Egan, Ruth P. K.
Egan, Ruth P. K.
Egan, Ruth P. K.
Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
- PublicationMetaphysical possibilities(University College Dublin. School of Philosophy, 2010)Saul Kripke's famous proposal for the necessity of a posteriori identities applies not only to proper names but also to natural kinds, according to Kripke, thus theoretical identifications like 'Water is H2O' are metaphysically necessary truths. He explains the illusion of contingency concerning this necessary identification by suggesting that, while water could not have turned out to be anything other than H2O, it is nevertheless possible that there could have been a phenomenon very like water that was not H2O. David Chalmers' two dimensional semantics provides a framework for the systematic treatment of this possibility concerning what he terms 'watery stuff', such that it is a metaphysical possibility that 'Watery stuff is not H2O' be true. Indeed many other philosophers also view this as metaphysically possible. In this thesis, against both Chalmers and Kripke, I argue that there could not be a phenomenon very like water that was not H2O. After initially analysing each philosopher's claim for the possibility of (non-H2O) watery stuff, I ascertain that it must bear a strong likeness to water and be able to interact with us in a similar manner. Thus, examining what kind of possible world would be required for the claim that there could be watery stuff, I conclude that metaphysically possible, but nomologically impossible, worlds cannot give us watery stuff since nothing in those worlds could be similar enough to water. As for the nomologically possible worlds, nothing other than H2O in those worlds does give us anything like water. Consequently I conclude that there are no metaphysically possible worlds with a phenomenon very like water that is not H2O. I further conclude that the characterisation of Chalmers' primary intension is based on the way the actual world is and, therefore, considering another world as 'actual', contrary to what he claims, has little effect on what extension should be picked out in that world. I briefly examine Kripke's other examples of necessary a posteriori identities and conclude that, in some cases, the possibility which is supposed to explain our illusion of contingency concerning such identities, is also not a genuine possibility. This detailed investigation of the water example, I argue, demonstrates the indispensability of considerations of the properties and laws of the actual world to metaphysical possibility judgements concerning actual phenomena (or similar).
- PublicationZombies and their possibilities(University College Dublin. Department of Philosophy, 2003)This thesis is a critical examination of the basis of some arguments in contemporary philosophy of mind against a materialist view of phenomenal consciousness, as proposed by David Chalmers (1996) in his book The Conscious Mind. I address Chalmers' "zombie" argument in particular, disputing the soundness of the argument itself and its basis, and examining some of the salient concepts involved. I argue that logical possibility claims only carry as much weight as the background framework against which the claim was made. I propose therefore that Chalmers only succeeds in showing the epistemic possibility of zombies (i.e. they only seem logically possible given our current ignorance in the area) and this, I contend, is not strong enough to refute materialist claims with respect to consciousness. In addition I try to show that he does not adequately answer objections to his argument from a posteriori considerations since I argue that logical entailment of a given phenomenon by its (physical) basis is generally something that only begins to emerge during the process of discovery of what that phenomenon is a posteriori . I explore Chalmers' notion of a zombie and propose that it suffers from a basic incoherence which arguably places a question mark over its logical possibility. I also query Chalmers' claim that the essence of phenomenal consciousness is not explainable in terms of function/structure and, consequently, in physical terms. I suggest that by analysing our mental life into phenomenal and psychological aspects whereby the latter is associated with mental functioning, Chalmers already prejudices the question of whether there could be a function of phenomenal consciousness. Arguably experience may be essential for our kind of functioning and may be at least partially so explainable.