Changing the Calculus of War: How Casualties Affect the Use of Emerging Military Technologies by Democratic States

The puzzle that this thesis will explore is why democratic states develop and use remote and autonomous military vehicles and weapon systems. I theorise that this can be explained by examining casualty aversion among political and military elites. Casualties are an expected outcome of warfare, occurring among all participants, willing and unwilling. The theory of casualty aversion holds that the electorates of modern democracies have come to regard military casualties as a failure of political policy and battle strategy. This antipathy to sustaining politically significant casualties can be traced to the historical conflicts of the twentieth century where militaries suffered catastrophic fatalities during both World Wars, the Korean War, and perhaps most markedly, the Vietnam War. In more recent conflicts- the interventions in The Balkans, the “War on Terror”, Libya, and Syria- there has been a notable official reluctance to simply put “boots on the ground” and instead a focus on using remotely and autonomously piloted vehicles and weapon systems to reduce the risk posed to personnel. The literature surrounding casualty aversion relies on the case of the United States of America as being representative of the theory for wider generalisation. However, the United States is problematic as a crucial case because its military budget is vast in comparison to other states, it intervenes in multiple conflicts across the world, and it has a pronounced global hegemonic affect among other democracies. This thesis will use three regional powers (Australia, the United Kingdom, and Israel) as cases to illuminate the strength of the elationship between remote and autonomous vehicles and weapon systems, the armed forces, and future conflicts. Three hypotheses, casualty aversion, economic gain motivations, and the need for creating strategic advantage are offered as the reasons for this development and use. Two additional methods are employed, document analysis and surveying, to illuminate the likely motivations of elites in developing and using these remote and autonomous military vehicles and weapon systems. The evidence indicates that casualty aversion theory holds true in two of the cases, the UK and Israel, while elites in Australia are likely influenced more by seeking a strategic advantage.