Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
  • Publication
    Corporate tax changes and credit costs
    (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 2022-07) ; ; ; ;
    We examine changes in the corporate tax rate across the U.S. and their implications on the pricing and quantity of loans. We find an asymmetric effect on the cost of credit: loan spreads decrease by approximately 5.9 basis points in response to a one percentage tax cut, but they are insensitive to corporate tax increases. Primarily, a debt restructuring effect (working via firm’s leverage) and, secondarily, a credit supply effect (working via bank market power and bank capital) drive the easing effect of tax cuts on equilibrium loan pricing, while the effect on the equilibrium quantity of loans is insignificant.
  • Publication
    Education and Credit: A Matthew Effect
    (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 2022-04) ; ; ;
    Using a unique corporate loans dataset for entrepreneurs with small and microenterprises, this paper examines how educational attainment affects bank credit decisions and subsequent individual and firm outcomes. Our results highlight a “Matthew Effect,” where an initial advantage is self-amplifying. We find that entrepreneurs who obtain university education are more likely to apply for credit, and receive higher credit scores, and better lending terms. Via this credit channel, such entrepreneurs have significantly better future firm outcomes compared to those without a university education. Furthermore, we find a key role for investments in innovation, intangible assets, and lower within-firm pay inequality.
  • Publication
    Enforcement of banking regulation and the cost of borrowing
    We show that borrowing firms benefit substantially from important enforcement actions issued on U.S. banks for safety and soundness reasons. Using hand-collected data on such actions from the main three U.S. regulators and syndicated loan deals over the years 1997–2014, we find that enforcement actions decrease the total cost of borrowing by approximately 22 basis points (or $4.6 million interest for the average loan). We attribute our finding to a competition-reputation effect that works over and above the lower risk of punished banks post-enforcement and survives in a number of sensitivity tests. We also find that this effect persists for approximately four years post-enforcement.
    Scopus© Citations 14  230