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  5. Dealing with monopsony power: Employment subsidies vs. minimum wages
 
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Dealing with monopsony power: Employment subsidies vs. minimum wages

Author(s)
Strobl, Eric  
Walsh, Frank  
Uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10197/8055
Date Issued
2007-01
Date Available
2016-10-13T12:48:16Z
Abstract
We show in a monopsony model that accounting for changes in hours a minimum wage has ambiguous effects on employment and welfare. When all workers have the same preference ordering over leisure and consumption employment subsidies unambiguously improve welfare. Many countries have minimum wages and also tax minimum wage workers.
Type of Material
Journal Article
Publisher
Elsevier
Journal
Economics Letters
Volume
94
Issue
1
Start Page
83
End Page
89
Copyright (Published Version)
2007 Elsevier
Subjects

Monopsony

Minimum wages

Hours worked

Productivity

Classification
J42
J48
DOI
10.1016/j.econlet.2006.08.005
Language
English
Status of Item
Peer reviewed
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ie/
File(s)
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Thumbnail Image
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eletrev6.pdf

Size

38.79 KB

Format

Adobe PDF

Checksum (MD5)

0cb77d76243b4b622ae7c0de19151ca4

Owning collection
Economics Research Collection

Item descriptive metadata is released under a CC-0 (public domain) license: https://creativecommons.org/public-domain/cc0/.
All other content is subject to copyright.

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