Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Publication
    Competition in Taxes and IPR
    (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 2020-06) ; ; ;
    We examine competition for foreign direct investment when governments compete in tax incentives along with intellectual property rights (IRPs) protection. Higher IPRs result in a lower probability of the multinational enterprise (MNE) being imitated and thus higher expected profits and tax revenues, all else equal. We show that, from the perspective of competing hosts, equilibrium IPRs are too high while taxes are too low. Coordination between jurisdictions can therefore lower the multinational's expected payoff, providing a rationale for why during recent trade negotiations FDI home countries complain about low IPRs in some locations while not pushing for them to be centrally determined.
      186
  • Publication
    Transport Infrastructure Investments and Competition for FDI
    (University College Dublin. School of Economics, 2017-09) ; ;
    This paper studies how transport infrastructure investments affect a bidding war for a firm between two asymmetric countries within a region in a context of imperfect competition, where transport infrastructure investments play the role of a global public good, leading to a reduction in the unit trade cost between the two countries. A number of interesting results are derived from the model. In particular, transport infrastructure investments can intensify fiscal competition between the two countries. Surprisingly, this conventional wisdom seems to be confirmed by this paper for the first time. Welfare implications of the model are also examined.
      417