Strategic and rent extracting tariffs in the presence of persuasive advertising
|Title:||Strategic and rent extracting tariffs in the presence of persuasive advertising||Authors:||Leahy, Dermot||Permanent link:||http://hdl.handle.net/10197/1744||Date:||Dec-1993||Online since:||2010-01-07T14:40:04Z||Abstract:||This paper examines positive and normative implications of tariffs in the presence of persuasive advertising. It demonstrates that protection affects imports, the domestic consumer price and the terms of trade directly and through its effect on the level of advertising. If protection reduces advertising a Metzler paradox can occur. A tariff can be used to induce foreigners to allow entry. Jointly optimal tariffs and advertising taxes and the optimal tariff for the situation when it is the only available policy instrument are derived under both monopoly and Cournot oligopoly.||Item notes:||A hard copy is available in UCD Library at GEN 330.08 IR/UNI||Type of material:||Working Paper||Publisher:||University College Dublin. School of Economics||Series/Report no.:||UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series; WP93/32||Keywords:||Persuasive advertising; Tariffs; Oligopoly; Entry||Subject LCSH:||Advertising--Economic aspects
|Language:||en||Status of Item:||Not peer reviewed|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics Working Papers & Policy Papers|
Show full item record
Page view(s) 5083
This item is available under the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland. No item may be reproduced for commercial purposes. For other possible restrictions on use please refer to the publisher's URL where this is made available, or to notes contained in the item itself. Other terms may apply.