Sustaining free trade in repeated games without government commitment
|Title:||Sustaining free trade in repeated games without government commitment||Authors:||Devereux, Michael B.||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/1475||Date:||1990||Abstract:||The paper examines how free trade can be sustained in a repeated tariff game in a simple two-country general equilibrium model. In the standard model, free trade can be sustained by "punishment strategies" with only a mild degree of forward looking behaviour on the part of governments. However, when there are short term factor market rigidities, and governments cannot precommit to an ex-ante optimal tariff, it may be much more difficult to sustain free trade. This is illustrated in two models.||Funding Details:||Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada||Type of material:||Working Paper||Publisher:||University College Dublin. School of Economics||Subject LCSH:||Free trade--Econometric models
|Language:||en||Status of Item:||Not peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers|
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