Now showing 1 - 10 of 90
  • Publication
    Explaining the investment boom of the 1990s
    (Blackwell on behalf of the Ohio State University Press, 2003-02) ;
    Real equipment investment in the United States boomed in the 1990s, led by soaring investment in computers. We find that traditional aggregate econometric models completely fail to capture the magnitude of this growth—mainly because these models neglect to address two features that were crucial (and unique) to the 1990s' investment boom. First. the pace at which firms replace depreciated capital increased. Second, investment was more sensitive to the cost of capital. We document that these two features stem from the special behavior of investment in computers and therefore propose a disaggregated approach. This produces an econometric model that successfully explains the 1990s' equipment investment boom.
      553
  • Publication
    Quantitative Easing and the Hot Potato Effect: Evidence from Euro Area Banks
    (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 2019-01) ;
    We use a bank-level data set to examine the behaviour of central bank reserves in the euro area banking system over the course of the ECB QE programme. Previous research on QE has generally paid little attention to the role of reserve dynamics within the banking system and some have assumed that the system passively absorbs additional reserves generated by asset purchases. However, with a negative deposit rate in place throughout the sample we study, euro area banks have had a disincentive to hold excess reserves and thus could wish to treat them as a “hot potato” that is preferably passed on to other banks. We find evidence for this hot potato effect, reporting substantial month-to-month churn in bank reserves as well as evidence that banks are responding to high reserve balances by pushing them off their balance sheets. Unlike in the traditional money multiplier model, where excess reserves are used in loan creation, banks appear to be primarily managing reserves through debt security purchases. As such, this hot potato effect seems likely to have had an effect on European bond yields that is distinct from the portfolio rebalancing effect emphasised in the QE literature thus far.
      352
  • Publication
    Tax incentives, material inputs, and the supply curve for capital equipment
    (Federal Reserve, 1999-05-04)
    The slope of the supply curve for capital equipment has important implications for the macroeconomics of investment and the effects of tax reform on capital accumulation. Goolsbee (1998) has used changes in investment tax incentives to identify whether this supply curve is significantly upward-sloping and has concluded that it is. This paper shows that investment tax incentives are a poor instrument for identifying this supply curve because they are spuriously correlated with supply shocks for equipment producers. Once input costs for equipment producers are controlled for, there is no evidence of a relationship between tax incentives and equipment prices. In fact, the evidence favors the interpretation that the supply curve is flat.
      311
  • Publication
    Do Business-Friendly Reforms Boost GDP?
    (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 2019-12) ;
    We use the time series variation in the World Bank’s “distance to frontier” estimates of the ease of doing business to assess the effects of changes in this variable on real GDP per capita. The use of Vector Autoregression techniques allows us to identify shocks to the ease of doing business that are initially uncorrelated with GDP, thus addressing an important endogeneity problem that affects the cross-sectional literature on this topic. The results are surprising. We report a robust finding that improvements to the ease of doing business have at least a temporary negative impact on GDP and find little evidence for a positive effect in the years following these improvements.
      275
  • Publication
    Are some forecasters really better than others?
    (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 2010-04) ; ;
    In any dataset with individual forecasts of economic variables, some forecasters will perform better than others. However, it is possible that these ex post differences reflect sampling variation and thus overstate the ex ante differences between forecasters. In this paper, we present a simple test of the null hypothesis that all forecasters in the US Survey of Professional Forecasters have equal ability. We construct a test statistic that reflects both the relative and absolute performance of the forecaster and use bootstrap techniques to compare the empirical results with the equivalents obtained under the null hypothesis of equal forecaster ability. Results suggests limited evidence for the idea that the best forecasters are actually innately better than others, though there is evidence that a relatively small group of forecasters perform very poorly.
      351
  • Publication
      347
  • Publication
    Calculating The Bookmaker’s Margin: Why Bets Lose More On Average Than You Are Warned
    (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 2023-02) ;
    If betting markets are efficient, then the expected loss rate on all bets on a game can be calculated from the quoted odds. Guides to sports betting tell bettors how to do this calculation of the predicted average loss rate. We show that if bookmakers set higher profit margins for bets with lower probabilities of winning (as implied by the evidence on favorite-longshot bias) then average loss rates across all bets will be higher than predicted by this widely-recommended calculation. We provide evidence from betting on soccer and tennis to illustrate that average realized loss rates on bets are consistently higher than predicted by the conventional calculation.
      214
  • Publication
    Oil Prices and Inflation Forecasts
    (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 2023-11) ; ;
    We examine how people’s forecasts for oil or gasoline prices influence their forecasts for broader inflation. We find little evidence from two US household surveys that people over-react to their beliefs about gasoline prices when formulating their forecasts about inflation, with much of theevidence pointing towards under-reaction. We also show that the participants in the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Wall Street Journal survey of economists appear to place too little weight on their subjective forecasts for oil prices when making their forecasts for total inflation.
      24
  • Publication
    Wage Curve vs. Phillips Curve : are there macroeconomic implications?
    (Federal Reserve, 1997-10-14)
    The standard derivation of the accelerationist Phillips curve relates expected real wage inflation to the unemployment rate and invokes a constant price markup and adaptive expectations to generate the accelerationist price inflation formula. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) argue that microeconomic evidence of a low autoregression coefficient in real wage regressions invalidates the macroeconomic Phillips curve. This conclusion has been disputed by a number of authors on the grounds that the true autoregression coefficient is close to one. This paper shows that given the assumption of a constant price markup, micro-level real wage dynamics have no observable implications for macro data on wage and price inflation.
      478
  • Publication
    Technology shocks and hours worked : checking for robust conclusions
    (Central Bank of Ireland, 2004-10)
    This paper presents some new results on the effects of technology shocks on hours worked based on structural VAR specifications containing various measures of US productivity growth and hours. These specifications can produce different answers depending on which sector of the economy is examined, which transformation of hours worked is used, and on how many lags are chosen for the VAR. However, it is shown that the results from the stochastic trend specification used by Jordi Gali (1999) are robust across changes in data definition and lag length, while the results from the per capita hours specification of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2003) are not. These results provide support for Gali's findings that technology shocks have a negative impact effect on hours worked and that these shocks play a limited role in generating the business cycle.
      299