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Meister Eckhart in Twentieth-Century Philosophy
Dermot Moran
(University College Dublin)
for
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The manner in which Meister Eckhart has been viewed by scholars has changed considerably over the centuries. Nevertheless, the Bull In agro dominico of 27th March 1329 already points towards the future directions that Eckhart research would subsequently take. There Eckhart is described in three-fold manner as ‘from Germany, a doctor of sacred theology (as it is said) and a professor of the Order of Preachers’. These characterisations of Eckhart continue to frame the debate – in other words, his connection with the German philosophical and mystical tradition, his status as a University of Paris master and Scriptural exegete, and his role as a theologian and vernacular preacher for the Dominican Order.

The revival of Eckhart during the nineteenth century uncovered many more Eckharts. Indeed, the basis for Eckhart’s growing popularity in the twentieth century was laid during the nineteenth century when Eckhart was rediscovered by the Romantics. Eckhart was initially revived by the eclectic engineer, Catholic Romantic, Franz von Baader (1765-1841), a friend of Schelling, who discovered Eckhart through his reading of Boehme. Baader inspired Hegel to refer to Eckhart in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, quoting Eckhart’s saying that the eye with which we see God is also the eye with which God sees us. The nineteenth-century revival broadly represented Eckhart as a speculative, dialectical thinker. He was seen (with Albertus Magnus) as one of the first German philosophers, a forerunner to the Protestant Reformers, ‘the father of German speculation’, i.e. German Idealism. Perhaps, more important (as Josiah Royce confirmed), because more influential, was Arthur Schopenhauer’s (1788-1860) account of Eckhart’s quietist overcoming of the will that compared him with the Indian Buddhist Sakyamuni in his World as Will and Representation.

Twenty-first-century philosophical interest in Eckhart has continued to expand on his influence and originality as the pre-Cartesian discoverer of subjectivity and infinity, harbinger of modernity, mystic preacher of loss of self, ‘detachment’ (Abgescheidenheit), going out from oneself, ‘innerness’ or intimacy (Innerlichkeit), and living ‘without the why’ (ohne Warum), themes that continue to bring Eckhart into comparison with Eastern philosophy. Eckhart is presented as having anticipated Descartes with his turn to subjectivity, and with his conception of the divine being as
generated by His own self-understanding, which one commentator Richard Woods refers to as Eckhart’s ‘Cartesian revolution’. One also finds during the twentieth century a renewed interest in Eckhart’s conception of the dialectical relation between human and divine intellect. During the twentieth century, however, interest in Eckhart has broadened and diversified: Eckhart has been discussed as the Thomist Scholastic, Neoplatonic negative theologian, Rheinish mystic, freethinker, accused heretic, and even feminist, Marxist, ecologist who respects God in nature, the apostle of freedom and ‘letting be’, postmodern transgressive deconstructionist, postmetaphysical theologian, the Eastern sage and the Zen Buddhist enlightened master. Eckhart also represents an important figure for contemporary theologians and philosophers of religion. He has often been championed by those wanting to counterbalance the more rigid prescriptions of the Neo-Thomist revival with the challengingly paradoxical conception of the transcendent yet immanent God is also seen as a flowering of negative theology. He has been embraced for a more positive outlook than typically possessed by medieval theologians, due to the absence of a sustained concentration on sin, evil and the consequences of the Fall. In this vein, the American former Dominican and now Episcopal priest Matthew Fox (b. 1940), a student of Marie-Dominique Chenu (1895-1990), interprets Eckhart in terms of what he, following Chenu, calls ‘creation spirituality’, an optimistic anthropological outlook that does dwell not on Original Sin but rather on the createdness of human beings in the image of the divine, with an inborn likeness to God. Similarly Eckhart’s liberating conception of spirituality has been embraced for shaking off the overly defined conception of the divine found in ontotheology (‘So therefore let us pray to God that we may be free of God’, Sermon 52, Beati pauperes spiritu) and offering a deeply charitable and loving way of living in witness to the divine that seems to overcome the dangers inherent in the institutionalization of religion. In this regard Eckhart has even been called insightfully a ‘mystic of everyday life’.

Twentieth-century philosophers of very different outlooks have been attracted to Eckhart, including existentialists (Karl Jaspers), phenomenologists (Martin Heidegger), Marxists (Ernst Bloch), and postmodern theologians (John D. Caputo, Michel Henry), among many others (e.g. Josiah Royce). He has been embraced by thinkers such as Rudolf Otto, Martin Buber and Erich Fromm. The existentialist psychiatrist and philosopher Karl Jaspers presents Eckhart as overcoming the subject-object divide; others see him as developing a conception of the epistemological subject. In the USA, Josiah Royce lectured on Eckhart at Harvard in 1915-1916 and compared him to Bergson. Hans Blumenberg, Karsten Harries and Elizabeth Brient associate Eckhart with Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) as mystics involved in bringing about the breakthrough to modernity through their manner of thinking the nature of the infinite, through the discovery of subjectivity in the modern sense. Other commentators (e.g. Kurt Flasch) emphasize Eckhart as a kind of proto-Kantian philosopher who understood the constitutive function of the understanding. Still others see him, following Heidegger, as a philosopher who explores the very experience of a meditative thinking that overcomes representationalism. The French phenomenologist Michel Henry (1922-2002) has
published a number of studies on aspects of Eckhart’s ontology, focusing on the particular power of a receptive passivity which bypasses the usual opposition between activity and passivity.  

Given this forest of interpretations, how can we find our way to the ‘true’ Eckhart—or is there an Eckhart for every age and taste? Assuredly, Eckhart is an extremely complicated and multifaceted thinker and there are serious hermeneutical problems associated with almost every way of interpreting him. He cannot be presented primarily either as a radical religious reformer or as a purely academic intellectual involved in scholastic dispute. Similarly, those who classify Eckhart as a mystic, often hold a view of mysticism that opposes it to philosophy, whereas, in fact, for many medieval philosophers, philosophy and mysticism cannot be opposed simply as the rational to the irrational (or superrational). Similarly, the German vernacular sermons, although written in a different register, cannot be truly said to offer a deeper or more spiritual vision than the equally complex and inspiring Latin sermons.

To illustrate the kinds of problems that emerge, consider that, while Eckhart does represent a distinctively German turn in late Scholastic thought (and not just because of his use of the vernacular), unfortunately, in the nineteen thirties and forties, he was presented as exemplifying race by German National Socialist ideologues, such as Sigrid Hunke (1913-1999) and Alfred Rosenberg (1893-1946, executed at Nuremberg), who called Eckhart ‘the apostle of the Nordic West’ and saw him as a ‘noble soul’ who opposed Papal dogmatism. A balance has to be struck. The effort to interpret Eckhart as a critique of ontotheology (based largely on his Parisian Questions) has to be balanced with the Eckhart who in his Opus tripartitum espouses the classical Thomist identification of God with pure being. Indeed, much recent scholarship on Eckhart (Goris, Haas, Sturlese, de Libera, McGinn, among others) represents a more nuanced critical reaction against earlier more one-sided characterisations of his oeuvre.

One important advance in twentieth-century scholarship on Eckhart is that it correctly approaches Eckhart not so much as an intellectual outsider but rather as belonging squarely within an older tradition of Christian theology inspired by Christian Neoplatonism that had been renewed and reinvigorated in the thirteenth century by Albertus Magnus and the Cologne school. Eckhart has to be read as both belonging to and radically renewing the tradition of negative theological writers that runs from Proclus and Dionysius through Johannes Scottus Eriugena, Maimonides, Albertus Magnus, and subsequently goes on to Nicholas of Cusa. At the same time, as a Parisian academic and a Dominican theologian, Eckhart absorbed and in many ways reinterpreted the central tenets of the new Aristotelian philosophy of being promulgated by Thomas Aquinas and other Neo-Aristotelians in the Paris Arts Faculty (some allegedly tainted with ‘Averroism’). The particular historical and social milieu of Eckhart’s German sojourn, including his complex relationship with women’s spiritual and devotional movements (often associated with extreme ascetic practices) of the late thirteenth century must also be taken into account. There is also a growing consensus confirming Eckhart’s orthodoxy or, at
least, his orthodox intent, and this has been bolstered in the late twentieth century by official moves by the Dominican Order to rehabilitate his standing in Rome.41

Eckhart’s complex metaphorical language and particularly his use of analogy, metaphor, and evocative images have also been highlighted by scholars as new hermeneutical approaches to his complex texts, including his Scriptural commentaries.42

Along with this scholarly revival of interest intent on clarifying Eckhart’s cultural, intellectual, and linguistic context, there have been renewed efforts to interpret systematically his enigmatic pronouncements and to show the inner unity of his thought. The first challenge is to specify correctly the relation between Eckhart’s Scholastic writings (including Questions and Commentaries) written in Latin and his more mystical sermons written in Middle High German. In the nineteenth century, these two sets of texts (in part due to the separate editions of Pfeiffer and Denifle) were seen to represent two distinct Eckharts: on the one hand, the more careful exegete writing for his academic peers; and, on the other, the unrestrained preacher attempting to communicate to an unlettered audience. Although Eckhart’s German sermons were supposedly addressed to largely unlettered religious women in convents, in fact, Eckhart preached in both German and Latin and his sermons are replete with highly technical principles and concepts drawn from a diversity of classical and scholastic sources (often simply cited as ‘a master says’, ein meister sprichet), including Aristotle, Augustine, Proclus, the Book of Causes, Dionysius, Aquinas, Albertus, Avicenna43, Averroes, Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed (translated into Latin around 1240),44 and the Mystical Book of the Twenty Four Philosophers. Recent scholarship has sought to reunite these diverse Eckharts, emphasising that his sermons and commentaries are both strongly rooted in Scripture and in the Christian philosophical tradition, and were pitched at a high doctrinal level.

Establishing Critical Editions and Authenticating Biographical Information

The explosion of scholarly interest in Meister Eckhart in the twentieth century45 was squarely founded on the new editions of his writings that emerged from the mid-nineteenth century onward, especially the groundbreaking editions of the German antiquarian and literary scholar Franz Pfeiffer (1815-1868) and the Austrian Dominican Heinrich Suso Denifle (1844-1905). In 1857 Pfeiffer published a two-volume edition of his German Mystics, which included many of Eckhart’s sermons and tracts written in Middle German.46 Unfortunately, if unsurprisingly, this edition of 110 sermons and some 18 tracts included many spurious or unattributed works. Soon after, in 1866, Denifle published a two-volume edition of Eckhart’s Latin writings.47 In part, Denifle’s aim was to counteract an earlier view that presented Eckhart as a pre-Lutheran reformer by emphasising Eckhart’s grounding in the Scholastic theological tradition. He claimed that efforts to read Eckhart as a pantheist showed a misunderstanding of the Catholic approach to grace. Denifle emphasised Eckhart’s relation to Thomas Aquinas (although he regarded the latter as the superior thinker) but also tended to downplay the German texts in favour the Latin. Gradually, Eckhart began to be studied through his own texts—he appears, for
instance, in Auguste Jundt’s history of pantheism with several sermons collected in an appendix.48

The pioneering work of Pfeiffer and Denifle was built on and corrected by subsequent scholars to provide the basis of the monumental critical editions of Eckhart’s Latin and German writings that have appeared in the twentieth century by a heroic group of scholars, often working in adversity including Josef Quint (1898-1976)49, Josef Koch (1885-1967), Martin Grabmann (1875-1949),50 Gabriel Théry,51 Antoine Dondaine (1898-1987)52, Raymond Klíbansky (1905-2005)53, and others. Quint established a list of 86 genuine sermons (including 71 found in Pfeiffer) in his first 3 volumes, but more have since been identified and included in Volume 5 (sermons 87 to 105). Popular interest in Eckhart was also stimulated by the appearance of modern German translations.54

The appearance of the critical editions of his writings has been accompanied by a wealth of studies of Eckhart’s life55, providing rich detail of the intellectual, cultural and religious milieu, including the ‘process’ around Eckhart’s accusation and trial leading to his condemnation in the Papal Bull In agro dominico (1329).56 Denifle, Théry, and others, began what has come to be an intense and highly nuanced study of the documents surrounding Eckhart’s trial.57 We have learned, for instance, that Eckhart was not born in Hochheim but that ‘von Hochheim’ was his family name. Enormous effort has been putting into the social and religious context of the day and especially the social context of the sermons.58 Kurt Flasch has written greatly on the social and historical background to Eckhart whom he reads as a philosopher in the context of the university and study centres of the period, rejecting any opposition between Eckhart’s supposed ‘mysticism’ and his ‘scholasticism’.

Stages on Life’s Way
It is now usual to divide Eckhart’s life into his periods in Erfurt, Paris, Strasbourg, and Köln. Eckhart was born in Tambach, Thuringia, around 1260, entered the Dominican Order in Erfurt as a teenager, and at least part of his formation took place at Cologne in the House founded by Albertus Magnus in 1248 (it is also possible he studied in Paris at that time—he may even have been there when the 1277 Condemnation was pronounced). He first lectured on the Sentences of Peter Lombard in the Dominican studium generale at the abbey of Saint-Jacques (established by St. Dominic and part of the University of Paris since 1220), in 1293-94. Only the first lecture (Collatio in libros sententiarum) of his course on the Sentences survives from this period.59

Between 1294 and 1298 Eckhart was prior of the Dominican House in Erfurt and vicar of Dominican houses in Thuringia.60 During this period he composed his Talks of Instruction (Die rede der underscheidunge) in 23 chapters, evening addresses to the young Dominican students at Erfurt.61 In this early work Eckhart is already promoting ‘self-abandonment’, the ‘empty spirit’ that is ‘attached to nothing’, the ‘nakedness’ that is ‘free of things’.62 In 1302 he returned to Paris to the Dominican Chair of Theology, by which time his master’s degree must have been conferred (the title ‘Meister’ is thought to refer to his magister) as he had completed the necessary four
years of post-bachelor lecturing. At Paris his duties as professor included exegetical commentary on Biblical books, partake in disputes (disputationes) on particular questions, and preaching. During this period, Eckhart composed the first two of his Pariscian Questions. Eckhart was opposing the views of another Paris master, the Franciscan Gonsalvus of Spain (1255-1313) who was a promoter of the young Duns Scotus, who was lecturing on the Sentences in Paris from 1302. Eckhart had defended the thesis that the ‘the praise of God in heaven is better than the love of God on earth’. Gonsalvus opposed this position. There was an ongoing dispute between Dominicans and Franciscans concerning the primacy of intellect over will or vice-versa. Henry of Ghent had proposed the identity of God with pure being.

After just one year in Paris, Eckhart was once again assigned administrative duties, this time in the newly created province of Saxonia. The plan of the Opus tripartitum was probably drafted at this time. This was to contain three parts: opus propositionum, opus quaestionum and opus sermonum. He returned for a third time to Paris to the Chair of Theology at St. Jacques from 1311 to 1313. From 1313 until 1323 he is in Strasbourg as a vicar and as prior of the Dominican convent, dealing with issues connected with the Brethren of the Free Spirit. During this period he composed ‘Of the Nobleman’ (DW V, pp. 109-119). Recent scholarship has placed new emphasis on Eckhart’s encounter with Beguine spirituality during his stay in Strasbourg. The similarities between Mechthild of Madgeburg, Marguerite Porete, and Eckhart have been discussed by many contemporary scholars. Eckhart’s debt to women religious, the Beguines, in particular has also been emphasised.

Presumably Eckhart returned to Cologne around 1323 as regent master (magister regens) of the studium generale in which he had earlier studied. Among his students at this time were Henrich Suso and Johannes Tauler. Inquiries into his orthodoxy began in 1325 under Eckhart’s Dominican superior Henry of Strassbourg and were made official in 1326 under the Archbishop of Cologne, Henry of Virneberg.

Most of his German sermons belong to his later period. There are disputed issues around his authorship of certain works as well as the dating of certain works. For instance, Lori Storlese has claimed that Eckhart’s Opus tripartitum is to be located in Eckhart’s time in Erfurt after his first Paris sojourn, whereas Kurt Ruh has challenged the authenticity of the Talks of Instruction.

Characterising Eckhart’s Intellectual Outlook
Eckhart’s complex relationship with Scholasticism and his association with different intellectual centres, including three periods at Paris, make it difficult to characterise with precision his intellectual position. As a Dominican theologian, he clearly belongs to the tradition of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas (Eckhart frequently quotes or alludes to both masters). He is also particularly connected with the so called German Dominican ‘school’ in Cologne, which included Dietrich of Freiburg (1250-1310), and later Berthold von Moosburg, Johannes Tauler, and others. In recent years, a group of German medieval scholars, the so called ‘Bochum school’ of scholarsBurkhart— Burkhart Mojsisch, Kurt Flasch, Lori
Sturlese—have documented in detail Eckhart’s links with his immediate German milieu. Mojsisch and Sturlese, in particular, have explored Eckhart’s connection with Dietrich von Freiberg71, a Dominican theologian at Paris who also worked on the intellect and whom Eckhart knew personally, albeit that he is never mentioned by Eckhart in his works72. Much more is now known of Eckhart’s relationships with his teacher Albert the Great as well as with the broad school which included Ulrich of Strassburg (c.1225–1277), a movement known broadly as ‘Rheinish mysticism’.73 A lively debate rages as to whether these German Dominicans can truly be said to constitute a ‘school’ in the sense of maintaining a unified philosophical position.74 It is undoubtedly the case that the Dominicans exercised intellectual dominance in Germany in the late thirteenth until the mid fourteenth century. Broadly speaking, the main tenets of this Albertist Dominican school are the understanding of God as pure intellect, the claim that human nature too is essentially intellect (a view earlier promulgated by Johannes Scottus Eriugena) and the claim that human intellect can attain to the intellectual vision that God Himself enjoys.75 Albertus and his followers maintain an older Augustinian psychology that sees the soul as an entity independent of the body, which although not identical with intellect, contains the originally pure intellect directly illuminated by God.76 Dietrich of Freiberg disagreed with Thomas on the relationship between being and essence; for him it is not a real distinction as for Thomas but rather essence and existence are two ways of signifying the same thing.

As the nineteenth-century commentators already recognised, Eckhart must also be situated in an older Christian Neoplatonic tradition of Einheitsmetaphysik which prioritises thinking the divinity (Gottheit) as a transcendent, infinite, unnameable One (as Werner Beierwaltes77 Theo Kobusch, and others have done78). Eckhart is certainly familiar with the Neoplatonic negative theology, especially as found in the Christian followers of Proclus, mediated through Pseudo-Dionysius or the Liber de causis,79 but also with the strong influence of Maimonides. In recent years, also, there has been a plethora of works devoted to apophatic theology and spirituality by, among others, Jean-Luc Marion80, Michael Sells, Denys Turner81, Deirdre Carabine, and Thomas Carlson.82

God, for Eckhart, following the Christian Neoplatonic negative tradition, is such complete simplicity and unity as to be entirely ineffable. Thus Eckhart says in Sermon 26 Nolite timere eos qui corpus occidunt: ‘Everything that is in the Godhead is one, and of that there is nothing to be said’83 In this context he elevates God above being and yet, in several of his works notably his Opus tripartitum, retains Thomistic and Scholastic formulations that one and being are convertible, ens et unum convertuntur. Thus in the Commentary on Exodus, a particularly important Biblical text since it contains the ‘I am who am’ (Exodus 3: 14) statement that motivated St. Augustine and others to identify God with Being. For Eckhart, as for the Christian tradition, God is the ‘I am who am’ of Exodus, as well as ‘that which is’ ‘what it is’. Eckhart identifies the one with being.84 God is being, esse, that which is, the identity of essence and existence85, necessary being.86 However, in his Parisian Lectures, Eckhart says God cannot be called esse and prefers to refer to Him as intellect which is prior to being. Thus Eckhart can write that God’s act of understanding is His very
existence, ‘God exists because He understands’ (quia intelligit, ideo est). Eckhart maintains that being always presupposes the knowing of intellect. Absolute knowing, considered in itself, can be understood as without being or prior to being.

In his Commentary on the Book of Exodus, Eckhart claims that the divine assertion ‘I Am Who Am’ involves a repetition that ... indicates the purity of affirmation excluding all negation from God. It also indicates a reflexive turning (reflexa conversio) back of his existence into itself and upon itself and its dwelling and remaining fixed in itself. It further indicates a ‘boiling’ or giving birth to itself -- glowing in itself, and melting and boiling in and into itself, light that totally forces its whole being in light and into light and that is everywhere totally turned back and reflected upon itself, according to that saying of the sage, “The Monad gives birth to” (or gave birth to) “the monad and reflected love or ardent desire back into itself”. Eckhart stresses both the transcendent Oneness of the divine and also that God is being or ‘is-ness’ (Istigkeit). From Eriugena (following Dionysius), he also speaks of God as ‘nothingness’. Johannes Scottus Eriugena understands God as ‘nothingness’ (nihilum, Periphyseon III.685a) and as the negation of essence (negatio essentiae, I.462b) and says that God is ‘not this nor that nor anything’ (nec hoc nec illud nec ullum ille est, I.510c). The ‘nothingness’ of creatures is a common theme—deriving from St Augustine and developed also by Eriugena and others. St. Augustine claimed that the creature, considered apart from God, is a mere nothing. Eckhart constantly reinforces this message. For Eckhart, the transcendent nothingness of God and the dependent nothingness of creatures are mirrors of each other. His thought seeks to mediate the tension between these spheres of nothingness. It is precisely this emphasis on nothingness that attracted Heidegger.

In the remainder of this chapter, then, I shall focus on what I regard as the most powerful and influential philosophical interpretations of Eckhart in twentieth-century European thinkers, particularly Martin Heidegger and his followers, notably his Marburg student Käte Oltmanns (who wrote a thesis on Eckhart, later published as Die Philosophie des Meister Eckhart, 1935) and Reiner Schürmann (1941-1993), a highly regarded professor at the New School for Social Research in New York, and an influential commentator and interpreter of the work of Eckhart. Schürmann in particular interprets Eckhart as a critic of ontotheology and indeed as a post-modern proponent of différencement.

**Eckhart and Heidegger: Gelassenheit**

Perhaps the most important twentieth-century philosopher to have taken up Eckhart is Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), so it is necessary here to examine his unorthodox approach in some depth. Heidegger was deeply influenced by Meister Eckhart both directly through his own texts as well as through citations of Eckhart to be found in the German poet Angelus Silesius (a.k.a. Johannes Scheffler, 1624-1677). In addition, several of Heidegger’s circle, including his student Käte Oltmanns and his old friend from his native village of Messkirch, Fr. Bernhard Welte (1906-1983), wrote on Eckhart. Furthermore, many philosophers, including Reiner Schürmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann, Jean Greisch, and John D. Caputo, have also contributed
significantly to the discussion of the complex relation between Heidegger and Eckhart. Recently, for instance, the relationship between Heidegger’s *Gelassenheit* the concept of *wu-wei* in Taoism has been examined. Heidegger focuses on Eckhart’s central concept: *Gelassenheit*, often translated as ‘letting be’ and on his concept of the abandonment of self-willing.

Already in his Habilitation thesis of 1915 on ‘Duns Scotus’ Doctrine of the Categories and of Meaning’ Heidegger promises a future study of Eckhart. He also proposed a lecture course on Eckhart in Freiburg in 1919, which, however, was never given. His 1916 lecture ‘Die Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft’ (‘The Concept of Time in Historical Science’) begins with a quotation from Eckhart concerning the simplicity of eternity in contrast to the changeability and multiplicity of time. Heidegger was clearly reading Eckhart closely. In a letter to his wife Elfriede of 22nd January 1919, he says that he has been reading Eckhart in the edition of Ernst Diederichs (he commends the edition but dismisses the editor’s introduction as ‘worthless’) and remarks that he learned that some of Eckhart’s sermons had been published along with Tauler’s in Adam Petri’s Basel edition of 1521. In one lecture from the 1930s Heidegger even claims that German philosophy begins with Eckhart, and he continues to invoke Eckhart especially in his lectures and talks during the 1940s and 1950s. For instance in his 1949 short piece, *Der Feldweg* (‘The Country Path’), he refers to Eckhart as the ‘old master of reading and of life’:

In the unspoken of his speech, as the old Master of Reading and of Living Meister Eckhart said, is God first God. (im ungesprochenen ihrer Sprache ist, wie der alte Lese- un Lebe-meister Eckehardt sagt, Gott erst God). Most crucially, Heidegger makes use of certain central Eckhartian notions, most notably ‘letting be’ (*Gelassenheit*), ‘detachment’ or ‘releasement’ (*Abgeschiedenheit; MHG abgescheidenheit*), and the notion of the ‘without why’ (ohne Warum).

Undoubtedly Heidegger’s most influential interpretation of Meister Eckhart is to be found in a slim volume entitled *Gelassenheit* (1959) which includes two texts: a 1955 talk entitled simply ‘*Gelassenheit*’, and a ‘conversation’ (*Gespräch*) entitled ‘Towards an Explication of *Gelassenheit*: From a Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking’ (‘Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit. Aus einem Feldweggespräch über das Denken’). In fact, this latter text is a truncated excerpt from a much longer triologue written by Heidegger a decade earlier, in 1944-1945. The full version has now appeared in Heidegger’s *Gesamtausgabe* volume 77. According to the Editor Ingrid Schlüssler the version originally published in 1959 represents only the last third of the version now available.

In this text Heidegger’s main focus is to elucidate the nature of ‘meditative thinking’ (*Nachdenken, Besinnung*), its peculiar character of *letting be* or ‘releasement’ (*Gelassenheit*) in relation to the overwhelming dominance of the framework of technological thinking, and the need for ‘rootedness’ (*Bodenständigkeit*). For Heidegger, this ‘letting be’ offers an opening in space and time that allows for a kind of counter-thinking or thinking ‘otherwise’. The occasion for Heidegger’s talk, delivered in his birth place of Messkirch, was the relatively inauspicious one hundred and seventy-fifth anniversary of the birth of a local composer Contradin Kreutzer.
(1780-1849). Heidegger is here practicing an Eckhartian-style sermon, given to local people not particularly tutored in philosophy or theology, warning of a current danger and suggesting a helpful practice to overcome the danger. This short talk does not even mention Eckhart by name, but, in the talk, Heidegger does refer to an ‘old word’, which he calls ‘letting be’ or ‘releasement toward things’ (die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen).106

In this Messkirch address, Heidegger’s ‘first word’ in his home village is the word ‘thanks’. He goes on to link the ‘thoughtlessness’ and ‘thanklessness’ (Gedankenlosigkeit) of much of our modern living which may be characterized as a ‘flight from thinking’ (Flucht vor dem Denken). Thinking today has essentially been transmuted into ‘calculation’ (Rechnen), investigating and planning, which must be contrasted with meditative thinking (Besinnung)—a term much favoured also by Heidegger’s mentor Edmund Husserl. Meditating, Heidegger insists, is not something high-flown and abstract rather it concerns what is closest to us. Moreover meditative thinking requires grounding, it flowers in a homeland just as does a work of art. Thinking requires a certain kind of ‘groundedness’ or ‘rootedness’ (Bodenständigkeit).

According to Heidegger, scientific calculative thinking is everywhere and nowhere more evident than in the pursuit of nuclear power and the biotechnological control of the life process itself. The current age is the nuclear age and an age characterized by technological efficiency:

Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry. (Die Natur wird zu einer einzigen riesenhaften Tankstelle, zur Energiequelle für die moderne Technik und Industrie).107

But much more dangerous than the atom bomb is the capacity of scientists to technologically interfere with the life process itself. Heidegger in 1955 is fully aware of the dominance of technology and calculative thinking and its apparent inescapability. As a result of this technological upheaval modern humans have lost their ‘rootedness’ (Bodenständigkeit, GA 16: 526). No one has thought through precisely what this reliance and pursuit of technology is doing to us:

Yet it is not that the world is becoming entirely technical which is really uncanny (das eigentlich Unheimliche). Far more uncanny is our being unprepared for this transformation of world (Weltveränderung), our inability to confront meditatively what is really dawning in this age...108

The intrinsic ‘sense’ of the technological world is hidden from us (Der Sinn der technischen Welt verbirgt sich, GA 16: 527). The danger is that calculative thinking may be considered the only kind of thinking in which cause humans would have abandoned their nature as meditative beings. Heidegger then proceeds to offer an interpretation of what a detached attitude to technology should involve. Meditative thinking with its ‘rootedness’ (Bodenständigkeit) must harbour the possibility for humans to say both ‘yes and no’ to technology (GA 16; 527), both to employ technology and also to ‘let it be’, to let it in and also leave it out.109

Heidegger acknowledges that technology and the entire technical framing of the modern world cannot now be put to one side, rather the challenge is not to allow ourselves to be dominated and enslaved by it. If we adopt the right attitude
Our relation to technology will become wonderfully simple and relaxed (einfach und ruhig). We let (Wir lassen...in ...) technical devices enter our daily life, and at the same time leave them outside (lassen... draussen...), that is leave them alone, as things which are nothing absolute but depend on something higher. I would call this comportment towards technology which expresses “yes” and at the same time “no,” by an old word, releasement toward things.\textsuperscript{110} This appearing and hiding of the essence of technology is something we can be open to and we can adopt an attitude which Heidegger calls ‘openness to the mystery’ (\textit{die Offenheit für das Geheimnis}, GA 16: 528). This combination of \textit{Gelassenheit} and ‘openness to the mystery’ is precisely what is supposed to give us a new rootedness, a new ‘Grund und Boden’. However, Heidegger says this kind of meditative thinking (\textit{Nachdenken, Besinnung}) does not happen by itself and is no accident but requires ‘courage’ so it seems to require a self-conscious act of willing. Yet it is precisely this which he challenges in his second essay.

The second text published in the 1959 \textit{Gelassenheit} volume was written somewhat earlier (1944-1945) cast in the form of a trialogue between three people: a scientist/researcher (Forscher), a scholar (Gelehrter) and a teacher (Lehrer) and is translated as ‘Conversation on a Country Path About Thinking’\textsuperscript{111}. Here Heidegger develops the theme of \textit{Gelassenheit} in a more systematic and technical manner and, this time, Meister Eckhart is explicitly mentioned as one of the old ‘masters of thought’ (\textit{bei älteren Meistern des Denkens}) ‘from whom much can be learned’.\textsuperscript{112}

Heidegger here develops a much deeper account of the nature of \textit{Gelassenheit} or letting be. He is reflecting on the relation between thinking and willing (which Kant characterised as ‘spontaneity’). Heidegger here rejects the religious interpretation of \textit{Gelassenheit} as a letting go or abandoning of the human will in order to let the divine will prevail. In this context, Heidegger thinks Eckhart himself errs on the religious side, replacing human will with divine will. He quotes Eckhart’s \textit{Talks of Instruction (Counsels of Discernment)}: ‘Where I will nothing for myself, there instead wills God’ (GA 77: 158). Rather Heidegger seeks to articulate a new kind of non-willing, meditative response that is not fundamentally based on questioning but rather on a kind of ‘answering’ (Antworten), which may also be understood as a kind of thanking.

Questioning is a will to a response, for Heidegger, whereas what is needed is a kind of response that answers to the ‘claim’ (Anspruch) of Being: ‘The word must first be listened to’ (GA 77: 25).

According to Heidegger (and here the influence on Gadamer can clearly be seen), a genuine conversation does not attempt to \textit{will} something, i.e. its outcome or result. Conversation has to involve a receptivity and openness to the matter at hand. Heidegger’s \textit{Gelassenheit} does not involve letting oneself go in order to invite God in. Rather for Heidegger, \textit{Gelassenheit} is entirely outside the domain of the will; it is neither passive nor active. Possibly influenced by Schopenhauer, Heidegger proposes \textit{Gelassenheit} as a kind of ‘non-willing’ (Nicht-Wollen) but is careful, especially in the longer unpublished version of the conversation, to distinguish this non-willing from
any kind of ‘self-refusal’ (Sich-Weigern) or ‘self-opposition’ (Sich-Widersetzen) or ‘forbidding’ (Verbieten). According to Heidegger, to explicitly renounce willing is still to will. In this lecture, especially, Heidegger understands representationalist thinking, thinking which sees to understand something in a particular manner, subject to a particular framework or context, as a kind of willing. Technological thinking, then, is an extreme form of wilfulness.

In the Gelassenheit lecture, in order to characterise the new kind of opening within which genuine as opposed to representational thinking takes place Heidegger introduces two new concepts namely, the notions of ‘horizon’ (Horizont), taken from Husserl, and ‘region’ (and here Heidegger uses both ‘die Gegend’ as well as an older dialect term ‘die Gegnet’) which he understands as a certain kind of open space, but presumably not an imposed context. For Heidegger, a region is ‘an expanse and an abiding’ (die Weite und die Weile). It seems to have the character of both gathering and opening ‘so that its openness is gathered and held’. The open expanse (Weite) is also a kind of ‘abiding’ or ‘whiling’ away. In other words, the concept of an opening here has not just got spatial meaning but also a temporal connotation. A kind of temporal space is necessary for a genuine conversation.

For Heidegger thinking is the activity of opening or regioning, where such opening is simply allowing the space of meaning to manifest itself as opposed to imposing a grid on it. Furthermore, ‘releasement’ into the open is a matter of waiting (Warten). As Heidegger writes:

Releasement (Gelassenheit) is indeed the release of oneself from transcendental representation and so the relinquishing (Absehen) of a willing of the horizon. Such relinquishing no longer stems from a willing, except that the occasion for releasing oneself to belonging to the open-region would require a trace of willing (Spur des Wollens). This trace, however, vanishes while releasing oneself and is completely extinguished in releasement.

Part of Heidegger’s concern is to establish a kind of thinking about being which is haunted neither by metaphysics nor theology. It cannot be representational thinking. Furthermore, Gelassenheit should not be determined by the structure of Christian expectation, faith and hope. The experience of transcendence of which he is talking here is still very much understood phenomenology, as the experience of manifestation. Heidegger is exploring the manner in which truth is made manifest by humans, how humans stand in the truth. That—which-regions is itself truth, and the true human relation to such truth is thinking in the sense of allowing something to manifest itself.

The problem is whether, in these texts, Gelassenheit, for Heidegger, signals a kind of quietism, doing nothing, a retreat from action. Eckhart in his own Talks of Instruction directly addresses the issue of action and quietism. He argues there that persons who are too concerned about acting become attached to the action which is something temporary, whereas nothing is permanently in one’s possession, so it is important to be detached from such doing.
Heidegger ends his meditation by invoking a single Greek word from Heraclitus, which he translates as ‘going near’ (Nahegehen) or ‘moving-into-nearness’ (In-die-Nähe-gehen).\textsuperscript{115} This suggests a kind of activity, a kind of alertness which has at the same time to inhibit becoming representation.

Clearly, in these extremely dense texts, Heidegger is attempting not just to comment on Eckhart in the sense of offering an interpretation, but rather to free up the true sense of Eckhart’s Gelassenheit so that it can be a form of remedial thinking in relation to the thinking of Being and living out the human activity of manifesting truth. Heidegger is not offering exegesis; he is rather wrestling the concept of Gelassenheit from its Christian context in Eckhart and allowing it to have a deeper and more ontological significance. This represents a very profound and creative reading (even misreading) of Eckhart, which dislocates it from its historical and conceptual content. It can be argued, for instance, that Heidegger imposes on Eckhart’s sense of Gelassenheit the Christian concept of resignatio, resignation to the will of God, rather than reading it as a more radical breaking free of all representations and images both of the divine and of worldly things.

**Eckhart’s Treatise On Detachment in Relation to Heidegger**

In order to contextualise Heidegger’s approach and understand its relation to Eckhart, we need to look more closely at Eckhart’s treatise On Detachment (Von Abgescheidenheit, Middle High German: Von abegescheidenheit).\textsuperscript{116} This is a complex but unified tractate on the virtue of detachment.\textsuperscript{117} Its date is uncertain.\textsuperscript{118} The treatise begins with Eckhart attesting that he has read the pagan masters, the Old Testament prophets, the New Testament, and has sought himself to discover the highest virtue for human beings. According to Eckhart, detachment is the most elevated of the human virtues (surpassing even love, humility, and compassion) as, through it, humans lose their connected with creaturehood. Detachment attains to the unity and purity of God himself. Detachment affords humans perfect knowledge and will as the divine knowledge and will take effect in them. The object of this detachment is pure nothingness. Detachment places God above all good works; All the good works in the world have no effect on God’s detachment.\textsuperscript{119}

Elsewhere, in his Sermon 53 Misit dominus manum suam, Eckhart confirms that detachment was one of his central themes:

*When I preach, I am accustomed to speak about detachment, and that a man should be free of himself and of all things; second, that a man should be formed again into that simple good which is God; third, that he should reflect on the great nobility with which God has endowed his soul, so that in this way he may come to wonder at God; fourth, about the purity of the divine nature, for the brightness of the divine nature is beyond words. (Sermon 53: Misit dominus manum suam).*\textsuperscript{120}

This list of themes has rightly been recognised by Reiner Schürmann and others as a summary of Eckhart’s teaching.\textsuperscript{121} The four themes are ‘detachment’ (abegescheidenheit), ‘being transformed’ (Wiedereingebildet) into God, the ‘nobility’ (Adel) of the soul, and the ‘simplicity’ (Lauterkeit) of God. Eckhart places detachment
in first position. Indeed, Eckhart interprets Christ’s injunction to Martha, ‘One thing is necessary’ (unum est necessarium, Luke 10:42), as meaning ‘whoever wants to be free of care and to be pure must have one thing, and that is detachment’. Richard Woods also highlights Eckhart’s other main teachings including the spark of the soul, the nothingness of God and of the creature, and the birth of the Word in the soul.

Eckhart places a unique emphasis on the notion of ‘breakthrough’ (Durchbruch), a concept also invoked by Heidegger, and indeed which is echoed in Husserl’s claim about the role of the Logical Investigations in effecting a ‘breakthrough’ in his thinking. In his Sermon 52, Beati pauperes spiritu, Eckhart says:

... a great authority says that his breaking through (durchbrechen) is nobler that his flowing out (üzvliezen); and this is true.  

This breakthrough is a break-out from all that is temporal and conditioned. By abandoning the created and the temporal, we return to the eternal, but since the eternal is itself the changeless:

But in the breaking through, when I come to be free of will of myself and of God’s will and of all his works and of God himself, then I am above all created things, and I am neither God nor creature, but I am what I was and what I shall remain, now and eternally.

Heidegger’s provocative reading of Eckhart absorbs him into Heidegger’s own project of thinking Being independently of beings. Heidegger’s selective highlighting and interpretative rendering of Eckhartian themes has been hugely influential in lifting Eckhart out of purely medieval thought and presenting him as a still vital voice of our age.

Eckhart as a Critic of Ontotheology: The Postmodern Reception

Another important theme introduced by Heidegger which has had an enormous bearing on Eckhart studies is Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology. Heidegger is largely responsible for identifying, naming and criticising the ontotheological tendency of modern philosophy and theology. This has been interpreted as a challenge to Neo-Thomistic conceptions of being (found in Maritain, Gilson and others). In this context, Eckhart has been championed by post-Heideggerian critics of ontotheology, such as Alain de Libera, Emilie zum Brunn, John D. Caputo, among many others. A number of studies produced by a group of CNRS researchers in Paris argued strongly for Eckhart’s radical stance against the prevailing identification of God with being. Thus, in their Preface to the first French translation of Eckhart’s Parisian Questions, Maître Eckhart à Paris. Une critique médiévale de l’ontothéologie, the authors claim boldly that, already in his first Paris sojourn of 1302/1303, and six centuries before Heidegger, Eckhart had established the basic principle of all his subsequent philosophy, namely, that God is not Being but intellect. This is presented as a critique of ontotheology.

The French deconstructionist Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), too, has discussed Meister Eckhart in several places and has cautioned against his own concept of différence being understood in terms of Eckhart’s negative theology. Derrida discusses Eckhart’s Gelassenheit (and Angelus Silesius) in his ‘Postscriptum: Aporias, Ways and Voices’. He refers to the manner in which Angelus Silesius takes up the
themes of Gelassenheit and the ‘ohne Warum’ (without the why). The essay is a meditation on the kind of assertion or non-assertion involved in the *apophasis* of negative theology and whether in fact it is an atheism. Derrida wants to stress the ambiguity involved in negative theology but his discussion is hardly either incisive or innovative. The American postmodern philosopher John D. Caputo (who has written extensively on Eckhart and who acknowledges the influence of Derrida) has commented illuminatingly on the relation between the strategies of Derrida and Eckhart. Caputo claims that Eckhart employs certain deconstructive strategies aimed at loosening the grip of ‘ontotheology’. For Caputo, interpreting Derrida, negative theologies are still caught up in asserting the ontotheological God which they claim to deny. In other words, negative theology still remains *theo-logy*, a speaking about God, even if that God is interpreted in a more transcendent manner. In this respect, Eckhart too remains within a kind of ontotheology; he can write both that God is esse while creatures are nothing and also that God is a ‘nothingness’, a ‘desert’. Caputo defends Eckhart against Derrida’s criticism of ontotheology by suggesting that this critique of ontotheology is already present in Eckhart. Eckhart, for Caputo, is supremely aware that language is caught up in a self-defeating enterprise. This failure of language for him has an ontological function to point to the inexpressible God beyond language. For Caputo, deconstruction is parasitic on hermeneutics and on an assertion which it then proceeds to qualify. To call God ‘creator’ is to mark him off from creatures, to call him cause is to mark him off from effects and so on. Caputo believes that, to a certain extent, Eckhart is in the grip of a ‘Neoplatonic henological metaphysics’, nevertheless he is also praying God to rid him of God. Eckhart is not a proponent of the metaphysics of presence, rather Caputo finds a certain ‘mystical dissemination’, ‘grammatological exuberance’ and ‘transgressive energy’ in Eckhart’s tracts and sermons. Eckhart’s aim is to ‘prod the life of the spirit’. Caputo claims that Eckhart’s Neoplatonic negative theology actually masks a deconstructive challenging of assertion. Caputo concludes: What Eckhart taught had little to do with a Neoplatonic One or a superessential presence. Rather he taught with irrepressible exuberance the joyful wisdom of a life graced by God and in the process shattered with loving joy the most prized graven images of onto-theo-logic. In this tradition also one could situate the work of the Catholic postmodern thinker Jean-Luc Marion.

These bold Heideggerian-inspired interpretations of Eckhart as proponent of meditative thinking (capably of shedding light on our technological condition) and as a critic of ontotheology have dominated philosophical interpretations of Eckhart in the late twentieth century. In a sense, Heidegger, in his typical style, pays little attention to the historical and intellectual context of Eckhart’s work, but, undoubtedly his reading takes Eckhart seriously as a ‘master thinker’ in the full richness of Heidegger’s understanding of thinking (*Denken*). The twenty-first century will undoubtedly discover new ‘Eckharts’ answering to the needs of the age and will undoubtedly refine further our understanding of the historical Eckhart.
Heterodox Hegel


See, for example, the chapter ‘Spiritual Ecology’ in Carolyn Merchant, Radical Ecology: the Search for a Livable World (London: Routledge, 1992), esp. pp. 125-26, which cites the work of Matthew Fox on Eckhart as seeing creation as the expression of the divine.


Kurt Ruh, for instance, is not alone in finding the German sermons more spiritual. For an excellent discussion, see Bernard McGinn, *The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart. The Man From Whom God Hid Nothing* (New York: Crossroad, 2001), pp. 20-34.


In "On Detachment" Eckhart is able to find a text from Avicenna, *De anima* 4.4, that recommends detachment as the highest virtue, Colledge and McGinn, p. 288.

McGinn, *Eckhart. Teacher and Preacher*, p. 17: ‘No Christian author of the Middle Ages, however, knew Maimonides better or reflected greater sympathy for his views than did Meister Eckhart’. See also, *Commentary on Exodus*, p. 90.

Recent developments include the establishment of an Eckhart research centre at the Thomas Institut in Köln and the setting up two societies, The Eckhart Society (UK), and *Meister-Eckhart-Gesellschaft*, an international society for the promotion of the study and research into the life, writings, and reception of Meister Eckhart in an interdisciplinary context. The Dominican Order has petitioned Rome for the removal of the judgement against Eckhart. Pope John Paul II quoted Eckhart in a sermon which was seen as a major step towards his official rehabilitation. An *Eckhart Jahrbuch* has appeared since 2007.


See Klaus Jacobi, ed., Meister Eckhart: Lebensstationen – Redesituationen, Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens. Neue Folge, Bd. 7 (Berlin, 1997).


The dating is based on the fact that the manuscript heading has ‘Brother Eckhart’ (brüoder Eckhart) and refers to him as ‘vicar of Thuringia’ (vicarius von Thüringen, DW V p. 185). Pfeiffer included this text among 18 tracts he thought genuine. Quint includes it as one of his three genuine tracts, see DW V 185-309; translated as ‘The Talks of Instruction’, in M. O’C. Walshe, Meister Eckhart. Sermons and Treatises, vol. III (Longmead, Shaftesbury, Kent: Element, 1990), pp. 11-60. It is translated as ‘Counsels of Discernment’ in Edmund Colledge and Bernard McGinn, ed., Meister Eckhart. The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatise and Defense (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), pp. 247-285. Wolfgang Wackernagel has analysed the piece in his in ‘Éloge du Redemeister: Discours et discernement dans le Discours de discernement’, in Klaus Jacobi, ed., Meister Eckhart: Lebensstationen, Redesituationen (Akademie Verlag, 1997). The German ‘Rede’ means a kind of informal advice, the Latin term being ‘collatio’.


See for example, Jean-Luc Marion, God without Being, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991). Marion argues that ‘God is love’ places ‘love’ before being. Whereas creatures are dependent on their being, the same is not true for God. For Marion, God does not fall within the dominion of Being but comes to humans as a gift. Marion therefore is rejecting ontotheological conceptions of the divine and embracing rather the tradition of Pseudo-Dionysius.


Only God’s existence is necessary existence’, McGinn, Meister Eckhart. Teacher and Preacher, op. cit., p. 95.


See Reiner Schürmann, Wandering Joy: Meister Eckhart’s Mystical Philosophy, translation and commentary by Reiner Schürmann, foreword by David Appelbaum (Great Barrington, MA: Lindisfarne, 2001). Schürmann was himself influenced by Bernhard Welte, who lectured on Eckhart at Freiburg,
was close to Heidegger and gave the graveside oration on his death, see B Welte, *Meister Eckhart. Gedanken zu seinen Gedanken* (Freiburg i. Br: Herder, 1979).


100 Reiner Schürmann in particular has attempted to document the places where Heidegger speaks of Eckhart.

For a study of these terms in Eckhart, see Erik Alexander Panzig, Gelästenheit und Abegescheidenheit. Eine Einführung in das theologische Denken des Meister Eckhart (Leipzig, 2005).


See M. Heidegger, Feldweg-Gespräche (1944/45), Gesamtausgabe 77 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1995).


Heidegger, Gelassenheit (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004), p. 23; Discourse on Thinking, op. cit., p. 54; GA 16: 527.

Heidegger, Gelassenheit, op. cit., p. 18; Discourse on Thinking, op. cit., p. 50; GA 16: 523.

Heidegger, Gelassenheit, op. cit., p. 20; Discourse on Thinking, op. cit., p. 52, trans. modified; GA 16 525.

In the course of this essay, Heidegger plays on the multiple meanings of ‘letting’ (lassen): including verlassen (forsaking, abandoning, leaving behind), einlassen (to let in, admit), ablassen (to let up, to stop), fallenlassen (to discard, leave to one side), sich einlassen auf (to engage in), and so on. Indeed, in the ‘Worldhood of the World’ chapter of Being and Time, see Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 17th edition (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1993), pp. 84-85; trans. John Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Being and Time (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 117. Heidegger speaks of ‘sein lassen’, about letting something be discovered in its readiness to hand.

Heidegger, Gelassenheit, op. cit., p. 23; Discourse on Thinking, op. cit., p. 54; GA 16: 527.

Heidegger, Gelassenheit, op. cit., p. 27; Discourse on Thinking, op. cit., pp. 58-90.

Heidegger, Gelassenheit, op. cit., p. 34; Discourse on Thinking, op. cit., p. 61.

Heidegger, Gelassenheit, op. cit., p. 40; Discourse on Thinking, op. cit., p. 66.

Heidegger, Gelassenheit, op. cit., pp. 57-8; Discourse on Thinking, op. cit., pp. 79-80.

Heidegger, Gelassenheit, op. cit., p.70; Discourse on Thinking, op. cit., p. 89.


See Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), and John F. X. Knasas, *Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists* (New York: Fordham Univ Press, 2003). The term ‘ontotheology’ is to be found in Kant but Heidegger applies it to the whole metaphysical tradition which treats of God as a being albeit an infinite being.


