Practical reasoning and practical knowledge
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|Title:||Practical reasoning and practical knowledge||Authors:||Stout, Rowland||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/11264||Date:||Jun-2019||Online since:||2020-02-10T09:45:52Z||Abstract:||The judgement that provides the content of intention and coincides with the conclusion of practical reasoning is a normative judgement about what to do, and not, as Anscombe and McDowell argue, a factual judgement about what one is doing. Treating the conclusion of practical reasoning as expressing a recommendation rather than a verdict undermines McDowell’s argument; the special nature of practical reasoning does not preclude its conclusions being normative. Anscombe’s and McDowell’s claim that practical self-knowledge is productive of action may be accommodated by identifying the content of practical knowledge not with the conclusion but with a premise of practical reasoning–a kind of practical reasoning that occurs within rather than before action.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Taylor & Francis||Journal:||Canadian Journal of Philosophy||Volume:||49||Issue:||4||Start page:||564||End page:||579||Copyright (published version):||2018 Canadian Journal of Philosophy||Keywords:||Practical reasoning; Practical knowledge; Intention in action; Anscombe; McDowell||DOI:||10.1080/00455091.2018.1463839||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy Research Collection|
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