Declining industries and monopoly unions : a further argument against protection

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Author(s)
Uri
Date Issued
February 1995
Date Available
15T14:35:44Z January 2010
Abstract
Wage stickiness is frequently cited as a justification (temporary) protection when a sector is hit by an adverse shock. The present paper, rather than assuming arbitrary wage stickiness, instead models it as an outcome of monopoly union behaviour. It is shown that if intervention was not undertaken before the shock, because of a high marginal social cost of taxation, protection or subsidisation is even less appropriate after the shock occurs.
External Notes
A hard copy is available in UCD Library at GEN 330.08 IR/UNI
Type of Material
Working Paper
Publisher
University College Dublin. School of Economics
Series
UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series
WP95/4
Keywords
Classification
D61
E24
J51
R13
Subject – LCSH
Wages
Labor unions
Trade adjustment assistance
Equilibrium (Economics)
Language
English
Status of Item
Not peer reviewed
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
Owning collection
Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers