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Follow-my-leader FDI and collusion
Author(s)
Date Issued
2001-03
Date Available
2009-07-23T14:11:28Z
Abstract
This paper presents a simple model to illustrate the following idea: domestic rivals may be motivated to setup foreign
production in the same country because the replication of each other’s foreign direct investment (FDI) facilitates collusive
behaviour in the market in which they compete. This implies positive interdependence between firms’ FDI decisions, i.e. foreign investment by one firm brings increased incentive for others to follow-suit. So, we highlight a mechanism that propagates FDI clusters: a flurry of investment from one country, or region, to another.
production in the same country because the replication of each other’s foreign direct investment (FDI) facilitates collusive
behaviour in the market in which they compete. This implies positive interdependence between firms’ FDI decisions, i.e. foreign investment by one firm brings increased incentive for others to follow-suit. So, we highlight a mechanism that propagates FDI clusters: a flurry of investment from one country, or region, to another.
Sponsorship
European Commission
Type of Material
Working Paper
Publisher
University College Dublin. School of Economics
Series
UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series
WP01/07
Subject – LCSH
Investments, Foreign
Industrial location
Industrial clusters
Language
English
Status of Item
Not peer reviewed
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
File(s)
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WP01.07.pdf
Size
56.32 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
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a0dd0177705080d0e7e4b8c89ea54f07
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