The relationships between phenomenology and the analytic tradition - the main rival to phenomenology in the twentieth century, which eventually became the dominant approach in anglophone academic philosophy - are complex and became increasingly fraught over the course of the century.\footnote{On the development of the analytic tradition in the twentieth century, see Anat Biletzki and Anat Matar (eds.), The Story of Analytic Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998); Juliet Floyd and Sanford Shieh (eds.), Future Pasts: The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth-Century Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Peter Hylton, Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); and especially the essays in Michael Beaney (ed.), The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology (London: Routledge, 2007). For a discussion of the development of both traditions in the twentieth century, see my "Introduction: Towards an Assessment of Twentieth-Century Philosophy:" in The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, Dermot Moran (ed.) (London: Routledge, 2008).} Early in the twentieth century, there was considerable interaction between both phenomenological and analytic European philosophers. Husserl, for instance, was one of the first philosophers to recognize the philosophical significance of the Gottlob Frege (arguably the founder of analytic philosophy). Similarly, Bertrand Russell read Frege and Meinong, and corresponded with them in German; Wittgenstein moved between Austria and Cambridge; Moore read Brentano and chaired one of Husserl’s lectures in London; Ryle lectured on Austrian philosophy at Oxford; Carnap attended Husserl’s seminars in Freiburg in the 1924-1925, and so on. On the other hand, there was lack of knowledge of the different traditions: for instance, Paul Ricoeur lamented that he could find no one in Paris from whom to learn Russell’s philosophy in the 1930s and Russell’s History of Western Philosophy.
(1946) is notorious for its poor treatment of European philosophers such as Nietzsche and for ignoring twentieth-century developments apart from “the Philosophy of Logical Analysis.”

While there was interaction and discussion between the various schools and traditions, the Second World War seemed to have had a decisive impact and, in the post-war years, the two traditions grew apart, leading eventually to a kind of détente, although one based largely on mutual ignorance. Karlo-Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas, and Paul Ricoeur are rare examples, in the period under discussion, of European philosophers who sought to incorporate the insights of Wittgenstein, Austin, Searle, and others. Meanwhile, Anglophone analytic philosophers, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, simply paid no attention to phenomenology and its European followers. It was not until the end of the 1970s that analytically trained philosophers such as Richard Rorty began to pay close attention to Husserl, Heidegger, and the phenomenological tradition. The “analytic” response to phenomenology in fact has to be found largely on the European continent and then within the larger neo-Kantian tradition.

Some of the sharpest critical responses to phenomenology (primarily, the work of Husserl and Heidegger) came from within the loosely organized phenomenological movement itself; and indeed many of these criticisms anticipated those made subsequently by analytic philosophers. As Ricoeur put it, phenomenology is “both the sum of Husserl’s work and the heresies issuing from it.” In this chapter, however, I shall be concerned with what may be broadly construed as the analytic reception of phenomenology. Because Neo-Kantian criticisms of phenomenology in many ways anticipated and indeed inspired the analytic criticisms, it will be necessary to discuss the Neo-Kantian reaction to phenomenology en passant. Furthermore I will begin my narrative a little earlier than 1930, since critical responses to phenomenology began to appear especially after Husserl published his major book on phenomenological method, the programmatic Ideas I in 1913; and, owing to the absolute dearth of interrelations between the

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3 A noteworthy exception is Wilfrid Sellars, who allowed some room for phenomenology, albeit without the Wesensschatz, and who had studied Husserl with his teacher Marvin Farber, who himself had studied with Husserl in Freiburg.
4 In this regard, Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature groups Russell with Husserl as epistemological foundationalists and links the later Wittgenstein with Heidegger as critics of foundationalism and representationalism. [*] For a discussion of Rorty, see the essay by David R. Hiley in The History of Continental Philosophy: Volume 6.
6 E. Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, F. Kersten (trans.) (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1983). Since Ideas I was the
traditions during the 1960s, I will end my survey a little later than 1970 with the Searle-Derrida debate that began in 1977. I take this encounter to be one of the paradigmatic cases, although Searle himself denied that this debate represented “a confrontation between two prominent philosophical traditions.”

I. Challenges to Phenomenology in Europe

Phenomenology was inaugurated as a specific method at the outset of the twentieth century by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), especially in the Introduction to the second volume of his massive ‘breakthrough’ work, Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations, 1900/1901). Husserl systematically developed phenomenology in his subsequent publications, i.e. Ideas I (1913), Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929), Cartesian Meditations (1931) and the articles of the Crisis of the European Sciences that appeared in the journal Philosophia (1936). In the period from 1913-1929, Husserlian phenomenology vied with Neo-Kantianism (Windelband, Rickert, Natrop, Cassirer) as the most prominent philosophical movement in Germany, with phenomenology gradually challenging and eventually eclipsing the once dominant Neo-Kantian tradition, while the tradition of ‘life-philosophy’ (Lebensphilosophie) remained somewhat minor voice until the revival of Nietzsche’s work in the 1930s. The neo-Kantians took phenomenology seriously and engaged critically with it: Paul Natorp, for instance, reviewed both Husserl’s Logical Investigations and his Ideas I, and was prescient in predicting that Husserl would move closer to neo-Kantianism. When, in 1916, Husserl moved from the University of...

only book Husserl published between 1901 (Logical Investigations) and 1929 (Formal and Transcendental Logic), it is impossible to overestimate its importance as the primary source (outside Husserl’s own lectures and seminars) for those wishing to engage with his phenomenology. As such, it is cited by Carnap, Ryle and others.


9 For a detailed discussion of German and French neo-Kantianism, see the essay by Sebastian Luft and Fabien Capeillères in The History of Continental Philosophy: Volume 3.
Göttingen to take up the Chair of Philosophy in Freiburg (previously occupied by Heinrich Rickert), phenomenology became installed in the Neo-Kantian heartland. In the following decade or so, from 1916 to 1928 (the year of his official retirement), Husserl established himself as the most influential philosopher in Germany. His protégé Martin Heidegger was his preferred successor and, with Husserl’s support, succeeded him to the Chair of Philosophy in Freiburg in 1928. Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit (Being and Time, 1927)*, which Husserl himself had arranged to be published in his *Jahrbuch*, had immediate impact, but the ground for his fame had already been prepared by his lectures at Marburg (1923-1928) which had already made him famous with a generation of students, as Hannah Arendt would later recall.\(^{10}\)

Heidegger’s own intellectual formation owed much not only to Catholic Neo-Thomism (through which he encountered Brentano’s work on Aristotle, which led him to Husserl),\(^ {11}\) but also to Neo-Kantians such as Rickert (his *Doktorvater*) and Emil Lask. Following his ten-year close exposure to Husserl, in his magnum opus, Heidegger deliberately linked phenomenology to hermeneutics, as found in the German tradition of Schleiermacher and Dilthey, as well as drawing on Kierkegaard’s and Jasper’s existentialism, and thereby changed phenomenology radically from within. Presuppositionless, descriptive eidetic insight, gained under the rigorous application of the *epoché*, gave way to interpretation, historical situatedness and an appreciation of human finitude and of the anxiety involved in person existence. Husserl’s term ‘consciousness’ (*Bewusstsein*) was replaced by Heidegger’s Dasein.\(^ {12}\) Soon after, with the publication of his *Kantbuch*, Heidegger deliberately distanced himself from Neo-Kantianism, very publicly in his famous Davos debate with Ernst Cassirer in 1929.\(^ {13}\)

When he eventually came to read *Being and Time* in 1929, Husserl was deeply disturbed by Heidegger’s distortion of transcendental phenomenology. He was also especially disturbed after he read Georg Misch’s 1931 study, *Lebensphilosophie*

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und Phänomenologie,\textsuperscript{14} which discussed Husserl, Heidegger and Dilthey, in terms that suggested it was Heidegger who was the leading new voice of hermeneutical phenomenology as he had absorbed the best impulses of life-philosophy: the attempt to grasp life itself. Husserl embarked on a series of responses to the Heideggerian challenge culminated in his 1936 \textit{Crisis of the European Sciences}.\textsuperscript{15} But his young assistant Eugen Fink also sought to defend Husserl’s phenomenology against its critics - in particular in his 1933 \textit{Kant-Studien} article “The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism,”\textsuperscript{16} which Husserl himself explicitly endorsed - in which he responded to the accusation that with \textit{Ideas I}, Husserl had drawn closer to neo-Kantianism.

By 1930, phenomenology had become something of an orthodoxy in Germany and was already beginning to experience a backlash. Thus, for example, Max Horkheimer, in his speech inaugurating the newly emerging Frankfurt School, had characterised phenomenology as belonging to “traditional” rather than “critical” theory.\textsuperscript{17} The Neo-Kantians, following Heinrich Rickert, had renewed their attack on phenomenology, precisely because they claimed there was no pure given back to which phenomenological intuition could turn. They were effectively challenging what, after Sellars, would be known as the ‘myth of the given’. Scheler’s sudden death in 1929 and Heidegger’s “turning” (\textit{die Kehre}) away from the constraints of academic philosophy during the 1930s also contributed to the decline of phenomenology, as did the Nazi purge of Jewish academics from the universities. Even younger German philosophers of the day – including Gadamer and Eugen Fink – believed that Husserlian phenomenology needed to be wedded to something more fundamental: in Gadamer’s case, it was hermeneutics and the nature of language; in Fink’s case it was Hegelian speculation.

After the Second World War, interest in phenomenology sharply declined in Germany. Husserl had died in isolation in 1938; Heidegger was under a teaching

\textsuperscript{14} Georg Misch, \textit{Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie. Eine Auseinandersetzung der Diltheyschen Richtung mit Heidegger und Husserl} (Leipzig: B. B. Teubner, 1931). Misch, Dilthey’s son in law, sent a copy of his book to Husserl, who was deeply disturbed to find that his version of phenomenology was presented in a bad light in contrast with Heidegger’s absorption of Dilthey.


suspension and was giving private talks on German poets such as Hölderlin; Fink was
developing his own philosophy, writing about Nietzsche; Gadamer was developing
hermeneutics (and reviving Hegel) and Habermas was renewing critical theory.
Heidegger’s official embrace of Nazism between 1933 and 1945 was a major reason
for the hostility which German analytic philosophers in particular (many of whom had
been expelled from or had to flee Nazi Germany) held towards phenomenology.
Jürgen Habermas was shocked by Heidegger’s apparent unrepentance and lack of
self-questioning regarding his National Socialist activities, as instanced by
Heidegger’s publicaion of his 1935 lectures Introduction to Metaphysics where he
left standing remarks concerning the ‘inner truth and greatness’ of National
Socialism. Moreover, Heidegger’s invocation of ‘metaphysical’ concepts such as the
‘being of beings’ was considered anathema by philosophers who follow the positivist
rejection of metaphysics as nonsense. Phenomenology’s legacy was now tainted both
by fascism and by the spectre of reviving metaphysics!

As we have seen, phenomenology was being challenged in Germany by neo-
Kantian and Frankfurt School thinkers during the 1930s-1950s. But phenomenology
also came under attack from various offshoots of the neo-Kantian tradition, especially
the Vienna Circle movement that gradually evolved into logical positivism. I will
now turn to the analytic challenge to phenomenology, which I will present in the form
of four paradigmatic confrontations.

II. Four Confrontations

The First Confrontation: Phenomenology (Husserl) and Viennese Logical Positivism
(Schlick) Plus Neo-Kantianism (Natorp and Rickert)

Phenomenology, itself the child of the Austrian tradition of philosophy founded by
Bolzano and Brentano, did have a specific line of influence in Vienna.

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18 See M. Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1953), p. 152;
trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt as Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven & London:
Yale University Press, 2000), p. 213. Habermas’s review of the 1953 Heidegger lectures can
be found as “Martin Heidegger: On the Publication of the Lectures of 1935,” in Richard
Wolin, ed. The Heidegger Controvery: A Critical Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1993).

19 On the complex history of the Vienna Circle, logical positivism and logical empiricism, see
Thomas Uebel, “On the Austrian Roots of Logical Empiricism: The Case of the First Vienna
Circle,” in Logical Empiricism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Paulo Parrini et
al. (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007).

20 See Barry Smith, Austrian Philosophy. The Legacy of Franz Brentano (Chicago and
during the development of logical positivism. Felix Kaufmann (1895-1949), a graduate in jurisprudence and an enthusiastic reader of Husserl’s phenomenology, attended meetings of the circles around Hans Kelsen (his doctoral supervisor), the economist Von Mises, and the group that eventually became known as the Vienna Circle. Kaufmann had a significant influence on the social phenomenology of the young Alfred Schutz, and his book on the *Infinite in Mathematics and its Exclusion* (1930) was highly regarded by Husserl. Kaufmann often discussed Husserl at meetings of the Vienna Circle (much to the annoyance of Schlick and some others) and also wrote on the relations between phenomenology and logical empiricism. In 1938, Kaufmann emigrated to the United States where, as an academic (teaching law and philosophy) at the New School for Social Research, he wrote several papers on the relation between phenomenology and analysis and, indeed, debated with his fellow émigré Rudolf Carnap on the nature of induction and truth in the pages of the newly founded *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. It is clear that Carnap respects Kaufmann and that Kaufmann was recognized as an influential mediator between phenomenology and the emergent logical positivist tradition. In particular, Kaufmann defended Husserl’s concept of *Wesensshau* against Moritz Schlick’s criticisms (which I shall discuss below), and argued that Husserl’s concept of evidence (*Evidenz*) had been misunderstood by those critics who regarded it as a subjective feeling of certainty.

During the early 1930s, critical philosophical responses to phenomenology came especially from Vienna Circle logical positivists such as Schlick and

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241
Rudolf Carnap.\textsuperscript{27} Admittedly, Schlick had already challenged Husserl’s phenomenology in the first edition (1918) of his \textit{Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre} (\textit{General Theory of Knowledge}).\textsuperscript{28} Husserl responded to Schlick’s criticisms in the Foreword to his Second Edition of the Sixth Investigation (which was published as a separate volume in 1921). Here Husserl asserts that many criticisms drawn from outside phenomenology fail to understand the effect that bracketing has on one’s opinions and convictions. He dismisses the absurd view that Schlick attributes to him:

How readily many authors employ critical rejections, with what conscientiousness they read my writings, what nonsense they have the audacity to attribute to me and to phenomenology are shown in the \textit{Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre} of Moritz Schlick. On page 121 of that work it is said that my \textit{Ideas} “asserts the existence of a particular intuition, that is not a real psychic act, and that if someone fails to find such an “experience”, which does not fall within the domain of psychology, this indicates that he has not understood the doctrine, that he has not yet penetrated to the correct attitude of experience and thought, for this requires “peculiar, strenuous studies”’. The total impossibility that I should have been able to utter so insane an assertion as that attributed to me by Schlick in the above italicized sentences, and the falsity of the rest of his exposition of the meaning of phenomenology, must be plain to anyone familiar with this meaning.\textsuperscript{29}

The tone of Husserl’s dismissal of Schlick indicates that there is a certain hostility in his attitude to him. Husserl is incredulous that Schlick apparently believes that his eidetic intuition is not also a real psychic act. Husserl goes on to remark: “I must expressly observe that, in the case of M. Schlick, one is not dealing with irrelevant slips, but with sense-distorting substitutions on which all his criticisms are based.”\textsuperscript{30} Husserl is particularly annoyed that a doctrine of special

\textsuperscript{27} Moritz Schlick (14 April 1882 – 22 June 1936; born in Berlin, Germany; died in Vienna, Austria) was educated at the University of Berlin. His influences included Carnap, Planck, and Wittgenstein, and he held appointments at the University of Vienna.

\textsuperscript{28} The Second Edition of Schlick’s \textit{Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre} is translated as \textit{General Theory of Knowledge} Schlick dropped most of the Husserl discussion and condensed his criticisms into a single paragraph in the Second Edition; see Moritz Schlick, \textit{General Theory of Knowledge}, A.E. Blumberg and H. Feigl (trans.) (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1985). For an interesting discussion, see Roberta Lanfredini, “Schlick and Husserl on the Essence of Knowledge,” in \textit{Logical Empiricism}, Parrini \textit{et al.} (eds.).

\textsuperscript{29} Husserl, \textit{Logical Investigations}, vol. 2, 179.

or indeed mystical intuition is being attributed to him and to phenomenology. Husserl believes the meaning of the *epoché* has been completely misunderstood by Schlick. Phenomenology is not a Platonic gazing at essences given in a kind of intellectual intuition; it is based on hard work, akin to mathematics.

In fact, Schlick had been targeting Husserl’s account of essential intuition (*Wesensschau*) in the *Logical Investigations* from as early as 1910. In general, Schlick was opposed to the idea that knowledge (which he conceived of as essentially propositional) could be any kind of intuition. As he puts it in a 1932 paper, “Form and Content: An Introduction to Philosophical Thinking”: “Intuition is enjoyment, enjoyment is life, not knowledge.” For him, the pure content of intuitive experience was inexpressible. He writes, “The difference between structure and material, between form and content is, roughly speaking, the difference between that which can be expressed and that which cannot be expressed. And he goes on to say: “Since content is essentially incommunicable by language, it cannot be conveyed to a seeing man any more or any better than to a blind one. For Schlick, one can see a green leaf and say that one sees the green leaf, but one’s saying it does not communicate the intuitive content ‘green’. This is his position against phenomenology. Schlick maintained that all knowing involved seeing-as and hence conceptualizing and judging. Pure intuiting, for Schlick, did not have the status of knowing. Ironically, Schlick does not challenge Husserl on the basis of any kind of verificationism. Both Husserl and Schlick were advocates of kinds of empiricism whereby knowledge is founded on perceptual experience, but Husserl always rejected positivism on the grounds that it overly narrowly restricted the content of experience (to sense data) and did not grasp the nature of what Husserl termed “categorial intuition.”

Nevertheless, the brief but acrimonious debate between Husserl and Schlick more or less set the tone for future confrontations between phenomenology and the nascent analytic movement. Schlick returned to attack Husserl’s phenomenology again in 1930, this time attacking Husserl’s defence of synthetic

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priori propositions (Husserl’s ‘material a priori’), which Schlick regarded rather as empty tautologies, rather than offering significant eidetic insights.\textsuperscript{35} For Schlick, as for logical positivism in general, there is no synthetic a priori. Schlick followed Wittgenstein’s \textit{Tractatus} in holding that a priori statements were simply tautologies and as such did not “say” anything. For Husserl, on the other hand, there are certain truths that are a priori but which depend on the nature of the matter in question.\textsuperscript{36} Thus, something being blue and at the same time yellow is not, for him, a purely formal truth based solely on the law of noncontradiction, but rather an a priori synthetic truth grounded in the essential nature of colour as essentially dependent on surface. Interestingly, as we shall see below, the mature Wittgenstein would side with Husserl against Schlick on this issue of the synthetic a priori.\textsuperscript{37}

Husserl may have been particularly irked by Schlick precisely because the latter was repeating a criticism of phenomenology’s reliance on intuition that was to be found not just in the nascent logical positivist tradition to which Schlick belonged but also in orthodox neo-Kantianism. For neo-Kantianism, it was a matter of orthodoxy that intuitions without concepts were blind. Prominent German neo-Kantians of the day, including Rickert and Natorp, as well as other prominent philosophers such as Hans Cornelius (one of Adorno’s teachers), had also criticised phenomenology’s assumptions concerning pure unmediated givenness. Phenomenology was seen as a new form of irrational or nonconceptual intuitionism, and, as such, would be doomed to failure. Indeed, Rickert and others said as much in their criticisms of Husserl.

It is one of the ironies of the history of philosophy that in his early lectures at Freiburg, Heidegger, himself a student of Rickert, takes up the challenge of defending phenomenological intuition against both Natorp and Rickert. In his 1919 lecture-course, “The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview,” Heidegger takes issue with Natorp’s criticism that phenomenology’s claim to be founded in immediate intuition is bankrupt since all immediacy has to be mediated by concepts and since consciousness, which is the basis for all objectification, is itself something that escapes determination. For Natorp, original experience can at best be “theoretically regained” or “reconstructed” by some

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{36} For a recent discussion, see Jocelyn Benoist, \textit{L’a priori conceptuel: Bolzano, Husserl, Schlick} (Paris: Vrin, 1999). Benoist carefully distinguishes the question of the nature of analyticity (as raised by Quine) from the question of the nature of the synthetic a priori.
\item \textsuperscript{37} For a discussion of the transformation from the early to the late Wittgenstein, see the essay by Bob Plant and John Fennel in \textit{The History of Continental Philosophy: Volume 3}.
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kind of working back through the original “construction” process whereby the experience was subsumed under generalising concepts. Natorp, then, challenges the view that phenomenology can recover direct unmediated experience. Phenomenology can at best be a “reconstruction” of experience.

Against Natorp’s critique, the young Privatdozent Heidegger defends phenomenological viewing by arguing that conceptual description is in fact founded in an original experience that is originally non-theoretical in character. Furthermore, it is a mistake to consider phenomenological ‘signification’ to be itself another kind of standpoint; it is in fact the attempt to free thinking from standpoints. The “original sin” against phenomenology, as Heidegger puts it in the same lecture course, is to assume that the phenomenological stance is merely another standpoint. For Heidegger, phenomenological meaning-apprehension goes along with the life process itself and grasps the essential ‘worldliness’ of experience in a non-falsifying way. According to Heidegger, now embarking on his own original conception of phenomenology, phenomenology essentially operates with what he terms in 1919 “hermeneutical intuition” (hermeneutische Anschauung). Heidegger is, as we can clearly see, already on the road to the hermeneutic transformation of Husserlian descriptive phenomenology.

In later lecture courses, Heidegger offers a similar defence of phenomenology against his former teacher Rickert. In agreement with Natorp, Rickert also maintained that experience necessarily involves conceptualisation and indeed would soon afterward (in 1920) published a virulent critique of the “vitalism” of the then popular life-philosophy (which Rickert understood broadly as including Nietzsche, Simmel, Dilthey, Bergson, Scheler et al.) on the grounds that life had

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39 Natorp had been a major influence on Husserl and reviewed both Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas* I. They were in regular correspondence until Natorp’s death in 1924. Natorp reviewed the first volume of the *Investigations—Prolegomena to Pure Logic*—favourably in *Kant Studien* in 1901, portraying Husserl as broadening the essentially Kantian inquiry into the necessary conditions of the possibility of experience. See Paul Natorp, “Zur Frage der logischen Methode. Mit Beziehung auf Edmund Husserls Prolegomena zur reinen Logik,” *Kant Studien* 6 (1901), published in English as “On the Question of Logical Method in Relation to Edmund Husserl’s *Prolegomena to Pure Logic,*” in *Readings on Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations*, J.N. Mohanty (ed.) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977).

40 Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 94; *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, 111.

41 Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 93. Interestingly, at various points in his own lecture courses, Husserl himself designated the original sin of philosophy as the fall into psychologism and naturalism.

42 Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 99; *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, 117.
to be conceptualised in order to be understood. Rickert attacks those life-philosophers who argue for the need to remain “true to life”. This is simply impossible for Rickert, since reality is grasped not just through sense impressions, but is mediated through language. Language, with its generalizations and “species names”, is, according to Rickert, precisely a necessary reduction of the complexity of the world of sensuous experience. It is conceptualisation that brings order and system into the world of sensory experience that otherwise would be a chaos of fleeting sensations (as Kant had pointed out). Rickert concludes that “what is directly experienced as reality cannot be known. Thus, there is no metaphysics of life. … Life, as the unmediated reality, can only be lived through. As immediate life it mocks any attempt to get to know it.” Of course, Rickert shared Husserl’s disdain for what they regarded as irrationalist “life philosophy,” brimming with “enthusiasm” but lacking solid argumentation and conceptualisation. Indeed, it was largely owing to Heidegger and Jaspers that more existentialist figures such as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were reclaimed by the philosophical tradition. Scheler too had been responsible for a new appreciation of the role of personhood, emotions, and feelings, in philosophy, but neo-Kantianism resisted the lure of life philosophy and continued to insist that the business of philosophy was the clarification of scientific knowledge, not of the celebration of life. Even the term Erlebnis, dear to both Dilthey and Husserl, is a concession to vitalism, according to Rickert, and he identifies and criticises the urge toward life that is to be found in Heidegger’s philosophy (inspired by Dilthey).

The attack of the positivists was essentially a reprise of the original criticisms of phenomenology made by the Neo-Kantians. Yet Husserl remained well disposed to the Neo-Kantians, especially Natorp. During his Freiburg years, he also maintained formal but cordial relations with Rickert and corresponded with him frequently. Indeed, as he pointed out to Rickert, both were in agreement in opposing the increasingly dominant naturalism. Both phenomenology and Neo-Kantianism understood philosophy to be primarily an a priori and transcendental enterprise and resisted all attempts at naturalism. One the other hand, Husserl was more antagonistic towards the new positivism. Having originally been an admirer of Ernst Mach, one of the forerunners of the Vienna Circle, and having characterised phenomenology, with its unprejudiced viewing, as

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44 The German reads: “… was als Realität unmittelbar erlebt wird, kann nicht erkannt werden. Also gibt es keine Metaphysik des Lebens. … Das Leben als das unmittelbar Reale lässt sich nur erleben. Es spottet als unmittelbares Leben jedem Erkenntnisversuch.” (Rickert, *Die Philosophie des Lebens*, 113; my translation).
the genuine positivism in Ideas I § 20, in later years, Husserl went on to claim in Crisis that “positivism, in a manner of speaking, decapitates philosophy,” by ignoring the role of the subject in the constitution of knowledge.

The Second Encounter: Carnap Reads Husserl and Heidegger
The second encounter between phenomenology (this time represented by Husserl and Heidegger) and analytic philosophy (this time represented by Carnap) was even sharper in tone than the earlier dispute between Husserl and Schlick. Heidegger’s famous, “What is Metaphysics?,” delivered at the University of Freiburg in July 1929, was deliberately provocative and evoked very strong reactions. Carnap, who was present at the talk, was, reputedly, appalled by Heidegger’s claims. His reply, entitled “On the Overcoming of Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of Language,” appeared in the new journal of the logical positivists, Erkenntnis, Volume 2, in 1931. Carnap’s essay was actually a programmatic manifesto against traditional metaphysics involving the supposed demonstration of the meaningless of metaphysical claims based on a ‘logical analysis’ of meaning. With this essay, the battle between a certain tendency in phenomenology and logical analysis (later transformed into ‘analytical philosophy’) had begun. Indeed, the journal Erkenntnis had been explicitly founded by Carnap and Reichenbach to preach the logical positivist message and explicitly advocate ‘scientific philosophy’. Carnap’s attack on Heidegger was in effect a deliberate declaration of war, just

46 Originally translated as “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language,” in Logical Positivism A.J. Ayer (ed.) (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), this translation has been reprinted -- with a more accurate title -- as “The Overcoming of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language,” in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, Murray (ed.).
47 For a discussion of some of these battles see the essays in Parrini et al. (eds.) Logical Empiricism: see especially Gottfried Gabriel, “Carnap’s ‘Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language’: A Retrospective Consideration of the RelationshipBetween Continental and Analytic Philosophy.”
48 As Carl Hempel recalled in 1975, “The old Erkenntnis came into existence when Hans Reichenbach and Rudolf Carnap assumed the editorship of the Annalen der Philosophie and gave the journal its new title and its characteristic orientation; the first issue appeared in 1930. The journal was backed by the Gesellschaft für Empirische Philosophie in Berlin ... and by the Verein Ernst Mach in Vienna, whose philosophical position was strongly influenced by that of the Vienna Circle; a brief account of these groups, and of several kindred schools and trends of scientific and philosophical thinking, was given by Otto Neurath in ‘Historische Anmerkungen’ [vol. 1, 311-14]” (Carl Hempel, “The Old and the New ‘Erkenntnis’,” Erkenntnis 9 [1975]).
as Heidegger’s own Inaugural Address was meant to challenge both Husserl and neo-Kantianism.

For subsequent followers of analytic philosophy, Carnap’s essay has been seen as effectively unmasking Heidegger’s nonsense (literally). Indeed, the significance of Carnap’s criticisms of Heidegger may be compared with Heidegger’s own criticisms of Cassirer in his famous Davos debate of 1929. Just as Heidegger’s debate with Cassirer had the eventual result of elevating phenomenology over neo-Kantianism in Germany, Carnap’s debate with Heidegger had the eventual result of elevating analytic philosophy over Heideggerian phenomenology in the anglophone world.  

In fact, however, Carnap was actually much closer to Husserlian phenomenology than many analytic philosophers have been willing (until recently, for example, in the work of Michael Friedman 50) to acknowledge. Carnap had been a student of the neo-Kantian philosopher Bruno Bauch at Freiburg, and had even attended Husserl’s seminars in 1924-25, when he was living near Freiburg and assembling the material that would become Der logische Aufbau der Welt (The logical construction of the world; 1928) 51 Carnap became associated with the Vienna Circle after he moved to take up a position in Vienna in 1926, introduced through his friend Hans Reichenbach. 52 In 1929, Carnap, along with Hans Hahn and Otto Neurath wrote the manifesto of the Vienna Circle, which aimed at propagating a “scientific conception of the world [wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung]” in opposition to traditional metaphysical and theological worldviews. 53 This manifesto suggested that the survival of metaphysical outlooks could be explained by psychoanalysis or by sociological investigation.

49 Carnap participated in the debate at Davos. Michael Friedman claims that Carnap’s virulent attack on Heidegger in "Overcoming Metaphysics Through the Logical Analysis of Language" essay grew directly out of his encounter with Heidegger in Davos in 1929 (A Parting of the Ways. Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger [La Salle, IL: Open Court, 2000], x).
50 See, for example, the essay by Michael Friedman and Thomas Ryckman in The History of Continental Philosophy: Volume 3.
53 See Friedrich Stadler, "The Vienna Circle: Context, Profile, and Development;" in The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism, Richardson and Uebel (eds).
but most advanced was the “clarification of the logical origins of metaphysical aberration, especially through the works of Russell and Wittgenstein.”

Husserl, Heidegger and Carnap all shared a view of philosophy as attempting to clarify certain basic matters and getting beyond certain traditional philosophical problems which they regarded as “pseudo-problems” (Scheinprobleme). Husserl himself often made derogatory remarks about “windy metaphysics” not grounded in intuition and indeed his clarion call “to the things themselves” was meant to be a repudiation of metaphysical speculation. So the rejection of metaphysics alone did not single out Carnap’s approach from that of the phenomenologists. Furthermore, Carnap cited Husserl in positive terms in several places in the Aufbau, as he had earlier done in his dissertation published as Der Raum (1922), where he discusses Husserl’s views on the intuited nature of space. There is even some debate about the extent of Husserl’s influence, especially on Carnap’s central conception of “construction” (Aufbau). Carnap certainly played down the influence in later years but it is clear that, in the mid-1920s, he was well disposed toward the Freiburg phenomenologist.

In general, the Aufbau shows strong Neo-Kantian influences, albeit that Carnap is deeply in debt to the new Russelian “logistics” which he regards as “most comprehensive” (Aufbau §3). Following on from the tradition of Meinong, Husserl, and others, who were also seeking a “theory of objects,” Carnap is seeking to identify various forms of object and begins broadly from the division between physical objects, psychological objects and cultural objects. Like Husserl, Carnap operates with a very wide conception of an “object” – an object is anything about which a statement can be made (and hence includes relations, events, etc). Carnap confirms the positive connection between his approach and Meinong’s theory of objects as well as Husserl’s “mathesis of experiences” (as he finds explicated in Husserl’s Ideas I).

Analytic philosophers may be surprised to learn that Carnap even invokes Husserl’s epoché approvingly in Aufbau §64. In speaking about beginning from one’s personal experiences (which Carnap, adapting the term “methodological

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56 See Richardson, Carnap's Construction of the World, 153-4. Carnap wanted to maintain both that purely geometrical space was a formal construct, derivable from mathematics, and that physical space was experienced in intuition, albeit it in a limited way.
57 Carnap, Logical Structure of the World, 9. Carnap refers to Husserl's Ideas I (I 913), §75, but this does not seem to be the right reference for "mathesis."
individualism” calls “methodological solipsism”), Carnap says that he will suspend belief as to whether the beliefs are actual or not:

At the beginning of the system, the experiences must simply be taken as they occur. We shall not claim reality or nonreality in connection with these experiences; rather, these claims will be “bracketed” (i.e., we will exercise the phenomenological “withholding of judgement”, *epoché*, in Husserl’s sense (*Ideas* I §§31, 32).\(^58\)

Interestingly, perhaps inspired by the Humean approach (which Husserl himself, following Brentano, adopted in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations* until convinced by Natorp of the need to recognize the "I"), Carnap believes that original experiences are given in a non-egoic manner (*Aufbau* §65). They do not have to be related to a "subject" or a "self," concepts that Carnap believes are higher "constructions" in his sense. Some kind of "I-relatedness" is not an original property of the basic experiences, Carnap claims, since to invoke the "I" is already to invoke "others" and these are higher-order entities, outside the original given. Departing from the mature Husserl of *Ideas I* (who had restored the pure ego as the transcendental source of all experience), Carnap believes that the assumption that experiences must be related to a subject is actually a prejudice driven by the subject-predicate structure of our language. Carnap acknowledges that in divorcing experiences from subjects he is departing from certain philosophical "systems;" including that of Husserl (Carnap refers to *Ideas I*, 65; presumably §37).\(^59\) The *Aufbau* then offers the kind of building-up or construction of objects from experiences that Husserl's phenomenology also tried to trace, but it does so by avoiding the introduction of the pure or transcendental ego.\(^60\)

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\(^59\) Ibid., 106.

\(^60\) In an illuminating article, Abraham Stone has summarized the correlations between Husserl and Carnap in the *Aufbau* as follows: “Carnap’s initial realm of the ‘autopsychological’ clearly corresponds (as he explicitly points out [Logical Structure, §64]) to Husserl’s region of pure consciousness; its fundamental objects are called *Erlebnisse*. Next comes the physical realm, where, as in Husserl, the fundamental objects are ‘things.’ Carnap even follows Husserl on the detailed steps by which such ‘things’ are constituted: first, a level of visual things (*Sehdinge*), i.e., mere colored surfaces moving in space (Husserl, *Ideas I*, §15; Carnap, *Logical Structure*, §128); then, a narrowly ‘physical’ level of quantitative description in which movement is determined by strict causal law (Husserl, *Ideas I*, §52; Carnap, *Logical Structure*, 180-82); finally, the level of ‘intersubjective’ objects (though in this case, as both make clear, there is a kind of interweaving by which higher-order, psychological objects are used to complete the constitution of lower-order, physical ones) (Husserl, *Ideas I*, §151; Carnap, *Logical Structure*, §§148-9). After the physical realm comes a ‘heteropsychological’ one (corresponding to Husserl’s psychological region), and finally a realm or realms of *Geist*. Carnap follows Husserl, moreover, in referring to the process responsible for this structure, by which one object
In his 1931 article "Overcoming Metaphysics," Carnap continues in the spirit of the Vienna Circle manifesto to apply the methods and procedures of the new logic (which Heidegger himself had written about as early as 1912) to show that Heidegger's "metaphysical" claims about nothingness were not just false but literally nonsensical. It is worth noting that Heidegger is but one target of Carnap's analysis. Carnap makes clear that he could have drawn his nonsensical statements from anyone of a number of "metaphysicians" and, indeed, those cited in the paper include Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Bergson, as well as Heidegger. Carnap uses the concept of "pseudo-statements" in order to criticize Heidegger. A "pseudo-statement" is a sentence that has a surface grammatical sense but which on analysis turns out not to assert anything that is meaningful (capable of verification) and hence that is literally meaningless. As Carnap puts it, such pseudo-sentences accord with "historical-grammatical syntax" but violate "logical syntax."

In "Overcoming Metaphysics," Carnap argues that there is a fault in human language that admits sentences (both meaningful and meaningless) that possess the same "grammatical form." Carnap suggests that sentences in Heidegger's 1929 essay - Carnap places Heidegger in "the metaphysical school" - such as "The Nothing nothings" (Das Nichts Selbst nichtet) bear a superficial grammatical resemblance to acceptable sentences such as "'The rain rains."

But this sentence is misleading because, Carnap asserts, "nothing" cannot function like a name. He points to the difference between the "is" of predication (e.g., "he is hungry") and the "is" of existence (e.g., "he exists") and asserts that the correct logical form of the "is" of existence is that it is applicable only to predicates, and not to signs for objects. Carnap writes:

To be sure it has been known for a long time that existence is not a property (see Kant's refutation of the ontological proof of the existence of God). But it was not until the advent of modern logic that full consistency on this point was reached: the syntactical form in which modern logic introduces the sign for existence is such that it

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founded on another, as Konstitution (Carnap, Logical Structure, §§1-2)" (Stone, "Heidegger and Carnap on the Overcoming of Metaphysics," 230). Stone’s page references are to the 1974 German edition of the Aufbau.

61 Heidegger's text is quoted by Carnap: "What is to be investigated is being only and – nothing else; being alone and further - nothing; solely being, and beyond being - nothing. What about this nothing? ... Does the Nothing exist only because the Not, i.e., the Negation, exists? Or is it the other way around? Does Negation and the Not exist only because the Nothing exists? ... We assert: the Nothing is prior to the Not and the Negation ... Where do we seek the Nothing? How do we find the Nothing ... We know the Nothing ... Anxiety reveals the Nothing. What about this Nothing - The Nothing itself nothings [Das Nichts selbst nichtet]" ("The Overcoming of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language,” 24).
cannot, like a predicate, be applied to signs for objects, but only to predicates …

This extents the Frege-Russell treatment of the existential quantifier. According to Carnap in his essay “Overcoming Metaphysics,” Heidegger makes the logical mistake “of employing the word ‘nothing’ as a noun” (Gegenstandsname) instead of recognizing it is an negative existential sentence or assertion. Carnap’s approach, of course, is precisely an application of Russelian logical analysis (as exemplified by Russell in his “On Denoting” [1905]) to a typical sentence of metaphysics to show that its apparently meaningful grammatical form masks an underlying logical nonsense.

Carnap’s attack on Heidegger has been seen in some analytic circles as devastating. His views were popularized in the anglophone world by A.J. Ayer, especially in his Language, Truth and Logic, published in 1936, shortly after Carnap's visit to London. But the original target for the logical positivists had been Hegel and, when logical positivism moved to Britain, neo-Hegelians such as Bradley and Greene. Carnap's article, however, went much further in its attacks, not just targeting Hegel (who also writes about the Nothing), but even criticizing Descartes for his supposed pseudo-statement "I am;' presented as the conclusion of his cogito ergo sum. Most analytic philosophers would not follow Carnap in his analysis of the supposed logical flaw in Descartes's famous dictum, yet he was treated as having effectively dismissed Heidegger. In fact, between the 1930s and the 1970s, analytic philosophy was largely defined by its overt hostility to all forms of metaphysics, but the situation has changed rapidly since the 1970s and something called "analytic metaphysics" - inspired by the work of Roderick Chisholm, Peter Strawson, David Lewis, David Armstrong, and others - is now a leading branch of analytic philosophy. Moreover, Carnap's rejection

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62 Ibid., 28.
63 In Language, Truth and Logic (1936), for instance, A. J. Ayer quotes a sentence from Bradley's Appearance and Reality as nonsensical: "the Absolute enters into, but is itself incapable of, evolution and progress:' In the same work, Ayer also criticizes Heidegger's assumption that "Nothing" is "a name which is used to denote something peculiarly mysterious;' but he himself makes dear that he is repeating Carnap's analysis in his "Overcoming Metaphysics" article of 1931. See A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd ed. (New York: Dover, 1952), 36.
64 In large part, the debate between phenomenology and logical positivism was about the meaning and status of the a priori. As Friedman, among others, has pointed out, Carnap's reaction to phenomenology, and indeed to Heidegger, was complex. Husserl's account of the a priori comes close to that of the logical positivists. Of course, both Carnap and Heidegger had received their initial training in neo-Kantianism. See Friedman, A Parting of the Ways, and his essay 'A Turning Point in Philosophy: Carnap-Cassirer-Heidegger;' in Logical Empiricism, Parrini et al. (eds); see also Gabriel, "Carnap's 'Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language.'"
of Heidegger has in fact been revisited by analytic philosophers, many of whom now acknowledge the limitations of Carnap’s approach.

In 1935 Carnap delivered three lectures in London, published as Philosophy and Logical Syntax. In these lectures, he states that the only proper task of philosophy is logical analysis and offers as his example the logical analysis of metaphysics. Carnap defines metaphysical statements as follows: "I will call metaphysical all those statements which claim to represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all experience, e.g., about the Essence of things, about Things in themselves, the Absolute, and such like." He includes statements by ancients such as Thales ("the Essence and Principle of the world is water"), Heraclitus, Anaximander, Pythagoras, and Plato, as well as moderns such as Spinoza, Schelling, Hegel, and Bergson. According to Carnap, all the statements of metaphysicians of this kind have no empirical content, hence no possibility of being verified and are thereby literally nonsensical. The supposed problems of metaphysics were, for him, in reality pseudo-problems. Carnap does allow for metaphysical statements to have a function, namely, an expressive one, similar to the function of "lyrical verses": "The metaphysician believes that he travels in territory in which truth and falsehood are at stake. In reality, however, he has not asserted anything, but only expressed something, like an artist."

Although Heidegger never directly replied to Carnap, he does seem to have been affected by Carnap’s criticism. Thus, in his 1943 ‘Postscript to “What is Metaphysics?”’ Heidegger insisted that one of the chief “misconceptions” concerning his position was that it “declares itself against ‘logic.’” Heidegger goes on to claim that logic has degenerated into “logistics” and that “exact thinking” is not really the most rigorous or penetrating form of thinking: “exact thinking merely binds itself to the calculation of beings.” Calculative thinking is in pursuit of mastery; in opposition to this, there is another form of thinking, that Heidegger here calls “essential thinking,” whose aim it is to find the word that speaks “the truth of being.” The question “How is it with the nothing?” is not a question of logic. The “nothing” is more originary than the logical concepts of “not” and negation. The fundamental mood of anxiety reveals the nothing in a

66 Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language;" 79. Interestingly, in these lectures, Carnap takes issue with Wittgenstein's claim in the Tractatus that his own statements were without sense. For Carnap, the sentences of the Tractatus have sense as logical analysis but not as a competing metaphysics.
67 For further discussion of Heidegger's early work on logic, see the essays by Miguel de Beistegui and Babette Babich in The History of Continental Philosophy: Volume 3.
way that is more primordial. Heidegger simply shifts the ground for the entire discussion. Issues from within formal logic cannot affect a kind of thinking which is more originary than logic.

The Third Encounter: Cambridge (Wittgenstein) and Oxford (Ryle) Consider Phenomenology

In general Ludwig Wittgenstein seems to have been uninterested in phenomenology, just as he was uninterested in or impatient with other philosophical movements of the time – including the logical positivists whom he himself had influenced and who continued to admire him, even after he had abandoned the position that they embraced! There have been suggestions that his work has much in common with Husserl’s Logical Investigations, but the precise nature of Wittgenstein’s knowledge of that book has not been established. Occasionally, especially in the late twenties and early nineteen thirties, Wittgenstein employed the term “phenomenology” in a positive sense, with an entire chapter of his so called “Big Typescript” (1933) entitled “Phenomenology is Grammar.” Similarly, in some remarks made in 1929, Wittgenstein offered apparently sympathetic reflections on Heidegger’s Being and Time, wherein he recognised the importance of “anxiety” or “dread” (Angst) and related the notion of the experience of astonishment concerning the experience of running up against the limits of language. In remarks that were recorded by Friedrich Waismann, Wittgenstein said:

I can readily think what Heidegger means by Being and Dread. Man has the impulse to run up against the limits of language. Think, for example, of the astonishment that anything exists. This astonishment cannot be expressed in the form of a question, and there is also

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no answer to it. Everything which we feel like saying can, a priori, only be nonsense. Nevertheless, we do run up against the limits of language. This running up against the limits of language is Ethics. I hold that it is truly important that one put an end to all the idle talk about Ethics—whether there be knowledge, whether there be values, whether the Good can be defined, etc.\footnote{See Wittgenstein, “On Heidegger on Being and Dread,” 80-81.}

Heidegger had discussed the nature of Angst in \textit{Being and Time} §40, but he returned to it also in his July 1929 lecture “What is Metaphysics?,” which we have already discussed. Around this time also, in 1930, Wittgenstein made a comment, recorded by his friend Maurice O’Connor Drury, concerning Schlick’s upcoming presentation at the Moral Science Club in Cambridge, where he had been asked to speak about phenomenology. Wittgenstein commented acidly: “You ought to make a point of going to hear this paper, but I shan’t be there. You could say of my work that it is ‘phenomenology’.\footnote{See Maurice O’Connor Drury, “Conversations with Wittgenstein,” in \textit{Personal Recollections of Ludwig Wittgenstein}, Rush Rhees (ed.) (Totowa, N. J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), 131. See also Herbert Spiegelberg, “Wittgenstein Calls his Philosophy ‘Phenomenology,’” \textit{Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology} 13(3) (October, 1982).} In several of his remarks, Wittgenstein speaks of a kind of phenomenology of colour experiences, for instance, that cannot be contradicted by physics; and acknowledges the appeal of phenomenology in his \textit{Remarks on Color}. But more than that, in his later career Wittgenstein was developing an appreciation for \textit{a priori} synthetic propositions that Schlick has explicitly rejected as part of the phenomenologist’s toolbox.

Meanwhile, at Oxford, the ordinary-language philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976),\footnote{Ryle was a graduate at Oxford in classics and philosophy, who spent his entire academic life at Christ Church, and he eventually became Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy.} who was responsible for lecturing on phenomenology and Austrian philosophy, had his own way of reading Husserl and others.\footnote{For an interesting discussion of Ryle’s reading of phenomenology, see Amie L. Thomasson, “Phenomenology and the Development of Analytic Philosophy,” \textit{Southern Journal of Philosophy} 40 (2002 Supplement).} Initially Ryle was reasonably well disposed to phenomenology, both for its descriptions of conscious states and for its conception of philosophy as independent of the sciences. But by the late 1930, he had come to reject it in favour of a kind of linguistic behaviourism that repudiated most “internalist” accounts of the stream of consciousness.
Very early in his lecturing career, Ryle reviewed Husserl’s Polish student Roman Ingarden’s *Essential Questions* (*Essentiale Fragen*)\(^77\) in *Mind* in 1927 and Heidegger’s *Being and Time*\(^78\) in *Mind* in 1929, just two years after that work had originally appeared in German, and, in 1929, he even visited Husserl in Freiburg and discussed phenomenology with him.\(^79\) Ryle initially seemed to have been quiet favourably disposed to phenomenology, which he saw as offering the same kind of conceptual analysis that he favoured. In 1932, Ryle contributed a fairly detailed article explaining phenomenology to the *Supplementary Volume* of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*,\(^80\) and his later articles on phenomenology (especially his review of Husserl’s American student Marvin Farber’s *The Foundations of Phenomenology*\(^81\)) are extremely valuable and insightful with regard to the initial reception of phenomenology in the Anglophone world.\(^82\) In his 1932 article “Phenomenology,” Ryle points out that phenomenology, which he defines as the science of the manifestations of consciousness, is not to be confused with phenomenalism. He explains Brentano and his fellow phenomenologists as asking the question: “What is it to be a case of remembering, judging, inferring, wishing, choosing, regretting, etc.?” (CP1 167). This, for Ryle, is a conceptual question totally distinct from empirical inquiries into what causes one to remember, and so on. Ryle therefore explicitly endorses the phenomenologists’ separation of their discipline from empirical psychology. He further agrees with Husserl that the discipline of phenomenology is *a priori*. Phenomenology, for Ryle, is a kind of *a priori* conceptual analysis. He disagrees, however, with Husserl’s claim that phenomenology is a rigorous science, since Ryle simply thinks philosophy generally, as the “analytic investigation of types of mental functioning,” has nothing to do with science: “Philosophical methods are neither scientific nor unscientific” (CP1 168). Philosophy is *sui


\(^80\) Gilbert Ryle, "Phenomenology;' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume 11 (1932); reprinted in CPI.

\(^81\) Gilbert Ryle, "Review of Marvin Farber: *The Foundations of Phenomenology*;' *Philosophy* 21 (1946); reprinted in CPI.

\(^82\) In the postwar years, Ryle became more emphatic in his criticisms of many aspects of phenomenology's manner of proceeding. While Ryle's quirky writing style may sound today somewhat chauvinistic in its championing of Anglo-Saxon values over those he styles 'Teutonic;' there is no doubt that he makes every effort to understand phenomenology as well as to criticize it.
generis, although that does not mean that it is occupied with special sorts of entities such as abstract objects, sense data, and other philosophical terms of art.

Interestingly, in endorsing Husserl’s apriorism, Ryle agrees with Husserl’s opposition to various forms of naturalism and empiricism. Ryle further agrees with Husserl that philosophy should not engage in the construction of speculative systems. While he does find some metaphysical constructions in Husserl, Ryle goes on to assert: “But with his [Husserl’s] official view, that the business of philosophy is not to give new information about the world but to analyse the most general forms of what experience finds to be exemplified in the world, I completely agree” (CP1 170).

On the other hand, Ryle explicitly disagrees with Husserl’s account of ideal entities (abstract objects, propositions, and so on) which he thinks is close to Meinong’s. He opposes the view that one can have essential or eidetic insight in the manner of a supposed direct inspection of essences. As Ryle sees it, Husserl often speaks as if one simply inspects or “constatates” (Ryle’s word) essences. This is misleading because he also talks about identifying the eidetic laws. Ryle writes:

Philosophy is, accordingly, a kind of observational science (like geography); only the objects which it inspects are not spatio-temporal objects but semi-Platonic objects which are out of space and time. These are correlates to acts of conception and judgment, though whether it is essential to them to be so correlative or whether it is accidental is left rather obscure by Husserl’s writings. (Ibid.)

Ryle supposes that Husserl conceives these ideal objects as independently subsisting (akin to Meinong), although for Ryle, Husserl is not clear enough on this point. In his later writings of phenomenology, Ryle continues to dismiss Husserl’s Platonism concerning these ideal entities (CP1 219). He believes it is both an “impropriety” and a “nonsense” to speak of seeing essences in this manner (CP1 220). Taking his cue from the later Wittgenstein, Ryle notes that “we elucidate their significations by fixing the rules of their uses and not by any operation of gazing at any wearers of labels” (CP1 221). For Ryle, thought does not begin with a vocabulary and then develop a syntax; rather, “its vocabulary is syntactical from the start.” In his 1946 review of Farber’s The Foundations of Phenomenology, Ryle is more emphatic:

The proprietary method claimed for Phenomenology is a sham, and Phenomenology, if it moves at all, moves only by the procedures by

83 See Ryle, “Review of Marvin Farber,” CP1 221.
which all good philosophers have always advanced the elucidation of concepts, including consciousness-concepts. Husserl’s practice bears this out. He does often produce acute original and illuminating elucidations of such concepts. (Ibid.)

Ryle concedes that Husserl engages in conceptual clarification, but in general, as he puts it in his review of Heidegger, he fears that the phenomenological approach will end in a “windy mysticism.” In “Phenomenology,” Ryle thinks that Husserl does not have to cling to the doctrine of eidetic intuition. Indeed, for Ryle, the main doctrine of phenomenology is the thesis that all consciousness is consciousness of something; in other words, that all consciousness is intentional, or, in Ryle’s terms, “transitive” (CP1 171). Although he is deeply interested in Husserl’s account of intentionality, Ryle ends up criticizing its conception of mental acts as “consciousness-of.” Rather, Ryle thinks (following the former Wykeham Professor of Logic, John Cook Wilson’s views), mental acts such as believing involve reference to knowledge; and hence “knowledge-of” should replace Husserl’s location of “consciousness-of.” In his “Phenomenology” of 1932, we already see phenomenology being criticized from the standpoint of the newly emerging analytic philosophy of language. Furthermore, Ryle is explicitly unhappy with Husserl’s turn to a kind of “egocentric metaphysic” (CP1 174), having gone beyond its original purpose of providing conceptual analyses of mental acts or states.84

In his main work, The Concept of Mind (1949), Ryle rejected all philosophical efforts to postulate an ego or Cartesian-style mind as some kind of “ghost in the machine,” favouring instead a behaviourist, “dispositionalist” account of sentences that purported to involve mental predicates. Ryle Writes:

It is being maintained throughout this book that when we characterize people by mental predicates, we are not making untenable

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84 In the nineteen fifties Ryle participated in the famous Royaumont conference in France, along with Merleau-Ponty. Unfortunately, there does not appear to have been much useful exchange of views. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Ayer, who was stationed in Paris attached to the British Embassy, and Merleau-Ponty were known to have had lengthy conversations and to have radically disagreed. In one encounter in 1951, recorded by Georges Bataille, Ayer, Bataille and Merleau-Ponty took opposite sides on the meaning of a sentence such as “the sun existed before humans were on earth” with Ayer insisting it was completely meaningful and Bataille being incredulous.84 Unfortunately, we know little more about these conversations. See A.J. Ayer, Part of My Life: The Memoirs of a Philosopher (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 285. For an interesting analysis of the Ryle-Merleau-Ponty debate, see Juba Himanka, “Does the Earth Move? A Search for Dialogue between Two Traditions of Contemporary Philosophy,” The Philosophical Forum 31(1) (Spring 2000), esp. 58-9.
inferences to any ghostly processes occurring in streams of consciousness which we are debarred from visiting; we are describing the ways in which those people conduct parts of their predominantly public behaviour.  

As a result, Ryle was characterized as a logical behaviorist and his views strongly influenced his student Daniel Dennett, who employs the Rylean strategy of the "category mistake" to diffuse ontological commitments with regard to mental entities. Ryle was now rejecting the very concept of a stream of consciousness and was advocating that our mental categories (what he calls "category habits") be replaced by new "category disciplines" that are purged of Cartesian myth. Ryle's views on the ego, of course, are actually not far removed from those of Jean-Paul Sartre, especially as given in his 1936 essay The Transcendence of the Ego, where Sartre too tries to dissolve reference to the ego in sentences such as "I am chasing a street-car." For Sartre, the immediate conscious experience has the form "street-car to be chased." Ryle's criticism of Husserlian approaches to consciousness, then, might not have extended to all phenomenology's exponents. The problem with the encounter between phenomenology and ordinary language philosophy as exemplified by Ryle at Oxford, is that the confrontation was one-sided. The phenomenologists and their continental followers rarely showed interest in what was happening in the anglophone world. For all intents and purposes, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Feigl, and others, were completely absorbed into anglophone, Anglo-American philosophy, and their roots in European thought were ignored until a new subject, the history of analytic philosophy, emerged in the 1980s.

The Fourth Dimension: John Searle and Jacques Derrida Arguing Over Austin
The fourth paradigmatic encounter I will discuss in this essay is the confrontation that took place between the American philosopher John R. Searle and the French philosopher Jacques Derrida in the late 1970s. While this is somewhat outside the parameters of the historical period under consideration in this volume, it has to be acknowledged that the 1960s perhaps represent a particularly barren period in terms of the relations between analytic and continental philosophy (understood here as the legacy of phenomenology) generally. On the one hand, it was only in the postwar years that many of the classics of the continental

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86 See, for instance, Daniel C. Dennett, Content and Consciousness (London: Routledge, 1969).
87 A milestone in the development of the history of analytic philosophy was Michael Dummett's Origins of Analytical Philosophy, originally delivered as lectures in Bologna in 1987.
tradition – Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* (translated 1970), Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (translated 1962), Sartre’s *Being and Nothingness* (translated 1958), and Merleau-Ponty’s *Phenomenology of Perception* (translated 1962) – first began to be discussed seriously in the Anglophone world. Philosophers such as John Wild, J.N. Findlay, Hazel Barnes, and others played an important intermediary role here. On the other hand, a growing hostility to continental philosophy and an increasing insistence that philosophy as such was analytic became particularly strident in the English-speaking world during that decade. Philosophically, the 1960s is a period of apartheid and separate development, and it is difficult if not impossible to find a fruitful encounter between analytic philosophy and phenomenology. Within the analytic tradition there were lone voices – such as those of P.F. Strawson (defending descriptive metaphysics), and Wilfrid Sellars – that were relatively favourably disposed to certain kinds of post-Kantian philosophy, but there was no serious effort to engage with phenomenology or its continental followers.

Hence the need to look to the 1970s to round off our narrative. The confrontation that I want to consider ostensibly took place over Derrida’s interpretation of the Oxford philosopher John Austin’s account of performatives, but it reaches to the very heart of Searle’s and Derrida’s versions of what constituted the nature of language, the practice of philosophy, and indeed the standards governing textual interpretation. This debate continues to generate controversy as to its importance for the confrontation between so-called “analytic” and “continental” ways of philosophizing, and represents a convenient place for us to end our story in this essay.

Searle studied at Oxford in the 1950s with Austin and others. He initially worked on philosophy of language and became well known for his book *Speech Acts* (1969), which systematized Austin’s work on performatives and other kinds of illocutionary acts. In Europe, Searle’s work had a strong influence on both Habermas and Apel. Searle then moved to write on issues in the philosophy of mind and especially on the nature of intentionality. Searle’s *Intentionality* (1983) is modelled on his earlier analysis of speech acts. Just as, in speech acts, there is a distinction between propositional content and illocutionary force, in intentional states there is a similar distinction to be found between the propositional content and its propositional attitude or what Searle terms “psychological mode.” Searle claims that in researching his book *Intentionality*, he could find nothing useful in the analytic literature:

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So I turned to the phenomenologists, and the book that I was urged to read was Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*. Well, I read the First Logical Investigation, and, frankly, I was very disappointed. It seemed to me that it was in no way an advance on Frege and was, in fact, rather badly written, unclear, and confused. So I abandoned the effort to try to learn something about intentionality from previous writers and just went to work on my own. … I learned nothing from Husserl, literally nothing, though, of course, I did learn a lot from Frege and Wittgenstein.\textsuperscript{89}

Searle, then, claims to have rediscovered intentionality and to have made it intelligible within analytic philosophy of mind without further reference to the phenomenological tradition.

In contrast to Searle’s, Jacques Derrida’s intellectual formation came primarily through his engagement with the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger in particular. He wrote three early, formative studies on Husserl.\textsuperscript{90} Derrida’s work was deeply inspired by a “linguistic turn” that took place in French philosophy in the 1960s largely through the influence of Heidegger’s later essays on language, on the one hand, and the renewed interest in the proto-structuralist linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure, on the other.\textsuperscript{91} While most often associated with poststructuralism, by his own account, Derrida remained deeply indebted to Husserlian phenomenology and the practice of the *epoché* in particular.

It is true that for me Husserl’s work, and precisely the notion of *epoché*, has been and still is a major indispensable gesture. In everything I try to say and write the *epoché* is implied. I would say that I constantly try to practice that whenever I am speaking or writing.\textsuperscript{92}


\textsuperscript{91} For a discussion of Derrida’s philosophical formation and influences, see my *Introduction to Phenomenology* (London: Routledge, 2000), 435-73. [*] See also the essay on the linguistic turn in continental philosophy by Claire Colebrook in *The History of Continental Philosophy: Volume 6*.

Derrida’s controversy with Searle was occasioned by the publication of an English translation of his essay “Signature Event Context” in the first issue of a new journal of textual studies from Johns Hopkins University – *Glyph* - in 1977.\(^ {93} \) As Searle recalls, there was a reading group at Berkeley, of which he was a part, and someone proposed reading this Derrida essay. He was very critical of the paper and was invited to submit his comments to the new journal. His reply, “Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida,” appeared in the same issue of *Glyph*.\(^ {94} \)

In his original paper, Derrida offers a complex and often enigmatic discussion of Austin’s use of performatives. Derrida’s paper in general is a meditation on the supposed centrality of the communicative function of language and involves discussion of the views of Condillac (taken as maintaining the classical view of language as a representation of ideas) and Husserl, as well as Austin. Derrida’s topic is the multiple nature or “polysemy” of communication, and his essay introduces many of his more familiar themes, including *différance*, the absence of the signified, and so on. Indeed, part of his aim is to explain and apply aspects of Husserl’s analysis of language. Sentences (even observational sentences) have sense even apart from the experience that is being described. The experience may be absent. Similarly, in written language, the “speaker” may be absent. A key feature of linguistic acts is their “iterability,” by which Derrida means that linguistic statements need to be repeatable and be able to function outside their immediate context, and especially beyond the purview of the immediate range of receivers, listeners, readers, and so on.

The essay begins with a short quotation from Austin’s *How to Do Things with Words* (1962), where Austin states that for simplicity he will restrict his discussion to spoken utterances, and indeed literal speech, excluding such things as an actor pronouncing words on stage, or other “parasitic” forms, such as playful speech, metaphors, etc. Austin writes: “Language in such circumstances is in special ways – intelligibly - used not seriously, but in ways parasitic on its normal use - ways which fall under the doctrine of the etiolations of language.”\(^ {95} \)

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\(^ {93} \) Derrida’s essay was originally delivered as a paper at a Canadian conference in 1971, whose overall theme was “communication,” and was published in *Marges de la philosophie* in 1972.


In his essay, Derrida challenges the view that there is a single meaning to communication, and indeed points to the complex nature of what is supposed under the notion of “literal meaning” and the complexities introduced by metaphorical uses of language. For Derrida, the true complex nature of language where metaphor, and so on, are in play from the beginning is being ignored here, making Austin’s otherwise interesting analysis beside the point. Derrida carefully focuses on Austin’s apparently innocent use of the metaphorical term “parasitical,” which suggests that metaphorical and analogical uses of language are extensions of the basic literal function of language, as if that “literal” function was itself perfectly clear. Metaphor, fiction, and so on, are seen by Austin and others as some kind of (perhaps dispensable) add-on to the literal use of language.96

In his reply, Searle simply dismissed Derrida’s interpretation of Austin as a misunderstanding, owing, he claims, mostly to Derrida’s ignorance of post-Wittgensteinian developments in linguistics and the philosophy of language. Searle goes on to deny that iterability is a specific feature of written rather than spoken language. Rather, permanence is what distinguishes the written mark. In reply, Derrida claims he has been misunderstood, his statements taken out of context, ignoring the larger claims of his other work and so on. Derrida’s evasion, his play on the very notion of seriousness in philosophy, all indicate that he was not seeking to seriously engage with his opponent. Searle regarded his ‘debate’ with Derrida as a non-event and refused to continue it. He later commented:

With Derrida, you can hardly misread him, because he’s so obscure. Every time you say, “He says so and so,” he always says, “You misunderstood me.” But if you try to figure out the correct interpretation, then that’s not so easy. I once said this to Michel Foucault, who was more hostile to Derrida even than I am, and Foucault said that Derrida practiced the method of obscurantisme terroriste (terrorism of obscurantism). We were speaking French. And I said, “What the hell do you mean by that?” And he said, “He writes so obscurely you can’t tell what he’s saying, that's the obscurantism part, and then when you criticize him, he can always say, ‘You didn’t understand me; you’re an idiot.’ That’s the terrorism part.” And I like that. So I wrote an article about Derrida.97

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III. Conclusion: More of the Same

To be sure, the context of analytic philosophy had changed considerably as the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations replaced the earlier Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. Where the backdrop to Carnap’s approach had been the Tractatus view, the backdrop to the Oxford ordinary-language philosophy of Ryle and Austin – which Searle encountered in the 1950s – was the view that what ordinary speech enshrines makes sense and is somehow “right.” Nevertheless, the exchange between Searle and Derrida in many ways resurrects a point at issue between earlier opponents such as Heidegger and Carnap. Both Carnap and Searle begin from the literal use of language, which they see as fundamental to science as the articulation of truth. Both Heidegger and Derrida, on the other hand, see language as essentially and inescapably symbolic and metaphorical. For them, the poetic function is not one function among many of language, but in a sense the primary force that makes language possible at all. It is because language points beyond itself and indeed beyond what is immediately indicated that it is capable of functioning for the transmission of meaning. At the time of his dispute with Heidegger, Carnap was trying to fix the meanings of language, or at least to have a scientific language which was logically purified and unambiguous and which picked out the one true world (although later Carnap moved to recognize the multiplicity of irreducible “conceptual schemes,” as his pupil Hilary Putnam terms them). Heidegger, on the other hand, was growing increasingly dissatisfied with the embedded language of the philosophical tradition and wanted to exploit the poetic resources and ambiguities in language, especially the German and ancient Greek languages, as ways of expressing the manner in which Being reveals and conceals itself across history.

In what has come to be known as analytic philosophical generally, enormous emphasis is placed on the values of clarity, accuracy and rigour in argumentation. From that point of view, Heidegger and Derrida are seen as needlessly obscure, engaged in “rhetoric” or literary allusion, offering bad arguments or even no arguments at all. Indeed, as we have quoted above, Searle even used the phrase (which he claims he took from Foucault’s assessment of Derrida) “terrorist obscurantism.” Even Rorty, who agrees with much of what Derrida has to say, is quite willing to concede that “Searle is ... right in saying that a lot of Derrida’s arguments ... are just awful.” On the other hand, Heidegger,

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98 Wilfrid Sellars spoke about Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations having moved analytic philosophy from its Humean to its Kantian phase.
as we also saw, regarded such demands for exactitude as part of calculative rather than originary thinking. Phenomenology privileged eidetic insight and description over argumentation. Of course, the later Wittgenstein had a similar view of philosophy as presenting a particular view on matters or perhaps escaping from the grip of a prevailing mistaken picture of things. This does not require argumentation but rather what Husserl would call a “change of attitude” (Einstellungänderung) or what Thomas Kuhn would call a “paradigm shift.”

There is no doubt that there is obscurity in Derrida and Heidegger; but this is seen as necessary in relation to the complexity of the thought and its need to break its relation to its tradition. Rigorous argumentation, moreover, is but one aspect of philosophical inventiveness. The Platonic dialogues show how discussions can lead to aporias and to insights which are not quite what was intended in the argumentation. Hermeneutics, for Heidegger, had exactly this function. Indeed, Husserl’s own position was that phenomenology came through insight and attention to what is given and gained by insight, rather than through argumentation and deduction. In a sense, the encounters between analytic philosophy and phenomenology have constantly returned to this battle-ground originally staked out by the Neo-Kantians: the relation between sensuous intuition and conceptualisation (which itself requires language).

This tension between what can be seen and what must be deduced continues in the latest versions of the debate. For example, influential commentators, including Hubert Dreyfus, have interpreted John Searle himself as pursuing a kind of phenomenology with his close description of the essential conditions of intentionality and his interest in consciousness, perception, and other themes familiar to phenomenology. In reaction, John Searle has attempted to distinguish his practice of (what he terms) logical analysis from what he takes to be phenomenological analysis. This distinction largely repeats the kinds of distinction of approach made by Schlick against Husserl, Ryle against Husserl, Carnap against Heidegger, and so on. Yet, it would be wrong to think that the encounters are simply indications of incorrigible misunderstandings and misconnections. Phenomenology continues to develop and mutate and, alongside, analytic philosophy has discovered that it is not just a method but a tradition and it too has its hermeneutical dimensions. Indeed, there is little agreement today as to what constitutes the core of analytic philosophy, and there are challenges to the whole idea of philosophy as a priori analysis of intuition. One positive gain is that analytic philosophers have recognized that phenomenology does have some

value. Searle, for instance is critical of phenomenology, and yet, in a certain sense, has written approvingly of what phenomenology tries to do: “I want to emphasize at the start that if phenomenology is defined as the examination of the structure of consciousness, I have no objections whatever to phenomenology. My misgivings are about some specific authors and their practice of this method.” Searle goes on to say and perhaps we should leave this as a suitable last word for this essay: “Properly understood, there is no conflict between analytic philosophy and phenomenology. They offer noncompeting and complementary methods of investigation and anybody prepared to do serious work should be ready to use both.”

102 Ibid., 323,