Export subsidies and price competition

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorNeary, J. Peter-
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-30T15:51:28Z-
dc.date.available2009-09-30T15:51:28Z-
dc.date.issued1989-04-
dc.identifier.other198902en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10197/1459-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines optimal policy towards a home exporting firm which competes on price with a foreign firm. Two policy instruments are compared: an output subsidy and a price subsidy. The paper also considers two games: the conventional ex ante game, in which the government sets the value of the subsidy before firms set their prices, and the ex post game, where firms first set their prices in the anticipation of a subsidy by the government at the second stage. It is shown that the two types of subsidy are equivalent in the ex ante game and that a higher level of welfare can always be achieved in the ex ante than in the ex post game. This reinforces the view that optimal policy in a model characterized by Bertrand competition is an export tax rather than a subsidy.en
dc.description.externalNotesThe binding of this item renders some marginal text unreadable. A hard copy is available in UCD Library at GEN 330.08 IR/UNIen
dc.format.extent455188 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherUniversity College Dublin. School of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Seriesen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP89/2en
dc.subject.lcshExport subsidiesen
dc.subject.lcshExport dutiesen
dc.subject.lcshCompetitionen
dc.titleExport subsidies and price competitionen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.internal.authoridUCD0042en
dc.internal.availabilityFull text availableen
dc.statusNot peer revieweden
dc.type.capturetechniquePDFimageen
dc.neeo.contributorNeary|J. Peter|aut|-
item.grantfulltextopen-
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers
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