Strategic and rent extracting tariffs in the presence of persuasive advertising

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Title: Strategic and rent extracting tariffs in the presence of persuasive advertising
Authors: Leahy, Dermot
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Date: Dec-1993
Online since: 2010-01-07T14:40:04Z
Abstract: This paper examines positive and normative implications of tariffs in the presence of persuasive advertising. It demonstrates that protection affects imports, the domestic consumer price and the terms of trade directly and through its effect on the level of advertising. If protection reduces advertising a Metzler paradox can occur. A tariff can be used to induce foreigners to allow entry. Jointly optimal tariffs and advertising taxes and the optimal tariff for the situation when it is the only available policy instrument are derived under both monopoly and Cournot oligopoly.
Item notes: A hard copy is available in UCD Library at GEN 330.08 IR/UNI
Type of material: Working Paper
Publisher: University College Dublin. School of Economics
Series/Report no.: UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series; WP93/32
Keywords: Persuasive advertisingTariffsOligopolyEntry
Subject LCSH: Advertising--Economic aspects
Trade regulation
Language: en
Status of Item: Not peer reviewed
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers

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