Inferentialism, Naturalism, and the Ought-To-Bes of Perceptual Cognition

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Title: Inferentialism, Naturalism, and the Ought-To-Bes of Perceptual Cognition
Authors: O'Shea, James R.
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Date: 7-Feb-2018
Online since: 2021-08-13T15:40:24Z
Abstract: Any normative inferentialist view confronts a set of challenges in the form of how to account for the sort of ordinary empirical descriptive vocabulary that is involved, paradigmatically, in our noninferential perceptual responses and knowledge claims. This chapter lays out that challenge, and then argues that Sellars’ original multilayered account of such noninferential responses in the context of his normative inferentialist semantics and epistemology shows how the inferentialist can plausibly handle those sorts of cases without stretching the notion of inference beyond its standard uses. Finally, it is suggested that for Sellars there were deeply naturalistic motivations for his own normative inferentialism, though the latter raises further questions as to whether this really represents, as Sellars thought, a genuinely scientific naturalist outlook on meaning and conceptual cognition.
Type of material: Book Chapter
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Copyright (published version): 2018 Taylor & Francis
Keywords: InferentialismNoninferentialismPerceptual knowledgeMyth of the given
Subject LCSH: Sellars, Wilfrid, 1912-1989
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Language: en
Status of Item: Peer reviewed
Is part of: Kolman, V., Beran, O., Koreň, L. (eds.). From Rules to Meanings: New Essays on Inferentialism
ISBN: 978-1-138-10261-3
This item is made available under a Creative Commons License:
Appears in Collections:Philosophy Research Collection

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