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  5. Politics and Clientelism in Urban Ireland: information, reputation, and brokerage
 
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Politics and Clientelism in Urban Ireland: information, reputation, and brokerage

Author(s)
Komito, Lee  
Uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10197/10265
Date Issued
1985-09
Date Available
2019-05-02T07:47:19Z
Abstract
Existing studies of Irish politics presume a clientelist exchange between politician and voter: the politician uses personal influence to obtain state benefits for the constituent, and the constituent provides electoral support in return. This study investigates the accuracy of this assumption by tracing how people actually obtain the state resources they need, and examining the exchanges between voter, politician, and bureaucrat that revolve around public resources.
A number of issues are addressed. First, there is little data on how or why clientelism operates in urban Ireland, as most studies have examined only rural communities. Second, despite the clientelist rhetoric, the actual necessity for clientelist exchanges has not been demonstrated. Third, it is unclear which social and economic factors encourage voters to become clients, or what political benefits politicians receive by acting as patrons or brokers.
Finally, the thesis investigates why clientelism should in fact exist in a homogeneous society which lacks politically salient ethnic, class, or regional divisions. Research shows that clientelism exists in Dublin, but politicians do not control material resources, but rather information regarding state benefits and access to the bureaucrats who allocate benefits. Often, politicians ensure that voters obtain benefits which they are entitled to, but which they might not otherwise receive. Politicians do not obtain a direct return for this assistance, but their enhanced reputation in the community increased their overall electoral support. Brokerage exchanges are most frequent among poorer segments of the community who are most dependent on state assistance. State officials help create the demand for information and access, while also helping politicians to satisfy those demands. Clientelism is both an urban and rural phenomenon; the control of information and access gives politicians considerable leverage over people who depend on state assistance.
Type of Material
Doctoral Thesis
Publisher
University Microfilms International
Subjects

Irish politics

Clientelism

Urban Ireland

Information

Reputation

Brokerage

Irish brokers

Clients

Influence

Corruption

Patrons

County Council

Administration

Government planning

Dublin

Bribery

County Councillors

TDs

Rezoning

Development plan

Illegal housing

Political

Web versions
http://www.ucd.ie/lkomito/thesis.htm
Language
English
Status of Item
Peer reviewed
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ie/
File(s)
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Politics and Clientelism in Urban Ireland.pdf

Size

710.4 KB

Format

Adobe PDF

Checksum (MD5)

c59bcf273b8f38fa570d4fc1faef3388

Owning collection
Information and Communication Studies Research Collection

Item descriptive metadata is released under a CC-0 (public domain) license: https://creativecommons.org/public-domain/cc0/.
All other content is subject to copyright.

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