Social Choice in Sensor Networks

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Author(s)
Uri
Date Issued
August 2012
Date Available
04T11:00:26Z July 2013
Abstract
In this position statement, we argue for the use of online algorithms for social choice and group decision making in sensor networks whereby self-interested agents socially maximize their utility and preferences, which are based on variable network state. Specifically, we consider the nondictatorship principle of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem and discuss this in the context of the Schulze voting method.
Type of Material
Conference Publication
Publisher
WAITS 2012 Workshop
Keywords
Web versions
Language
English
Status of Item
Peer reviewed
Description
ECAI 2012 Workshop on Artificial Intelligence for Telecommunications & Sensor Networks (WAITS 2012), Montpellier, France, August, 2012
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
Owning collection
Computer Science Research Collection