Veto Players and Welfare State Change: What Delays Social Entitlement Bills?

Files in This Item:
 File SizeFormat
DownloadDaeubler_VetoPlayersWelfare_prepub.pdf286.28 kBAdobe PDF
Title: Veto Players and Welfare State Change: What Delays Social Entitlement Bills?
Authors: Däubler, Thomas
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/12392
Date: 1-Oct-2008
Online since: 2021-08-09T14:31:33Z
Abstract: In contrast to the study of outcomes such as social spending, systematic comparative analysis of political processes underlying welfare state change is scarce. This study deals with the influence of government parties and second chambers as veto players in social entitlement legislation. It asks three questions regarding the duration and outcome of the legislative process at the parliamentary stage. Does the number of government parties or the ideological distance between them affect the passage of bills? Under which circumstances do second chambers have an influence? Does the ideological position of the leftmost governing party affect the speed of passage of bills in policy areas where there is pressure for retrenchment? The hypotheses are tested using an original dataset on social entitlement bills initiated in Belgium, Germany and the UK between 1987/88 and 2002/03. Event history analysis at the level of individual bills yields the following results: proposals initiated from among the government parties on the floor are delayed by a higher number of parties in government, by greater ideological distance between them, if the second chamber is controlled by the opposition and its approval is mandatory, if the left veto player is more rightwing and if the bills deal with expansionary or mixed policies. Cabinet bills, in contrast, are not affected by any of these factors. The results point to a number of further research questions and show that quantitative studies in comparative welfare state research can go beyond testing simple hypotheses with macro-level outcome data. © 2008 Cambridge University Press.
Funding Details: German Research Foundation
Gottlieb Daimler- and Karl Benz-Foundation
Type of material: Journal Article
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Journal: Journal of Social Policy
Volume: 37
Issue: 4
Start page: 683
End page: 706
Copyright (published version): 2008 Cambridge University Press
Keywords: Veto playersWelfare state reformLegislative politicsRetrenchmentNew social risksPolicyGovernmentReform
DOI: 10.1017/S0047279408002274
Language: en
Status of Item: Peer reviewed
ISSN: 0047-2794
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ie/
Appears in Collections:Politics and International Relations Research Collection

Show full item record

Page view(s)

66
Last Week
6
Last month
checked on Sep 20, 2021

Download(s)

22
checked on Sep 20, 2021

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric


If you are a publisher or author and have copyright concerns for any item, please email research.repository@ucd.ie and the item will be withdrawn immediately. The author or person responsible for depositing the article will be contacted within one business day.