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Realism and the absence of rivals
Author(s)
Date Issued
2016
Date Available
01T02:00:35Z March 2017
Abstract
Among the most serious challenges to scientific realism are arguments for the underdetermination of theory by evidence. This paper defends a version of scientific realism against what is perhaps the most influential recent argument of this sort, viz. Kyle Stanford’s New Induction over the History of Science. An essential part of the defense consists in a probabilistic analysis of the slogan 'absence of evidence is not evidence of absence'. On this basis it is argued that the likelihood of a theory being underdetermined depends crucially on social and historical factors, such as the structure of scientific communities and the time that has passed since the theory first became accepted. This is then shown to serve as the epistemological foundation for a version of scientific realism which avoids Stanford’s New Induction in a principled and non-question-begging way.
Type of Material
Journal Article
Publisher
Springer
Journal
Synthese
Volume
194
Issue
7
Start Page
2427
End Page
2446
Copyright (Published Version)
2016 Springer
Language
English
Status of Item
Peer reviewed
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
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Realism-and-the-Absence-of-Rivals-Synthese-Penultimate_Draft.pdf
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