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The Economics of Advance Pricing Agreements
Author(s)
Date Issued
2014-11
Date Available
2014-11-12T10:31:25Z
Abstract
Advance pricing agreements (APAs) determine transfer prices for intra-firm
transactions in advance. This paper interprets these contracts as a means to
overcome a hold-up problem that occurs because governments cannot commit
to non-excessive future tax rates. In addition, with private information, just as
in practice, our APAs will be complex and require lengthy negotiations. Never-
theless, implemented APAs lead to a Pareto improvement even when all agents
are risk neutral. However, not all efficient APAs are concluded in equilibrium.
International agreements to avoid double taxation will likely reduce the number
of realized APAs.
transactions in advance. This paper interprets these contracts as a means to
overcome a hold-up problem that occurs because governments cannot commit
to non-excessive future tax rates. In addition, with private information, just as
in practice, our APAs will be complex and require lengthy negotiations. Never-
theless, implemented APAs lead to a Pareto improvement even when all agents
are risk neutral. However, not all efficient APAs are concluded in equilibrium.
International agreements to avoid double taxation will likely reduce the number
of realized APAs.
Type of Material
Working Paper
Publisher
University College Dublin. School of Economics
Series
UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series
WP14/19
Copyright (Published Version)
2014 the authors
Web versions
Language
English
Status of Item
Not peer reviewed
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
File(s)
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Name
WP14_19.pdf
Size
899.09 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
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