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Institutional Heterogeneity and Change: The University as Fool

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Institutional Heterogeneity and Change: The University as Fool

Abstract

While institutional theory has focused on the effect of institutions on individual organizations, this paper addresses the relationships between institutions. Using a case history approach, it examines the relationship of one institution, the University, within an institutional complex. The study suggests that the University acts and has a role akin to the Fool in the medieval royal court. The Fool is embedded in a multiplicity of loyal yet agonistic relationships with a collection of ‘Sovereign’ institutions, such as the Church, the State, the Nation, the Corporation, and the Professions. Akin to the Fool, the University’s skills at normative narrating, sorting and playing are central to the creation and maintenance of a semiotic nexus and the process of institutionalization and de-institutionalization. In turn, these semiotic resources are utilized in the practice of educating. The paper concludes by examining how the metaphor of the Fool provides a way of re-thinking these practices.
Institutional Heterogeneity and Change: The University as Fool

Introduction

Institutional theory has made a significant theoretical contribution through its inquiry into the structures and activities that give meaning and stability to behaviour in organizations. It has a long history – its roots can be traced to Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Cooley, Mead, Veblen and Commons – but it only coalesced as a coherent and influential theory of organizing during the 1980s. Powell and DiMaggio’s definition crystallizes the domain:

The new institutionalism in organization theory and sociology comprises a rejection of rational-actor models, an interest in institutions as independent variables, a turn toward cognitive and cultural explanations, and an interest in properties of supra-individual units of analysis that cannot be reduced to aggregations or direct consequences of individuals’ attributes or motives. (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991: 8)

In particular, institutional theory highlights the coercive and normative pressures that institutional agents (e.g. the State, Professions, etc.) impose on organizations. For instance, Meyer and Rowan’s (1977; 1978) path-breaking study of educational systems indicated that while ‘efficiency’ mattered most in manufacturing, in the school context – where ‘legitimacy’ had primacy – powerful institutional forces dictated behaviour. One consequence of their research was that during the 1980s organizational scholars and practitioners shifted their focus to symbols, myths and rituals. In time, institutional theory became a popular and enduring theoretical frame across the social sciences (see Scott (2001) for an excellent summary of the literature).

Notwithstanding the theory’s significance, it is not without problems, especially in its earliest manifestations. First, its focus on how institutions contribute to social
order perhaps put too much emphasis on continuity, conformity and stability. Once this was recognised, a body of research into institutional change duly emerged (see Hargrave and Van de Ven (2004) for a review). Second, it overfocused on the institutional context’s influence on organization structure and behaviour within organizations. For instance, Scott (2005) mused that early institutional theory was too ‘top-down’ with too much research focused on the “institutional effects” on organizational form. Again, this critique generated a line of research into the heterogeneity of the institutional environment and the mix of conflicts within this environment. This paper builds on these traditions.

The paper’s focal institution is the University and it employs institutional theory to study how the University and its relationship with other institutions evolved over the centuries. A vast amount has been written about the University and this provides a rich empirical dataset to be mined. The primary frame for analysing these texts was chronology, the purpose being to make sense of the University’s evolution through an extended case study. Influential texts in this analysis were those that previously included taxonomic understandings of the University, such as Kerr (1963/2001), Parsons and Platt (1973), Readings (1996), Delanty (2002) and Olsen (2005). The case study then provides a basis for theorizing about institutions and institutional change.

We proceed as follows. The paper begins by introducing the idea of the University as a ‘Foolish institution’, embedded in a close relationship with a ‘Sovereign’ institution akin to the fool’s role in the medieval royal court. This metaphor provides a framework for understanding the evolution of one institution, the University, embedded in a complex network of relationships with other institutions. The middle part of the paper describes this development. The paper
then proceeds to explore other ‘foolish’ aspects of the contemporary university. The Fool is full of ambiguity and paradox. So it is with the University, with its foolish nature constituting a source of dynamism for other institutions (even though this creates a profound insecurity within itself). The paper proceeds to explore the notion of the Fool as normative narrator, sorter and playmaker, which provide a vital dynamic to the processes of institutionalization and de-institutionalization. Together, these practices mean that the University is deeply implicated in meaning-making, through the creation and maintenance of what I refer to as the semiotic nexus. This leads to a discussion on how the University uses these semiotic resources in its key role in educating. The paper concludes by reflecting on how the metaphor of the Fool provides a frame for re-thinking the educational practices of the University and its own future.

The University: A Foolish Institution?

*The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knows himself to be a fool.*

William Shakespeare (1564 - 1616), "As You Like It", Act 5 scene 1

Detailed study of the history of the University suggests that it is an institution that acts and has a role akin to the Fool in the royal court of medieval times. Since this metaphor is central to the paper, its genesis and appropriateness merit comment. The metaphor was not arbitrarily imposed on the narrative, but instead emerged through a close reading and analysis of the case, following the mode of theory construction that Weick (1989) refers to as ‘disciplined imagination’. I sought to avoid the trap of fashioning a narrative to suit the metaphor in three ways. First, I continually assessed the metaphor against the empirical data – extant narratives and commentary on the university – albeit in a rather unstructured manner. Second, I sought independent comment on the metaphor from colleagues and through presenting the ideas at
academic conferences. Finally, I adjudicated the metaphor’s authenticity and value by applying Cornelissen’s (2006) eight ‘optimality principles of metaphorical imagination’, which provide a measure of a metaphor’s effectiveness. This was probably one of the first applications of Cornelissen’s principles in the literature.

The Fool is usually associated with the Middle Ages but is also a feature – in some form or another – of many societies over history (Otto, 2001). The Fool has many faces; he is a shape shifter, a chameleon and a trickster, always open to the possibility of transformation. This ambiguity extends to the Fool’s own sexuality – the Fool is usually male but female Fools were not uncommon – as demonstrated by the Fool’s enduring penchant for cross-dressing. Perhaps the best-known representation is in Shakespeare’s plays which often featured the Fool as a recurring character type, usually based on the jesters employed by the royal courts of his time. The Fool is symbolically linked to the king, and this relationship holds on stage, in the reality of the royal court, and in its metaphorical use in my historical interpretation of the evolution of the University. Saying that the University is a ‘Foolish institution’ means that it is always defined by its unique relationship with another institution, termed the ‘Sovereign institution’.

This study of the University’s evolution identifies at least five different institutions that realize this Sovereign role – the Church, the State, the Nation, the Professions, and the Corporation – as well as others that partly attain the position.

The first Fool-Sovereign relationship of note is to be found in the emergence of

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1 For example, the ‘concreteness principle’ asserts that the source concept should be sufficiently concrete (rather than abstract) compared to the target to be understood and manipulated. While the adjudication was subjective, the metaphor did not violate any of Cornelissen’s principles.
The medieval universities in Italy, France and England during the late 11th and early 12th centuries. The medieval universities had an enduring impact on the University as an institution, providing many of the defining features of the contemporary university, including the term university (from the Latin, universum, meaning whole or corporation), masters with a degree of autonomy, a system of lectures, examinations, administrative structure (faculties), the residential college, and a central location (i.e. the notion of the University as a place). There were important structural distinctions between the different forms of medieval university, depending on whether the students, church, State or monarch paid the teachers. At the same time, they shared certain attributes. For instance, the medieval university was primarily a place of indoctrination, rather than of teaching, living or research. Typically, these institutions had grown out of the older monasteries or the newer cathedral schools and were tied to a universal, ‘natural’ order – the universal ideology of Christianity – rather than to the State or civic society. (An exception was the University of Constantinople, founded in the 9th century as a secular institution of higher learning to support the state administration.) While law, arts, medicine and theology were all part of the curriculum, theonomy – government by God – provided the medieval university with a dominant and unifying philosophical principle. In this respect, the medieval university might be described as the University of God (Delanty, 2002), with the Church taking the role of the Sovereign Institution. The University’s religious roots are visible to this day, most especially during the conferring of degrees, and in the distinction between academic and non-academic staff, which is a variant of the traditional religious distinction between the clergy and the laity.

As a deviant, the Fool is a liminal character, and yet he holds a position at the
centre of the royal court. His relationship with the King is equally complex: he is
the King’s friend and confidant, but he is also a servant and subject to punishment
at a whim (‘Take heed, sirrah- the whip!’ King Lear, 1:4:109). In King Lear, the
Fool seeks to demonstrate to Lear the truth about the people around him, but when
Lear goes insane and is unable to heed the Fool’s advice and knowledge, the Fool
vanishes. Interestingly, the tradition of court jesters ended in Britain less than fifty
years after King Lear was first performed, as Oliver Cromwell’s Puritan republic
had no place for such frivolities as professional jesters.

Our Foolish Institution, the University, is not dissimilar. By the end of the 18th
century, the medieval university had become quite isolated from society,
oligarchical, rigid, introverted, and reactionary, being largely opposed to the
Reformation, unsympathetic to the Renaissance, and antagonistic to the new
science of the Enlightenment. In addition, the universities saw their scientific
leadership usurped by the scientific academies, such as the Royal Society, that
were established all over Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. An early lesson
that the University learned was that while it should be loyal to the sovereign
institutions, this loyalty is not unconditional, and it may align itself to other, more
powerful, sovereigns as these emerge.

The Enlightenment and the Reformation reduced the power of the Church and it
was these changes that lay at the heart of the University’s strategic realignment
that took place during the nineteenth century. An important contribution to this
process was Kant’s seminal book, The Conflict of the Faculties (Kant, 1798/1979).
Kant argued that the authority of the three ‘higher’ faculties of theology, law and
medicine – around which the medieval universities were centred – was
heteronomous (i.e. was imposed by others). Theology depends on the Bible, law
on the civil code, and medicine depends on the decrees of the medical profession.

In contrast, the authority of the lower faculty (philosophy) is autonomous, in that it legitimates itself by reason alone, by its own practice. For Kant, the University is based on a conflict between the tradition established by the higher faculties and the free inquiry of the lower, with reason ultimately providing the ratio for all the disciplines; it is their organising principle … Thus the lower faculty turns out to be the higher, the queen of the sciences, the discipline that incarnates the pure principle that animates the University and differentiates it from either a technical training school (a guild) or a specialized academy (a royal society) (Readings 1996, p. 15, 57).

Kant’s text was tremendously important in providing a conceptual basis for academic freedom, which is not unlike the freedom afforded the Fool in the Royal Court. However, perhaps the more important part of his argument was that the State had a duty to protect this freedom. This formed the basis for a more complex relationship between the State and the University, with the former protecting the latter in order to ensure the rule of reason in public life, and the latter, via philosophy, providing a counter to the excesses of the State and its desires: “The businesspeople of the three upper faculties will always be such magicians if those of the philosophical faculty are not permitted to work publicly against them” (Kant, 1798/1979, p. 50). Kant provided an enduring conceptual architecture for the structure of the University and its relationship with the State consisting of four elements: (i) the people; (ii) the government (State); (iii) the higher faculties (theology, law, and medicine); and (iv) the lower faculties (philosophy). The government contracts with the higher faculties to do a job, as it were, but these higher faculties should not get involved in speculations or debates about this function because this would be pedagogically confusing. Instead, speculative
analysis is best left to an independent group, the philosophers, who have a particular duty to safeguard ‘reason’, which is above and beyond the functional duties that the higher faculties have to the government. It was this more sophisticated understanding of the relationship between the University and the State that provided the conceptual underpinnings for a different institution, the State, to take the role of the Sovereign in the evolving story of the Foolish Institution. This also affected the nature of the University as the State’s rationalizing, accounting practices transformed lazy professors into hard-working scholars fashioning their academic reputations. By 1749, the ‘publish or perish’ syndrome was in place in Germany – largely due to the influence of the State – as were the foundations of what we later recognise as the contemporary research university revolving around ministries and markets (Clark, 2006).

As the story developed during the nineteenth century, another realignment emerged as part of modernity’s cultural project and its engagement with cultural nationalism. The dominant institution in the University’s field was not so much the State, as the Nation. While Kant had argued that the State should support and protect the University because this was needed to foster reason, the new dispensation positioned culture as the University’s unifying function. Hence the humanities and literature became central, in contrast to philosophy’s pole position in Kant’s ‘university of reason’ (see Roberts and Turner (2000) for further discussion on the rise of the humanities in the 19th century). This concern with culture followed the romantic fascination with subjective Bildung (the self-development of man) and is well articulated by Cardinal Newman, who declared that a university training

    aims at raising the intellectual tone of society, at cultivating the public mind, at
purifying the national taste, at supplying true principles to popular enthusiasm and fixed aims to popular aspirations, at giving enlargement and sobriety to the ideas of the age, at facilitating the exercise of political powers, and refining the intercourse of private life (Newman, 1852/1947, p. 157).

But even as Newman was writing his influential book, *The Idea of a University*, others were turning the University away from the Nation and towards the *Professions*. The medical and legal professions had been important stakeholders of the University since medieval times, but developments during the nineteenth century brought the professions, more generally, into a sovereign alignment with the University. In particular, there was a move away from contemplative, idealist philosophies and theories of learning propagated by the Platonic tradition towards real-world, action-orientated, purposeful production of knowledge via a modern experimental science of inquiry. The purpose of the University for Benjamin Franklin – who set up what eventually became the University of Pennsylvania – was not to serve the Nation but to ‘serve mankind’. By the mid-19th century the idea was in place in the US that universities were not just to produce ‘gentlemen’, teachers, preachers, lawyers and doctors – as per the Newman model – but were to be actively involved in industrial and agricultural development. The unifying goal of the new form of university was the betterment of *humanity*, in contrast to the ‘university of culture’ which was centred on nationalism. This idea became institutionalised in the United States through the land grant movement (from 1862), and in the demands of the time that research be related to the technical advance of farming and manufacturing in service to the political and economic segments of society.

The institutional form of the University was reconfigured during the 19th century
as an emerging American middle class articulated their emotional and intellectual needs through the new ‘culture of professionalism’ (Bledstein, 1978). Bledstein is unambiguous:

With the creation of the university in America, an institution unlike any in Europe, the middle class succeeded in establishing an institutional matrix for its evolving types of behavior. By and large the American university came into existence to serve and promote professional authority in society. (1978: x)

In 1876, Johns Hopkins University was founded and many Americans wanted this to follow the ‘German’ or ‘Humboldtian’ model – after Wilhelm von Humboldt who founded the University of Berlin in 1809 – focusing on graduate work and research. However it soon became clear that a large undergraduate student body was required to support graduate study and scholarship. Hence it effected a superimposition of a Platonic German University (or French grandes écoles) on top of a classical English/American liberal arts college. This somewhat contradictory institution became hugely influential and the model for all subsequent American universities and indeed many universities outside the US. The research, graduate component dedicated itself to increasingly specialized, fragmented scholarship while the college component dedicated itself (at least in theory) to general education, character building, and civic education for a democratic society. Serving the civic community, rather than the State, meant providing ‘human resources’ to the professions and industry – e.g. engineers, doctors, lawyers etc. This led to increasing disciplinary specialization and fragmentation with departments reflecting professional associations externally. This shift was also manifest in the University’s structure and content. The first business school was founded in 1881 (the Wharton School of Finance and
Economy), while by 1900 commercial pursuits attracted around 30 percent of Ivy League graduates (Bledstein, 1978: 6).

This new idea of a university also brought a shift in pedagogical approach, pioneered by Peirce (1839-1914), John Dewey (1859 - 1952) and others influenced by the Pragmatic school of philosophy enunciated by William James (1842-1910). Dewey’s point of departure from traditional theory was that he stressed developing applicable thought *processes*, rather than just the learning of great books and cultural legacies. Hence, the focus shifted to immediate experience, practical education and useful and instrumental knowledge (i.e. the sciences and professional studies) over the traditional humanities curriculum (philosophy, literature, history, and theology).

Not surprisingly, this new university model was criticised by many. Thorstein Veblen, for instance, was dismissive of the attempt to link the College (undergraduate) and the University (graduate). In his view, “this holding together of two disparate schools is at the best a freak of aimless survival” (Veblen, 1918/1957, p. 17), which led him to question whether those involved in undergraduate education were “a *bona fide* university faculty, and not a body of secondary-school teachers masquerading under the assumed name of a university” (ibid). Veblen also rejected what he termed ‘vocationalism’ – and he specifically mentioned the schools of business and law, and by extension, schools of engineering, which he saw as being properly outside the purview of the University. For him, and he spoke for many others, the purpose of a University is to train

the incoming generation of scholars and scientists for the further pursuit of knowledge. Training for other purposes is necessarily of a different kind and is
best done elsewhere; and it does not become university work by calling it so and imposing its burden on the men and equipment whose only concern should be the higher learning (Veblen, 1918/1957, p. 12).

Thus, the University should eliminate all non-intellectual schooling from its remit – i.e. schools of business, journalism, education, religion and the like. “Practical importance, is not a sufficient title to academic recognition: if that is the best that can be said, it is an excellent reason for exclusion” (Flexner, 1930, p. 27).

Flexner and Veblen represent one position in a much wider debate about which Sovereign the University should serve – the State, Nation or the Professions. And whether or not research should form part of the University’s function, or whether this is best left to other institutions. Of course the practical working through of these issues varied from country to country, but suffice to say that the ‘pure’ liberal University, unsullied by professional schools, did not flourish during the twentieth century.

By the late 19th century, a further shift occurred as the University commenced a more explicit engagement with business and commerce. A first sign that the Corporation was becoming the new power was the widespread substitution of ‘laymen’ (i.e. businessmen) in place of clergy in the governing boards of US undergraduate colleges.

As the University shifted its gaze to the Corporation, it increasingly came to adopt organizing principles from the business world, which again affected the nature of the institution. We can, indeed, speak of the emergence of the ‘Entrepreneurial University’. In 1910, in an early study of management in higher education, Cooke observed that

There are very few, if any, of the broader principles of management which obtain
generally in the commercial world which are not, more or less, applicable in the college field, and as far as was discovered, no one of them is now generally observed” (Cooke, 1910, p. 7).

Things changed, however, during the twentieth century. As universities grew and became more powerful, and as mass education became a reality, there were increasing demands for greater accountability, which duly brought management discourse and technologies into universities. Increasingly the administrator took the central place in the University, a role previously occupied by the professor (Barzun, 1968; Borrero Cabal, 1993, p. 3).

Managerialism inexorably migrated into universities, especially during the latter part of the twentieth century. The pace and nature of this migration differed from country to country, but the trend followed a general pattern (Birnbaum, 2000). As night follows day, faculty resisted and criticised the advent of managerialism, the perceived corporatisation of the University, the de-professionalization of academic work, the rise of consumerism, the discourse of ‘excellence’, and the commodity (versus community) model of the University. Again we turn to Veblen for a critique. Writing in 1918, he challenged the notion of a future where “corporations of learning shall set their affairs in order after the pattern of a well-conducted business concern” (Veblen, 1918/1957, p. 62). Veblen proceeded to detail the kind of ‘strong man’ and almost totalitarian regime that the business model involves, wherein the faculty are simply employees, no different from employees in any business, hired and fired at the will and whim of the boss. For him, scientific inquiry requires autonomy rather than managerial control, and learning, by its very nature, is not compatible with the business model. Business methods do have their place but only “in the corporation’s fiscal affairs and in the
office-work incident to the care of its material equipment” (p. 71).

Veblen was locked into the liberal idea of the University of Culture. The University produces culture, which cannot be valued, certainly not by University managers. The only competent judges of the University’s cultural success are the autonomous scholars, whose requirements – freedom, community and intimacy – are precisely the opposite of the University managers. While Veblen’s argument is almost a century old, and faculty still retain considerable power in universities, his essential points constantly bubble up in contemporary debates and criticisms of the Entrepreneurial or Corporate University (Soley, 1995; Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; Martin, 1998; Aronowitz, 2000; Bruyn, 2001).

Bill Readings (1996) takes a similar swipe at the entrepreneurial university, but from a somewhat different angle. His argument was that developments in literary theory, philosophy and history during the twentieth century had evacuated meaning from root concepts like ‘culture’ and the ‘nation’. As the idea of national culture no longer provided the University with an integrating semantic structure, what gets taught or produced as knowledge came to matter less. In this vacuum, all that matters is that what is taught or researched is done ‘excellently’.

**The Fool’s many faces**

During the 19th century the University demonstrated a remarkable ability to align itself with different sovereigns and to institutionalise organizing practices that at once enabled transformation and yet sustained a meaningful link with tradition. The institution, in the guise of the new American university model, flourished during the twentieth century, although a confused identity emerged as different actors fought for the already contested position of Sovereign.
After the Second World War it became clear, at least in the United States, that university research had played a vital role in the war effort and that universities were more than simply teaching institutions. Thus the Military wrested the sovereign’s role, at least in some parts of the University, as US universities came to be seen as the primary locus for the research that would underpin that country’s military and industrial dominance. At the same time, there was a long-standing view – going back at least to pivotal thinkers like John Dewey and William James – that education was a tool for progressive social change. Thus, the University wasn’t just there to serve a Sovereign (be it the Church, State, Nation, the Corporation, Professions, or Military), but its primary role should be a promoter-cum-architect of emancipation and social justice. In other words, the new Sovereigns should be the ideals of Justice and Emancipation.

But all of these competing Sovereigns led to confusion, tension and finally violence. As early as 1930, Flexner was complaining that universities were too many things: they were “secondary schools, vocational schools, teacher-training schools, research centers, ‘uplift’ agencies, businesses – these and other things simultaneously” (Flexner, 1930, p. 179). However, his vision of a university “characterized by highness and definiteness of aim, unity of spirit and purpose” (Flexner, 1930, p. 178-9) was an anachronism even when he was penning his words. By the early 1960s, Clark Kerr’s idea of a ‘multiversity’ reflected the reality if not the aspiration of higher education in the US and beyond. For Kerr (1963/2001), the multiversity is a large, inconsistent, bureaucratic institution with fuzzy boundaries, made up of and serving many communities, functions and interest groups and articulating quite different traditions. Kerr identifies three primary threads that weave much of the multiversity’s mosaic: first, the focus on
undergraduate life where the tradition is British, Newman, Plato and humanistic; the alternative focus on graduate life where the tradition is German, Humboldt, Pythagoras and scientific; and thirdly the professions where the tradition is American, Franklin and the Sophists. The multiversity is paradoxical in that it presents itself as a radical institution, when often its conduct is quite conservative. Likewise, it happily depicts itself as a cloister, an ivory tower aloof from the world and yet it readily embraces the desires and wishes of external groups, such as the Church, State, Professions, and Military. This funding promiscuity has made it difficult for central administration to regulate the multiversity’s individual departments and academics, especially those that are most entrepreneurial. For Kerr, therefore, the multiversity is akin to a hotel, in that both house a disparate group of individuals who have little in common other than shared use of services like restaurants, heating, parking, security, etc. Pithily, he observed that the multiversity is no more than “a series of individual faculty entrepreneurs held together by a common grievance over parking” (Kerr, 1963/2001, p. 15).

Kerr’s views are important not least because he was President of the University of California during the 1960s when the University system was growing rapidly and manifesting, through student unrest, the tensions that had developed in the institution. The student protests of the 1960s were in many ways a rejection of what the University had become, on the basis that it had – at least from one perspective – failed to deliver a just society. Moreover, if one accepted that the University was embedded in the social world that was creating and perpetuating social injustice, it couldn’t be expected to help create justice, or to undo its own work. The only way to get the institution to change, the students argued, was to take radical action.
A somewhat different take on the student riots is that the students were angry because ideals of the time – such as valorising freedom and the market – were not being implemented in the University. If freedom was truly celebrated, then it meant giving students autonomy, respect, and privilege. So, for instance, the University of California’s report on university governance, published in 1968, advocated a major role for students in the management of university affairs, including admissions policy, faculty censure, curriculum design, and university governance (Foote et al., 1968). In part, the logic underpinning this shift can be attributed to the rise of consumerism, as students came to see themselves as (mass) consumers of education, which conferred them with rights as consumers rather than as citizens seeking social justice. Indeed, this confusion was symptomatic of the time: the rationale for the unrest was never clear. And even though the students believed that the times were a-changing, in hindsight, things probably did not change that much. This is consistent with Bourdieu’s (1988) less flattering analysis of the academic field, which he saw as fundamentally conservative. For Bourdieu, the causes of the student riots in 1968 were not so much about emancipation and freedom, but were centred on structural problems in academic demographics, the economic needs of society, and the powerplays of vested interests in academia. It was thus, perhaps, inevitable that many of the changes brought about in the late 1960s were rowed back during the later 1970s and 1980s. As Aronowitz and Giroux put it, “Education history of the later 1970s and 1980s can be told in terms of student disempowerment” (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1993, p. 5).

One way of capturing the confused nature of the University is to leverage tropes favoured by the ‘postmoderns’ that seem especially applicable to the
contemporary institution. It is at once virtual, reflexive, fragmented, ambiguous, de-centred, contradictory, devoid of fundamentals, inconsistent, and multi-faceted (see, for instance, Smith and Webster (1997)). It is also a corporate conglomerate that is embedded in, dependent on, and constituted by information and communication technologies. And the postmoderns have burrowed away at the institution’s foundations and traditions, raising profound questions about ideas such as the canon as “self-evident repositories of enlightenment” (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1991, p. 15), and the notion that intellectual knowledge, as interpreted by the academy, should be privileged over other types of knowledge (e.g. practical knowledge, gossip, folk wisdom, etc). Similarly, they have attacked the concept of a ‘universal’ aesthetic against which art might be judged.

Other metaphors also describe the nature of the ‘postmodern’ university and how it differs from earlier visions. If the liberal university espoused by Newman was akin to a village with its priests, and Flexner’s vision of a modern university was analogous to a one-industry town with an intellectual oligarchy, the multiversity is a city of infinite variety, in which there is a lower sense of community but also less sense of confinement. And if there is a diminished sense of purpose, there are also more ways to excel. Another way of understanding the postmodern university is to see its maze of major fault lines: student v faculty, professors v non-professorial teaching staff, academics v administration, full-time v part-time, humanists v scientists, research v teaching, production v consumption of knowledge, liberal education v vocational training, radical thought v conservative practice.

The university as a ‘Foolish’ institution neatly captures this heterogeneity and confusion. Throughout history and across cultures the Fool has used masks and
masquerade, costumes and Carnival to play with (mis)representation and dissimilitude. With the Fool, you may not get what you see. The Fool as trickster is “the mythic embodiment of ambiguity and ambivalence, doubleness and duplicity, contradiction and paradox” (Hyde, 1998, p. 7), providing a dynamic in a sea of apparent order, a mischievous willingness to contemplate and provoke an alternative state of affairs even at some risk to its own status.\(^1\) Thus, while some might pine for Kant’s university of reason, or the University of culture, the contemporary university is better understood as the institutional manifestation of modernity’s ontological uncertainty, insecurity and ambiguity.

**Making meaning: The Fool as Normative Narrator**

My empirical setting is the library and my empirical material is drawn from what has been written about the University and how it has changed over time. This represents another aspect of the Foolish Institution at work: the Fool as normative narrator. The Fool is a story-teller, but its stories are always embedded in a framework of norms and values that connect the moment into longer conversations over time and space.

In considering this story-telling role, the metaphor of Shakespeare’s Fool suggests parallels to how we see the University: the Fool has audiences (plural) rather than a single audience. First and primarily, the Fool speaks to his king, his Sovereign. Second, he also addresses other characters in the play. Third, he has conversations essentially with himself, about his own position, and the Fool’s role in the world. Fourth, he routinely makes witty remarks about topical issues engaging the viewing audience of the time but which have nothing whatsoever to do with the
play. (The meaning of these witticisms is usually lost on contemporary audiences).

Likewise, the Foolish Institution (the University) – which shares the Fool’s fetish for garish costumes – addresses four different audiences. First, the University directs much of what it says to its sovereign institution, whether this is the Church, the State, the Nation, the Professions, the Corporation, the Military, or the ideals of Emancipation and Justice. For instance, as the Nation became the University’s Sovereign, professors became indispensable ‘interpreters’ of the Nation giving them a powerful and privileged position in society. This is why, in the nineteenth century, universities garnered a crucial role in promoting national languages, codifying national literatures and geography, and providing repositories of national culture. Likewise, business schools provide a mechanism whereby the University can speak to its new sovereign, the Corporation, as an institution. In this regard, university research tries to be purposeful, working to deepen and consolidate the sovereign institution’s power and position.

Second, it also addresses other institutions within its compass, such as ‘marriage’, the ‘family’, etc. This constituency includes aspiring and declining sovereigns. Third, the University has conversations with itself about the nature of the University and its role in the world. My research draws on this conversation, as articulated through the writings of Kerr, Readings, Delanty, Newman, et al who are part of the University, writing about the University and also writing about society more generally. Finally, the University engages in ‘idle’ speculation and basic research that have no immediate practical relevance.

Akin to the medieval fool, who is not there to merely tell stories, the University is expected to provide a normative narrative, or a critical interpretation of the world. From the 17th century, this was enacted through the theatrics of the public
academic lecture and performed disputation, though these modes subsequently declined as the new rationalism of the Enlightenment marginalised dissimulation and role-playing (Clark, 2006). Likewise, the University’s long tradition of academic freedom mirrors the Fool’s position as the Sovereign’s independent critic. The principle of academic freedom goes back to the medieval universities that provided a degree of sanctuary for critics (such as John Wycliffe, Jan Hus, and Martin Luther), on the basis that the Church possessed a superior intellectual and spiritual authority compared to other institutions such as the State (Scott, 1984, p. 25; Pelikan, 1992). However, Kant made the key contribution, and while his idea may be problematic in practice, it still underpins much contemporary discourse, such as we find in critical management studies. The university does not just (re-)tell stories, parables, and proverbs. Its power also comes about from its material ability to sort things out (Bowker and Star, 1999); it is a sorter par excellence. While the medieval fool does this discriminating through an observant eye, quick wit and an agile ability to voice distinctions, the University relies on a set of material and writing practices embedded in lecture and library catalogues, grading schemes, charts, tables, classification systems and such like. These ‘little tools of knowledge’ (Becker and Clark, 2001) provide a formidable sorting ability that underpins the university’s epistemic power and also its administrative competence in making decisions about who to appoint, which course to run, who to promote, etc. The nature of these sorting practices partly depends on the particular Sovereign being served.

Through these twin processes of normative narrating and sorting the university constructs and maintains what I term the semiotic nexus. The semiotic nexus gives meaning to an institution – be it the University, its sovereign or one of the
other institutions in the realm – through telling a multi-part, compelling, value-
laden tale about the institution and its place in the world. The university is not the
only institution engaged in this process of ‘making meaning’ – narrating is a form
of theorizing that everyone engages in – but it plays a central role in determining
what counts as knowledge, as well as defining what is valuable, peripheral,
obscene, sacred, profane, reputable, opinion, fact, etc. The university, like the
Fool, personifies truth and reason, in that it is required to tell the truth, to abolish
myth, and to distinguish fact from mere opinion. In other words, the University’s
normative story-telling ability allied to its sorting practices and technologies are
basic to how the University realizes its imagined community of academics, how it
at once becomes an institution itself, and also how it maintains and sustains the
semiotic nexus underpinning other institutions. In other words, these practices
play a significant role in the process of institutionalization.

These processes work largely at the level of the institutional complex, which I
define as a network of identifiable institutions that interact with one another and
with, in particular, a focal institution. In this study, the focal institution is the
University and the institutional complex consists of a network of institutions
including the Church, the State, the Nation, the Corporation, and the Professions. I
distinguish an institutional complex from the related and better-known concept of
the ‘organizational field’, which Scott defines as “a community of organizations
that partakes of a common meaning system and whose participants interact more
frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside the field” (Scott,
1995, p. 56). A good example of an organizational field is an educational system
composed of a set of schools and related organizations such as district offices and
parent-teacher associations. While an organizational field is constituted by
organizations – such as individual schools, district offices, parent-teacher associations, etc. – the institutional complex is made up of institutions. This distinction is useful even though institutions and organizations are difficult to disentangle empirically. In essence, an institutional complex precedes and provides the materials for the cognitive and normative dimensions of institutions.

Play in the Fool

The Fool is a ludic spirit within the institutional complex, and play – a free activity standing outside of and opposed to the seriousness of ordinary life (Huizinga, 1955) – is its modus operandi. As with the child, the Fool is allowed, expected and given time and space to play. Through playing with language the Fool sparks a new (yet old) understanding of the here and now. This incandescent quality at once makes events alive – giving them immediate meaning – while simultaneously framing them within a longer temporal structure or longue durée that articulates the empirical with a transcendent truth. Each ‘play’ then endures as a new mental creation, to be repeated and retained in memory, echoing older refrains of truth and tradition. Following Huizinga, play is primordial and because of its close links with the sacred, it works to keep old norms and beliefs alive. The Fool as playmaker extraordinaire is central to this continual process of institutional re-creation through which an institution breathes, lives and renews itself.

Yet, because it takes work to create order within play, play always (subliminally) reminds us that the world is fundamentally chaotic and that any meaning within this chaos is always provisional and artificial. The Fool’s work of play then is to institutionalise order and at once to open up order to de-institutionalisation. Through its role as playmaker, the Fool puts an institution ‘into play’, which
means that work must be done to either re-create or de-stabilize the institution. In this way, the Fool’s ability and license to play is paradoxically central to both institutionalization and de-institutionalization.

While the Fool is a liminal entity that is encouraged to play, its role is not without boundaries. Indeed, delimiting social positions is central to its own (liminal) role. And the Fool must also be careful not to transgress this role, as may happen, for instance, if it appropriates the position of Sovereign or becomes an agent of the Sovereign. In both cases, it forgets to ‘play the fool’. This perhaps has happened to the University as it grew into a ‘multiversity’ wherein (a) ‘foolish’ intellectuals ceded power and status to earnest ‘academic workers’, and (b) the multiplicity of Sovereigns in the institutional complex led to profound confusion about the University’s own identity. Another transgression occurs when the Fool cannot see beyond the play-making; i.e. the Fool becomes a Trickster, a Lucifer figure working solely to undermine and destroy order. This happens when the Fool forgets that part of the Fool’s role is sustaining order in the institutional complex.

Within the university setting, the decline of the academic lecture into public farce during the 18th century, the excesses of postmodern self-indulgence, and the careerism underpinning much statistical and interpretative sophistry are perhaps good examples of this kind of transgression.

Yet another transgression occurs when the Sovereign becomes a Fool/Trickster, which can happen when the Sovereign forgets that its power is ultimately derived from a primordial sovereign, namely the People.

**Using meaning: the Fool as Educator**

We make a distinction between the *construction* of the semiotic nexus (which is a
part of institution-building) and the utilization of these semiotic resources, both of which are ongoing, dynamic processes. For the University, the utilization process focuses attention on the University as an educational institution. In large part, this function refers to the University’s involvement in the general education of those destined to be the Sovereign’s successors, whether these are religious noviciates, the citizens and nationals of a state or nation, or aspiring and junior members of the professions or corporations. There are significant differences in the understanding of education depending on which Sovereign is being addressed. For instance, the general education of ‘citizens’ is the focus of the University’s liberal tradition, wherein the focus is largely on knowledge for its own sake and the development, through undergraduate education, of ‘generalists’ who would prove to be good citizens. In contrast, the education of professional practitioners focuses on creating ‘specialists’, competent in using knowledge to solve particular problems in particular domains. These differences necessarily erupt in tensions within and without the University.

Pursuing the metaphor of the Fool presents an interesting perspective on the University as an educational institution. While the Fool is an educator of sorts, she does not really ‘own’ knowledge that she ‘passes on’ as per our conventional understanding of pedagogy. Unlike the teacher who is usually cast as the learner’s caring coach, the Fool is an irritant, a provocateur, whose modus operandi is to provoke new wisdom in others. The Fool’s approach is, quite literally, to play the fool, acting as a lucid and ludic lens through which others perceive and recognise profound truths, truths that indeed may be lost in the conventions of learning and scholarship. The fool (like the child) is not expected to ‘know’ anything and is therefore free to act the fool, because she cannot, by definition, ‘know any better’.
Paradoxically, this epistemic vacuum is also a potential source of great wisdom, which is why the idea of the ‘wise fool’ has such a long tradition. Moreover, the oxymoron ‘wise fool’ is also reversible: he that believes himself to be wise is necessarily foolish. For the Fool also reminds us that knowledge of the mystery of life is always beyond even the wise; at best we can only know that there is much of which we are and can only be ignorant. And in recognising this, the highest wisdom is perhaps to do nothing other than to play the Fool, as Erasmus wickedly pointed out in his seminal satire, *The Praise of Folly* (Erasmus, 1511/2005).

*The Praise of Folly* was hugely influential in the sixteenth century and perhaps its central message can continue to map out a positive path for the University, an institution that is bedevilled by angst about its role in the world (Wilshire, 1990; Readings, 1996; Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; Barnett, 2000; Brint, 2002). The central character in Erasmus’s masterpiece is Stultitia, the goddess of Folly, who advocates that *nature* is the primordial life-force of the universe and that all manifestations of institutionalization, all civilizing enterprises, laws, customs and traditions, are but foolish attempts to contain nature. The University, from this perspective, must continue to live with its role as an institutionalizer *and* de-institutionalizer. It must be a dependent, loyal subject to its Sovereign(s) and yet it must also be a promiscuous charlatan. It must be caring and yet it must be fearlessly critical. It must be central yet at the same time liminal. It must advocate reason and yet always celebrate and recognise that folly is foundational. In short, it must be the institutional manifestation of an *oxymoron*, remembering that this word comes from the Greek, *oxumōrone*, meaning ‘pointedly foolish’.

**Conclusions and Implications**

Within institutional theory, most studies consider institutional change in the
context of the relationship between an agent and the institutions within which it is embedded. Either institutional change is effected through the accumulation over time of acts not necessarily intended to cause such change, or else “actors gain their agency from the presence of multiple institutional referents that overlap and conflict” (Dorado, 2005: 385). In both instances the agent is analytically distinct from the institution, a distinction that is manifest in contemporary institutional theory through the foregrounding of concepts such as the ‘institutional entrepreneur’ (DiMaggio, 1988; Beckert, 1999; Dorado, 2005; Battilana, 2006). This study suggests a different orientation to agency and institutional change. Rather than framing the latter around the agency-institution dichotomy, agency is perhaps best seen as an attribute of institutions that work (and play) in an institutional complex where they proactively change and reactively respond to other institutions. In other words, this study shifts the focus from the agency-institution dichotomy to the institution-institution(s) relationship. This shift also moves the focus away from the institution-organization relationship, which is similarly fronted in institutional theory through such concepts as the ‘organizational field’.

This has methodological consequences because, following Foucault, Latour, Garfinkel and others, the dominant fashion in social theory has been to understand macro phenomena through detailed study of situated practice. This fashion is reflected in institutional theory, which emerged coincident with social theory’s ‘turn to practice’ (Reckwitz, 2002), and indeed in organization studies more generally. However, relationships between institutions may need to be researched differently and over longer time periods, indicating that the ‘turn to practice’ may be succeeded by a renaissance in macrosociological studies of institutional
Methodologically, the paper builds on earlier, more theoretical, discussions on metaphorical analysis in organizational studies by interpreting, through metaphor, the interaction between institutions over time. The metaphor of the Fool and the analysis of the case provide a language and perspective on processes of institutionalization and de-institutionalization, and, specifically, it explicates how the University as an institution – in terms of its identity, structure, and content – and its relationship with other institutions have changed over time. The three practices of normative narrating, sorting and playing describe how the University works (and plays) to create and re-create order within a longer tradition and narrative. At the same time, by problematizing and critiquing the status quo the possibility of de-institutionalization is effected through putting institutions within the institutional complex ‘into play’.

The University as Fool, dancing with and between a constellation of powerful Sovereigns, also provides a useful perspective on local practices and disputes in business schools and universities, on the contemporary role of academics, and on the nature of theorizing and learning. For instance, the study suggests that the contemporary debate about the nature and role of the Business School might usefully shift to addressing the role of the university and its relationship with other institutions rather than the more parochial travails of the B-School. And while the Fool’s role is traditionally understood in terms of its relationship with the State, it is clear that the University has partly escaped its subservience to the State through engaging with and being funded by other Sovereigns, such as the Professions. This has implications in terms of how the University engages with its Sovereigns, and again the metaphor provides an enduring trope to guide the nature of this
engagement. Here, we are at one with Dahrendorf (1969) for whom the fools of modern society are the intellectuals who “have the duty to doubt everything that is obvious, to make relative all authority, to ask all those questions that no one else dares to ask” (Dahrendorf, 1969: 51). While this role was traditionally conferred on and appropriated by the academic, this is less so today. For instance, the sociologist of science, Steve Fuller, has recently observed that academia “increasingly looks like a state of exile from the intellectual world” (Fuller, 2005: 2), probably because academic freedom diminished in significance once a general right to free speech became institutionalized. However, there is an historical and social onus on the university to not only house but to actively foster intellectuals that question and play with society’s institutions. In this context, it is important to reassert and re-invigorate the academic’s role as Fool (qua Intellectual), which can only be secured through engaging distinctively, closely, and critically with the various Sovereigns in the University’s institutional complex. Finally, the perspective enunciated in this paper requires that distinctive virtues and practices be celebrated within the University, with consequential implications for how the institution should be funded, assessed and organized.

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Notes

i A recent example of such a threat is the planned downsizing of Keele University’s School of Economic and Management Studies (see http://www.ucu.org.uk/index.cfm?articleid=3005, accessed December 19, 2007).

ii The approach taken in this study is ‘critical’ in the specific sense described by Fournier and Gray (2000).

References


