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Political campaign spending limits
Author(s)
Date Issued
2010-10
Date Available
2010-12-20T15:00:55Z
Abstract
Political campaign spending ceilings are purported to limit the incumbent's ability to exploit his fundraising advantage. If the challenger does not have
superior campaign effectiveness, in contrast to conventional wisdom, we
show that the incumbent always benefits from a limit as long as he has an
initial voter disposition advantage, however small and regardless of the
candidates’ relative fundraising ability. If the challenger has higher campaign
spending effectiveness, the effect of limits may be non-monotonic. If the
incumbent enjoys a mild initial voter disposition advantage, a moderate limit
benefits the challenger. Further restricting the limit favours the incumbent.
Stricter limits may lead to the unintended consequence of increased expected
spending.
Sponsorship
Not applicable
Type of Material
Working Paper
Publisher
University College Dublin. School of Economics
Series
UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series
WP 10 34
Subject – LCSH
Campaign funds--Mathematical models
Political campaigns--Law and legislation
Web versions
Language
English
Status of Item
Not peer reviewed
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
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