Foreign competition and wage inequality

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Title: Foreign competition and wage inequality
Authors: Neary, J. Peter
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Date: 29-Nov-2001
Online since: 2009-07-22T13:53:50Z
Abstract: I argue that increased foreign competition can affect technical choice and skill differentials even when actual imports do not rise significantly. I present a model of General Oligopolistic Equilibrium ("GOLE") in which a reduction in import barriers (whethe technological or policy-imposed) encourages more strategic investment by incumbent firms. The predictions accord with many of the stylised facts: higher skill premia; higher ratios of skilled to unskilled workers employed in all sectors and throughout the economy; little change in import volumes or prices; and rapid technological progress with rather little change in total factor productivity. (Presidential address to the International Economics and Finance Society, presented at the AEA/ASSA meetings, New Orleans, January 2001.)
Funding Details: The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)
Type of material: Working Paper
Publisher: University College Dublin. School of Economics
Series/Report no.: UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series; WP01/02
Keywords: General Oligopolistic Equilibrium ("GOLE")Skill premiaSkill-biased technical progressStrategic investmentTrade and wages
Subject LCSH: Competition, International
Wage differentials
Competition, Imperfect
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Language: en
Status of Item: Not peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers

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