10) = 42.58***$	$\chi^2(10) = 41.67***$

Notes: Number of observations is 54. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model and applying the General-to-Specific procedure. Analytic weights are applied using the total number of votes per country. Omitted variables include: fraction of years not free, right wing government, strong presidential system and Western Europe. A dummy for Italy is added because votes from Italy also include those from the Vatican. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). The Breusch-Pagan test of independence indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis of independence of the residuals across the equations in each of the Polish and Czech regressions. Therefore, OLS estimates would be inconsistent and the choice of SUR is justified.

Table A2 Poland: General Unrestricted Model Specification

A. Coalition of Democratic Left and Union of Labor (SLD-UP)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom	0.376*	(0.192)	0.076	(0.172)
Civil/Political Freedom Squared	-0.027**	(0.012)	-0.006	(0.014)
Fraction Years Free	-0.582	(0.637)	0.120	(0.737)
Fraction Years Partially Free	-0.899*	(0.494)	-0.391	(0.559)
EF: Size of Government	-0.003	(0.043)	-0.011	(0.044)
EF: Legal/Property Rights	-0.091	(0.072)	-0.133*	(0.070)
EF: Sound Money	-0.037	(0.064)	-0.021	(0.066)
EF: Foreign Trade	0.073	(0.081)	0.121	(0.080)
EF: Regulation	-0.266***	(0.088)	-0.272***	(0.093)
GDP per capita	0.005	(0.015)	-0.001	(0.015)
Gini Index	0.013	(0.009)	0.015	(0.010)
GDP Growth [%]	0.006	(0.028)	-0.004	(0.030)
Inflation [%]	-0.005	(0.009)	-0.009	(0.010)
Gov.: Centrist or mixed ¹	0.273**	(0.114)	0.306***	(0.115)
Gov.: Left wing ¹	-0.058	(0.121)	-0.013	(0.121)
Gov.: authoritarian ¹	0.309	(0.406)	0.410	(0.414)
Gov.: ethnic/religious ¹	0.875***	(0.308)	0.815***	(0.304)
Weak presidential ²	0.140	(0.388)	0.107	(0.392)
Parliamentary ²	0.298**	(0.152)	0.263	(0.167)
Central/Eastern Europe	-0.267	(0.384)	0.119	(0.424)
Former Soviet Union	-0.505	(0.499)	-0.179	(0.516)
South East Asia	0.197	(0.316)	0.228	(0.326)
Middle East/North Africa	0.362	(0.438)	0.363	(0.452)
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.403	(0.423)	-0.370	(0.446)
Central/Latin America	-0.380	(0.347)	-0.419	(0.359)
Anglo-Saxon	-0.258	(0.162)	-0.241	(0.164)
United States	0.230	(0.221)	0.192	(0.230)
Italy	-1.515***	(0.187)	-1.483***	(0.196)
Constant	-0.164	(0.970)	0.245	(0.954)
R-squared	0.8912		0.8830	

B. Solidarity Electoral Action (AWSP)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom	-0.356	(0.410)	-0.254	(0.360)
Civil/Political Freedom Squared	0.012	(0.026)	0.025	(0.029)
Fraction Years Free	-0.176	(1.360)	-0.748	(1.540)
Fraction Years Partially Free	-0.264	(1.055)	-0.200	(1.168)
EF: Size of Government	0.001	(0.093)	-0.040	(0.092)
EF: Legal/Property Rights	-0.152	(0.153)	-0.215	(0.147)
EF: Sound Money	-0.104	(0.137)	-0.076	(0.137)
EF: Foreign Trade	0.075	(0.173)	0.121	(0.168)
EF: Regulation	0.353*	(0.188)	0.246	(0.195)
GDP per capita	0.074**	(0.031)	0.063**	(0.032)
Gini Index	0.026	(0.020)	0.029	(0.020)
GDP Growth [%]	-0.283***	(0.059)	-0.252***	(0.062)
Inflation [%]	-0.030	(0.020)	-0.019	(0.021)
Gov.: Centrist or mixed ¹	-0.217	(0.244)	0.016	(0.239)
Gov.: Left wing ¹	-0.245	(0.257)	-0.049	(0.252)
Gov.: authoritarian ¹	-0.968	(0.867)	-0.501	(0.865)
Gov.: ethnic/religious ¹	-0.672	(0.658)	-0.240	(0.635)
Weak presidential ²	0.370	(0.828)	-0.003	(0.819)
Parliamentary ²	0.519	(0.325)	0.316	(0.349)
Central/Eastern Europe	0.948	(0.820)	0.430	(0.885)
Former Soviet Union	2.470**	(1.065)	2.153**	(1.078)
South East Asia	-0.371	(0.674)	-0.142	(0.681)
Middle East/North Africa	0.840	(0.935)	0.995	(0.944)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.327	(0.903)	-0.101	(0.931)
Central/Latin America	0.606	(0.741)	0.413	(0.750)
Anglo-Saxon	-0.235	(0.346)	-0.009	(0.343)
United States	-0.721	(0.473)	-0.748	(0.479)
Italy	1.518***	(0.398)	1.599***	(0.409)
Constant	-2.791	(2.069)	-3.507*	(1.993)
R-squared	0.6616		0.6052	

C. Union of Freedom (UW)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom	-0.214	(0.253)	0.138	(0.218)
Civil/Political Freedom Squared	0.012	(0.016)	-0.015	(0.018)
Fraction Years Free	0.452	(0.838)	0.020	(0.935)
Fraction Years Partially Free	0.885	(0.650)	0.328	(0.709)
EF: Size of Government	-0.040	(0.057)	-0.050	(0.056)
EF: Legal/Property Rights	0.071	(0.094)	0.035	(0.089)
EF: Sound Money	0.112	(0.084)	0.118	(0.083)
EF: Foreign Trade	-0.077	(0.107)	-0.069	(0.102)
EF: Regulation	0.231**	(0.116)	0.251**	(0.119)
GDP per capita	0.024	(0.019)	0.028	(0.019)
Gini Index	0.018	(0.012)	0.019	(0.012)
GDP Growth [%]	0.035	(0.036)	0.031	(0.038)
Inflation [%]	0.009	(0.012)	0.007	(0.013)
Gov.: Centrist or mixed ¹	0.472***	(0.151)	0.454***	(0.145)
Gov.: Left wing ¹	0.274*	(0.159)	0.265*	(0.153)
Gov.: authoritarian ¹	0.740	(0.535)	0.779	(0.525)
Gov.: ethnic/religious ¹	0.539	(0.405)	0.716*	(0.385)
Weak presidential ²	0.019	(0.510)	-0.012	(0.497)
Parliamentary ²	-0.381*	(0.200)	-0.303	(0.212)
Central/Eastern Europe	0.649	(0.506)	0.441	(0.537)
Former Soviet Union	0.268	(0.656)	0.045	(0.654)
South East Asia	0.660	(0.415)	0.638	(0.413)
Middle East/North Africa	-0.142	(0.577)	-0.058	(0.573)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.436	(0.556)	0.409	(0.565)
Central/Latin America	0.063	(0.457)	-0.012	(0.455)
Anglo-Saxon	-0.594***	(0.213)	-0.593***	(0.208)
United States	-1.428***	(0.291)	-1.397***	(0.291)
Italy	-0.120	(0.246)	-0.152	(0.248)
Constant	-4.944***	(1.276)	-5.476***	(1.210)
R-squared	0.8232		0.8234	

D. Law and Justice (PiS)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom	-0.455	(0.278)	-0.227	(0.242)
Civil/Political Freedom Squared	0.029*	(0.017)	0.023	(0.020)
Fraction Years Free	-0.227	(0.921)	-1.133	(1.038)
Fraction Years Partially Free	0.623	(0.714)	0.274	(0.787)
EF: Size of Government	0.076	(0.063)	0.074	(0.062)
EF: Legal/Property Rights	0.049	(0.104)	0.093	(0.099)
EF: Sound Money	0.030	(0.093)	0.016	(0.092)
EF: Foreign Trade	0.210*	(0.117)	0.164	(0.113)
EF: Regulation	-0.127	(0.127)	-0.165	(0.132)
GDP per capita	0.022	(0.021)	0.024	(0.022)
Gini Index	0.022	(0.013)	0.020	(0.013)
GDP Growth [%]	-0.085**	(0.040)	-0.061	(0.042)
Inflation [%]	0.001	(0.014)	0.010	(0.014)
Gov.: Centrist or mixed ¹	-0.296*	(0.165)	-0.241	(0.161)
Gov.: Left wing ¹	-0.359**	(0.174)	-0.335**	(0.170)
Gov.: authoritarian ¹	-0.703	(0.587)	-0.662	(0.583)
Gov.: ethnic/religious ¹	-1.444***	(0.445)	-1.294***	(0.427)
Weak presidential ²	-0.128	(0.560)	-0.206	(0.552)
Parliamentary ²	-0.431**	(0.220)	-0.500**	(0.235)
Central/Eastern Europe	0.103	(0.555)	-0.478	(0.596)
Former Soviet Union	0.048	(0.721)	-0.369	(0.726)
South East Asia	-0.801*	(0.456)	-0.747	(0.459)
Middle East/North Africa	-0.770	(0.633)	-0.755	(0.636)
Sub-Saharan Africa	-1.452**	(0.611)	-1.647***	(0.627)
Central/Latin America	-1.552***	(0.502)	-1.546***	(0.505)
Anglo-Saxon	0.099	(0.234)	0.162	(0.231)
United States	-0.454	(0.320)	-0.437	(0.323)
Italy	0.061	(0.270)	0.073	(0.276)
Constant	-1.978	(1.401)	-2.427*	(1.342)
R-squared	0.7652		0.7607	

E. Citizens' Platform (PO)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom	0.130	(0.240)	-0.419**	(0.201)
Civil/Political Freedom Squared	-0.009	(0.015)	0.034**	(0.016)
Fraction Years Free	-1.482*	(0.796)	-0.400	(0.862)
Fraction Years Partially Free	-0.831	(0.617)	0.300	(0.653)
EF: Size of Government	-0.076	(0.054)	-0.062	(0.052)
EF: Legal/Property Rights	0.089	(0.090)	0.134	(0.082)
EF: Sound Money	0.079	(0.080)	0.087	(0.077)
EF: Foreign Trade	-0.027	(0.102)	-0.020	(0.094)
EF: Regulation	0.195*	(0.110)	0.123	(0.109)
GDP per capita	-0.009	(0.018)	-0.022	(0.018)
Gini Index	-0.007	(0.012)	-0.008	(0.011)
GDP Growth [%]	0.072**	(0.035)	0.092***	(0.035)
Inflation [%]	0.024**	(0.012)	0.031***	(0.012)
Gov.: Centrist or mixed ¹	0.508***	(0.143)	0.571***	(0.134)
Gov.: Left wing ¹	0.563***	(0.151)	0.586***	(0.141)
Gov.: authoritarian ¹	-0.419	(0.508)	-0.486	(0.484)
Gov.: ethnic/religious ¹	0.535	(0.385)	0.291	(0.355)
Weak presidential ²	0.647	(0.484)	0.601	(0.459)
Parliamentary ²	-0.169	(0.190)	-0.323*	(0.195)
Central/Eastern Europe	-0.653	(0.480)	-0.171	(0.495)
Former Soviet Union	-1.447**	(0.623)	-1.005*	(0.603)
South East Asia	-0.658*	(0.394)	-0.564	(0.381)
Middle East/North Africa	-0.763	(0.547)	-0.867	(0.529)
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.206	(0.528)	-0.133	(0.521)
Central/Latin America	0.307	(0.434)	0.437	(0.420)
Anglo-Saxon	-0.058	(0.202)	-0.032	(0.192)
United States	-0.207	(0.277)	-0.236	(0.268)
Italy	0.215	(0.233)	0.238	(0.229)
Constant	-2.818**	(1.211)	-2.432**	(1.115)
R-squared	0.6034		0.6266	

F. League of Polish Families (LPR)	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom	-0.664	(0.518)	-0.349	(0.452)
Civil/Political Freedom Squared	0.036	(0.033)	0.025	(0.037)
Fraction Years Free	3.534**	(1.717)	3.030	(1.935)
Fraction Years Partially Free	1.587	(1.332)	1.399	(1.467)
EF: Size of Government	0.064	(0.117)	0.049	(0.116)
EF: Legal/Property Rights	-0.145	(0.193)	-0.154	(0.185)
EF: Sound Money	-0.284*	(0.173)	-0.268	(0.172)
EF: Foreign Trade	0.078	(0.219)	0.080	(0.211)
EF: Regulation	0.406*	0.237)	0.327	(0.245)
GDP per capita	0.006	(0.039)	0.000	(0.040)
Gini Index	-0.011	(0.025)	-0.009	(0.025)
GDP Growth [%]	-0.173**	(0.075)	-0.139*	(0.078)
Inflation [%]	-0.038	(0.025)	-0.027	(0.027)
Gov.: Centrist or mixed ¹	-1.587***	(0.309)	-1.474***	(0.301)
Gov.: Left wing ¹	-0.453	(0.325)	-0.388	(0.317)
Gov.: authoritarian ¹	-0.846	(1.095)	-0.707	(1.087)
Gov.: ethnic/religious ¹	-3.018***	(0.830)	-2.723***	(0.797)
Weak presidential ²	1.114	(1.045)	0.878	(1.030)
Parliamentary ²	0.880**	(0.410)	0.790*	(0.439)
Central/Eastern Europe	1.600	(1.036)	1.169	(1.112)
Former Soviet Union	4.309***	(1.345)	3.966***	(1.354)
South East Asia	-1.535*	(0.851)	-1.401	(0.855)
Middle East/North Africa	0.333	(1.181)	0.437	(1.187)
Sub-Saharan Africa	-1.007	(1.140)	-1.210	(1.169)
Central/Latin America	-0.267	(0.935)	-0.322	(0.943)
Anglo-Saxon	0.087	(0.437)	0.204	(0.432)
United States	0.826	(0.597)	0.863	(0.602)
Italy	-0.280	(0.503)	-0.294	(0.514)
Constant	-1.436	(2.613)	-2.535	(2.504)
R-squared	0.8070		0.8033	

G. Others	Civil Liberties		Political Rights	
Civil/Political Freedom	0.488	(0.382)	-0.018	(0.344)
Civil/Political Freedom Squared	-0.046*	(0.024)	0.014	(0.028)
Fraction Years Free	-0.103	(1.266)	0.002	(1.473)
Fraction Years Partially Free	-1.283	(0.982)	-0.425	(1.117)
EF: Size of Government	0.138	(0.086)	0.074	(0.088)
EF: Legal/Property Rights	0.356**	(0.143)	0.221	(0.141)
EF: Sound Money	-0.332***	(0.127)	-0.287**	(0.131)
EF: Foreign Trade	-0.031	(0.162)	0.091	(0.160)
EF: Regulation	0.088	(0.175)	-0.028	(0.187)
GDP per capita	-0.066**	(0.029)	-0.085***	(0.031)
Gini Index	-0.052***	(0.018)	-0.046**	(0.019)
GDP Growth [%]	0.008	(0.055)	0.018	(0.059)
Inflation [%]	-0.024	(0.019)	-0.019	(0.020)
Gov.: Centrist or mixed ¹	-0.795***	(0.227)	-0.449**	(0.229)
Gov.: Left wing ¹	-0.259	(0.240)	0.083	(0.241)
Gov.: authoritarian ¹	-0.569	(0.808)	0.250	(0.827)
Gov.: ethnic/religious ¹	-0.495	(0.612)	-0.099	(0.607)
Weak presidential ²	0.800	(0.771)	0.351	(0.784)
Parliamentary ²	0.393	(0.303)	0.063	(0.334)
Central/Eastern Europe	-0.759	(0.764)	-0.911	(0.847)
Former Soviet Union	-0.657	(0.991)	-0.558	(1.031)
South East Asia	-1.443**	(0.627)	-1.135*	(0.651)
Middle East/North Africa	0.263	(0.871)	0.418	(0.903)
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.013	(0.841)	0.451	(0.890)
Central/Latin America	1.231*	(0.690)	0.902	(0.718)
Anglo-Saxon	-0.729**	(0.322)	-0.419	(0.329)
United States	1.658***	(0.440)	1.521***	(0.459)
Italy	0.067	(0.371)	0.279	(0.391)
Constant	-1.571	(1.927)	-1.131	(1.906)
R-squared	0.5326		0.4921	

Breusch-Pagan Test of Independence

Civil Liberties	Political Rights
$\chi^2(21) = 85.20***$	$\chi^2(21) = 86.66***$

Notes: Number of observations is 66. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model and applying the General-to-Specific procedure. Analytic weights are applied using the total number of votes per country. Omitted variables include: fraction of years not free, right wing government, strong presidential system and Western Europe. A dummy for Italy is added because votes from Italy also include those from the Vatican. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). The Breusch-Pagan test of independence indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis of independence of the residuals across the equations in each of the Polish and Czech regressions. Therefore, OLS estimates would be inconsistent and the choice of SUR is justified.

Appendix B: List of Explanatory Variables:

Measures of Democracy

- **Freedom House Democracy Index:** The average of 2001 indicators of political freedom and civil liberties as reported by Freedom House, rescaled so that it ranges from 0 (no democracy) to 10 (full democracy).
- Sub-Indexes of Freedom House Democracy
 - Civil Liberties
 - Political Rights
- **Duration of Democracy:** Fraction of years between 1972 and 2001 in which the country is considered free, partially free, and not free, as reported by Freedom House.
- **Democracy Dummies:** Dummies included to measure whether the country is free, not free or partially free, where free is the omitted category, as reported by Freedom House.
- **Polity Democracy Index:** Computed by subtracting AUTOC (general closedness of political institutions) from DEMOC (general openness of political institutions), so that the resulting variable ranges from -10 (high autocracy) to 10 (high democracy), as reported by Polity IV Project Dataset.

Measures of Political Environment

- **Political orientation of the current government:** Coded as 1. Right-wing, 2. Centrist/mixed, 3. Left-wing, 4. Authoritarian and 5. Ethnic/Religious, right wing is omitted category. As reported in Beck, George, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh (2001)'s Database of Political Institutions and updated by the authors using information reported on <http://www.electionworld.org/index.html>.
- **Political System:** Coded as 1. Direct Presidential, 2. Weak Presidential (relatively strong president elected by the legislature) and 3. Parliamentary, where direct presidential is the omitted category. As reported in Beck, George, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh (2001)'s Database of Political Institutions and updated by the authors using information reported on www.electionworld.org/index.html.

Measures of Economic Freedom

- **Heritage Economic Freedom Index:** The 2001 economic freedom index as reported by the Heritage Foundation, rescaled so that it ranges between 0 (not free) and 5 (most free).
- **Fraser Economic Freedom Index:** The 2000 economic freedom index as reported by the Fraser Institute, which ranges between 0 (not free) and 10 (most free).
- **Sub-indexes of Fraser Economic Freedom:**
Each of the following indexes are measured on a 10 point scale determining the extent to which each area is considered economically free, ranging from 0 (not free) to 10 (most free):
 - Size of Government: Expenditure, Taxes and Enterprise
 - Legal Structure and Security of Property Right
 - Access to Sound Money
 - Freedom to exchange with foreigners
 - Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business

Measures of Economic Development

- **GDP per capita:** Gross Domestic Product is in per capita terms at purchasing power parity and in thousands of current US\$ as of 2000, as reported by the World Development Indicators.
- **GDP Growth:** Gross Domestic Product growth is in percent as of 2000, as reported by the World Development Indicators.
- **Inflation:** Inflation is the GDP deflator (annual %) in percent, as of 2000, as reported by the World Development Indicators.
- **Gini Coefficient:** The gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality, taken from Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) database and the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) in various years.

Distance Measures

- **Distance:** Measures the distance from host country capital to home country capital, measured in kilometers by City Distance Tool www.geobytes.com/CityDistancetool.htm.

- **Border Dummies:** Dummies included for countries which share a border with the Czech Republic and Poland.

Additional Dummies Included

- **Regional dummies:** Included for Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union, South East Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Sahara Africa, Central and Latin America and Anglo-Saxon Countries, where Western Europe is the omitted category.
- **Italy Dummy:** Included as votes from Italy also include those from the Vatican.

Table B1: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables: Political Indicators

Regions	Sub-Indexes of Freedom House Democracy Index 2000 ¹			Sub-Indexes of Freedom House Democracy Index 2001 ¹			Fraction Years Free ²	Fraction Years Partially Free ²	Polity Democracy Index 2001 ³	Polity Democracy Index 2002 ³	Political Orientation of Gov. ⁴	Political System ⁵
	Overall Index	Civil Liberties	Political Rights	Overall Index	Civil Liberties	Political Rights						
Former Soviet Union	3.90 (1.79)	3.83 (1.37)	3.67 (2.46)	3.70 (1.77)	3.67 (1.31)	3.50 (2.41)	0 (0)	0.32 0.15	0.30 (6.75)	0.10 (6.92)	3.30 (1.16)	0.20 (0.63)
Central and Eastern Europe	7.86 (1.83)	7.38 (1.56)	8.45 (2.31)	7.93 (1.69)	7.50 (1.42)	8.57 (2.25)	0.25 (0.16)	0.22 0.22	8.23 (1.74)	8.62 (1.33)	2.43 (0.94)	1.64 (0.74)
Asia	5.36 (3.34)	5.00 (2.77)	5.48 (3.89)	5.36 (3.34)	5.00 (2.77)	5.48 (3.89)	0.24 (0.31)	0.45 0.38	3.00 (7.45)	3.07 (7.36)	3.36 (1.50)	1.14 (0.86)
North Africa and Middle-East	2.47 (1.68)	2.44 (1.77)	2.11 (1.83)	2.13 (1.46)	2.11 (1.47)	1.89 (1.65)	0.02 (0.06)	0.44 0.33	-4.00 (4.80)	-4.08 (4.79)	3.67 (0.98)	0.33 (0.72)
Sub-Sahara Africa	4.58 (2.50)	4.31 (1.94)	4.45 (3.28)	4.58 (2.43)	4.17 (2.07)	4.72 (3.00)	0.05 (0.10)	0.48 0.30	2.36 (4.88)	3.18 (5.12)	3.08 (1.16)	0.33 (0.78)
Central and South America	7.08 (2.71)	6.67 (2.75)	7.50 (2.89)	7.17 (2.79)	6.67 (2.84)	7.64 (2.97)	0.46 (0.29)	0.37 0.28	7.08 (4.58)	7.08 (4.58)	1.83 (0.83)	0.08 (0.29)
Anglo-Saxon	9.83 (0.41)	9.72 (0.68)	10 (0)	9.83 (0.41)	9.72 (0.68)	10 (0)	1 (0)	0 0	10 (0)	10 (0)	1.50 (0.84)	1.67 (0.82)
Western Europe	9.50 (0.71)	9.17 (1.18)	10 (0)	9.50 (0.71)	9.17 (1.18)	10 (0)	0.97 (0.07)	0.02 0.05	9.94 (0.25)	9.94 (0.25)	1.61 (0.78)	1.72 (0.67)
United States	10	10	10	10	10	10	1	0	10	10	1	0

Notes: The table reports the mean values for each explanatory variable, with the standard deviation in parentheses.

¹ The democracy index is the average of 2000 and 2001 indicators of political freedoms and civil liberties as reported by the Freedom House, rescaled so that it ranges from 0 (no democracy) to 10 (full democracy). ² Fraction years free (partially free) is a variable that corresponds to the fraction of the years that the country was classified as free (partially free) by the Freedom House. ³ The Polity democracy index for 2001 and 2002 ranges from -10 (high autocracy) to 10 (high democracy)

⁴ Political orientation of the government. ⁵ Political system: presidential, weak presidential (relatively strong president elected by the legislature), parliamentary.

Table B2: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables: Economic and Inequality Indicators

Regions	Sub-Indexes of Fraser Economic Freedom Index 2000 ¹						Heritage Economic Freedom Index 2000 ²	Heritage Economic Freedom Index 2001 ²	GDP per Capita 2000 ³	Gini Coefficient ⁴	GDP Growth 2000 [%] ⁵	Inflation ⁶ [%]
	Overall Index	Size of Gov.	Legal/Property Rights	Sound Money	Foreign Trade	Regulation						
Former Soviet Union	5.50 (1.57)	5.19 (1.29)	5.81 (2.06)	4.53 (4.35)	6.78 (0.19)	5.20 (1.27)	1.35 (0.49)	1.31 (0.49)	4.23 (2.25)	38.84 (12.71)	5.96 (3.14)	35.49 (55.03)
Central and Eastern Europe	6.10 (0.70)	4.85 (1.14)	6.49 (0.74)	6.44 (1.90)	7.02 (0.93)	5.69 (0.54)	1.95 (0.62)	2.05 (0.58)	9.01 (3.92)	30.40 (4.12)	4.69 (1.75)	7.60 (10.81)
Asia	6.80 (1.14)	6.80 (1.35)	5.73 (1.74)	8.03 (1.51)	7.28 (1.52)	6.17 (1.03)	2.06 (1.02)	2.07 (1.02)	9.78 (9.71)	37.50 (8.33)	5.91 (2.97)	3.30 (4.93)
North Africa and Middle-East	6.05 (1.08)	5.61 (1.26)	6.11 (1.57)	7.46 (1.90)	5.95 (1.34)	4.96 (1.32)	1.58 (0.85)	1.60 (0.89)	6.94 (4.88)	43.24 (10.18)	3.68 (2.19)	15.13 (15.92)
Sub-Sahara Africa	5.52 (1.02)	5.99 (1.04)	4.42 (1.42)	5.92 (2.19)	6.32 (0.57)	5.25 (1.07)	1.50 (0.58)	1.65 (0.39)	2.01 (2.42)	45.32 (8.28)	2.49 (3.45)	50.23 (119.97)
Central and South America	6.66 (0.70)	7.31 (0.93)	5.09 (1.19)	7.63 (1.55)	7.00 (0.72)	6.25 (0.61)	2.11 (0.74)	2.12 (0.73)	7.73 (2.22)	49.27 (8.98)	3.46 (2.62)	7.72 (7.41)
Anglo-Saxon	8.21 (0.21)	6.46 (0.59)	9.23 (0.18)	9.40 (0.26)	8.24 (0.43)	7.71 (0.46)	3.14 (0.10)	3.19 (0.15)	26.85 (4.93)	37.19 (4.53)	4.62 (3.51)	3.31 (1.08)
Western Europe	7.38 (0.47)	4.60 (1.24)	8.43 (1.03)	9.28 (0.65)	8.01 (0.74)	6.57 (0.68)	2.73 (0.26)	2.78 (0.27)	25.67 (7.28)	31.78 (4.31)	4.05 (1.52)	3.02 (3.54)
United States	8.54	7.57	9.23	9.66	8	8.23	3.2	3.25	34.14	40.8	4.2	2.21

Notes: The table reports the mean values for each explanatory variable, with the standard deviation in parentheses.

¹ The Fraser Economic Freedom Index and sub-indexes are measured on a 10 point scale determining the extent to which each area is considered economically free, ranging from 0 (not free) to 10 (most free). ² The Heritage economic freedom index is the 2002 value of the index, rescaled so that it ranges between 0 (not free) and 5 (most free). ³ Gross national income is in per capita terms and in thousands current US\$. ⁴ The gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality, which ranges from 0 (perfect equality) and 100 (perfect inequality). ⁵ GDP growth is in percent. ⁶ Inflation is in percent.

Appendix C: List of Regions and Countries

Former Soviet Union	
Polish Votes	Czech Votes
Azerbaijan	Belarus
Belarus	Georgia
Jordan	Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan	Russia
Moldova	Ukraine
Russia	Uzbekistan
Ukraine	
Uzbekistan	

Asia	
Polish Votes	Czech Votes
China	China
Hong Kong	India
India	Indonesia
Indonesia	Japan
Japan	Korea South
Korea North	Malaysia
Korea South	Mongolia
Malaysia	Pakistan
Singapore	Philippines
Taiwan	Singapore
Thailand	Thailand
	Vietnam

Central and Eastern Europe	
Polish Votes	Czech Votes
Albania	Albania
Bosnia-All	Bosnia-All
Bulgaria	Bulgaria
Croatia	Croatia
Czech	Estonia
Estonia	Hungary
Hungary	Latvia
Latvia	Lithuania
Lithuania	Poland
Macedonia	Romania
Romania	Slovakia
Slovakia	Slovenia
Slovenia	

Latin America	
Polish Votes	Czech Votes
Argentina	Argentina
Brazil	Brazil
Chile	Chile
Columbia	Columbia
Costa Rica	Costa Rica
Cuba	Cuba
Mexico	Mexico
Panama	Peru
Peru	Uruguay
Uruguay	Venezuela
Venezuela	

Western Europe	
Polish Votes	Czech Votes
Austria	Austria
Belgium	Belgium
Cyprus	Cyprus
Denmark	Denmark
Finland	Finland
France	France
Germany	Germany
Greece	Greece
Iceland	Israel
Israel	Italy
Italy	Netherlands
Luxembourg	Norway
Netherlands	Portugal
Norway	Spain
Portugal	Sweden
Spain	Switzerland
Sweden	
Switzerland	

Anglo-Saxon	
Polish Votes	Czech Votes
Australia	Australia
Canada	Canada
Ireland	Ireland
USA	USA
United Kingdom	United Kingdom

Middle East and North Africa	
Polish Votes	Czech Votes
Algeria	Algeria
Egypt	Egypt
Iran	Iran
Iraq	Iraq
Jordan	Kuwait
Kuwait	Lebanon
Lebanon	Libya
Libya	Morocco
Morocco	Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia	Syria
Syria	Tunisia
Tunisia	Turkey
Turkey	United Arab Emir.
United Arab Emir.	Yemen
Yemen	

Sub-Sahara Africa	
Polish Votes	Czech Votes
Angola	Congo-Kinshasa
Congo-Kinshasa	Cote d'Ivoire
Kenya	Ethiopia
Madagascar	Ghana
Nigeria	Kenya
Senegal	Nigeria
South Africa	South Africa
Tanzania	Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe	

Table C1 Bivariate Correlations of Fraser Economic Freedom Index and Sub-Indexes

2000 Fraser Index	Economic Freedom	EF: Size of Government	EF: Legal/Property Rights	EF: Sound Money	EF: Foreign Trade	EF: Regulation
Economic Freedom	1					
EF: Size of Government	0.22	1				
EF: Legal/Property Rights	0.76	-0.32	1			
EF: Sound Money	0.84	0.03	0.60	1		
EF: Foreign Trade	0.76	0.01	0.57	0.51	1	
EF: Regulation	0.85	0.20	0.63	0.56	0.66	1

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