Follow-my-leader FDI and collusion

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
WP01.07.pdf56.32 kBAdobe PDFDownload
Title: Follow-my-leader FDI and collusion
Authors: Leahy, Dermot
Pavelin, Stephen
Permanent link:
Date: Mar-2001
Online since: 2009-07-23T14:11:28Z
Abstract: This paper presents a simple model to illustrate the following idea: domestic rivals may be motivated to setup foreign production in the same country because the replication of each other’s foreign direct investment (FDI) facilitates collusive behaviour in the market in which they compete. This implies positive interdependence between firms’ FDI decisions, i.e. foreign investment by one firm brings increased incentive for others to follow-suit. So, we highlight a mechanism that propagates FDI clusters: a flurry of investment from one country, or region, to another.
Funding Details: European Commission
Type of material: Working Paper
Publisher: University College Dublin. School of Economics
Series/Report no.: UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series; WP01/07
Subject LCSH: Investments, Foreign
Industrial location
Industrial clusters
Other versions:
Language: en
Status of Item: Not peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers

Show full item record

Page view(s) 20

checked on May 25, 2018

Download(s) 50

checked on May 25, 2018

Google ScholarTM


This item is available under the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland. No item may be reproduced for commercial purposes. For other possible restrictions on use please refer to the publisher's URL where this is made available, or to notes contained in the item itself. Other terms may apply.