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  5. Samuelson’s Fallacy of Large Numbers With Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion
 
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Samuelson’s Fallacy of Large Numbers With Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion

Author(s)
Whelan, Karl  
Uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10197/27925
Date Issued
2024-07
Date Available
2025-04-14T11:27:13Z
Abstract
Samuelson (1963) conjectured that accepting multiple independent gambles you would reject on a stand-alone basis violated expected utility theory. Ross (1999) and others presented examples where expected utility maximizers would accept multiple gambles that would be rejected on a stand-alone basis once the number of gambles gets large enough. We show that a stronger result than Samuelson’s conjecture applies for DARA preferences over wealth. Expected utility maximizers with DARA preferences have threshold levels of wealth such that those above the threshold will accept N positive expected value gambles while those below will not and these thresholds are increasing with N.
Type of Material
Working Paper
Publisher
University College Dublin. School of Economics
Start Page
1
End Page
17
Series
UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series
WP2024/13
Copyright (Published Version)
2024 the Author
Subjects

Risk aversion

Paul Samuelson

Law of large numbers

Classification
D81
Language
English
Status of Item
Not peer reviewed
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ie/
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WP2024_13.pdf

Size

262.48 KB

Format

Adobe PDF

Checksum (MD5)

a5f864e56c3097990a9b36e24a127805

Owning collection
Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers

Item descriptive metadata is released under a CC-0 (public domain) license: https://creativecommons.org/public-domain/cc0/.
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