Kantian Reflections on the Givenness of Zahavi’s Minimal Experiential Self
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|Title:||Kantian Reflections on the Givenness of Zahavi’s Minimal Experiential Self||Authors:||O'Shea, James||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/12433||Date:||14-Oct-2015||Online since:||2021-08-20T10:17:41Z||Abstract:||At the core of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason was a decisive break with certain fundamental Cartesian assumptions or claims about consciousness and self-consciousness, claims that have nonetheless remained perennially tempting, from a phenomenological perspective, independently of any further questions concerning the metaphysics of mind and its place in nature. The core of this philosophical problem has recently been helpfully exposed and insightfully probed in Dan Zahavi’s book, Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame (OUP, 2014). In these remarks I suggest that Zahavi’s view of what he calls "The Experiential Self" defends precisely the sorts of claims to which a Kantian account of consciousness is fundamentally opposed, and while assessing the overall merits of the two contrasting outlooks is no easy matter, I side with the Kantian view.||Type of material:||Journal Article||Publisher:||Taylor & Francis||Journal:||International Journal of Philosophical Studies||Volume:||23||Issue:||5||Start page:||619||End page:||625||Copyright (published version):||2015 Taylor & Francis||Keywords:||Kant; Zahavi; Self-conciousness; Inner sense; Apperception; The self||DOI:||10.1080/09672559.2015.1096295||Language:||en||Status of Item:||Peer reviewed||ISSN:||0967-2559||This item is made available under a Creative Commons License:||https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ie/|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy Research Collection|
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