Cost asymmetries in international subsidy games : should governments help winners or losers?

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorNeary, J. Peter-
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-05T13:55:35Z-
dc.date.available2009-10-05T13:55:35Z-
dc.date.issued1990-12-28-
dc.identifier.other199008en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10197/1477-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the optimality of export subsidies in oligopolistic markets, when home and foreign firms have different costs and there is an opportunity cost to public funds. Subsidies are found to be optimal only for surprisingly low values of the shadow price of government funds, and if subsidies are justified they should be higher the more cost-competitive are domestic firms. These results hold under both Cournot competition and Bertrand competition when firms move before governments. The results suggest that recent arguments for export subsidies apply only for firms that would be highly profitable even without subsidies.en
dc.description.externalNotesA hard copy is available in UCD Library at GEN 330.08 IR/UNIen
dc.format.extent592199 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherUniversity College Dublin. School of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Seriesen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP90/8en
dc.subject.lcshExport subsidies--Econometric modelsen
dc.subject.lcshOligopoliesen
dc.subject.lcshCompetitionen
dc.titleCost asymmetries in international subsidy games : should governments help winners or losers?en
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.internal.authoridUCD0042en
dc.internal.availabilityFull text availableen
dc.statusNot peer revieweden
dc.type.capturetechniquePDFimageen
dc.neeo.contributorNeary|J. Peter|aut|-
item.grantfulltextopen-
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
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