The Personalization of Electoral Rules: How Shifting Influence From Selectors to Voters Affects Party Unity
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|Title:||The Personalization of Electoral Rules: How Shifting Influence From Selectors to Voters Affects Party Unity||Authors:||Däubler, Thomas||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/12165||Date:||29-Jan-2021||Online since:||2021-05-18T11:57:18Z||Abstract:||How does making electoral systems more candidate-centered affect party unity? Using a principal-agent perspective, this study makes three contributions to the literature on this topic. Conceptually, it suggests thinking about the incentives due to personalization as arising from a shift in electoral impact from party selectors to voters. Theoretically, it incorporates this notion into a spatial model of parliamentary voting that also considers principals’ monitoring capacities. From the resulting framework follows a rich set of observable implications, notably that candidate-centered electoral systems facilitate rather than undermine collective action within parliamentary parties under certain conditions. Empirically, this study then analyzes the 2010 reform of Sweden’s flexible-list proportional representation system, which changed the preference vote threshold. As expected, I find that when extreme (district-based) selectors disagree with the moderate bills supported by the party group leadership, personalized rules incentivize politicians to support these policies and vote in unison.||Funding Details:||German Research Foundation||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Sage||Journal:||Political Research Quarterly||Copyright (published version):||2021 University of Utah||Keywords:||Parliamentary voting; Party unity; Personalization; Candidate selection; Flexible-list PR; Principal-agent model; Legislative behavior; Parliamentary behaviour; Candidate selection; Incentives; Institutions||DOI:||10.1177/1065912920987898||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed||ISSN:||1065-9129||This item is made available under a Creative Commons License:||https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ie/|
|Appears in Collections:||Politics and International Relations Research Collection|
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