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Politician preferences and caps on political lobbying

File(s)
FileDescriptionSizeFormat
Download pastinei_workpap_004.pdf2.43 MB
Author(s)
Pastine, Ivan 
Pastine, Tuvana 
Uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10197/700
Date Issued
November 2006
Date Available
03T15:16:43Z December 2008
Abstract
This paper extends Che and Gale (1998) by allowing the incumbent politician to have a preference for the policy position of one of the lobbyists. The effect of a contribution cap is analyzed where two lobbyists contest for a political prize. The cap always helps the lobbyist whose policy position is preferred by the politician no matter whether it is the high-valuation or the low-valuation contestant. In contrast to Che and Gale, once the cap is binding a more restrictive cap always reduces expected aggregate contributions. However, the politician might support the legislation of a barely binding cap. When politician policy preferences perfectly reflect the will of the people, a more restrictive cap is always welfare increasing. When lobbyist’s valuations completely internalize all social costs and benefits, a cap is welfare improving if and only if the politician favors the high-value policy. Even a barely binding cap can have significant welfare consequences.
Type of Material
Working Paper
Publisher
University College Dublin. School Of Economics
Series
UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series
WP06/19
Copyright (Published Version)
2006 School Of Economics, University College Dublin
Keywords
  • All-pay auction

  • Campaign finance refo...

  • Explicit ceiling

Classification
D72
C72
Subject – LCSH
Political campaigns--Mathematical models
Campaign funds
Noncooperative games (Mathematics)
Web versions
http://www.ucd.ie/economics/research/papers/2006/WP06.19.pdf
Language
English
Status of Item
Not peer reviewed
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/1.0/
Owning collection
Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers
Views
1577
Acquisition Date
Jan 27, 2023
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Acquisition Date
Jan 27, 2023
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