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Inferentialism, Naturalism, and the Ought-To-Bes of Perceptual Cognition
Author(s)
Date Issued
2018-02-07
Date Available
2021-08-13T15:40:24Z
Abstract
Any normative inferentialist view confronts a set of challenges in the form of how to account for the sort of ordinary empirical descriptive vocabulary that is involved, paradigmatically, in our noninferential perceptual responses and knowledge claims. This chapter lays out that challenge, and then argues that Sellars’ original multilayered account of such noninferential responses in the context of his normative inferentialist semantics and epistemology shows how the inferentialist can plausibly handle those sorts of cases without stretching the notion of inference beyond its standard uses. Finally, it is suggested that for Sellars there were deeply naturalistic motivations for his own normative inferentialism, though the latter raises further questions as to whether this really represents, as Sellars thought, a genuinely scientific naturalist outlook on meaning and conceptual cognition.
Type of Material
Book Chapter
Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Copyright (Published Version)
2018 Taylor & Francis
Subject – LCSH
Sellars, Wilfrid, 1912-1989
Language
English
Status of Item
Peer reviewed
Part of
Kolman, V., Beran, O., Koreň, L. (eds.). From Rules to Meanings: New Essays on Inferentialism
ISBN
978-1-138-10261-3
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
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O'Shea J - Naturalism & the Ought-to-be's of Inference - EDITS since sent on 26June17.pdf
Size
227.9 KB
Format
Owning collection
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