Follow-my-leader FDI and collusion
|Title:||Follow-my-leader FDI and collusion||Authors:||Leahy, Dermot
|Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/1283||Date:||Mar-2001||Abstract:||This paper presents a simple model to illustrate the following idea: domestic rivals may be motivated to setup foreign production in the same country because the replication of each other’s foreign direct investment (FDI) facilitates collusive behaviour in the market in which they compete. This implies positive interdependence between firms’ FDI decisions, i.e. foreign investment by one firm brings increased incentive for others to follow-suit. So, we highlight a mechanism that propagates FDI clusters: a flurry of investment from one country, or region, to another.||Funding Details:||European Commission||Type of material:||Working Paper||Publisher:||University College Dublin. School of Economics||Subject LCSH:||Investments, Foreign
|Language:||en||Status of Item:||Not peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers|
Show full item record
Page view(s) 20143
This item is available under the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland. No item may be reproduced for commercial purposes. For other possible restrictions on use please refer to the publisher's URL where this is made available, or to notes contained in the item itself. Other terms may apply.