Learning by doing in international subsidy games

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Title: Learning by doing in international subsidy games
Authors: Leahy, Dermot
Permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/10197/1713
Date: May-1993
Abstract: A series of two-period, three-stage games with learning by doing is developed. In the first stage firms choose first-period outputs. Then governments choose export subsidies. Finally firms choose second-period outputs. I show (i) firms use first-period outputs strategically to manipulate export subsidies and the second-periods outputs of rivals. (ii) These strategic effects are weakened when experience is diffused and by a third government tariff. (iii) When initial costs are symmetric and home residents partly own the foreign firm home outputs and subsidies exceed their foreign counterparts. These differentials increase in the speed of learning.
Type of material: Working Paper
Publisher: University College Dublin. School of Economics
Keywords: Learning by doingExport subsidiesStrategic effects
Subject LCSH: Export subsidies--Mathematical models
Game theory
Language: en
Status of Item: Not peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers

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