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Legal independence vs. leaders' reputation: Exploring drivers of ethics commissions' conduct in new democracies
Author(s)
Date Issued
2018-05-22
Date Available
2019-04-24T11:14:42Z
Abstract
The article addresses the emerging debate in delegation scholarship over the role of legal independence vs. reputational activism of agency leaders, in shaping de facto independence. The study explores a transitional context, analysing the enforcement styles of Serbian and Macedonian ethics commissions. Through a qualitative analysis of the commissions' enforcement styles, and a quantitative analysis of their rhetorical patterns, the article finds that the commissions' de facto independence was not a function of their legal independence but rather of the reputational craft of their leaders. In new democracies, the role of structural agency insulation is minimized both in containing as well as in fostering de facto independence: informal networks, on the one hand, provide non‐institutional routes for principals to undermine agencies' de facto independence; external conditionality and increased policy salience, on the other hand, provide reputational opportunities for agency leaders to overcome low legal independence.
Type of Material
Journal Article
Publisher
Wiley
Journal
Public Administration
Volume
96
Issue
3
Start Page
544
End Page
560
Copyright (Published Version)
2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Language
English
Status of Item
Peer reviewed
ISSN
0033-3298
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
File(s)
No Thumbnail Available
Name
Slobodan Tomic Public Administration Article Proofs.pdf
Size
301.16 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
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