Two-stage game models of international oligopoly

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Title: Two-stage game models of international oligopoly
Authors: Leahy, Dermot
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Date: Mar-1993
Abstract: This paper reexamines the import protection as export promotion thesis in a series of two-stage games in which firms choose R&D and/or capacity in the first stage and quantity or price in the second. It is shown that a tariff affects exports in two ways; firstly, if marginal cost is increasing, by raising home sales directly it crowds out exports; secondly by increasing R&D and/or capacity it raises exports indirectly. Prospects for export enhancing protection are compared for different games and shown to be better in the long run than in the short run.
Type of material: Working Paper
Publisher: University College Dublin. School of Economics
Series/Report no.: UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series; WP93/6
Subject LCSH: Foreign trade regulation--Econometric models
Foreign trade promotion--Econometric models
Import quotas--Econometric models
Language: en
Status of Item: Not peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers

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