Maastricht criteria versus stability pact
|Title:||Maastricht criteria versus stability pact||Authors:||Bohn, Frank||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/1313||Date:||Mar-2005||Abstract:||It is generally believed that fiscal consolidations should occur prior to a country's admission to the European Monetary Union (EMU). This paper argues that the fiscal Maastricht Criteria require badly timed, costly adjustments while not guaranteeing sustained Fiscal restraint. An effective Stability Pact is not only necessary, but should replace the Maastricht Criteria altogether. These conclusions are based on simulations scrutinising the effects both of contractionary fiscal policies and of joining a monetary union. In a case study type analysis it is shown that there is a strong case for both policy changes to happen at the same time.||Type of material:||Working Paper||Publisher:||University College Dublin. School of Economics||Keywords:||Transition to a monetary union;European Monetary Union;Fiscal policy;Regime change;MULTIMOD;Simulation||Subject LCSH:||Economic and Monetary Union--Membership
|Language:||en||Status of Item:||Not peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers|
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