Options
The Personalization of Electoral Rules: How Shifting Influence From Selectors to Voters Affects Party Unity
Author(s)
Date Issued
2021-01-29
Date Available
2021-05-18T11:57:18Z
Abstract
How does making electoral systems more candidate-centered affect party unity? Using a principal-agent perspective, this study makes three contributions to the literature on this topic. Conceptually, it suggests thinking about the incentives due to personalization as arising from a shift in electoral impact from party selectors to voters. Theoretically, it incorporates this notion into a spatial model of parliamentary voting that also considers principals’ monitoring capacities. From the resulting framework follows a rich set of observable implications, notably that candidate-centered electoral systems facilitate rather than undermine collective action within parliamentary parties under certain conditions. Empirically, this study then analyzes the 2010 reform of Sweden’s flexible-list proportional representation system, which changed the preference vote threshold. As expected, I find that when extreme (district-based) selectors disagree with the moderate bills supported by the party group leadership, personalized rules incentivize politicians to support these policies and vote in unison.
Other Sponsorship
German Research Foundation
Type of Material
Journal Article
Publisher
Sage
Journal
Political Research Quarterly
Copyright (Published Version)
2021 University of Utah
Language
English
Status of Item
Peer reviewed
ISSN
1065-9129
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License
File(s)
No Thumbnail Available
Name
Daeubler_Personalization_PRQ_prepub_withAppendix.pdf
Size
3.27 MB
Format
Owning collection
Scopus© citations
2
Acquisition Date
Mar 28, 2024
Mar 28, 2024
Views
278
Acquisition Date
Mar 28, 2024
Mar 28, 2024
Downloads
345
Last Week
2
2
Last Month
6
6
Acquisition Date
Mar 28, 2024
Mar 28, 2024