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A multisector model of efficiency wages
Author(s)
Date Issued
1999-04
Date Available
2008-06-03T15:35:25Z
Abstract
The pattern of effort and wages is derived in a multisector efficiency wage model. Firms choose effort endogenously. Easily monitored or low-turnover jobs have high effort and may have low wages in equilibrium. Empirical wage differentials from a measure of supervision are smaller than observed industry differentials that have been attributed to efficiency wage models and are closer to those predicted by the model. Workers can search for and avail of on-the-job offers. If sectors grow at different rates or the unemployment rate changes, the pattern of wage differentials is unaffected.
Type of Material
Journal Article
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Journal
Journal of Labor Economics
Volume
17
Issue
2
Start Page
351
End Page
376
Copyright (Published Version)
Copyright 1999 by The University of Chicago
Subject – LCSH
Efficiency wage theory
Wage differentials
Web versions
Language
English
Status of Item
Peer reviewed
ISSN
0734-306X
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
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walshf_article_pub_006.pdf
Size
1.93 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
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